Mandate for Leadership – Policy Management in a Conservative Administration
Heritage Foundation
The document does not mention Suriname at all.
Here the sections which mention the Carribbean
South American Policy
Introduction
Latin American nations have traditionally looked toward the U.S. when encountering a communist threat. Under the Carter Administration, the U.S. has not only withdrawn support from its allies in this battle against communism, but has, in some situations, actually promoted Marxist elements in Latin America. Latin American nations have adjusted to this new U.S. policy and are now trying to build their own defense mechanism against the communist threat. The threat is not academic. Two countries have already joined the Soviet-Cuban bloc (Nicaragua and Grenada), and three others have moved closer to Cuba (Mexico, Panama, and Guyana). In a sense, Jimmy Carter has done one good thing for Latin American countries: he has forced them to unite for their mutual defense. This section of the report reviews some of the critical strategic problems of South America and recommends policy initiatives for a conservative U.S. administration.
The Marxist Challenge
The most serious threat facing South America in the near future is Cuba. With a small number of determined people, Cuban-supported Marxist movements can exacerbate and exploit long-standing problems of South American countries and attempt to foment revolution. This has occurred in Central America and now in South America. Cuba is supporting and training terrorist groups, helping finance local communist parties, promoting and increasing labor unrest, promoting anti-U.S. propaganda, and influencing local educational systems.
In meeting this Cuban challenge, the U.S. should be prepared to stick by its anti-communist allies, to recognize that U.S.-style democracy may be inappropriate or at least premature for some South American countries, and to do nothing that would strengthen or lend respectability to the so-called liberation movements. At the same time, the U.S. should encourage responsible private and public sector leaders in these countries to effect whatever political, social, and economic changes are necessary in their countries to prevent these shortcomings from being exploited by the communists.
Further, the U.S. ought to recognize Cuba as the enemy it is and not try to normalize diplomatic relations with it, as the Carter Administration pursued as one of its early high-priority goals. Instead, the U.S. should take those political, economic, and paramilitary steps necessary to contain Cuba’s activities and influence to its own island.
The Security of the Region
Carter’s reduction in the flow of weapons into South America has adversely affected the United States, while it has fostered South American skepticism of the U.S. as a dependable ally. These nations have not reduced their arms purchases, but have turned to other weapon markets without the U.S.-imposed restrictions and regulations, primarily the Western European countries, and at times even the Soviet Union. South America has also developed its own arms industries in Brazil and Argentina to diminish the dependence on foreign purchased weapons, and both these countries have sold weapons to nations undergoing the U.S. arms embargo. Most requests for arms purchases turned down by the Carter Administration have been replaced by non-U.S. suppliers. This U.S. policy has not encouraged South American countries to reduce the arms build-up, or to stop human rights violations, as Carter expected. Instead of this, it has moved these countries farther apart from Washington. The U.S. private enterprise has accidentally become the target of these Carter policies, and it is U.S. business which has lost the South American arms market.
The U.S., through its military training programs for the South American armed forces, had influenced and received the confidence of many South American military men. Yet the Carter Administration has reduced these programs to average only $7 million per year for all of Latin America. In South America, several countries have withdrawn or have been excluded from these programs, and those still participating in the programs have seen them diminish in the last few years. The opportunity for other countries to replace the role of the U.S. in South America still remains unless the U.S. takes prompt and firm action to return to their traditional relationship. The Soviets have grasped this alienation that the South American nations feel toward the U.S., and they have capitalized on the opportunity by purchasing wheat from the anti-communist government of Argentina during the U.S. grain embargo, and improving relations with them.
While the Administration should discourage the purchase of unnecessary weapons, it should try to encourage them to be U.S.-made in the event such purchases should occur. Security and military programs should be increased, and all nations in South America should be encouraged to participate in these programs.
The Role of Private Enterprise
A less expensive and more effective U.S. aid program for South America could be achieved if our aid program were designed to promote the growth of the region’s private sector rather than the region’s governments. Certain functions now in the hands of governments could be assumed by the local private sector with improved quality and lower costs. Local businesses, small as well as large, should be able to expand. To facilitate this expansion, the U.S. may wish to structure its aid program to qualify private businesses for loans. If a business needs equipment for such expansion, the loans should be channeled through the EX-IM Bank, thereby giving an incentive to purchase U.S.-made equipment. The U.S. should increase its funds for the EX-IM Bank, and decrease the present interest rates charged by this agency. The U.S. private sector should also be encouraged to participate with their private sector counterparts in South America by providing loans through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The U.S. should also export U.S. management technology to allow foreign businesses to improve their methodology and efficiency.
To acquire greater control over the utilization of U.S. aid, the Reagan Administration should reverse the Carter Administration’s trend of increasing our funding of multilateral lending agencies while decreasing our influence in them.
Energy
The future petroleum picture looks favorable for Venezuela and Ecuador, both petroleum exporters. Venezuela’s PETROVEN has handed out a bid to begin further exploration in and production from the large proven reserves in the Orinoco Basin. Ecuador recently found large new petroleum fields and is expected to raise its petroleum production from its present level of 200,000 barrels per day. Peru will remain self-sufficient in its petroleum requirements for the next decade. Argentina expects to become self-sufficient in petroleum by 1981 and perhaps become a petroleum exporter soon thereafter. Bolivia is also currently self-sufficient, but its proven reserves are diminishing.
In addition to petroleum, major hydroelectric projects have been completed or are under construction throughout South America. Presently, Brazil and Argentina have three nuclear power plants, and both countries expect to increase this potential energy source. Nevertheless, some South American countries are still energy dependent and cannot afford to divert increasing sums of money away from internal development programs in order to finance their oil bills. As Mexico moves closer to Cuba, it may try to buy political influence in South America with its oil exports; it is already trying to do this in Central America.
The U.S. should encourage Venezuela to continue to take a leading role in supplying oil to its neighbors under favorable terms and should also explore the possible cooperation of Canada, Ecuador (if its production can be increased significantly), and perhaps the more moderate OPEC nations. In addition, the U.S. should provide to the South American nations its research into alternate energy sources, energy conservation, and encourage the development of energy sources. The multilateral lending organizations should set as a priority expanding their energy-related projects aimed at making all South American nations self-sufficient in energy.
Impact of Cultural Programs
The Cubans have demonstrated well in Nicaragua the greater impact which cultural programs based on person-to-person contact have than the U.S.’s high-funded, low-visibility projects there. We should learn from this expensive lesson and insist not only that every U.S. dollar expended in foreign assistance be publicized and every school built and every truck given be recognized by the population, but we should also place greater emphasis on person-to-person contact through U.S. emissaries who represent the best the U.S. has to offer and who are responsible enough to serve in that role. High-quality athletic exhibitions and cultural programs have great impact, and the loaning of medical, educational, agricultural, and other professional and technical personnel to local development programs would pay off. The Hispanic minority in the U.S. should take a role in representing the U.S. in all aid-related programs in South America.
Re-defining Human Rights
Recognizing the importance of human rights to the Carter Administration, leftists have infiltrated the human rights movement, drowned out the voice of objective reporters, and have sought to manipulate public opinion and the opinion of our Congress. As a result, legislation has been passed which prohibits the U.S. from selling badly needed arms and munitions to Latin American countries now under siege by internationally sponsored Marxist movements. These countries are now purchasing their arms at higher prices from France, Israel, Argentina, and Brazil.
The Carter Administration has permitted human rights violations to occur in leftist countries, without imposing on them the same harsh measures imposed on the conservative military-ruled countries. Nicaragua, a Marxist country, where tortures, executions, and disappearances are regularly reported, has received all the benefits of the Carter Administration, including aid and support. In Argentina, a conservative anti-communist military-ruled country, the cases of human rights violations reported have drastically decreased, but this has not prompted the Carter Administration to improve relations with them. Thus Jimmy Carter discredited the concept of human rights among Latin Americans by turning it into a political tool.
The Reagan Administration should discontinue this hypocritical use of a humanitarian principle.
Survey of Country Problems
Brazil
Brazil: The military government of President Figueiredo has begun a democratization process by granting amnesty to all politicians, permitting all political parties with popular support to register, and calling elections for Congress and governors for 1982. President Figueiredo’s administration, in its concern over growing Cuban adventurism in Africa and Latin America, has banned the communist party from participating in this electoral process.
Brazil’s major problem stems from its dependency on imported petroleum, which has increased foreign debt by $12 billion. The government of Brazil is trying to reduce this growing cost by developing alternative energy sources such as coal, hydroelectric power, nuclear energy, gasohol, and pure alcohol fuel.
The Reagan Administration should cooperate with the Figueiredo government in its program aimed at increasing political and social stability in Brazil. As mentioned earlier, the growing cooperation between Brazil and Argentina is a positive development worthy of our support.
Venezuela
The increasing cost of living and an alarming rise in the rate of crime are weakening popular support of Venezuela’s Christian Democratic president, Herrera Campins. He also has to contend with sniping from that faction of his party headed by former president Caldera. In addition, Herrera Campins and his COPEI party are constantly under attack by the opposition Democratic Action (AD) party and its last president, Carlos Andres Perez. The support given by the AD party to the Marxist Sandinistas in their attempts to overthrow Nicaraguan leader Somoza and Andres Perez’s overt displays of continuing and increasing loyalty to the Sandinista government are disturbing to many observers who had considered AD as an essentially centrist party.
The concerns of these observers are increased by signs that AD may join with Venezuela’s two communist parties, MEP and MAS, in opposing Herrera Campins’ attempts to support anti-Marxist measures in Central America. These measures have included financial support of the Christian Democratic leadership in El Salvador, plans to reduce the cost of petroleum to poorer Central American and Caribbean nations, and proposals to finance regional energy development projects. It would not be advantageous to the U.S.—or Venezuela—for the AD party to continue its leftward migration. Its history is one of strong anti-communism under such nationalist leaders as Leoni and Betancourt, and an abandonment of this philosophy would be unfortunate.
The recent friction between Venezuela and Cuba over the Cuban airplane bombing trial and the Herrera Campins Administration’s concern over the growing Marxist threat in the region should be capitalized on by the next U.S. administration in its aim of ending the Marxist offensive in Latin America. The U.S. should do what it can to shore up anti-communists within the two major parties, and take a supportive role in Venezuela’s petroleum exploration projects.
Guyana
Guyana’s Prime Minister Burnham, elected to office in 1964, describes his party’s ideology as Marxist-Leninist. Since 1964, he has won all elections by a majority, although there have been charges of fraud in each of them. Recently, a new constitution was enacted in Guyana whereby Reid, Burnham’s Vice Prime Minister, was promoted to Prime Minister and Burnham created a new powerful post for himself, the Executive Presidency. Through this post, Burnham has gained control over the armed forces and the Parliament. Executive President Burnham has promised to hold elections prior to January 1981.
Guyana has an openly communist government. It is on the Caribbean shore, only about 400 miles from the Cuban-supported communist government of Grenada. The potential danger to the security of the Caribbean islands and to our vital shipping lanes by this spreading Marxism is a legitimate worry, which is not reduced by some recent friction between Burnham and Castro. While maintaining a presence in Guyana and remaining alert to possible internal unrest there, the Reagan Administration should be particularly watchful of any attempts by the Cubans or Soviets to use Guyana for military or strategic purposes. Should such attempts occur or should Guyana be used as a staging area for the exportation of communism to other nations in the region, the U.S., alone or in concert with other hemispheric nations, should take effective action, including military action if necessary, to stop such activity.
Conclusions
At no time since the Cuban revolution have the Cubans and Soviets had such opportunity to expand their interests in our own hemisphere. The policies of the Carter Administration, which have created this opportunity, have to be changed, and the first change which the Reagan Administration should make is to send a clear signal to friend and foe that the U.S. does view Latin America with special interest and will resist Soviet attempts, made directly or by Cuban proxy, to expand its strategic interests in this hemisphere.
Muting human rights criticisms, encouraging trade and the expansion of the private sector, and supporting responsible rightists who seek social progress in their countries under their direction are tactics long overdue in U.S.-Latin American relations.