A study of small power’s defense policy [CASE STUDY: THE NETHERLANDS]
From the thesis: The Czech Republic in NATO: A study of small power’s defense policy
According to Domke, “most familiar refrain to observers of Dutch politics, and
especially ofDutch security policy is that Holland is a small country. Size does explain
some ofthe basic trends and special problems observed in postwar Dutch defense.”9
The Netherlands was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(1949) and it has been seen as a reliable ally continually for the almost 50 years ofits NATO
membership. Although some people claim that Dutch society has experienced political
polarization over security and defense issues since the mid-1960’s10 and that subsequently,
“attitudes toward security, defense and NATO issues were shifting significantly,”11 it has
not had any major influence on the Netherlands’s long-term positive image in NATO. On
the contrary, the Netherlands has remained a great supporter ofNATO policy. Regardless
ofthe the heavy nuclear debate throughout the 1980’s, the Netherlands defense policy had
stayed closely tied with NATO’s strategy of defense, deterrence, and flexible response until
the end ofthe Cold War.12 No fundamental changes have occurred since 1990 with respect
to the newly emerging options in European security architecture. Indeed, the Netherlands
9 William K. Domke, “The Netherlands: Strategy Options and Change,” in Evolving
European Defense Policies, ed. Kelleher and Mattox (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company,
1987), p. 273.
10 Richard A. Bitzinger “The Low Countries,” in Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic
Alliance, ed. Robert ALevine (New York: Crane Russak, 1991), p. 199.
11 Ibid.. p. 214.
12 Domke, p. 292.
defense reform has followed NATO’s “New Strategic Concept,” a conformity which has
confirmed its image as a reliable partner.
One might see such reliability as blind unity. However, these policies should be
considered as a decisive willingness to engage in collective defense,13
intensive
communication in time of crisis,14
and burden and risk-sharing.
A question arises about the Dutch case: Why is the Netherlands a reliable NATO
member and what contributed to this image? Modern Dutch history, its geo-strategic
situation, and its economic factors significantly determined the strategic decision ofthe
Netherlands to join the alliance (at first, the Brussels Treaty and later on, NATO). These
basic determinants are then also reflected in the principles ofthe Dutch security and defense
policy within the Dutch alignment in NATO. Security and defense policy, together with a
developed strategic political culture are the foundations ofthe Dutch position in the
alliance.
The historical experience ofthe Dutch people helped confirm the rationale in their
post-war government’s decision to solve their security dilemma through a collective defense.
A decline of colonial power, low security guarantees resulting from a policy of neutrality,
invasion, and the occupation by German armies (all bitter facts of either World War II, or
the period before or after) were the factors in Dutch history that influenced their decision to
participate in alliances.
13 The North Atlantic Treaty. (Washington, D.C.,: 1949), Article 5.
14 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies ( Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 91.
10
The overall limiting aspects ofthe geo-strategic position ofthe Netherlands
determined some ofthe factors that helped form the decision ofthe Dutch officials to
change their posture of neutrality in its foreign policy to one of defense cooperation among
democracies. The small size and location ofthe country, sandwiched among three major
powers, at a crossroad oftrade lines, were the main limits which determined the strategic
decision.
Certain economic factors also affected the Dutch decisions in national post World
War II security. Holland’s poor economy was not helped by its policy of neutrality as the
country was exploited by all hostile sides in both World Wars. Moreover, the costs of
post-war reconstruction, unemployment, inflation and other destabilizing factors were high,
comparable with those ofthe countries directly involved in World War II. A preference for
stabilizing the post war economy before building armed forces, and a demand for increased
defense capabilities led to the decision to facilitate these goals within an alliance.
Recovering the Dutch post War economy also led to military integration. The
Netherlands based the recovery on using massive economic aid through Marshall Plan, and
on economic integration within region. Dutch economic dependence on a Germany that was
occupied by the victorious powers required that the Dutch cooperate closely with the
supervising powers not only with respect to the economy, but also in military, and foreign
policy.
All these three basic aspects (historical experience, geo-strategic situation, and
economy) affected the strategic decision ofthe Dutch to participate in a military alliance of
western democracies. Further, the Dutch security and defense policy, which was based on
11
this decision, and the strategic political culture then became the main modulators ofthe
Dutch position within NATO.
The Dutch security and defense policy was strictly subordinated to NATO
defense-planning and strategic concepts, flexibly adjusting to any announced changes.
When the economic development and domestic political situation allowed, the armed forces
were modernized and defense capability increased. By sharing the alliance’s tasks and
cooperating closely with other allies, the Dutch gained respect in the eyes ofthe other
allies.
Alongside this kind ofsecurity and defense policy, the Dutch strategic political
culture played significant role in the Dutch effort to achieve a prominent position within
alliance’s structures. Strong political consensus among the Dutch, support among the
citizens for a Dutch security and defense policy tied closely to the Euro-Atlantic defense
concept, and the public concern demonstrated by political elites’ about national security
were decisive elements in helping to formulate the strategic political culture which has
tremendously influenced the position ofthe Netherlands in NATO. Logically starting with
the examination ofthe most important historical events and processes, let us briefly
summarize what the essential historical points were that prompted the strategic decision to
leave behind a century-old policy of neutrality, and to enter into and firmly integrate within
West European and, later, Euro-Atlantic defense structures.
12
A. DETERMINANTS OF THE STRATEGIC DECISION
- A Lesson from History
The fate of a country is rightly in the hands of authorities, ifthey choose to take
their national history into account to ensure a better and safer future for their citizens. It
works both in the case ofsmall states and that of great ones as well. For example, the
course ofWorld War II reoriented the foreign policy of neutrality not only in the
Netherlands but also in the United States. The Netherlands left their policy of neutrality
behind and allied with others. Yet, learning such a lesson from history was a long-term
process. In order to understand this process, it would be worthwhile to study Dutch history
from the Golden Age ofthe nation (starting in the end of 16th century) to World War II,
(when the Netherlands became a member ofEuro Atlantic defense community).
After examining the large epoch ofDutch history, I have found that three aspects
are significant to our study. First is the sharp decline ofDutch colonial power from a great
power of decisive strength on an international scale in 18th century, to a small power with a
far less significant position in 20th century.
Secondly, a foreign policy of neutrality is not a rational option for the security
dilemma of any country who is ofthe Netherlands’ parameters. Located among the three
Great Powers at the gate ofEuropean trade and possessing a large economic base, the
Netherlands could not carry out a scrupulous foreign policy of neutrality. In response to the
Netherlands’ pursuit of an active role in promoting permanent peace and security,the Great
Powers showed little respect to Dutch neutrality and independence.
13
Thirdly, the German invasion in 1940 and the five-year occupation ofthe country
with all its military, political, social, and moral consequences exposed the bitter weakness of
neutrality.
Finally, the events ofthe early, post World War II period were the last stones on the
Netherlands’ road to military alliance. Fear of a renewed German threat, the emerging Cold
War, and the likely nuclear dimension of any future European conflict galvanized western
democracies into a strong military alliance, which acted as a firm counterweight to the
Eastern Bloc’s security system for over 40 years.
a. Decline ofColonial Power
Some scholars simplify the foreign policy history ofthe Netherlands as one
of a declining power.15
In fact, a phase that began with decades ofmilitary, economic,
political, cultural and intellectual blossom in the 17th century culminated in years of
economic devastation, military defeat, and loss of national sovereignty during the five years
ofNazi occupation in World War II.
Within this long historical period, the Netherlands underwent the transition
from a policy of neutrality to one oftight military and political alignment. One ofthe most
obvious reasons, of course, is the fact that the Netherlands, originally a great power,
became a small power, incapable of persuasive unilateral acts offorce in international
relations.
15 Peter E. Baehr, “The Foreign Policy ofthe Netherlands,” in The Other Powers, ed.
Ronald P. Barston (New York: Barnes&Noble, 1973), p. 62-3.
14
In examining the decline ofits power throughout history, it is worthwhile to
divide the period ofmodern Dutch history into three smaller periods oftime: its rise, its
peak and its fall. The glory ofthe Netherlands as a great power took place in a period called
the “Golden Age.”16
(1) Rise.
During the early Golden Age (1588-1647), the Republic became a
great power. The Netherlands territorially expanded to the North, cleared regions of
Spanish garrisons and gained strategic approaches to the Northern Rhine. Militarily, the
Netherlands underwent army reforms which are still considered a turning point in the
history ofsoldiering and military organization. The Dutch military reforms ofthe 1590’s
were pivotal, introducing basic changes which were then widely adopted all over Europe.17
From 1590, there was a dramatic improvements in the Republic’s
economic circumstances. Commerce and shipping expanded enormously, as did the towns.
Dutch commercial and financial activities, skills, technology, and engineering came to exert
an immense impact on European culture and perhaps especially in central Europe,
Scandinavia, Spain, and, later, Russia.18
To protect their commerce, the Dutch expanded
16 Adriaan J. Barnouw, “The Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age,” in The Netherlands.
ed. Robert J. Kerner (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1946) p
40.
17 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise. Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 267.
18 Ibid, p. 271.
15
their navy, until by 1650 it was twice the size ofthe French and English fleets combined.19
At the same time, as the Dutch dominance in the “rich trades” commenced, innovations
and achievements in Art and architecture proceeded with intensity, which has no parallel in
any other time, or place, in history.20
The rise ofthe mechanistic world – viewed within intellectual life,
brought new inventions in Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy. Together with progress in
the other sciences, long-distance navigation was developed, which made possible a
vigorous, successful and enduring maritime expansion in Asian, African, and American seas.
(2) Greatness.
In the latter half ofthe Golden Age (1647-1702), the Netherlands
attained world trade primacy and consolidated a vast and profitable colonial empire in the
Western hemisphere as well as another in the Eastern.21 With the possession ofNorthern
Brazil, the Dutch totally dominated the European sugar market. The Netherlands was by far
the strongest European power in Africa, and dominated the transatlantic slave trade. The
Dutch were in full control along the Guinea cost, and also conquered Angola from the
Portuguese. By 1648 all six ofthe modern Dutch Antilles – the three “Curacao” islands –
Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire – and the more northerly “Leeward” group – St. Eustatius,
19 “Netherlands,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
1995), p. 300.
20 Jonathan Israel, p. 548.
21 Ibid.. p. 581.
16
Saba, and half of St. Martin – were under the Dutch flag. Finally, there was “New
Netherland” (Nova Belgica), from where the Dutch controlled the North American für trade
from its two bases at Manhattan (New Amsterdam) and Fort Orange, which is today
Albany. In the East Indies, the Dutch were solidly entrenched in the Indian subcontinent,
Ceylon, Malaya peninsula and Indonesia (and until 1662, Taiwan).22 But this imposing
empire on both sides ofthe South Atlantic collapsed.
(3) Decline.
The age ofmilitary, economic, political and cultural decline
(1702-1806), caused by frequent fights with other conquest powers over the colonies,
revolutions and counterrevolutions, coups d’ etat, and finally the French occupation
resulted in the long-term decline ofDutch colonial power until the first half ofthe 20th
century.
The year 1702 was a key division in the history ofthe Netherlands
because ofthe onset ofthe War ofthe Spanish Succession (1702-13), the last great
European conflict in which the Netherlands participated as a major power. After the War of
Spanish Succession (Peace ofUtrecht 1713), the Netherlands started to conduct policy of
neutrality.23 The Dutch army fell from 130,000 to 40,000 troops by 1715.24 Military
22 Ibjd, p. 934.
22 Ibid.. p. 960.
21 Ibid.. pp. 985-6.
17
expenditure was cut drastically, and with a weakening military followed the collapse of
Dutch world trade primacy in the decades 1720-40.25
The economic decline ofsociety was followed by the decline ofthe
universities and the decline in visual arts. In addition, society was destabilized by the Second
Orangist Revolution (1747-1751), the Patriot Revolution (1780- 1787), the Fourth
Anglo-Dutch War (1784), and the Orangist Counter-revolution (1787-1795).
The crushing ofthe Dutch navy by the British at the battle of Camper
Down on October 1797, definitively marked the end ofDutch naval power as a significant
force in global politics.26 Loss of navy power was accompanied by losses of overseas
territories. The British empire permanently absorbed Ceylon, and the Dutch enclaves in
South India, South Africa, and Jawa. Surinam, west Guyana, and Curacao were
temporarily captured. The decline of colonial power lasted in broad sense until 1949, when
the Netherlands recognized Indonesia as an independent nation.
Napoleon had achieved absolute power in France and extended his
control over the Netherlands. At his direction, General Augerean on September 14, 1801
sponsored a final coup d’ etat which strengthened executive authority in the Netherlands.
Napoleon’s wars had ruined the trade which had been the main source ofDutch
prosperity.27 After the separation ofBelgium in 1839 the Netherlands completely withdrew
25 Ibjd, p. 998.
26 Ibid.. p. 1124.
27 Hendrik N. Boon, “Decline and Reawakening” in The Netherlands ed. Robert J. Kerner
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1946), p. 66.
18
from great-power politics.28 The Dutch found in a policy of neutrality a tool of ensuring
peace for a small state.
In 1997, the Dutch queen remains sovereign of the Netherlands
Antilles, Surinam, and Aruba, which became autonomous in internal affairs in 1954, 1975,
and 1986, respectively.
b. Precarious Neutrality
Since the beginning of 18th century the Netherlands veered toward a policy
of neutrality. In fact, Dutch neutrality ensured only fragile peace during the period until
World War II. There were two main reasons for this non-persuasive Dutch neutrality in
foreign policy. First, The Netherlands, with its traditional enthusiasm for the force of
international law, extended commerce and perpetuated its interests from the times of its
glory and, overestimating the scope of a small power, did not permit itselfto be reduced to
any degree of isolationism. Second, the high level ofthe concern ofthe Great Powers’ in
Dutch affairs generated a lack ofrespect for its neutrality.
The neutrality policy ofthe late 18* century was in reality a pro-French
policy and ended in French domination.29 In spite ofits firm national resolve not to
participate in international politics, the Netherlands suddenly found itselfin the center of
world politics with the “Luxembourg Affair.” The nation was shocked to learn that the
28 Amry Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 4.
29Ibid.. pp. 2-3.
19
actions ofits queen and ofits foreign minister had nearly precipitated a general war in
Western Europe. Napoleon III, envious and afraid ofthe expansion ofPrussia as the result
ofthe Austro-Prussian war in 1866, demanded compensation for France. He approached
King William III as Grand Duke ofLuxembourg, for the cession ofLuxembourg to France
in exchange for a monetary indemnity. Though small, the country would have been of
considerable strategic value to France. King William and his foreign minister had obtained
the approval ofBismarck for the deal, but when the plan became known in Germany, a
national outburst of German sentiment for war followed. Great Britain then called a
conference ofthe Great Powers, in which the demilitarization and neutralization of
Luxembourg was agreed upon as the solution to the problem.30
Later on, Dutch neutrality was challenged in the Boer War. Tension became
acute when it became known that the Boer republics had not been invited to the first Hague
Peace Conference in 1899. The Dutch government found itselfin a very embarrassing
position, for ifit had extended an invitation to the Boer republics to send representatives to
the conference the British government would not have participated in the conference.31
The adherence ofthe Netherlands to the North Sea Declaration in 1908 led
to a series of events which were extremely disturbing to a small state determined to keep
out ofthe main current ofworld politics. Some officials ofthe Dutch government saw in the
declaration a departure from the traditional policy ofstrict neutrality. The reason the affair
caused such an uproar was that, at about the same time, the Dutch government announced
30 Ibid.. p. 136.
31 Ibid.. p. 137.
20
plans for strengthening its coastal defenses. It was assumed that the plans were the result of
German pressure. It was contended that the purpose ofthe plans was to prevent a British
fleet from going up the river to the aid ofAntwerp should the Germans invade Belgium.32
There is a question as to what extent the Dutch policy ofneutrality and
independence kept the country out ofWorld War I hostilities. The Netherlands was able to
stay out ofthe war for the reason that the Central Powers and the Allies both thought it was
in their best interest not to force Holland into war. Germany wished to keep Holland open
as a channel through which to receive urgently needed imports from abroad, and Great
Britain had no desire to see Germany occupy the Dutch coastline and be free to use Dutch
ports and Antwerp as submarine bases.33 Despite this basic attitude of Germany and Britain,
the Netherlands’ policy of neutrality did not manage to save the country from the
devastating consequences ofWorld War I.
When World War I broke out, Holland found itself unprepared and startled.
It had developed a firm beliefin international agreements and had not considered European
tension too seriously. Nevertheless, measures were taken to protect its borders: the 200,000
men whom the country could bring under arms were immediately mobilized and
supplemented by the Landstorm, until about 450,000 men were in the field.34
For four years
the armed forces stood guard over the country, which was threatened several times by
32 Ibid.. p. 139.
33 Ibü, p. 123 and p. 140.
34 Bartholomew Landheer, “Modern Development,” in The Netherlands, ed. Robert j. Kerner
(Barkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1946), p. 85.
21
invasion, a danger which fortunately never materialized. Holland suffered severe privations
in the war, and its losses from the unrestricted submarine warfare ofthe Germans were
considerable. Nevertheless, Dutch neutrality continued to be respected by both warring
powers, because England was not eager to have Germany on the Dutch coastline and
Germany, in turn, did not seen any advantage in lengthening its front. World War I brought
to the Dutch a taste ofthe world to come – government control over economic activities,
large-scale unemployment, and increasing political differentiations.35
Providing an asylum for the deposed German emperor in 1918 was preceded
by a peculiar incident, not in accordance with the neutral policy ofthe Netherlands. The
Adjutant General to Queen Wilhelmina invited Emperor William II to take refuge in the
Netherlands. This act was seen by the Powers as a commitment to international politics.36
The Netherlands’ Government entered the League ofNations without
hesitation in 1919. Since the preparation ofthe negotiations started during the War, some
Dutch saw in League membership a departure from their traditional policy of neutrality and
independence.37
The historical events described above show that neutrality was not a rational
option for Dutch security and defense. The Netherlands had really been tightly involved in
international relations because ofits concerns for its overseas territories, its high level of
international commerce, its physical location among powers, and its strong trust in the
35 Ibid.. p. 86.
36 Army Vandenbosch, p. 139.
37 Ibid.. p. 145.
22
power ofinternational law. This Dutch commitment, together with the little respect the
Powers gave to Dutch neutrality, taking advantage ofthem whenever it suited their
purposes, reduced the probability ofDutch neutrality.
c. Consequences ofthe World War II
The course of World War II and its consequences for the Dutch state and
society was the main catalyst that moved the Dutch along the road from neutrality to
collective defense. The Dutch policy of neutrality in the beginning ofWorld War II was a
continuation ofits policy in World War I, and all ofthe old problems again presented
themselves. World War I had left neutral states sadly impaired and chaotic; the plight of
neutrals in the World War II became no better. There were violations ofDutch neutrality
by belligerent ships and aircrafts; several Dutch planes were fired on above Netherlands
territory; a number ofDutch ships were sunk by German submarines and magnetic mines;
German seaplanes fired machine guns and dropped bombs on Dutch fishing boats in the
North Sea. Dutch ships on their way to Holland were taken to British control bases for
searches, thereby causing considerable delay and loss ofmoney to the owners ofthe ships
and cargo.38
38 Ibid,, p. 280.
23
(1) Pre warperiod.
After the collapse ofthe policy of collective security in the
mid-1930’s, Dutch foreign policy was still designed to maintain neutrality, just as it had
served the Netherlands during the World war I.
Although official relations between the Netherlands and Germany
had been good, and the German Foreign Office repeatedly assured the Netherlands
government that the Reich would respect Dutch neutrality, the Dutch policy was not seen
entirely as impartial when international tension began to increase after the German
occupation ofthe Rhineland in 1936. Germany, after the outbreak ofthe war, sought by a
press campaign to frighten the Netherlands into breaking with the League. The German
press declared that neutrals attending League meetings were guilty of unneutral acts,
because the League had become an “Anglo-French” organ.39
The Dutch hoped that the miracle could happen again. Developments
in warfare and the ideological character ofthe gigantic struggle, however, made it extremely
unlikely. After the German reoccupation ofthe Rhineland, the Dutch saw little else that they
could do. It was too late to adopt another policy. After that date, any move in the direction
of a political or military alliance with France and Great Britain would have been the signal
for a speedy invasion oftheir country. Nor did the Dutch feel that an alliance would add
anything to their security.40
39 Ibid.. p. 146.
40 IbjdL, p. 147.
24
On August 28, 1939 the Dutch government ordered the mobilization
ofthe armed forces in anticipation ofthe outbreak ofwar. Immediately after the invasion of
Poland on September 1, the Dutch government issued a declaration announcing the
intention ofthe Netherlands to stay out ofthe European conflict. The mobilization was
maintained until invasion.41
(2) Invasion.
On May 10, 1940, at three o’clock in the morning, German troops
started to cross the border. German planes bombed Dutch airfields and dropped parachute
troops near strategic locations a few days later. Queen Wilhelmina and the royal family went
to England on a British destroyer.
By Tuesday, May 14, the military situation became manifestly
hopeless. Rotterdam was heavily bombed. The center ofthe city, including one-eighth ofits
total area was destroyed. Approximately 900 persons were killed and 78,500 were made
homeless. Rotterdam, along with Warsaw and Coventry, became a wartime symbol ofNazi
ruthlessness. On the following morning the capitulation was signed.42
41 Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945. (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 5.
42 Ibid.. p. 10.
25
(3) Occupation.
The people ofHolland entered five years of occupation after a
five-day war. Hitler planned to tie the Netherlands to Germany as closely as was politically
feasible after a German victory. Although Dutch casualties in manpower had not been
heavy, the economic, military, social and moral consequences were high in World War II.
Hitler established a civilian administration staffed by Germans for the
occupied territory. The Dutch National Socialist Movement (N.S.B.) was given a free hand
in the staging of public demonstrations and the dissemination of propaganda. Political
Parties were dissolved and Dutch National Socialists were placed in administrative
positions. The Jewish population was segregated, concentrated, and later deported to
Poland. The German administration attempted to secure labor for the Reich through a series
ofspecial actions, including recruitment of certain age groups to be deployed in Germany as
manpower in the branchs of commerce, industry, and agriculture.
When the Allied armies liberated Belgium during the first days of
September 1944, the German administration increased its hostility in the occupied
territories. Dutch men ofmilitary age were drafted or arrested primarily for fear they might
assist the Allied forces. No longer did the Germans attempt to use Dutch factories and other
productive facilities, but they transported as much machinery and equipment as possible to
Germany.43 The raw materials and foodstuffs, which the Dutch government had stockpiled
as a precautionary measure, was also moved to Germany.44
43 Ibid.. p. 13.
44 Ibid.. p. 70.
26
The approaching armies ofthe Western Allies relieved the
Netherlands. On May 5, 1944, the surrender of German troops in Holland went into effect
at eight o’clock in the morning. Holland was free at last after five years of enemy
occupation.
A weak system of collective security, an ineffective policy of
neutrality during increasing European tension in the 1930’s, and the consequences ofWorld
War II on the Dutch nation (i.e., military defeat, overall economic exploitation, and social
and moral devastation) led to a rejection ofthis policy of neutrality by the government in
exile. This change of attitude was indicated on radio broadcasts by Foreign Minister van
Kleffens from London on November 25, 1942. He declared to his compatriots that the old
times were not coming back, that the old policy of no political agreements with any state or
group ofstates could not be resumed. Although this decision was made during the War,
closer military collaboration with other countries continued to be carried out afterward.
d Post- World War IIDisorder
The situation in Europe after World War II, a fear of a growing German
threat, a weak system of collective defense with increasing tension between powers, and an
emerging Soviet threat all directly influenced decision-making ofthe Dutch post-war
government regarding national security. This process ofreadjusting Dutch foreign policy
resulted in the firm integration ofthe Netherlands into Western European structures.
However, the road from aloofness to collective defense was an indirect one.
27
In the immediate postwar years, the Netherlands relied upon the general
collective security system ofthe United Nations. This security policy was based on
international cooperation between Western powers and the Soviet Union.45 However, the
outbreak ofthe Cold War in 1946 and increasing disagreement among the Great Powers did
not allow for this policy any longer.
(1) German threat.
The government also attached great importance to finding an
international solution for the German question. In December 1946, foreign minister Van
Boetzelaer said: “Prevent[ing] renewed German aggression is our primary aim and in the
interest of us all.”46 The Netherlands wanted to make it impossible for Germany to threaten
her security again, and decided to influence the German issue through the Brussels Treaty
Organization.47 In 1948, governments offive European countries: Britain, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed Brussels Treaty, establishing a military alliance.
Similarly to the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, signed by France and Britain, the Brussels Treaty
was directed against Germany.48 In protest ofsigning the pact, the Soviet Union blocked
45 S.I.P. van Campen. The Quest for Security: Some Aspects ofNetherlands Foreign Policy
1945-1950 (The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1957), p. 30.
46 Proceedings ofthe Second Chamber, States General, 1946-47, 16 December 1946, p. 88.
47 Jan van der Harst, “From Neutrality to Alignment: Dutch Defense Policy, 1945-1951,” in
NATO: The Founding ofthe Atlantic Alliance and the Integration ofEurope, ed. Francis H.
Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 34.
48 Harst, p. 29 and Baehr, p. 65.
28
West Berlin in 1948. “The Soviet Union rather than Germany soon came to be recognized
as the greater threat.”49
(2) Soviet Threat.
This threat had at least two dimensions – a military and an ideological
one. The fear ofthe Soviet threat resulted from the sheer weight ofthe Soviet military. The
USSR could mobilize about 150 to 175 divisions (more than 25 of which were elite troops
stationed in the eastern part of Germany) against a paltry 14 divisions stationed in Western
Europe, two ofwhich were American. The balance of air forces was also disadvantageous
to the West: 6,000 Soviet aircraft as opposed to 1,000 aircraft in Western Europe. The US
nuclear monopoly in the early postwar period could not counterbalance the Soviet Union’s
conventional military power. “Even the small number ofbombs in the US arsenal meant that
America’s nuclear deterrent remained a hollow threat during the years that the United
States alone had the bomb. And it is likely that the Russians, through espionage, knew well
the emptiness ofthat threat.”50 Moreover, time was passing and the USA soon lost its
nuclear monopoly. In August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device.
The ideological dimension ofthe Soviet threat had two aspects. First
was a traditionally deep-rooted sense of democracy among the Dutch. As far back as the
days ofthe Dutch Republic, the Netherlands presented an early model of a democratically
ruled nation. It was not a modern democracy, but the men in power were enlightened
49 Campen, p. 146.
50 Ibid.. p. 31.
29
autocrats who wisely granted freedom ofspeech and freedom ofreligion, and encouraged
the founding of private institutions that gave destitute and underprivileged citizens freedom
from fear. Suppression ofliberating thought was never a part oftheir policy. Thus, the
notion of the Soviet “People’s Democracy” was totally unacceptable to the Netherlands.
Second, the democratic world feared the spread of communism to
the West. Soviet support ofsubversive activity on the part of communist parties in Western
Europe was what the cabinet feared most.51
In 1947 the Cominform was created,
communist-inspired strikes broke out in France and Italy, and Moscow gained control over
several East European countries while exerting pressure in Turkey, Greece and various
parts of Asia.52 These fears of communism along with the strong Soviet military presence in
Europe generated the notion of a significant Soviet threat in Dutch politics.
Both sharing bitter experiences with German expansion, Europe and the
Netherlands (as a part ofEurope) focused on setting a world order in the post World War
II era, such that would eliminate any renewed German threat. This was accomplished by
establishing the Brussels Treaty organization. Soon afterward, the emerging Soviet threat
soon received priority in the security decision-making process ofwestern democracies.
They founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 as a political and military
defense coalition to counterbalance the Soviet military weight and to contain communism.
These two basic facts of post World War II Europe, along with the particular
consequences ofWorld War II to Dutch society, challenged the Dutch decision makers.
51 Ibid, p. 30.
52 Ibjd, p. 29.
30
They, in response to a mosaic of experiences from national history, started the process of
adjusting the Dutch foreign policy away from neutrality. This process led to a climax in
1949, when the Netherlands became member ofNATO. - Geo-strategic Situation
Dr. Ronald P. Barston has underlined the importance ofthe following variable for a
small state’s security: “The freedom ofmaneuver of a small state may be restricted by its
strategic location.”53 This situation fully applies to the Dutch case. The factors that are
included in a description ofthe Dutch geo-strategic situation actually determine some ofthe
decision-making constraints for the Dutch policy makers. The following is a brief
description ofthe main aspects ofsuch a situation that illustrate this argument best.
The Netherlands is a small country with geographic position at the crossroads of
Western Europe.54
Its location among three Great Powers – Britain, France, Prussia, and
later on Germany – has influenced the Dutch security situation throughout modern history.
The Netherlands is a compact country ofthe size slightly less than twice the size ofNew
Jersey (33,936 sq. km. or 13,103 sq. mil.). It lies in the lowland of northern Europe. The
country is justly called a low country, for half ofits territory lies below the high-water levels
ofits many rivers and ofthe bordering North Sea. Close to 60% ofthe population live in
dikes – protected areas.
53 Ronald P. Barston, The Other Powers. (New York: Barnes&Noble, 1973) p. 20.
54 Vandenbosch, p. 2.
31
The Netherlands, with ports ranking third in the World in terms of cargo handled, is
called the gateway for Western Europe’s trade with the world. The Netherlands is the .
world’s third-ranking producer of natural gas and has the sixth-richest reserves.55 Most of
these data have changed only slightly with time.
The main elements ofthe Dutch geo-strategic situation are its location along major
European sea lines, its location among larger European neighbors, its role as a strategic
entry and exit point in military campaigns, its natural geographic vulnerability, and its
natural resources.
First, the location ofthe country on the sea lines, rivers and land roads ofWestern
Europe significantly influenced Dutch security. The Netherlands controlled goods shipments
to all three Great Powers with vital importance for Germany. The Netherlands, as the
territorial sovereign over the Rhine, was used as a transit country for the trade ofthe
Rhineland and that of northeastern France to the rest ofthe world.56
Great Britain and the United States, aware ofthe strategic importance ofthe
Netherlands against Germany in World War I, imposed an economic embargo on the neutral
Netherlands and blocked eighty-six Dutch vessels laden with foodstuffs and cereals in
British and American ports at the end of 1917. In 1939 Rotterdam’s total shipping tonnage
was 57 million tons, ofwhich nearly 23 millions tons was transit trught to and from
Germany. This caused severe hunger among the relatively large Dutch population because
55 “Netherlands,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
1995), p. 300.
56 J. Anton de Haas, “Holland’s Role in World Trade,” in The Netherlands ed. Robert J.
Kerner (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1946) p. 171.
32
of a lack offoodstuffs. To avoid the mistake made in World War I when Germany did not
have control over shipping ofsupplies to the Rhineland, Germany invaded the Netherlands
in 1940 and set up a German administration over the Dutch territory.
The location of a country among larger competitive powers is another important
factor for a small state. This handicap helped shape Dutch security in two ways. First, the
Netherlands has historically been considered a state capable of contributing to equilibrium
among the powers ofFrance, Britain, Prussia, and later on Germany. This balancing role of
Netherlands was formally confirmed by the Congress ofVienna57 in 1815, when the
Netherlands was united with Belgium to create a buffer state.58
The third strategic aspect resulting from the location ofthe Netherlands at the
crossroads ofwestern Europe has been the function ofthe Netherlands as a strategic access
and/or departure point in war campaigns among powers. Napoleon annexed the Netherlands
in 1806 as part of his strategic move to the east, the same year, he defeated Prussian and
Russian forces at Friedland, near Königsberg in eastern Prussia.
Great Britain, on the other hand, has not really had continental ambitions in recent
history; however, it has tried to use the Netherlands in its drive for maintaining a naval
advantage in war. Indeed, it was Britain who pursued the creation of a buffer state at the
mouth ofthe Rhine in order to restrict any direct approach to the channel by the Germans.
This fear wasjustified, since the Netherlands played an important role in German military
Fred L. Israel, Major Peace Treaties ofModern History 1648 – 1967. (New York: Chelsea
House Publishers, 1967), vol. I, p. 549.
58 Vandenbosch, p.3.
33
plans. The plans of von Schliefen, General Chief of Staff ofthe German army 1899 to
1906, called for marching throughout Holland on two fronts in case ofwar. General von
Moltke, successor to von Schlieffen and Chief of Staff at the outbreak ofWorld War I,
changed the plan in 1909 by eliminating from it the march through Holland.59 Nevertheless,
Hitler successfully returned to von Schlieffen’s plans in 1940, when he annexed the
Netherlands in a five-day Blitzkrieg. Thus, both Great Britain and Germany have held the
position ofthe Netherlands in high strategic regard.
The flat lowlands ofthe country are yet another aspect that affects geo-strategic
situation ofthe Netherlands. The fact that 60% ofthe population lives on territory below
sea level sharply increases the country’s vulnerability in case of an armed conflict.
In fact, the Netherlands came to understand this all too clearly in World War II. In
the final days ofthe war, the Germans flooded an area offertile land in the province of
Noord-Holland, which is located below sea level and had been reclaimed from the sea since
World War I. The inundations covered approximately eight percent ofthe total agricultural
acreage ofthe Netherlands. About one-third ofthe inundated soil was covered with sea
water. Where sea water was allowed to flood the land, effective reclamation ofthe soil was
bound to take a great deal oftime.60
Lastly, the strategic resources of natural gas are a further factor resulting from the
location ofthe Netherlands. The great importance ofthis aspect was expressed by Richard
E Bissell, research fellow at the American University’s School ofInternational Service,
59 Ibid.. p. 120.
60 Wormbrunn, p. 78.
34
when he pointed out that “resources as a cause of conflict predate human society.”61 Since
the Slochteren gas field near Groningen (among the largest active fields in the World) was
brought into production in 1959, this factor could not have been relevant in the early
postwar security policy ofthe Dutch. Its relevance, however, increased later on in the
forming ofthe Dutch security and defense policy during the Cold War era.
The geo-strategic situation of a small state is a very important aspect ofits security.
The Netherlands endures a number of disadvantages from this point of view. The
Netherlands is located at the crossroads ofWestern Europe, connecting the Great powers
and controlling their supplies. Furthermore, the location ofthe country among France,
Britain, Prussia and, later on, Germany was a determining factor in Dutch security, as Dutch
territory has served as an equilibrium point for balancing powers and as a strategic access
point in war campaigns among the Powers. Also, the low and flat terrain ofthe Netherlands,
sharply increases the general vulnerability ofthe Netherlands. These factors ofthe Dutch
geo-strategic situation helped influence the reorientation ofthe Dutch policy from neutrality
to alignment.
61 Richard E. Bissell, “The Resource Dimension ofInternational Conflict” in Managing
GlobalChaos. ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela All (Washington, DC:
United States Institute ofPeace, 1996), p. 141.
35 - Economic Factors
The question of economic development often takes priority in the foreign policy
ofsmall states.62 These states usually do not have sufficient resources which would allow
them to face any economic sanctions imposed by the Great Powers in the case of a
diametrically different foreign policy on the part ofthe smaller state. Thus, for a small state
to develop its economic, security, and defense policies under an economic and security
umbrella ofthe Great Powers would be fruitful.
The Netherlands learned just such a lesson: that economic objectives are met only
within a dependable security system. By not respecting this basic knowledge, by
underestimating the need of a dependable security system, and by adjusting its foreign
policy to changes too slowly, the Dutch were left prone to a violent interruption ofits
economic plans by an aggressor. Subsequently, foreign rule exploited the Dutch economy.
The need to recover economically and increase defense capability, while an external threat
was growing, led to a reorientation the Dutch foreign policy after World War II. Eventually,
disharmony between the economic policy and the security system, economic exploitation of
the country during the period of dependence, and a plan for economic recovery led the
Dutch post World War II government to join a military alliance with the other western
democracies.
62 Barston, p. 24. “The foreign policy ofmany small states is dominated by the question of
economic development.”
36
a. Economic Policy vs. The Security System
The building ofDutch economic prosperity was interrupted by the German
invasion. The invasion, in turn, was a direct consequence of discord between Dutch
economic policies and the Dutch security system.
The Dutch economy had been traditionally based on foreign trade and
commerce, but had declined in power over the course of World War I. Gradually however,
the Netherlands began to regain its former prosperity, and in 1928 per capita international
trade, excluding transit shipments, amounted to $244, exceeding that of all other countries.
Belgium could muster only $218, England $215, and the United States $78 per capita.63
As a result ofthis growing trade, the merchant marine expanded rapidly. By
1929, it ranked eighth among the world’s merchant marines, exceeded only by England, the
United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Norway.64 The Netherlands imported
from its colonies tea, sugar, tobacco, spice, tin, bauxite, copper, and rubber, and then
reexported these products down the European continent. Also, a very large percentage of
its manufacturing industry operated principally for export. The percentage ofindustrial
products in total exports ofthe country had reached 60% before the war.65 A crucial part
ofthis export and reexport went to Germany. In the five years preceding World War II,
between 14 and 20 percent of all Dutch exports went to Germany.
63 Haas, p. 171.
64 Ibid.. p. 172.
65 Ibid.
37
The Netherlands imported goods from Germany as well. In the same period,
between a fourth and a fifth of all Dutch imports (in value) came from Germany.At their
peak, nearly a third of all Dutch imports came from Germany in 1931, and in 1934 a fourth
ofNetherlands exports went to Germany. Aside from this earlier level ofmutual commerce,
one half ofRotterdam’s total shipping tonnage in 1939 was transit to and from Germany.66
Such a close economic cooperation with Germany, however, excluded the possibility of
remaining neutral in the case of a conflict between powers.
Despite the fact that Dutch trade with the United Kingdom was almost as
large, there was no reason to hope that the World War I miracle, when the Netherlands was
spared direct military attack, could be repeated. In World War II, Germany was very
concerned with the strategic importance ofHolland. Britain has rarely had any reason to
expand into the continent. Thus, any potential threat in the case of a conflict among the
Powers could only really come from Germany, as the strategic importance ofthe
Netherlands was not equally important to both powers. On one hand, ifBritain had annexed
the Netherlands, the next step would have been Germany. On the other hand, by occupying
Holland, Germany would have controlled the channel. The British trust in their strength as
an isolated island and their consequent lower concern for Dutch neutrality could not
counterbalance Germany’s concern for ensuring a fluent supply to the Rhineland through the
Dutch ports. The Netherlands did not learn its lesson from World War I in that regard.
Insisting on a policy of neutrality, the Netherlands did not ensure sufficient security for its
economic policy.
66 Vandenbosch, p. 275.
38
b. Economic exploitation
The Dutch under the German occupation of 1940-1945 is a classical example
of” [h]ow the territory ofthe small state can be used – exploited – by another great power
in the execution ofsinister designs.”67
The state ofwar existing between Germany and the Allies imposed a heavy
economic burden on the Netherlands, quite apart from the expenses ofmobilization. Transit
trade with Germany practically ceased as a result ofthe British blockade in 1940. War
conditions made it more difficult to secure raw materials for the Dutch industry. Dutch
ships were sunk by mines in the English Channel and elsewhere. As a result ofthese
conditions, the total volume ofindustrial and commercial activity decreased. Furthermore,
unemployment rose despite the fact that approximately 300,000 men were mobilized.68
After the occupation began, Hitler established a German supervisory civilian
administration for the occupied territory. Although the total quantity ofindustrial
production dropped throughout the occupation until in 1944 it was less than halfthat of
1939, the value of exports to Germany doubled in 1940 over the level of 1938, and more
than tripled over 1938 for the four subsequent war years. This was mainly due to wholesale
removal ofsupplies and requisitioned clothing, bicycles, furniture, etc.
After September 1944 most factories ceased operations for lack offuel and
transportation. It has been estimated that, in January 1945, the level of production was only
67 Olaf V. Knudsen, “Analysing Small-State Security: The Role ofExternal Factors,” in Small
States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe, ed. Werner Bauwens, et. al. (London
and Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), p. 10.
68 Warmbrunn, p. 5.
39
25 percent that of 1938. Moreover, since the German war machine needed more and more
manpower, the Germans also drafted labor from the Netherlands. By the end ofthe war,
between 300,000 and 400,000 Dutchmen were at work in the German Reich, exclusive of
prisoners ofwar and the imprisoned Jews.
Before the end ofthe War, Hitler ordered a “scorched earth” policy
involving either the removal to Germany or the outright destruction ofindustries and
transportation facilities which might be of use to the Allies. Some ofthe worst demolitions
took place in the harbor ofRotterdam, where approximately 40 percent ofthe total pier
area and warehouse space was destroyed.
After the invasion at Normandy, and the Germans destroyed the dikes and
flooded the land, the soil was inundated. The circulation of paper money increased almost
fourfold from April, 1941 to May 1, 1945. Taxation of annual income almost doubled from
1940 to 1944. By Werner Warmbrunn, 1944 the average cost ofliving had risen by
approximately 50% over the base year 1938-39. The cost offood rose by about 60% during
the same period, while wages were frozen in 1940.69
Such heavy exploitation ofthe Dutch
economy as a direct consequence of a weak security system had a pivotal influence on the
reorientation ofthe Dutch foreign policy in the postwar years.
69 Ibid, pp. 67-82.
40
c. Economic recovery
The Dutch plan for economic recovery suggested that the Dutch, post World
War II government join a military alliance with the other western democracies for at least
three reasons. First, the Dutch cabinet was convinced that priority should be given to the
reconstruction ofthe financial and economic stability ofthe country. Military readiness
could be postponed until a later date.70 Thus, a military coalition with other democracies
was an easy way to increase defense capability without spending additional money.71
Second, the Netherlands put effort into the creation ofregional institutions
for economic cooperation, and it attached great value to the successful development ofthe
Benelux customs union, established in 1944.72 To avoid the mistakes ofthe prewar period –
an inharmonious economic policy and security system – the Netherlands covered the
economic union by one security umbrella. Hence, joining a Brussels Treaty seemed to be a
highly rationale step.
Finally, the US Congress approved a European Recovery Program, known
as the Marshall Plan, in the amount of $23 billion,73 as a part of the Truman Doctrine for
70 Harst, p. 30.
71 Harst, p. 34. “[t]he Netherlands participated in the Brussels Treaty to involve the United
States in the Defense ofWestern Europe. In addition to the obvious military benefits, the
Dutch recognized that an American contribution would enable them to reduce their own
defense expenditures.”
72 Ibid.. p. 28.
73 Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 210.
41
the containment of communism.74
Participating in the Marshall Plan thus offered a double
benefit to the strongly anticommunist cabinet ofthe Netherlands.75
However, considering the acceptance ofthe Marshall plan involved a cost
and benefit analysis, since the US administration was not hesitating to use the Marshall Plan,
at the same time, as a useful tool in its “carrot and stick” policy. The Americans pressed for
a Dutch retreat from Indonesia and insisted that Indonesian republics be granted their
independence. They threatened to cut off not only military assistance to the Netherlands,
but also that part ofthe Marshall Plan aid which was meant for Indonesia.76
Economic factors also played an important role in Dutch postwar decisionmaking. Discord between the economic policy and security system, the economic
exploitation ofthe country during the German occupation, and the plan for an economic
recovery were the factors which influenced this process the most.
B. POSITION-BUILDING MODULATORS
The security and defense policy of a specific state and its strategic political culture
are the main agents that form a state’s reputation in the eyes ofits allies. By attaining a
good position within a military coalition as a result ofsuch a good reputation, a small state
74 Cecil V. Crabb, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge and London:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 107.
75 Harst, p. 30.
76 Ibid, p. 35.
42
increases its chances to survive in times of crisis. Moreover, an applied national security and
defense policy can persuade armed partners to respect a small state’s position in the
Alliance. - Security and Defense Policy
The implementation of a small state’s security and defense policy in peacetime
requires the confluence of a broad, complex number of opinions, and practical provisions.
In order to simplify this complexity, it is useful to define a few crucial points. The main
factors serving to determine the security and defense policy of a sovereign member are its
level of policy coordination with the strategic concepts ofthe alliance; the level and
structure ofthe mutual defense cooperation among the coalition partners; the state’s share
ofthe risk in times of collective defense or other missions; and its share ofthe burden in the
effort to build credible defense capabilities for the coalition. The Dutch security and defense
policy is an example of a rational approach to this position-building process.
a. Policy Coordination
For the healthy working of a military alliance, it is important for the alliance’s
members to reach very close agreement on one strategic concept and to adjust their
respective national defense policies as close to this concept as possible. On one hand,
deviant defense policy alternatives are not helpful but harmful, particularly to the security of
a small state. On other hand, small states are afraid oflosing their sovereignty. However,
the small state, though reluctant to conform to coalition policy in peacetime, is not strong
43
enough in times of crisis to face an aggressor’s power unilaterally on its own, especially in
the nuclear age. The Netherlands, aware ofthese constraints on a small state, subordinated
its policy fully to NATO’s strategic concept of deterrence and flexible response77:
Throughout the first 20 years or so ofNATO’s existence, the
Netherlands almost totally subordinated national goals to NATO and U. S.
security policies. In fact, it was even argued that ‘national interest [was] not
a concept ofmuch relevance to Dutch foreign policy,’78 and that Dutch
security policy was, for all practical purposes, virtually nonexistent.79
The Dutch defense policy was tightly bound to NATO not only in the Cold
War era, but also during detente. While disarmament negotiations among superpowers
reduced the quantity of armaments on the European continent, NATO continued developing
the quality ofits defense systems as a continuation ofits “dual-track’ policy.80 During the
1984-1993 planning period, each ofthe Dutch armed services was supposed to complete
modernization programs, thus giving the Netherlands the most modern armed forces in
NATO.81 After the end ofthe Cold War, without regard to the emerging options within a
prospectively new European security system, the Netherlands continued to conduct policy
77 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers 1994)
p. 92.
78 Jan G. Siccama, “The Netherlands Depillarized: Security Policy in a New Domestic
Context,” in NATO’s Northern Allies: The National Security Policies ofBelgium. Denmark.
the Netherlands, and Norway, ed. Gregory Flynn (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1985), p. 117.
79 Bitzinger, p. 197.
80 Kaplan, p. 134.
81Harst, p. 281.
44
in accordance with NATO’s strategic concept agreed to at the North Atlantic Council’s
Roma summit of 1991.”82
The January, 1993 issue ofDutch Defense Priorities Review spells out the
new defense policy: the Netherlands has built new armed forces which can be deployed
immediately in peacetime and in crisis situations, and can operate more effectively.83
Promoting such a tight policy relative to NATO’s strategic concepts contributed to
Holland’s “place in the sun” within the Alliances’s structures.
b. Defense Cooperation
Promoting mutual cooperation occupies a place ofimportance in terms of
confidence-building measures among allies. The Dutch government has contributed in this
regard since the very beginning ofits alignment. The Netherlands and Belgium focused on
communications between headquarters, common armaments production and procurement,
the sharing oftraining camps and artillery ranges, the furnishing ofDutch troops to Belgian
maneuvers (and vice-versa), closer cooperation between Dutch and Belgian military
schools, and exchanges of officer trainees.84 Later on, this cooperation was extended to
other allies. Nevertheless, the Benelux regional scope is a cornstone ofDutch-NATO
82 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.” Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.nato.int/html. 20 July, 1997.
83 «
Objectives and tasks ofthe Ministry ofDefense” in Dutch Ministry ofDefense. Available
HTTP: http://www.mindef.n1/html.4 September, 1997.
84Harst, p. 33.
45
cooperation. In the second half ofthe 1980’s, about one-third ofDutch pilot trainees were
trained in Belgium.
In addition, the Netherlands participated in production and co-production of
F-16 and Leopard tanks and other projects.85 However, the ratification ofthe EC’s
Maastricht Treaty on economic and political union did not generate a strong sentiment for
European defense policy in the Netherlands. The Netherlands participates neither in the
Eurocorps, inaugurated by France and Germany in 1992 (unlike Luxembourg and Belgium),
nor in EUROMARFOR, the European Maritime Force (unlike Portugal).86
Instead, on
March 30, 1994, the Netherlands signed an agreement with Germany providing for the
creation of a 30,000-strong Dutch-German joint force that would be fully integrated into
NATO and open to other NATO members.
Moreover, the Netherlands promotes cooperation among Central and East
European countries within the “Partnership for Peace” program,87 and helps to generate an
increasing level ofmilitary cooperation, transparency and interoperability between NATO
and Partner forces.88 The broad scope ofDutch collaboration within the Alliance is an
example of how much a small state can contribute in that regard.
85 Domke, p. 290.
86 Charles L. Barry, “Creating a European Security and Defense Identity,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Spring 1997.
87 “Partnership for Peace.” Online. Available HTTP: http: //www.nato.int/html. 20 July, 1997.
88 Nick Williams, “Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?,” Survival,
vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, p. 98.
46
c. Risks Sharing
Commitment to collective defense and the expansion ofthat to the level of
collective security also brings with it certain kinds ofrisks that had been diminished under
the policy of neutrality. A small state in the Alliance is expected to share, for example, in
tasks resulting from nuclear deterrence policies, or in tasks resulting from troop deployment
in areas outside ofNATO.
Indeed, the Netherlands is experienced in both tasks. As far as strategy of
nuclear deterrence, the Netherlands was willing to share risks:
The Dutch government has a record of active participation in alliance
policy making and, more importantly, ofloyal fulfilment of alliance
responsibilities to the best ofits abilities. This has meant a commitment to
the alliance strategy offlexible response, in which Dutch forces are deployed
in the forward areas of Germany and, the recent decision to the contrary
[sic], assigned their share ofsix nuclear tasks.89
In addition to this highly positive Dutch attitude toward NATO’s nuclear
policy, it must be mentioned that the Netherlands’ commitments were never stretched. It is
true that the debate on the deployment ofintermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) (in the
form offorty-eight U.S. cruise missiles) in the Netherlands pushed the Dutch commitment
to NATO policy to its upper limits. Indeed, according to Professor William K. Domke,
“[t]he Dutch government committed itselfto the December 1979 NATO INF decision, but
it took until November 1985 before it decided to deploy the missiles.”90 Moreover, as
events and crises outside Europe throughout the 1970’s raised issues ofmilitary operations
89 Domke, p. 275.
90 Ibid, p. 285.
47
and contingency planning for areas beyond NATO’s command theaters, the Netherlands,
together with several other European states, insisted on the contingency that NATO’s
“out-of-area” must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.91 However, this objection did not
serve as an obstacle to the Netherlands in its committment to deploy 105 soldiers in the
Multinational Fore and Observers (MFO) on the Sinai Peninsula in April, 1982.
Another example comes from September, 1984. At the time, two Dutch
Alkmaar-class minesweepers arrived in the Red Sea and searched six weeks for anti-ship
mines used in the Iran-Iraq conflict. In this case, the operation in the out-of-NATO-area
was considered an important defensive measure to remove dangers to international
shipping.92 Later on, the Netherlands made a naval contribution to the US-led UN
coalition in GulfWar of 1991, and to the 1996 NATO-led peace force (SFOR) in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Netherlands contributed to SFOR with approximately 1,500
troops.
d. Burden Sharing
Burden-sharing is one ofthe major limits a small state faces in a large
coalition due to its more or less limited GDP. Thanks to a relatively healthy economy, the
Netherlands is now a solvent contributor to NATO’s programs. However, attaining this
status was not automatic, as the early Dutch alignment required a consumption ofsecurity
at their allies’expense.
91 Ibid.. p. 288.
92 Ibid, p. 289.
48
In the years 1948-1950 in fact, the Dutch lacked even a single standing
division. The government preferred to continue planning for the financial and economic
reconstruction ofthe country, while maintaining the defense budget at a supposedly low
level of 850 million guilders for 1949. This was about about 5.1 percent of GNP at the
time, which, interestingly however, was relatively greater than at any time since 1815.93
During a November 1948 visit to Holland, UK Field Marshal Bernard Law
Montgomery urged the Dutch to begin building up their army within the Allied framework.
He asked for an army corps ofthree divisions by the end of 1951. However:
The political will to increase military efforts was, in reality, lacking.
In March 1949, the cabinet approved a defense plan running to 1956, the
so-called ‘Lagerplan 1950,’ that required an increase in neither the budget
nor the length of military service. The implementation ofthe Montgomery
plan was thereby postponed indefinitely.94
These burdent-sharing limits were evident in other ways as well at this early
stage ofthe Netherlands’ membership in NATO, as the Dutch government, consistently
without regard to an ever-increasing Soviet threat, proceeded with the single-minded
economic recovery oftheir country.95
At the outbreak ofthe Korean War (one ofmost important dividing lines in
the Cold War) however, one can see a significant turning point in the Netherlands’
alignment. In March, 1951, after long and complicated discussions, the government finally
yielded to US pressure and increased the defense budget from fl. 850 million to fl. 1,500
93Harst, p. 33.
94 Ibid, p. 34.
95 Ibjd, p. 37.
49
million a year. Harst concludes that “[t]wo years after the creation ofNATO, the
Netherlands had eventually become a faithful member ofthe alliance, prepared to meet
NATO requirements, i.e., to have five divisions ready by 1954.”96
Heavy industrialization ofthe country and the previous preference for
financial and economic stability in the postwar period allowed for a rather steady allocation
of budgetary resources for defense during the 1960’s and 1970’s. From 1965 to 1970, cuts
in the size ofthe armed forces led to a drop in defense expenditure from 4 percent to 3.5
percent of GNP. Since 1970, however, spending has not dropped below 3.3 percent of
GNP.97
In May, 1997 moreover, the final communique ofthe North Atlantic
Council called for a long-term defense programme to revitalize the alliance through the
improvement of conventional and nuclear deterrence forces. The Netherlands agreed to
rectify serious deficiencies in joint defense arrangements and aim for a three-percent,
after-inflation increase in defense spending as a way to provide the resources needed to
improve capabilities. The defense budgets for 1979 through 1983 were also based on a
commitment to three-percent growth, which caused the Netherlands to build the most
modern armed forces in NATO.98
96
97
Ibid.. p. 39.
Netherlands Ministry ofDefense, “Main Financial Figures on Defense” (The Hague:
Directorate-General Economie en Financien, 1984), p.29.
98Domke, p. 281.
50
Alongside the development of defense programs, the Dutch economy
allowed for generous welfare programs, which did not enable the Dutch government to
respond flexibly to a request in 1985 by the Reagan administration for approval and
financial participation in the research and development portion ofthe Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI). Because Germany refused direct participation in this project and the fact
that following detente and disarmament, policies between superpowers led to the end ofthe
SDI project, this reluctance by the Dutch did not hold serious consequences for their image
of a reliable partner among allies.
The economy grew at a real average annual rate of 1.9 percent over the
decade between 1985 and 1994, but relatively costly public expenditures and consequential
deficit financing were exacerbated by a recession in 1992-1993. During this period
unemployment rose to over eight percent. Expansion resumed in 1994-1996, with
unemployment falling to less than 7 percent by late 1996 and inflation remaining low at
around 2.5 percent.” This optimistic economic development together with military reform
enabled the Netherlands to meet expectations on burden-sharing. As Bitzinger notes:
For a small nation, the Netherlands endeavors to maintain a
well-rounded, three-service military, and for the most part the Dutch have
worked hard to live up to their Alliance defense commitments. They have
purchased sophisticated weapons systems and kept their military standards
and professionalism high. Indeed, the Dutch armed forces are a good
example ofthe kind ofsecurity contribution a small nation can make to the
Alliance.100
99 Arthur S. Banks, et. al., Political Handbook ofthe World: 1997 (New York: The Research ,
Foundation ofthe State University ofNew York, 1997), p. 594.
100 Bitzinger, p. 208.
51
Despite the initial reluctance to allocate sufficient material and financial
sources to increase defense capabilities, the Netherlands increased its contributions step by
step, and watched its level vigilantly in comparison to other allies. This policy tremendously
contributed to the good positionofthe Dutch among its allies.
The Netherlands, during its NATO membership, carried out a transparent
security and defense policy, closely bound to NATO strategy, and devoid of any alternative
doctrines ofsolely national concern. This political platform was supported by a developed
level of defense cooperation, and the Dutch willingness to share risks and its fair burden of
the collective defense. This security and defense policy helped generat the high level ofthe
Dutch in the Alliance that can be seen today. - Strategic Political Culture
The main factors that define strategic political culture are 1) degree of political
consensus on basic principles ofsecurity and defense policy; 2) public support by political
elites for that kind of policy; and 3) the amount ofsupport among the citizens. This
variable does not refer exclusively to the category ofsmall states. The relationship between
strategic political culture, on one hand, and security and defense policy, on the other, is
mutually interactive. The security and defense policy generates a certain kind ofstrategic
political culture, and strategic political culture forms certain characteristics of the security
and defense policy.
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a. Political Consensus
Since 1949, The Netherlands has enjoyed broad domestic consensus on
national security policy and the country’s role within the Alliance.101 Dutch society and
politics were centered around traditional institutions called “pillars,” which included the
church, the labor movement, and other ideological subsocieties.102 The pillars were
composed of Christian (Reformed and Catholic churches), Socialist/Labor, and Liberal
elements (comprising secular opponents to the Socialistic bloc and, contrary to its name,
occupying the right wing on the national political spectrum). These pillars formed the base
for the social and political life ofthis country.103 Bitzinger notes, “Whatever the
composition ofthe coalition in power, national policy tended to vary little from
government to government.”104 With a such a high priority on the need for consensus and
governability, the parties agreed upon three basic concerns: continuation and expansion of
the welfare state, government subsidy ofthe domestic economy, and, especially, support
for the Western alliance.105
Despite a certain left-right polarization in Dutch society since the
mid-1960’s, the domestic consensus that formed around Dutch entry and commitment to
101 Bitzinger, p. 195.
102 Siccama, p. 134-135.
103 Bitzinger, p. 198.
104 Bitzinger, p. 198.
105 Ibid.. p. 198-199.
53
NATO has endured.106 From 1967 to 1982, among the political parties, only the small
Pacifist-Socialist Party unconditionally rejects NATO. The other small parties ofthe left
are openly critical ofNATO. Among the major parties in 1975, the PvdA (Labor)
congress staked continued NATO membership on progress toward detente. The other
parties actively support membership in NATO; over ninety percent ofCDA (Christian
Democratic Party) and WD (Liberal) party members favor NATO.107
However, a debate over the 1979 NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles
has pointed out the potential vulnerability ofthe consensus on security policy. 108 The
Socialist/Labor element ofthe political spectrum, as in Germany and other western
European countries, turned this debate into a tool oftheir populist policy, which
undermined an initially strong political consensus in Dutch society.109
Since that time, military spending has become a gauge ofwidening or
narrowing political unity regarding NATO. The discussions over long-term defense plans
has made defense policy decision-making a much more public issue. As Bitzinger notes,
“With the widening ofthe security debate and with the defense budget coming under much
106 Domke, p. 276.
107 Ibid, p. 271.
108 Siccama, p. 113-170.
109 JosefJoffe, The Limited Partnership (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1987), p. 112.
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closer scrutiny, both domestic defense policy and overall NATO doctrine became a more
open process, subject to wider pressures from more disparate interests.”110
b. Public Support ofPolitical Leaders
Government officials are almost uniformly supportive ofNATO
membership. The Foreign Ministry conducts security policy in the context ofNATO and
has never been in a position to develop an alternative security policy. The dominant
political figure in this regard was Foreign Minister J. A. Luns. He has been a member ofthe
Cabinet for almost nineteen years (1952-1971). The Dutch Policy under his leadership
always emphasized European integration and the strengthening of Atlantic co-operation.
Foreign Minister Luns was appointed as Secretary-General ofNATO in 1971 and has
became the symbol of pro-American foreign policy.111
He was not the only one, however. In the person ofForeign Minister Dirk
U. Sticker, later a Secretary-General ofNATO and leader of a number ofDutch
committees and subcommittees in NATO, Mr. Luns found a successor to his Euro-Atlantic
security and defense policy. When the ability to come to any decision in case of cruise
missile deployment was complicated, there was Foreign Minister van den Broek, who
“enthusiastically supported full deployment according to NATO policy.”112 The firm
linkages to US foreign policy have also been supported by the current Minister ofDefense,
110 Bitzinger, p. 202.
m
Baehr, p. 87.
112 Domke, p. 287.
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whose educational and working backgrounds took place in the USA (a PhD from John
Hopkins University and work at the World Bank in Washington, DC, respectively). He
desires that Dutch defense reform be tied closely to NATO’s structural changes in the spirit
of “A New Strategic Concept.”
c. Support ofCitizens
As Bitzinger has noted, “[n]ot only political parties but also trade unions,
schools, newspapers, broadcasting, hospitals, and even soccer teams were organized along
the lines ofthe pillars.”113
The strong support among the citizens to alignment gave
political figures a mandate to deal positively with the Alliance on a long-term basis. An
overwhelming majority ofthe Dutch population – some 75 to 80 percent – has consistently
supported their country’s membership in NATO. In, general the Dutch perceive the NATO
alliance as their best guarantee for Western security.114
In a 1988 poll ofthe Dutch
Atlantic Commission, 46 percent ofthe Dutch population said “No” to a European defense
without American participation.115
According to Bitzinger, “Conceptually, the public’s and domestic elites’
embrace ofseveral principles ofthe traditional security consensus remains intact. Support
for the Western Alliance remains high, as does the acceptance of an adequate national
113 Bitzinger, p. 198.
114 Peter M. E. Volten, “Dutch Defense Options,” in European Security Policy After the
Revolutions of 1989. ed. Jefrry Simon (Washington, DC: The National Defense University
Press, 1991), p. 399.
115 Ibid.. p. 401.
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defense and the need to fulfill one’s commitments to NATO.”116 However, as the nuclear
debate showed, the traditional political consensus on security and defense issues is not
perfectly uniform in the application of domestic policy, which, nevertheless, did not have a
very negative impact on long-term position ofthe Dutch in NATO.
There has been a characteristically strong consensus among Dutch political
parties on the basic principles ofsecurity and defense policy since the very beginning ofthe
Netherlands’ membership in the Atlantic Alliance. The strong pro-Alliance personality of
the Dutch officials and their permanent and decisive public support for the Alliance has
generated among its citizens a great deal ofsupport for a Dutch security and defense
policy, subordinated to the NATO strategy. Together with the transparent security and
defense policy ofthe Dutch, this general political culture, characterized by strong political
consensus, decisive support of political officials, and the widespread support ofthe Dutch
people, is the main position-building modulator that has contributed to the respectable
position ofthe Netherlands among its Allies.
C. CONCLUSION: THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS IN NATO
The Netherlands was chosen as an example of a small state’s effective security and
defense policy within NATO. Through permanent increases ofits own defense capabilities
by affordably building strong armed forces, a small country can attain a respectful position
in the Alliance, thus generating maximal security benefits to the small state.
116 Bitzinger, p. 203.
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In having accomplished this goal, the Netherlands has twice occupied the position
of Secretary General ofNATO, twice the position ofDeputy Secretary General, once
Director ofthe Private Office ofthe Secretary General, and once Assistant Secretary.
Other small countries do not have such a record. Only Belgium occupied the position of
the Secretary General once for a full-working period, and Norway once occupied the
position of Assistant Secretary. The Dutch officials have also occupied a number of
positions in various committees and subcommittees in the NATO political structure.
The Netherlands is also traditionally considered a mediator between Anglo-Saxons
and strong pro-Europeans in finding compromises. Because ofthis policy, the Netherlands
deserves a label ofreliable ally, a title which the Dutch have indeed enjoyed for the many
decades oftheir NATO membership. The Netherlands has always been finding solutions
and compromises, and has never pushed its own defense agenda alone against their Allies’
will. Such a clean image in other eyes ofthe other allies and such a firm positioning in
NATO structures has allowed the Netherlands to maintain an active role in the
decision-making process.
While cleverly counting the costs and risks ofNATO membership, and comparing
them with the benefits, the Netherlands has come to generate security “profits” from its
membership in this collective defense organization. Logically, one must ask the following
questions: What contributed to this position the most? And what are the current limits and
opportunities (advantages) ofthis highly profitable attitude ofthe Netherlands?
58 - Dutch Limits
The limits derived from its history, its geo-strategic situation and its economic
situation are some ofthose which influenced the Dutch decision to reorient its national
foreign policy from neutrality to alignment. On the other hand, some ofthese limits,
including historical limits, have changed over time and developed new aspects.
a. Historical Limits
Dutch history provides its political decision makers with at least five reasons
why they should promote the policy of being a reliable NATO member. First, the
Netherlands has become a small power in international relations. The Netherlands is a small
state not only with respect to its physical size, but also with respect to its military, political
and economic power. Second, its policy of neutrality was not effective enough to isolate
the Netherlands dependably from major European conflicts ofthe 20th century. Third, loss
ofstate sovereignty, and other political, economic, military, social, and cultural
consequences ofthe German occupation placed high priority on the issues of defense and
security in Dutch policy making. Fourth, the Dutch people found NATO to be a useful
institution in solving their security concerns for the entire Cold War era. Finally, NATO’s
flexibility to adjust its concept to the uncertain post Cold War world and its ability to
become a pillar ofthe new European security architecture persuaded the Dutch to maintain
a policy of augment in NATO.
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b. Geo – Strategic Limits
The Dutch geo-strategic situation is characterized by five factors. First, the
Netherlands is small. Second, the Netherlands is located on the western European trade
crossroads. Third, the country is located among three major competitive European powers.
Fourth, a great portion ofthe land is below sea level. Finally, the country possesses a
strategic deposits of natutal resources.
c. Economic Limits
It is disputable whether we are dealing with economic limits at all in the
Dutch case. On one hand, the GDP is limited due to “smallness.” On the other hand,
generally positive economic indicators suggest an advantage relative to comparable states.
Nevertheless, there have been four main elements ofthe Dutch economy that have
influenced Dutch policy in NATO. First, the Dutch experienced, firsthand, that their weak
defense resulted in the interruption of economic prosperity. Next, the subsequent economic
exploitation ofthe country under an aggressor caused mass hardship among the
population. Afterward, the Dutch emphasis on economic and financial recovery and the
relatively stable economic development in subsequent years created good starting points
for building strong, modern armed forces and for sharing the defense burden in accordance
with the demands ofthe alliance. Finally, the Dutch levels ofEuropean integration and
Atlantic cooperation created a great deal ofinterdependence in defense end economic
policies among the allies.
60 - Dutch Opportunities
The Dutch security and defense policy along with its strategic political culture
accelerated the effort among domestic political powers to encourage the country to
become a valuable member ofthe Alliance. The model that the security and defense policy
ofthe Netherlands provides can serve as a pattern of reasonable behavior within the
Alliance for a small state.
a. Security and Defense Policy
The main elements ofthe Dutch security and defense policy were defined in
the very beginning ofDutch membership in NATO:
- The preeminence ofNATO interests over other policy goals.
- The acceptance ofU.S. leadership ofthe Alliance.
- The need for West German participation within NATO.
- An emphasis on strategic deterrence.117
Most ofthese basic principles are still kept by the Dutch policy makers, though some of
them have changed with time and some new ones were identified throughout the almost
fifty-year Dutch membership in NATO.
The first was tight adherence to NATO’s plans and NATO’s policy. The
Netherlands did not develop any ofits own security and defense alternatives, and
subordinated its policy altogether to NATO’s one policy. The defense plans were derived
from NATO’s planning as the easiest way to meet NATO’s defense capability objectives.
117 Bitzinger, p. 196.
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Second was the strengthening oftheir own national capability to meet the
provisions of Article 5 in practice.118
The Netherlands consistently allocated defense
expenditures to realize all modernizing programs. Reductions, resulting from the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and other treaties, carried out by the
Netherlands are coordinated with other allies so as not to throw NATO defense
capabilities out ofbalance.
Third is the supporting concept of nuclear deterrence through gradual
reductions. Although the Dutch armed forces share the nuclear tasks ofthe alliance
unconditionally, the country supports each further reduction in the European nuclear
theater.
Fourth is maintaining a Euro-Atlantic scope ofEuropean security and the
caution to build up exclusively European defense capabilities. The Netherlands does not
aspire to continental leadership; therefore, it dislikes the French and German efforts to
dominate Europe. The Netherlands supports Euro-Atlantic cooperation as the foundation
ofEuropean security architecture. It also considers the US conventional military and
nuclear presence in Europe to be the lynchpin ofEuro-Atlantic defense cooperation.
Fifth is the acceptance ofthe dominant power within NATO’s structural and
political framework. The Netherlands, as a small state, respects US dominance and enjoys
its leadership within NATO’s agenda.
Sixth is the acceptance of burden- and risk sharing. The Dutch government
not only positively responds to the alliance’s requests for defense spending, but also
118 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949.
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provides material and personnel for NATO commitments in “out-of-area” issues in to keep
order, force peace, and promote international security.
Seventh is increasing cooperation and integration with partners and
neighbors. The Netherlands collaborates not only in all major armed projects but also
integrates its armed forces within Benelux and with Germany. The further development of
close cooperation in political, economical, social and cultural areas is considered an
essential part ofregional stability.
Eighth are certain limits of domestic policy. A deep examination of all main
aspects ofthe Dutch membership in NATO uncovers certain constraints on domestic
political powers. Support for nuclear deterrence has its limits. These limits are drawn by
the level of nuclear arsenal on national soil and the public acceptance ofthat level.
Last is the allocation of national wealth, a public issue. The people are not
willing to abandon expensive welfare and health programs, and current decision-making is
often narrowed to making a choice between defense and social options.
b. Strategic Political Culture
The strategic political culture ofthe Dutch has been configured almost
perfectly to allow the Netherlands to maintain a steady course in its effort to build an
advantageous position within NATO. By analyzing strategic political culture in all its
detail, three main points can be highlighted.
First, the Dutch political scene enjoys broad consensus ofmajor political
powers. The existence ofthis strong consensus, evident from the beginning ofDutch
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membership in NATO, still shows no sign of abating under the changing security
circumstances in Europe.
Second, the Dutch people have consistently supported political elites in their
approach to security and defense issues and to NATO policy. Such support has been
evident in two major directions. On one hand, it has directly influenced the meaning of
policy makers of NATO community; on the other hand, it has influenced domestic public
poles.
Thus, finally, the Netherlands has enjoyed an extremely high level of
support from its citizens for its security and defense policy. A great number ofDutch
citizens have expressed support for the Dutch commitment to NATO and to US
participation in European defense. However, Dutch decision makers do not have
unrestricted support in nuclear issues. The Dutch people do not support any further
escalations ofnuclear weapons in Europe as a strategy of deterrence.
This analysis ofthe lessons the Dutch have learned from its history, their
geo-strategic situation, and economic factors should help one to understand the main
factors which were taken in consideration by Dutch post World War II decision makers,
ending in the the reorientation oftheir foreign policy from neutrality to alignment.
Moreover, the analysis of position-building modulators helps one to identify and
understand the main elements ofthe Dutch security and defense policy and strategic
political culture that built so strong a position ofthe Netherlands in NATO.
A summary ofthese two analyses will be useful in comparing and contrasting them
with the case ofthe Czech Republic. The chief aim ofsuch a comparison would be to help
64
define this new member’s expected position within NATO, and to help uncover any
weaknesses which the Czech Republich may find useful in avoiding in order to achieve a
roughly equivalent position to the Dutch in NATO.
Date:
December 1, 1997