A primer on the future threat (DIA 1999)
Latin America
The still-shallow roots of democracy in Latin America will be tested through 2020, as the region continues—and in some countries, struggles—to complete the transition to market-oriented economies and open democracy in the face of corruption, social inequalities, rampant crime, and a legacy of authoritarian rule. Increasing transparency in political, economic, and military affairs ensuing from growing regional integration is favorable for consolidation of democracy in Latin America.
Nonetheless, the region’s vulnerability to severe economic shocks, and the failure of traditional party politics—based largely on personalism and self-interest—to address the region’s toughest social problems will continue to generate threats to stability and the potential for democratic reversals. Some countries may retain the trappings of democracy but fall back to de facto authoritarian rule, thereby creating subtle challenges for the United States.
The pace of continued democratic progress in Latin America hinges in part on the outcome of the current trend evidenced in some countries of eroding popular confidence in the ability of traditional political forces to solve the problems of crime, corruption, and social and economic inequality. Peru and Venezuela are the best current examples of the abandonment of traditional political parties for “new ideas.” The process may be underway in Mexico.
The trend could result in the rise of Fujimori- or Chavez-like strong-men—”caudillos”—willing to dispense with constitutional restraints and risk international scrutiny in their efforts to roll back the erosion in the quality of life for many Latin Americans. Also worth watching is the trend for some Latin leaders to try to extend their rule beyond legal limits by subversion or constitutional manipulation. At this juncture, Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, Haiti, and possibly Suriname risk falling, at least temporarily, into undemocratic rule in the next 10 years. This trend, however, may not lead to autocracy; the process may actually make traditional parties and politicians more accountable and in touch with key issues, or generate more responsive parties, in the process strengthening democracy.
Subordinating military and security forces to civilian authority and gaining their acceptance of civilian defense professionals probably will be widely accepted by 2020 as armed forces adjust to their changing role and position in society. However, military institutions will retain significant influence and high levels of autonomy in many countries, at least for the next decade, and some resistance to more civilian involvement in armed forces policy and operational activity will remain. Most regional militaries view themselves as guarantors of their constitutions. Should politicians opt for extraconstitutional measures to govern or extend themselves in office, militaries could once again be tempted to intercede in political matters.
Latin American leaders are for the most part likely to continue promoting market-oriented economic policies and reforms, but international economic conditions and an array of domestic economic factors could affect regional economic growth and stability. Public tolerance of reforms, reduction in social services, and erosion of quality of life increasingly will be challenged in the out-years if results are not tangible. Multilateral trade agreements will remain popular, and many Latin American governments will pursue subregional or other groupings, such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in the Southern Cone, to achieve a multilateral approach to trade in the region. Trade integration and ties to international financial institutions such as the IMF also should check most impulses to abandon market-oriented policies. Defense budgets in general will remain stagnant with military funding continuing to average just over 2% of GDP regionally.
Over the next two decades, relations between Latin American countries and the United States—except Cuba, and that too could change—will remain friendly and positive. The threat of armed confrontation between a regional military and the United States is small to nonexistent. However, tension and disagreements over some issues, such as mandated reports on drug certification and human rights observance and practices and perceived interference in domestic affairs, will periodically complicate Washington’s relations with hemispheric governments and affect military-to-military ties. U.S. intervention to stabilize a chaotic situation remains a distinct possibility.
Intra-regional relations will remain generally good throughout the period. Strides in democratization, regional economic integration, and developing confidence- and security-building measures among hemispheric nations and armed forces will enhance interstate relations and cooperation and facilitate the peaceful resolution of quarrels. However, regional armed forces will remain sensitive to military developments in neighboring countries. Numerous unresolved land, border, and natural resource disputes, as well as traditional animosities and rivalries, will remain and could periodically cause abrupt armed clashes between neighbors that will not lend themselves to quick or easy resolution.
Drug trafficking will remain a serious threat and major source of corruption and violence in the Western Hemisphere through 2020 and will continue to generate problems in U.S. bilateral relations with many governments in the region. Tremendous wealth will continue to empower drug traffickers to use political influence, bribery, and tactical and strategic alliances with insurgents and paramilitary groups to challenge local and national security forces, intimidate the populace, and undermine governments. The violence and corruption associated with drug trafficking will challenge several governments’ abilities to assert control over national territories and perform nation-building functions. In countering the drug threat, some nations’ violation of human rights will become increasingly problematic and at odds with U.S. goals and objectives.
Insurgency in Latin America, while significantly decreased, will remain a threat in some countries, particularly Colombia, Peru, Panama and Mexico through the near-term. Given current trends, the threat of instability to the security of Colombia’s political and economic institutions could become substantial in the next 5 years, and its spillover effects will exacerbate an array of destabilizing problems in neighboring countries. While insurgencies elsewhere will not seriously threaten stability, they will demand scarce resources, and counterinsurgency operations will inevitably lead to accusations of human rights abuses.
Terrorism will persist in Latin America through 2020. Several factors—loss of support, growth of democracy, and counterterrorism—have lowered the activities and profiles of the region’s terrorist groups. These groups will try to reinvent themselves, moderating their Marxist rhetoric while seeking to generate popular support by embracing the causes of anti-neoliberalism, land redistribution, indigenous rights, nationalism, and possibly even ecological preservation. External terrorist groups, such as radical Middle East organizations, probably will continue to see Latin America as a venue for infiltrating overseas communities, primarily to raise funds and to undertake selective operations against U.S. or Israeli interests. The region’s terrorist groups and insurgencies are likely to remain anti-U.S., at least in rhetoric, because of U.S. identification with market-oriented economic policies.
Latin America’s population growth—an estimated 122 million, or about 25%, in the next decade alone—will create labor pools that will outpace even the most optimistic economic projections. As a result, Latin America—particularly Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean—will remain a major source of illegal immigration into the United States. Migrant remittances from the U.S. probably will remain a critical ingredient of many Latin economies, and migration will remain a key social safety valve for many countries. A major unraveling of the political or economic situation in Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic could produce major mass migrations toward the United States.
The region also will remain highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Regional governments and multilateral organizations will look to Washington to provide the bulk of any needed humanitarian aid. However, Latin militaries will continue to play a leading role in disaster relief in their respective countries.
Most regional militaries will focus throughout the period on force modernization, restructuring, and redefining roles and missions; only a few countries, such as Chile and Brazil will acquire major advanced weapon systems. Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and probably Venezuela also would like to modernize their fighter inventory, but budget shortfalls are likely to present obstacles. No ballistic missile development programs are active in the region, and none are projected to be started or renewed during the period. The threat of regional nations acquiring WMD is considered small. Colombia and other nations, probably including Mexico, will focus their modernization and sustainment programs on improving capabilities to fight both drug trafficking and insurgency. The United States will be looked upon as a primary source for training and equipment and, by many, as a model to emulate.
Downsizing, restructuring, and redefinition of roles and missions are likely to lead to increased interest and participation in multinational peacekeeping operations by the region’s governments and armed forces in order to retain at least minimal defense capabilities. Most countries, however, will restrict such participation to activities outside the hemisphere and will require or seek outside support—particularly funding, transportation, logistics, and possibly equipment.
Central American efforts to foster enhanced regional military cooperation and integration, such as the Conference of Central American Armed Forces, as a means of focusing increasingly scarce resources on common military requirements are likely to grow. By 2020, such efforts may expand to include several Caribbean nations. However, lingering border disputes and historic distrust will continue to impede these undertakings.
The Panama Canal will revert to full control of the Panamanian government by the end of 1999. The Panamanian National Police (PNP), the country’s nominal ground security force, will assume total responsibility for protecting the canal operating area along with its other national security missions. Although the current threat to the canal is low, the increase in responsibility will strain the already limited resources and capabilities of the PNP, which will face continued and possibly even larger challenges from narcotrafficking and border security issues.
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