ABC Nightline: Suriname Special – June 1, 1983
ARA news items mentioning Suriname
Nightline presented an “exclusive” on Suriname: (Carl Bernstein) President Reagan last year authorized the CIA to undertake covert actions aimed at overthrowing the government of Suriname. The rationale of the President and the CIA to justify such action? That Suriname’s leader Bouterse was leading his country toward the arms of Fidel Castro. As required by law, William Casey went to Capitol Hill to inform the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of the impending operation — a multimillion dollar plan to create a paramilitary force of exiles from Suriname to overpower the country’s army and topple Bouterse.
But according to congressional sources the administration’s plan caused a full-scale revolt of both committees. The threat to hemispheric security cited by the President and the CIA simply did not exist, the Congressmen argued. Evidence that Castro was manipulating the government in Suriname or gaining a military foothold in the country was virtually nonexistent, they told Casey. (Footage of Surinamese political commentator Fred Marte: “The Cubans have been visiting Suriname after Bouterse took over. They are advising Bouterse; they are advising the Minister of Culture and Modernization how to teach the Suriname people how to make a revolution. They are giving military advice to Bouterse.”)
Within a week of Casey’s appearance before the House Intelligence Committee Chairman Boland had written the President that members were virtually unanimous in opposition to the CIA’s plan. The Senate also informed the President of its vehement and united opposition. The administration had become totally paranoid about Castro, members told Casey, seeking confrontation with the Cubans at almost every turn in the Americas. Things had gone too far. After listening to the objections of the House Committee, Casey said the CIA would nevertheless go ahead with its plans. But when Casey ran into a solid wall of opposition on the Senate Committee as well, he and the White House reportedly began reconsidering. Several weeks later the congressional committees were informed by Casey that the plans for overthrowing the government in Suriname had been withdrawn, and members seem reasonably confident that Casey had kept his word.
The Reagan administration’s concerns about Suriname were primarily fueled by fears of Cuban involvement in the country, according to congressional sources. Casey was reportedly unable to tell the Intelligence Committees how many Cubans were in Suriname. The number is belived to be small, probably no more than a hundred at most. But Casey insisted the increasingly autocratic rule of Bouterse was in itself cause for American concern.
Opposition in Suriname to that rule reached unprecedented proportions last October when Grenada’s Prime Minister Bishop visited the country. That month the nation’s largest trade union organized a strike and mass demonstrations, bringing the country to a halt. Bishop reportedly counseled Bouterse, “You must eliminate your enemies or they will eliminate you.” One night six weeks later Bouterse moved aginst leaders of the opposition brutally. More than a thousand people have fled Suriname ince the killings, joining some 15,000 other exiles who left during the first three years of Bouterse’s rule. In that exile community there are now efforts underway to move that country toward a coup with or without help from the CIA.
Grenada’s Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Suriname’s Ambassador to the U.S. Henricus Heidweiller and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle were interviewed. Ikle: would neither confirm nor deny Bernstein’s report. Bouterse, by assassinating the opposition, has threatened all possibilities for democracy to emerge in Suriname. The government of Suriname stands very close to Castro, Libya and the Soviet Empire. In the long-term this could become a threat to the Caribbean region.
Bishop: denied ever having made the comment about eliminating one’s enemies.
Heidweiller: said he had not heard of any CIA plans to overthrow the government, but had heard that “there were plans being prepared from Holland to invade the country and to topple the regime.”
Ikle: pointed out that philosophically Suriname is close to Cuba in suppressing freedom. There are Cuban advisers there. “Whether it will remain free or more Cuban-Soviet influence remains to be seen.” Shultz
From this CIA document the following excerpt (ABC Nightline, June 1, 1983
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000400080001-8.pdf
Koppel: The White House had no comment. The CIA had no comment, and the State Department went only a hair further. “We don’t comment on intelligence activities,” said State, “but as a matter of policy, it is not the policy of the government of the United States to overthrow the government of Suriname.”
That was all in response to a report by Carl Bernstein on this broadcast last night. In that report Bernstein quoted congressional sources as claiming that CIA Director William Casey told the House and Senate Intelligence Committees last December of a covert CIA plan to overthrow the government of Suriname. In the face of heated congressional opposition, the plan was reportedly dropped.
Today the New York Times reported that its independent sources had confirmed that story and Bernstein reports that other congressional sources have now also confirmed it. A little later in this broadcast we will talk with Henry Kissinger, Richard Allen and Stansfield Turner about the pros and cons of covert activity. But first, Fred Marte, a leader of the Council for the Liberation of Suriname.
Koppel: Mr. Marte, the conditions in your country — you claim they are even worse than we have heard. How bad are they?
Marte: Well, Ted, they are very bad because to look at the Suriname situation, one should view them on two levels. The first is the level of the national unit in which we have to do, we are confronted with armed bands in a fragmented state which are terrorizing the majority of the people of Suriname. Now, 99% of the Suriname people are against these armed bands, and it is a matter of fact that conditions are far worser, worse than we’ve, you’ve heard here.
Koppel: Had you heard, let me just ask you first of all whether you had heard, and I mean has the CIA for example been in touch with you or any of your colleagues, about providing assistance?
Marte: No, we don’t, we know nothing whatsoever about CIA and CIA contacts. We are trying to liberate Suriname from (inaudible) in fact criminals, and we are determined to do that, and we have embarked on this course.
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