Briefing by Military Authority

F-2012-32744

UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2012-32744
Doc No. C06033912
Date: 02/22/2017

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FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBOTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8540
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CONFIDENTIALPARAMARIBO 0524
E.O. 12065: GDS 03/18/88 (La Roche, Richard R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS PINT NS

SUBJECT: Briefing by Military Authority

REF: A) PARAMARIBO 0504 B) Behrend-LaRoche Telcon March 18

  1. (C) – Entire text.
  2. National Army Commander Bouterse, accompanied by Battalion Commander Fernandes and Acting President Ramdat-Misier, gave an hour-long briefing for assembled heads of mission at the Presidential Palace on the morning of March 18. The absence of Garrison Commander Horb, the third member of the Military Authority, went unexplained. Bouterse said that Acting Foreign Minister Naarendorp had been invited but had been prevented from attending by illness.
  3. Bouterse spoke in Dutch using President spokesman Petzoldt to interpret into English. Bouterse, who did virtually all of the talking, said his purpose was to review events of the past week and take questions mission representatives might have. He assured all present that the Military Authority had full control once more and that all efforts were being made to “normalize” the situation. We would note, for example, the absence of any abnormal military presence on Paramaribo’s streets.
  4. From information developed during the investigation of the coup attempt, Bouterse said there were both political and military aspects to the coup. Conspirators had considered three possible plans for assassination of the Military Authority: by inviting them to a religious gathering in a temple; by kidnapping them first during the gathering at the palace on the Hindu festival day of Holi Phagwa (March 10); and by inviting them to a dinner at the home of one of the initiators. The military action, which took place early on the following day, was therefore just one element of a total plan.
  5. In response to questions, Bouterse told the group that in spite of the predominance of Hindustanis among those thus far implicated in the coup attempt, the Military Authority considered it to be politically and not racially motivated. Of the two principal military men involved, Sgt. Hawker had been shot “according to the decision of a military court in the field and Lt. Rambocus would shortly be tried by a similar military court.” Pressed on Rambocus, Bouterse offered as background that he had already been implicated in a prior coup attempt (against former Arron government), but had been given a chance to go abroad. When he returned to Suriname, he was welcomed back into the community. The GOS had even offered Rambocus a chance to join its foreign service. Rambocus would now face trial for what Bouterse seemed to imply were his misdeeds aggravated by ingratitude.
  6. Charge asked about nature of military courts and Bouterse, assisted by Ramdat-Misier, said a military court “in the field” could appropriately try both military and civilian offenders. The courts could also refer cases to the regular military court. In the present situation, said Bouterse, it had been decided that “extraordinary circumstances” required the issuance of special decrees to deal with those involved in the coup plot. The decrees would be published today or tomorrow.
  7. Comment: Although we have no factual information on circumstances surrounding Hawker’s death, legal basis for what happened seems to us a fabrication which Bouterse is using to cover what was probably a summary execution and a clear human rights violation. Ambassador Hoekman (see SEPTEL on conversation with Hoekman) is convinced that Bouterse simply accepted bad advice and is now bound to perpetuate a lie. Bouterse’s lead into the Rambocus story seemed to have as a point persuading the diplomats that Rambocus was an enemy to the state who deserved no further chances to make mischief. Hoekman learned from Bouterse just after the briefing that Rambocus would be tried within the next few days, probably by Friday.
  8. In response to a closing question, Bouterse said a new government would be installed by March 26. Almost all ministers had been chosen but three “candidates” remained under consideration.

LA ROCHE

CONFIDENTIAL
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Source:

C06033912

Link:

Internal Link:

https://surinamepress.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Briefing-by-Military-Authority-March-1982-C06033912.pdf

Date:
March 18, 1982
Categories:
Desi Bouterse, Foiled Coups & Plots, Planned Suriname Invasion
Tags:
Boxes:
F-2012-32744
Years:
1982
Persons:
Behrend, Desi Bouterse, Hawker, Hoekman, La Roche, Ramdat-Misier, Roy Horb
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