Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada

by ROBERT A. PASTOR

I. COPING WITH REVOLUTIONS

ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT and frustrating challenges to US foreign policy in the post-World War II period has been coping with third world revolutions, particularly those in the Caribbean Basin. Whether the revolution has been in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Grenada, relations with the US have always deteriorated, and the revolutionary governments have moved closer to the Soviet bloc and toward a Communist political model. Both the deteriorating relationship and the increasingly belligerent posture of the US have conformed to a regular pattern; so too have the interpretations of the causes and consequences of the confrontation.

US government officials and a few policy analysts tend to view the hostile attitudes and policies of the revolutionary governments as the cause of the problem. According to this perspective, the revolutionary governments deliberately provoke the US and then point to US hostility to justify their militarization and close relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba. In the most sophisticated variation of this interpretation, Jorge Domínguez suggests that Cuban President Fidel Castro might have deliberately provoked the US in 1960 after concluding that “it was impossible to conduct a revolution in Cuba without a major confrontation with the United States” Soviet influence offered to reinforce Castro’s preference for centralized power whereas the US political culture encouraged pluralism at home and abroad (Domínguez, 1978: 137-149).

The predominant view in the literature, however, is that the US pushes revolutionary governments to the left by economic sanctions, political pressure, covert actions, and/or military threats or actions. According to this view, the US effort to contain or intimidate has the unintended effect of leaving the revolutionary governments with no alternative but to rely on the Soviet Union to defend themselves. The explanations for why the US adopts such a counter-productive policy are varied. Some, like former Grenada Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, assert that the US cannot accept “genuine national independence, non-alignment, and self-determination” (Bishop, 1983b: 237). Others suggest that the US opposes revolutions because they threaten US hegemony or its business interests. Still others find the cause in US misperceptions. In their analysis of the US-Cuban relationship in 1959-61, Zeitlin and Scheer described US policy as a victim of “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” By defining Castro as a Communist and developing policies as if he were one, the US, according to these two authors, eventually contributed to his becoming a Communist, and his revolution to becoming anti-American. In their view, the US missed an opportunity:

Had we [the US] sought to understand the social revolution occurring in Cuba, to sympathize with the aspirations of the Cuban people which Fidel Castro articulated so fiercely – with their demands for economic, political, and social changes, changes that challenged our long dominance in Cuban affairs – we might have succeeded in cementing cordial relations with the new Cuban government (Zeitlin and Scheer, 1963: 9).2

An alternative interpretation that focuses on the interaction of the two actors is offered by former US Ambassador to Cuba Phillip Bonsal: “We did not force [Castro] into the arms of the Communists, but we were, in my judgment, unwisely cooperative in removing the obstacles to his chosen path” (Bonsal, 1979: 208).3 Cole Blasier’s analysis of the interaction leads him to conclude that “almost from the beginning, Castro and the United States expected the worst from each other, and neither was disappointed” (Blasier, 1979: 208).

The debate on the reasons for the deteriorating relationship between the US and the Nicaraguan Revolution roughly parallels the debate on Cuba. Walter LaFeber, for example, argues that the US is pushing Nicaragua (and all revolutions) to Cuba; Harrison and Falcoff, that Nicaragua is provoking the US to justify its shift to the Soviet bloc; and Cruz, that the deteriorating relationship must be understood in terms of the interaction of the two actors (LaFeber, 1983; Harrison, 1983; Falcoff, 1983; and Cruz, 1984).

The interpretation of US-Grenadian relations follows a similar pattern. The United States Government attributed the tension in the relationship to Grenada’s having “adopted a militant foreign policy harshly critical of the US and openly aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union.”4 With regard to the question of whether the US pushed the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) to the left and to Cuba, former US Ambassador to Grenada (from 1977-79) Frank Ortiz was succinct: “… a Marxist-Leninist like Bishop is not ‘driven’ into the Communist camp; that is where he started out to go” (Ortiz, 1984: 12).5

However, the predominant view in the literature is that US policy pushed the Grenada Revolution to the left and to Cuba. A report by a Church group stated this view most crisply: “Through its attempts to dictate policy to the Grenada government [on its relations with Cuba], the United States had provoked the very development it sought to avoid” (EPICA, 1982:61). In his study of the Grenada Revolution, Hugh O’Shaughnessy also agrees that US policy was counterproductive: “It is ironic that the Cuban-Grenadian relationship should have been fostered by Washington, whose constant harping on the supposed strategic threat from a tiny eastern Caribbean island caused the New Jewel Movement to militarize their society more than they might otherwise have done” (O’Shaughnessy, 1984: 105).

Was Grenada pushed into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union and Cuba by insensitive and counter-productive US policies? Or did the Grenadian Government leap on the unsuspecting shoulders of the Russian bear because of the ideological predisposition of its leadership? These questions have not been satisfactorily answered in the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua, but the Grenada case offers a better opportunity because, unlike the Cuban or Nicaraguan revolutions, the case on Grenada is closed and contained. Moreover, rather than just rely on the regime’s public statements, scholars now have access to some of the documents of Grenada’s People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) and its ruling party, the New Jewel Movement (NJM). Although these documents, which were seized by US forces after the intervention, have their limitations, they do offer a credible and highly instructive window into the thinking of the PRG’s leadership. An additional source of information comes from the author’s own experience in the US government and his interviews with key officials in the Grenadian and US governments.6

This article begins with a brief survey of the background to the revolution. Then the three stages in the US-Grenadian relationship from 1979-1983 will be described: (1) the empty embrace (March 13-April 13, 1979); (2) moving apart (April 13, 1979-January 1981); and (3) confrontation and intimidation (January 1981-October 1983)). In the last section of this article, the author will analyze the causes and the consequences of the tense relationship between the US and the PRG, and speculate as to possible alternative approaches for addressing revolutionary governments.

II. THE SETTING

GRENADA MAY NOW be known to the world, but its politics and its problems are those of a very small island. Like many of its eastern Caribbean neighbors, Grenada has a population of less than 100,000 on an island 133 square miles – about twice the size and one-sixth the population of Washington, DC. Grenada’s economy is small (GDP of less than $100 million), open (the sum of exports and imports exceeds GDP), and extremely dependent (tourism earns one-half of its foreign exchange) (World Bank, 1982).7

Since universal suffrage was introduced by Great Britain in 1951, Grenada’s politics have been dominated by two charismatic, quasi-religious leaders, Eric Gairy from 1951-1979, and Maurice Bishop from 1979-1983. Both organized and led political parties, but were actually “heroes” amidst the “crowd” (Singham, 1968; Smith, 1983). Upon returning to Grenada from Trinidad’s oil fields in 1949, at the age of 27, Gairy began organizing the poor estate workers. He successfully confronted the planters and the British bureaucracy and won significant concessions for workers and small farmers, and, as a result, a devoted following. However, over time, Gairy “developed into a feared and somewhat eccentric Negro shepherd-king” (Naipaul, 1984: 63). By the 1970s, Gairy was regularly extorting money from business, irregularly terrorizing opponents, and periodically lecturing before Conferences on Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs). He was an embarrassment to the newly educated Grenadians, whose path to power was blocked by his continued popularity among the poor. Over a 25-year period, Gairy lost only 2 of 8 elections. In the last election before the revolution, on December 7, 1976, a coalition of 3 opposition parties, which included the New Jewel Movement, failed to unseat Gairy, although it won 48.6% of the vote and 6 of 15 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

One month later, a new administration in the US took office, eager to formulate a forward-looking policy toward the Caribbean. The Carter Administration strategy emphasized development and regional cooperation. It encouraged the establishment of the Caribbean Group, which was chaired by the World Bank and included 15 international organizations and 31 nations. Between 1977 and 1980, the Caribbean Group promoted regional projects and rationalized and quadrupled foreign aid to the entire region, but its direct impact on Grenada was negligible.

In February 1979, the US Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco arrested two Grenadians in Baltimore and charged them with illegally transhipping weapons to Grenada. Officials from the Bureau then pursued their investigations to Grenada and, collaborating with local police, arrested one New Jewel Movement (NJM) leader and interrogated others. Gairy left the island at the same time to attend a meeting on the International Year of the Child at the United Nations, and the NJM leadership feared that he left instructions with the police to assassinate them.

In the early morning hours of March 13, 4 leaders of the NJM – Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Hudson Austin, and one other – voted on whether to seize power. They divided equally with Coard and Austin voting to do it, and Bishop and the other person voting against the coup. The 4 therefore decided to add a fifth member – George Louison – and he voted with Coard and Austin to attack.

At 4 AM, 46 members of the New Jewel Movement attacked the True Blue police barracks and then seized the radio station. Two policemen were killed. The people of Grenada woke up the next morning to learn that Radio Grenada had become Radio Free Grenada, and that they had been liberated.

III. FIRST PHASE: THE EMPTY EMBRACE

THE COUP CAUGHT EVERYONE by surprise. Great Britain quietly sent a naval frigate to Grenada, and Prime Minister James Callaghan called Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams for his views. Adams told him that Gairy was indefensible, and that Bishop had phoned him and pledged early elections. Nonetheless, Adams told Callaghan that he decided to call together the leaders from 5 of the neighboring states to discuss what to do.

Bishop and other members of the NJM phoned leaders throughout the Caribbean, assuring everyone of their moderate intentions. US Ambassador Frank Ortiz recalled that Bishop “solemnly assured me that US lives and property would be protected, that good relations with the United States were a basic aim of his government, and that there would be prompt and free elections of a legally constituted government” (Ortiz, 1984: 7).

The leaders of 6 eastern Caribbean countries met in Barbados on March 14 and 15, 1979, and discussed the coup and how to respond. All were deeply concerned about the implications of the first violent, unconstitutional change of government in the area. Most knew Bishop, Coard, and some of the other leaders of the NJM either personally or through reputation as men of the “left;” the question, they asked themselves, was how far left, and what were the intentions of the NJM. In the communiqué issued at the end of the first day, the Caribbean leaders reported that they had “discussed the security implications of the situation for the region as a whole.” They affirmed their support for the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of Grenada but, at the same time, asserted “that the wider interests and unity of the area and of Grenada in particular require a return to constitutionality as soon as possible.” The key point of the communiqué, however, was their taking note of “the stated declaration of the leaders of the regime in Grenada to hold free and fair elections and… the hope that this would be done without delay. In this regard, the Ministers pledged their help if requested.” During the second day of discussions, the leaders met with George Louison, who was sent by Bishop as a representative of the new regime in Grenada. Louison repeated the assurances the regime had made, and made other, more specific pledges to begin preparations for elections.

In the US, a subcommittee of the Special Coordination Committee (a mini-SCC) of the National Security Council met the same day – March 15. It was the first – and one of the few – National Security Council meetings to discuss Grenada. Representatives of all the agencies had the same kinds of suspicions about the new leaders in Grenada that had brought the Caribbean leaders together. Despite the continuous flow of assurances, there were other unsettling signs in Grenada. The broadcasts from Radio Free Grenada sounded more like the propaganda of a Communist regime than the newscasts of the open, democratic countries of the Caribbean. More troubling was the dismissal by the new government of the entire professional police force and army and its replacement with a political People’s Revolutionary Army.

The discussion in the mini-SCC reflected rather predictable bureaucratic differences – with the Pentagon taking a more anxious view of the potential threat, and the State Department more relaxed. Nonetheless, the meeting reached a relatively quick consensus. Like the governments of Great Britain and Barbados, the US agreed that a return by Eric Gairy was untenable. As there were no other obvious alternatives, the subcommittee recommended to the President that the US support Great Britain and the eastern Caribbean nations in their efforts to influence the new regime to make good on its promise of early and free elections.

After the eastern Caribbean nations recognized the new regime, the State Department followed with a statement, on March 22, that the United States “strongly supports and endorses the views expressed in these [Caribbean] communiqués, which stress the need for prompt return to constitutional norms; the necessity to respect the fundamental principles of self-determination and non-intervention . [and therefore the US] decided to continue friendly and cooperative relations” (DeYoung, 1979b).

On the same day, Ambassador Ortiz was instructed to travel to Grenada to inform the new leaders of the US aid program and to communicate the interest of the United States in good and cooperative relations. Bishop and the other members of the NJM were totally unaware of the 5 US aid projects, which were channelled through the Caribbean Development Bank. The US also offered to increase the number of Peace Corps volunteers on the island rapidly, and, when Bishop expressed interest in this, Ortiz indicated that a new group could arrive within one or two weeks. Ortiz urged Bishop to send representatives to discuss specific projects with AID (Agency for International Development) personnel in Barbados. In addition, the US Ambassador had a very small fund – the Special Development Activities Fund (SDA) – that could be used quickly for grants of $5,000 for community-related projects. While the amount was small, these grants had proven very popular in the eastern Caribbean. Bishop expressed interest in the SDA grants.

Two days later, on March 25, Bishop held another rally and announced the suspension of the constitution – breaking one of his pledges – and decreed a package of “ten fundamental People’s Laws,” which included the retention of emergency arrest powers for the People’s Revolutionary Army. At the same time, however, he announced that Grenada would remain in the Commonwealth and retain the Governor General.

On March 28, Bishop called the US Embassy, and asked the US not to send the Peace Corps volunteers.” Although Bishop had appeared anxious for increased aid, he sent no one to the Embassy to follow up the Ambassador’s suggestion.

By late March, Bishop’s government seemed well-entrenched. Within a week of the coup, he had arrested many of his political opponents and transferred military and police powers to his followers. Recognized by all his neighbors, he had also received assurances of good relations and offers of aid from both the US and UK. At this moment, when his revolution seemed most secure, the US began to receive reports of arms shipments to Grenada from Cuba through Guyana.

Burnham had pledged to help the new government on March 20, and a Guyanese ship landed in Grenada two days later with supplies, and possibly with arms. On April 4, a small Cuban plane landed at Pearls airport and unloaded some small arms. Three days later, a Cubana flight from Georgetown, Guyana, to Cuba was diverted to Grenada. While the plane was supposedly being repaired, several boxes of arms were unloaded, and 8 Cubans remained in Grenada. One of those Cubans was Ivor Martínez, who would be head of Cuban operations until an ambassador was appointed. On April 8, another Cubana flight, claiming “technical difficulties,” landed at the Grenada airport and left arms and people. On April 9, a Guyanese ship, Jamaito, arrived in St. George’s with arms that Cuba had sent to Guyana. The US also learned that a Cuban ship, Matanzas, left Cuba on April 6 with a large shipment of arms; the suspicion was that it might be destined for Grenada. (It arrived on April 14.)

At the same time, Bishop’s speeches and his government’s radio broadcasts began to warn of an imminent invasion from a neighboring island by Gairy and a group of mercenaries. At a press conference on April 9, Bishop said that he would request arms from the US, UK, Canada, and Venezuela to prevent a counter-coup by Gairy. He added parenthetically: “We have also asked the governments of Cuba and other Caribbean countries for assistance in military training so as to prevent an attack planned by mercenaries against our country.” Since he had already received such assistance, this appeared to be a trial balloon to test the political atmosphere to see whether Cuban aid could be expanded and publicized.

The State Department sent instructions to Ambassador Ortiz to meet with Bishop to assure him that Gairy would not invade the island, and to express concern as delicately but clearly as possible, that relations with the US would be complicated if Bishop developed close military ties with Cuba. Ortiz arrived on the afternoon of April 9 and was left waiting to see Bishop for a day. While he was waiting, he witnessed the shooting, by the People’s Revolutionary Army, of a small plane contracted by Holiday Inn to take tourist photographs of the beach and hotel. The soldiers shot at the plane from Grenada’s most beautiful and widely-used beach at Grand Anse.

Ortiz first saw Coard and emphasized the importance of tourism to Grenada. Then, as he later recalled, he warned Coard “that incidents such as one I had just witnessed [the shooting of the plane] and the invasion scares would frighten tourists away.”12 In his conversation later the same day with Bishop, Ortiz covered a number of points. He reiterated his previous offer to send AID (Agency for International Development) officials and Peace Corps volunteers, but Bishop said he wasn’t ready for them. When Bishop expressed interest in receiving military aid, Ortiz explained the process for requesting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, and said that the Grenadian government should decide what it wanted and make a formal request. The Ambassador then pressed the Prime Minister on his promise to hold early elections, and, according to Ortiz, he showed “some annoyance” on this point.

Ortiz then got to the two principal points of the conversation. He provided proof that Gairy was in San Diego, not on a neighboring island as Bishop had repeatedly said publicly. Moreover, the US Government considered any conspiracy by Gairy to use the US to invade Grenada as a violation of the US Neutrality Act and would act to prevent it. He urged Bishop to try to calm the people of Grenada by conveying the information about Gairy, but, according to Ortiz, Bishop declined to do so.

While he had instructions to tell Bishop of the US concern about his establishing a military relationship with Cuba, Ortiz broadened the point:
Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada’s best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any13 tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba.13

Ortiz then gave Bishop a paper containing that talking point and the others that he made.

The same day, April 10, Bishop met with the British ambassador, who also offered to send a development assistance team and a group of security advisers. Bishop thanked him, indicated that he would accept the security advisers, but that Britain should delay sending the development assistance team. Bishop later informed the British that they should also postpone the sending of the security advisers. He promised to let them know in about three months.

By April 13, Bishop felt sufficiently confident to blast the US in his first major speech. He began by reassuring his countrymen – “there is peace, calm, and quiet in our country.” Then, with the deftness of an accomplished orator, Bishop used Ortiz’s démarche to assert the revolution’s nationalist credentials and paint the United States as an insensitive bully trying to push small Grenada around. “The Ambassador,” Bishop told his audience, “went on to advise us that if we continue to speak about what he called ‘mercenary invasions by phantom armies’ that we would lose our tourists. He also reminded us of the experience which Jamaica had in this regard a few years ago. As some of you will undoubtedly recall, Jamaica at that time had gone through a period of intense de-stabilization.” Striking an aggrieved posture, Bishop told his people that “we have always striven to develop the closest and friendliest relations with the United States…” But when Grenada requested aid, said Bishop, the US offered $5,000. “Sisters and brothers, our hospitals are without medicines… Is [that] all the wealthiest country in the world can offer?”

Then, after insisting that Gairy was about to invade, Bishop read from the talking points that Ortiz had left, explaining that the US would not permit Grenada to ask for help from, or have relations with, Cuba. “We reject entirely the argument of the American Ambassador… If the government of Cuba is willing to offer us assistance, we would be more than happy to receive it.” He concluded his speech with a powerful symbol: “No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country, or who to be friendly with… We are not in anybody’s backyard, and we are definitely not for sale … Though small and poor, we are proud and determined.”

The next day, as if it were a reaction to Ortiz’s strategem, the Cuban ship Matanza docked at St. George’s, and 50 Cuban technicians and many crates of arms were unloaded. The PRG then announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. On the same day, Bishop called the US Chargé in Barbados, and demanded that he send the AID officials promised by the Ambassador. The Embassy, not having yet fully absorbed his speech, sent the AID official three days later to look at several projects, but no high Grenadian official would meet with him.

The speech, however, set the tone for the world’s perception of the new revolution. Karen DeYoung, of the Washington Post, reported that the “strong US diplomatic response … may succeed only in pushing Grenada further to the left.” While the Cubans were responsive and helpful to the revolution, the article noted, the US only expressed “concern” and “displeasure” and regret over budgetary procedures. Moreover, according to DeYoung, public opinion on the island had turned against the US, viewing it as “a bully and a stingy one to boot” (DeYoung, 1979a).15

Bishop’s speech represented a turning point. The sequence of events leading up to the speech – the secret arrival of Cuban arms and advisers, the requests for help from the west without any followup – led many in the US government to believe that Bishop had deliberately staged the confrontation with the US. After reassuring everyone, Bishop felt secure enough to wait for the right opportunity to denounce the US, establish his nationalist credentials, and justify a relationship with Cuba.16 Ortiz’s démarche was the soft pitch that Bishop batted out of the ballpark, or at least this was the perception of many in the US government.

In October 1982, the author described this perception to Bishop and Coard, and both listened with what appeared to be genuine incredulity. Coard answered candidly: “Look, this was our first revolution. We were very inexperienced.” Bishop’s response was more graphic: “We are a lot like Americans. If you kick us in the shins, we will kick you in the balls.” Both insisted that Bishop’s speech on April 13 was not premeditated; it was an emotional reaction to their perception of Ortiz’s “lectures.”

That reaction needs to be understood in terms of their intellectual development as well as of Caribbean political culture, which places a high value on righteous defiance. Both Coard and Bishop studied in the US and in England, in the late 1960s, and were deeply influenced by the Black Power movement that swept those countries on a parallel track with the anti-Vietnam War movement. The Black Power movement offered an outlet for outrage which facilitated their entry into radical Marxist politics. Both embraced the Third World struggle against US imperialism, and came to believe that the US had consistently de-stabilized every independent government in the Third World concerned about social justice. Indeed, when asked, in an interview in 1983, whether he was surprised by US hostility to the Grenadian Revolution, Bishop responded:

Certainly, the overall response and reaction of the US frankly was no surprise to us. After all, the US is the formulator of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The formulator of the Roosevelt corollary in 1904. The US one hundred and thirty-five times invaded countries in this region over the last one hundred years (Bishop, 1983a: 255).

Both Coard and Bishop perceived Ortiz as an “arrogant racist,” who was “condescending with blacks.” Coard recalled that Ortiz “barged into my office and didn’t even knock.” And then he lectured to Coard and seemed uninterested in a response. Afterward he went to Bishop’s office and gave the same lecture, “the same threats.” Bishop exploded, according to Coard. Both felt that Ortiz’s leaving the paper with the talking points forced Bishop to respond. “The straw that broke the camel’s back,” in Coard’s words, was that Ortiz gave the same lecture to the head of security at the airport. (Bishop mentioned this in his April 13 speech.) When the author asked why they didn’t try to communicate their concerns to the US in a less public and provocative way, they confessed their inexperience and their quick angry reaction. In Bishop’s words: “Ortiz did everything possible to arouse a black man.”

Ortiz’s démarche served to reinforce their image of the US as an imperialist monster, bent on destroying their young revolution. In turn, their response confirmed the impression in Washington that these young Marxists wanted to provoke the US to justify their militarization and alliance with Cuba.

IV. SECOND PHASE: MOVING APART

INN THE SECOND PHASE, the US posture toward Grenada grew cooler and more distant. This phase can be divided into two parts. During the first part – from mid-April to November 1979 – the US began distancing itself from the regime while occasionally trying to show its cooperativeness. After November, the Carter Administration deliberately sought to restrict its contacts with the regime.

Soon after Bishop’s speech on April 13, the US government decided to re-evaluate its policy. By mid-April, the People’s Revolutionary Army had grown from about 50 men to about 2,000 (including the militia), eclipsing all the other armies of the region combined. There were about 80 political prisoners and no indication that the government would release them. After Bishop’s speech on April 13, the PRG admitted receiving arms from Cuba and other countries. This was later estimated at about 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100 heavy weapons, and ammunition (US-DS-DOD, 1983).

The State Department and the NSC began discussing options. There were 4 issues. First, did Grenada’s new leaders have a fixed direction toward Cuba, or was co-optation a plausible strategy? Secondly, what was the best way to influence the government to fulfill its pledges on elections, to remain closer to the Commonwealth Caribbean than to Cuba, and to inhibit any support for radical activities in the region? Third, what were the implications of a policy toward Grenada for the rest of the region? And fourth, what should the US do to preclude a repetition of another left-wing coup in the region?

Some argued that Bishop was still co-optable, and that the US should give more aid to the regime and encourage the Europeans to do more. Others argued that the April 13th speech represented a turning point toward Cuba chosen by Bishop, and that the thrust of US policy ought to be aimed at assisting the rest of the Caribbean. To provide bilateral aid to the one radical, non-democratic government in the eastern Caribbean would undermine the democracies and lend support to those radicals in the region who claimed that Grenada represented the wave of the future. Moreover, it would be an invitation to other governments to seek more aid by confronting the US.

An additional argument against the co-optation strategy was simply that the PRG showed almost no interest in being co-opted. Despite many offers by the US Embassy to help design aid requests, the PRG never responded, and when several AID officials travelled to Grenada on April 17 to visit SDA projects and meet Grenadian officials, the regime avoided any contact with them. Bishop never followed up on his off-hand request for military aid. It appeared that he had asked for help from the US without really wanting it. Perhaps he thought he could obtain more aid from other sources who would be sympathetic to his efforts to be independent of the US.17

The cooptation strategy would have aimed to calm the other regional governments and to encourage European governments to assist Grenada. The alternative “regional strategy” would encourage the other governments in the region to press Grenada to implement its pledges and to discourage Grenada from assisting radicals in neighboring countries. Instead of providing more aid to Grenada than to the other countries, as the co-optation strategy recommended, the regional strategy would increase aid to every country except Grenada until the PRG implemented its pledges. Grenada would therefore have a double incentive to contain its revolution and alter its policies: (1) it could receive aid from the US, and (2) it could avoid isolation from its neighbors. In addition, in consultations with the countries of the region, Great Britain, and Canada, the US would seek ways to reinforce the region’s security without jeopardizing civilian democratic governments.

The major argument against the regional strategy was that it signified a shift toward a more indirect, “distancing” approach to Grenada: instead of providing direct encouragement to the regime to move toward elections and a more friendly relationship with the US, the regional strategy provided indirect encouragement by helping the other nations more. Those who opposed the regional strategy argued that it meant US withdrawal from competition with the Cubans for Grenada’s future.

At the meeting on April 27, the mini-SCC recommended the regional strategy to the President, and he approved it. The co-optation strategy was rejected for several reasons: first, most thought it had already been tried and been rejected by Bishop in favor of a closer relationship with Cuba; second, and probably more importantly, most felt it would have a negative effect on those friendly countries most in need; third, the regional strategy was more congruent with the Administration’s approach to the region; and fourth, the regional nations could probably have a more positive influence on the PRG than could the US. It appeared that the NJM was comfortable with the US as its enemy, and perhaps the best strategy for the US was to avoid giving them a target.18

Between April and November 1979, the US pursued the regional strategy while continuing to seek ways to show it was interested in good relations. For example, Bishop insisted that his regime was threatened by Gairy, and that the US refused to extradite him. The US Ambassador explained the necessary legal procedures for extradition and even persuaded the Director of the Extradition Office of the Justice Department to visit Grenada to help the government prepare a stronger case. According to Ambassador Sally Shelton, Bishop “said he wished to meet with him personally.” When the Director arrived, Bishop declined the meeting, and instead only “a middle-level functionary with no real authority” spoke with him. As Ambassador Shelton recalled, the US official finally left after he and the Ambassador concluded that he PRG “was not genuinely interested in resolving this issue …” (US House, 1983: 62-63).

On May, wie some in the Embassy were still considering ways to heip Grenada design aid projects, Bishop gave a major speech and accused the US government of undertaking a massive de-stabilization campaign – “The Pyramid Plan of the CIA” – to destroy the revolution. He described in great detail how the plan would be implemented and warned his “brothers and sisters” to be vigilant in order to “crush the enemy” (Bishop, 1979а).

The documents obtained by US troops show that Bishop’s obsession with the CIA was not just publicly expressed to keep the “masses vigilant” and supportive of his government; his private thoughts and classified statements to small groups reflect the same paranoia. He received “intelligence,” from Grenadians and others in the US, describing alleged CIA activities in Grenada, and he erroneously gave most, if not all, of these reports credence.

During the remainder of the Carter Administration, the US expanded development programs for Grenada’s neighbors and, after consultations, helped formulate a regional security strategy. The British took the lead in improving the region’s policy forces, and the US assisted the establishment of a regional coast guard. At the same time, the nations of the region began discussions on their own regional security needs and developed informal arrangements to help each other in times of emergencу.

While Grenada tried to develop its relations with the Socialist International and a number of democratic governments, it reserved its closest relationships for Cuba and the Soviet Union. Grenada’s opposition to a UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one public sign; the documents reveal an even closer relationship. The Soviet Union, however, did not aid the PRG as much as Cuba did.

Within Grenada, the New Jewel Movement adopteda hard line approach to political expression – preventing the publication of independent newspapers, detaining political opponents indefinitely, prohibiting other political parties from functioning, and trying to control the labor unions – but it proved quite flexible with regard to private business and seemed to be giving greater emphasis to the importance of tourism, a curious priority given their revolutionary rhetoric.

Though the Carter Administration’s policy preference was to maintain a low profile and some distance from the regime, on 2 occasions the US was almost provoked into direct confrontation. In the fall of 1979, as the 2 Grenadians arrested for gun-running the previous February were coming to trial, the PRG intensified its efforts to get them released. The Bishop regime then arrested a US citizen living in Grenada on grounds that she was a threat to Grenada’s security. The US Ambassador demanded to know the evidence and the charges and believed “we had a hostage situation on our hands.” Grenada’s ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Dessima Williams, told a reporter from the Washington Post, after the indictment of the 2 men on September 1, that her government would now have to determine how to “reciprocate” in the case of the US citizen imprisoned in Grenada. The National Security Council met to consider US options, but, before reaching a decision, the Grenadians jumped bail, and the US citizen was released.

Similarly, two months later, two other American citizens were arrested by the Grenadian regime for no apparent reason, and, again, the NSC met and discussed a number of serious measures, but the regime released the citizens soon afterwards (US House, 1983: 64, 65; Robinson, 1979). As a result of these incidents, the US decided to adopt a more formal policy of distancing itself from the regime and of restricting ambassadorial visits to the island.

Did the Administration’s strategy of non-communication and confrontation erode the NJM’s coherence, leading to division and eventual self-destruction in October 1983? Was the Administration ultimately successful in creating the conditions that permitted it to intervene on October 25, 1983, and replace the Grenadian regime? The documents do not support either conclusion.

In the crucial debates, in the fall of 1983, over the future organization of the Grenada government and the direction of the revolution, no one in the PRG raised the US posture as a reference point, either for choosing one direction or the other. Those debates were driven by personality and ideology; none of the leaders expressed concern either with trying to influence effectively the US government or trying to respond to US pressures. Although some have suggested that Coard opposed Bishop’s meeting in Washington, the available evidence suggests that the NJM had been united from the beginning in its effort to appear to engage the US in dialogue.

On the other hand, the invitation from the other Caribbean governments to the US to intervene in Grenada was undoubtedly made in part because the governments expected an affirmative response. However, the Caribbean governments might have expected such a response from either US administration, although for different reasons: from the Carter Administration because of its strategy of regional support, and from the Reagan Administration because of its deep hostility to the regime and its readiness to use force. It is easy to speculate as to how the Carter Administration would have responded to such an invitation, but impossible to know.

VI. THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE COLLISION

WHO PUSHED FIRST? Did the US push Grenada to the left, or did Grenada deliberately provoke the US in order to justify its leftist preferences? As few of the PRG documents were written in the period before 1981 or specifically address Grenada-US relations, one needs to be careful about drawing definitive conclusions about the PRG’s policy toward the US at the beginning of the revolution or about its subsequent evolution.

Nevertheless, the picture is much clearer today. Those who argued that the US pushed Grenada to the left or to Cuba were wrong. Cuban arms and support arrived covertly while the US was pursuing a cooperative relationship with the PRG and before the Ortiz démarche of April 10. Moreover, it is now known that the New Jewel Movement described itself as a Marxist-Leninist Party before it took power in 1979, and that it identified with the Soviet Union and Cuba in its struggle against US imperialism. The first decisions of the NJM were to secretly adopt a Communist political model and seize control of the military forces (Hart, 1984: xiv), while publicly assuring everyone of their moderate and democratic (including elections) intentions. There is no evidence that those pledges were ever viewed by the NJM as anything more than a temporary tactic to consolidate the revolution.

The NJM invited Cuban arms secretly and received them before it publicly requested western military aid. Moreover, the request to the west appears disingenuous, as there was no follow-up with respect to the US, and an indefinite postponement with regard to British offers for aid. The relationship with Cuba grew closer, not because of US hostility, but because the leadership of both governments viewed the world in similar terms, and also because of the deepening personal relationship between Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro – two charismatic, nationalistic, anti-imperialistic leaders, who were inspired by their defiance of the US. The relationship with the Soviet Union did not deepen, despite repeated efforts to do so by the PRG, because of Soviet reluctance.23 The thesis that most revolutionary regimes “have a vital interest in maintaining their political autonomy from the Soviet Union” does not appear sustained in the Grenadian case (Feinberg and Oye, 1983: 201). The report by Grenada’s ambassador to the USSR shows a strong desire by the NJM for ideological and political attachment to the Soviet Union; there is no comparable evidence to reflect the NJM’s desire for autonomy from the USSR.

Did the PRG push first? Did it deliberately provoke the US to justify its alliance with Cuba and to establish its nationalist credentials? The author believed this at the time, but after interviews with Bishop and Coard and after reading the documents, he is inclined to accept the point that Bishop’s speech on April 13 was primarily an emotional reaction to the Ortiz démarche. Ortiz’s lectures on the vulnerability of tourism and the dangers of relations with Cuba and his style of delivery confirmed all of their preconceptions of the US as a de-stabilizing imperialist. Ortiz made a mistake in expressing displeasure with Grenada’s relations with Cuba rather than just the military relationship, and his delivery of the talking points was an unprofessional error. Bishop, for his part, not only erred in his misunderstanding of Ortiz’s message, but also in neglecting to consider an alternative approach or to calculate the cost of his emotional tirade.

Nonetheless, in the broader context of the evolution of the PRG’s international relationships, this meeting shrinks in importance. Regardless of what the US said or did, relations with the PRG were destined to be cool and distant at best as long as the NJM continued to view US imperialism as the devil incarnate, and the United States judged that its interests would be adversely affected by the expansion of Soviet-Cuban influence in the Caribbean.

However, just because relations could not be good does not mean that a collision or a confrontation was inevitable. Perceptions of each other’s behavior were crucial in bringing the two governments to a collision. Each suspected the other of the worst motives and interpreted information in a way that reinforced those suspicions.

From the beginning, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) apparently believed the US was going to de-stabilize its regime, and it is hard to see how the US could have convinced them otherwise, even though it was untrue. Also from the beginning, the US suspected the NJM were unfriendly and undemocratic leftists, who could very well be Marxist-Leninists and more sympathetic to the Soviet bloc than to the West. This proved to be an accurate perception. Nonetheless, the Carter Administration decided to give the new government the benefit of the doubt. After the first flurry of evidence confirmed its worst suspicions, however, the US moved to distance itself from the regime.

It is unlikely that the US would have confronted the PRG if it had not been for its clear alignment with Cuba, its total disinterest in making good on its pledge to hold elections, and had there not been change in administration in Washington. The Reagan Administration viewed the problems of the Caribbean Basin strictly in terms of the East-West struggle, and thus it viewed US policy toward Grenada as an important statement of its determination to confront communism (Pastor, forthcoming).

It seems unlikely that any US administration would fail to view the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean as anything but a threat to its interests. An important issue, which will be discussed later, is whether the NJM’s preconception of the US as a threat could have changed over time.

The issue for Grenada was not whether the US was a threat – that was assumed from the beginning – but, rather, what was the best response. Grenada pursued several strategies, but the major instrument was propaganda. As Bishop told me, “our only means of defense [against the US] is to warn our friends and our people of the threat.” Bishop believed that, by attacking the US, he could mobilize his people to defend the regime and sufficiently encourage American critics of the Administration’s policies, as well as others in the world, to raise the political costs of intervention. Of course, repeated condemnations of the US served only to confirm the US Government’s suspicions about the NJM, first creating, and then exacerbating, a threat that did not initially exist.

Bishop’s rhetoric did have one other important effect: it discouraged tourism to Grenada and thereby hurt the economy.24 The NJM believed that the US government orchestrated the adverse publicity against the revolution, but the PRG’s own rhetoric deserves that credit. The US government cannot manipulate the press on a story like Grenada, and, indeed, two recurring themes in the US press were that the US government was pushing Grenada leftward and that the Administration – first Carter, then Reagan – was behaving foolishly. No administration would choose to look bad in the US press just to hurt tourism in Grenada. Indeed, the US government had a simple tool to discourage US tourism to Grenada – the travel advisory – but neither administration used it.

Both the US and the Grenadian governments were sincere in their stated interest in good relations, but on terms that were not acceptable to the other. The US was more honest in stating its conditions, but it was also more intrusive in the sense that it was demanding that the PRG alter its internal mode of governing and its external relationships. The PRG pretended that its problem with the US was that the US did not respect its independence and non-alignment when it clearly understood that the problem was that the US would not accept its alignment with the Soviet Union and Cuba. That is why the NJM concealed the fact that it was a Marxist-Leninist party, and hid its aspiration of being accepted as a Communist state by the Soviet Union.

Arguments that the US opposes revolution because it defends US business interests or fears the contagion of social revolution are not supported by the Grenadian case where no US business interests were involved, and the revolution was neither social nor economic. The replacement of Gairy by wealthier, better-educated and generally lighter-skinned leaders hardly constituted a social revolution. The NJM also went out of its way to defend its moderate domestic policy and took pride in the fact that the only properties expropriated without compensation were those of Gairy and his deputy (Hart, 1984: xix). Ironically, as the revolution evolved, the PRG gradually discarded its dream of transforming the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors, and decided to concentrate on tourism – the sector most dependent on the US (Mandle, 1985).25 US concern with the PRG was based on the implications of its internal political model for the region and its external relationships with the USSR and Cuba. (The US would have been extremely concerned if the PRG had trained guerrillas or transferred arms to third countries, but no conclusive evidence was obtained during the revolution or in its documents.)

What were the options available to the US for moderating or altering the regime or its behavior? A friendly posture could not be sustained in the absence of reciprocal gestures by the PRG, and, unlike Nicaragua, Grenada was simply not judged worth the political price of seeking aid from Congress. Moreover, friendly democratic governments in the region naturally opposed such an approach.

The Carter Administration did not view the PRG as a security threat that might justify more drastic options, such as subversion, destabilization, or military intervention. The Reagan Administration perceived a serious threat, but apparently did not pursue these options. Until October 1983, military intervention was probably judged too costly in the absence of regional support or a justifiable reason. Subversion – the active support for opponents of the regime to overthrow it – was not a viable option because Bishop had locked up almost all his actual or potential opponents, Gairy was judged unsupportable, and the size of the People’s Revolutionary Army and the possibility of Cuban support meant that direct US intervention would be required.

De-stabilization, a strategy that the PRG believed the US had adopted as early as May 8, 1979, would have been easy to implement as two-thirds of Grenada’s foreign exchange relied on tourism and the Medical School. The US could have easily discouraged tourism by issuing a travel advisory and persuading the Medical School to move, but it chose not to do so, perhaps because a strategy of destabilization is a recipe for disaster unless there is a viable opposition that can pick up the pieces.

That left the option of “distancing and isolation.” This option is not preferred; rather it is what remains when an administration realizes that it has no other options. This option is as close as the US can get to ignoring the problem or hoping it will disappear. (Had there been evidence that the PRG was supplying arms to radicals, or preparing its airfield for Soviet bombers, the US would probably have traded this option for one of the others but, despite Reagan’s rhetoric, such was not the case.)

Both the Carter and the Reagan Administrations were left with this “distancing” option: both continued to believe that this was the least objectionable approach to moderating or changing the PRG. The different courses followed by both administrations illustrate the width of this option.

The Carter Administration initially tried co-optation, and then retreated to an approach that stressed development and security assistance to Grenada’s neighbors rather than confrontation with Grenada. This strategy was premised on the belief that the other Caribbean governments had a substantial stake in pressing Grenada to fulfill its initial pledges, and more effective leverage than the US. In line with that view, the Administration maintained a low-profile, believed a more strident approach would be counter-productive, in effect creating a bilateral confrontation in which the PRG could only look heroic, and the US foolish.

Whereas the Carter Administration viewed Grenada as a small, radical problem in the eastern Caribbean, the Reagan Administration approached Grenada as a small actor in a larger East-West struggle. The Administration apparently believed that only a change in regime would serve US interests or eliminate the threat to the region. According to this view, negotiations with the regime were a wasted effort; such a regime only understands threats, force, and propaganda, and Reagan’s strategy used all three. In addition, the Administration tried to isolate the PRG from the Caribbean by conditioning its contribution to the Caribbean Development Bank on the exclusion of Grenada.

The two strategies had different effects on the region, depending on the leadership in each country. Most leaders were more comfortable with the lower-profile, development-oriented, multi-lateral approach of the Carter Administration, while a few preferred the harder-line, higher-profile, security approach of the Reagan Administration. But the increased attention by both administrations undoubtedly assisted development, reinforced security, and contributed to stabilizing the democracies.

As to their effect on the PRG, there is simply no evidence to suggest that the different strategies made a significant difference. Perhaps the main difference, in terms of effect, was that the Reagan Administration induced the Bishop regime to greater heights of paranoia, but US policy during both administrations did not seem to have any impact on either Grenada’s political direction or its relations with Cuba and the USSR – the two key interests of the US. In an interview in September 1983, Bishop seemed to suggest that he viewed the continuity in US policy as marginally more significant to him than the difference: “All United States administrations, but I would say particularly this one, are very hostile to any progressive or revolutionary regime” (Bishop, 1983a: 251).

On the other hand, the aversion to any negotiations by the Reagan Administration meant that other interests – for example, the use of the airport – were not pursued. This was not yet an issue during the Carter Administration, and so the different approaches could not be tested. Lake notes that a flexible approach by the US has in the past yielded “partial successes” with radical regimes, even if the US could not change the character of the regime (Lake, 1985: 142). The airport issue would appear to be such an issue since the PRG had a considerable incentive to negotiate seriously – tourism. John Horton, who served in the CIA from 1948-75 and 1983-84, wrote about the Reagan Administration’s view of negotiations towards Grenada and other Marxist-Leninist governments:

This administration considers agreements with Marxist-Leninists to be risky – as indeed they are – but it also finds them too distasteful and inconsistent with its own tough posturing to be a serious option. The administration did not simply fail to give sufficient hearing to a diplomatic strategy; it ideologically shackled its imagination and so was not free to use the informed pragmatism that enables a skilled diplomat to probe for solutions (Horton, 1985: 24).

Given the political and geo-political impracticality of pursuing a warmer relationship with the PRG, the only apparent option for the US would have been a more hostile, confrontational approach, such as the Reagan Administration’s policy in Nicaragua. While the Grenadian Revolution flared in the minds of its leaders and in their rhetoric, the country’s internal social and economic life were hardly affected by the revolution. A more hostile approach would probably have radicalized the revolution, infused their popular mobilization strategy with a real mission and forced a nearly complete reliance on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

In short, if US policy seemed unproductive, there were worse options available. If there was little likelihood that US policy could have improved the revolution from the perspective of either US or Grenadian interests, it is very likely that US policy could have worsened the situation.

Because personalities and the psychology of group decisionmaking are key factors in understanding how a revolution evolves, and we know little about either, the two lessons that emerge from the Grenadian case have to be tentative. First, in the short-term, US policy ought to continue to aim to prevent groups who view the US as the problem and Cuba as the solution from coming to power by violent means. In the long-term, the US might be able to alter the views of radicals that the US is their principal enemy if the US could convincingly demonstrate its commitment to social justice and its tolerance of dissident regimes. Secondly, if Marxist-Leninists come to power, considerable opportunities exist to pursue US interests through negotiation. The Grenadian regime, for example, seemed open to negotiating limits to the use of its airport. If the Soviet or Cuban presence proves threatening to the region and the US, the US should seek to negotiate limits on that presence in concert with its friends in the region, and by utilizing a prudent combination of carrots and sticks.

US experience with revolutionary regimes suggests there is much the US could do to make the situation worse. This is particularly true at the beginning of a revolution when ideological zeal, anxiety, and inexperience combine in a manner that makes some confrontation with the US probable, if not inevitable. The key question is whether a more patient and lower-keyed US policy could be influential in moderating a revolutionary regime after the exuberance ebbs and failures become more evident. At such a moment, could US policy increase the chance that more pragmatic and moderate voices in the governing councils, or from the outside, could prevail? This certainly seems plausible, but the Grenadian case does not offer an answer to the question. At that moment, US policy hardened, and, to the extent that one can identify a direction in the evolution of the NJM, it too was hardening.

Indeed, in reading through all the documents, what seems most striking is that the United States did not seem to play as large a role in either the political, economic, or strategic thinking of the regime as their rhetoric might have suggested. Actually, it appears that the Grenada Revolution had more of an impact on the evolution of US policy than US policy had on the evolution of the Grenada Revolution.

And that may be the lesson for revolutionaries: Beware of the self-fulfilling prophecy; it works both ways.

NOTES

For the most systematic definition and analysis of the pattern of US relationships with revolutionary movements and governments, see Cole Blasier (1979). Anthony Lake (1985) also finds a recurring pattern in both the policy debate in the United States and the subsequent interpretation of US policy.

The concept of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” was borrowed from Robert Merton.

In a subsequent letter to Blasier, Bonsal explained that confrontational US policies – such as the sugar quota cut and the decision not to refine oil – offered Castro the nationalistic cause he needed to centralize power and ally with the Soviets (Bonsal, 1979: 300, n.178).

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Bosworth before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs (US House, 1982: 33 and 38).

Several analysts who have examined the documents tend to agree with Ortiz, among them are the Valentas (1984) and Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (1984).

The author conducted extensive interviews with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (1982a) and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard (1982) for a total of 13 hours, during 3 consecutive days from October 25-27, 1982.

The author also interviewed leaders from virtually all the Commonwealth Caribbean nations on several visits to the region from 1982-85, and members of the Carter and Reagan administrations and, as Director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs on the National Security Council (1977-81), the author participated in all of the key decisions on US policy toward Grenada during that period.

For a more extensive discussion of the background of the revolution, see Pastor (1985).

The sequence of events is pieced together from a number of sources, including that of Timothy Robinson (1979). Although the desk officer in the US State Department was informed of the trip by the 2 ATF officials in March, neither the Assistant Secretary of State nor the National Security Council (NSC) was aware of the trip. A series of long interviews by the author with Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard, on 25-27 October 1982, helped to fill in their perspective on the reasons for the coup; both said they were unaware of the presence of the Treasury officials on the island.

In his introduction to Chris Searle’s book of Bishop’s speeches, Richard Hart disclosed the details of the vote to launch the coup (Hart, 1984: xxiii).

Adams’ conversation with Callaghan, and his role in the events, was described in a public address that he gave at the Wilson Center (Adams, 1981) and in a subsequent interview with the author later the same day. In addition, he also discussed these events in the Barbados House of Assembly debates (official report, 2nd session) on 15 November 1983.

The 2 communiques issued at the end of the meetings of the leaders from the 6 Caribbean nations, held 14-15 March 1979, have been reprinted in a special report of the House of Commons entitled Caribbean and Central America (UK Parliament, 1982: 287-288).

In an interview with the author, Bishop said that he considered all Peace Corps volunteers to be agents of the (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He did not explain why he had earlier expressed an interest in them.

There are several accounts of the crucial meetings between Ortiz and Coard and Bishop on April 10th. The first full account was given by Bishop 3 days later on April 13th, in a speech called “In Nobody’s Backyard” (Bishop, 1979b). Ortiz later described his perception of the conversations in a letter to the Editor of the Atlantic Monthly (Ortiz, 1984: 7-12).

In addition, in my own interviews with Coard and Bishop, in October 1982, I inquired as to their perceptions of that conversation and how it fit into the US-Grenadian relationship.

After Bishop cited and criticized this point, the US State Department issued a clarifying statement on April 16 that Grenadian relations with Cuba was not the principal issue from the US perspective: “We would be concerned (however) about the development of close military and security ties” (Trewhitt, 1979).

For a description of British policy toward the People’s Republic of Grenada (PRG), see the House of Commons report (UK Parliament, 1982: 280-281).

While De Young’s article noted that a Cuban plane had arrived before the Ortiz visit, it gave more weight to his démarche as the cause of tensions.

In his famous, secret “Line of March” speech, on 13 September 1982, Bishop acknowledged that the New Jewel Movement (NJM) undertook a number of steps, such as an alliance with the bourgeoisie, at the beginning of the revolution to reassure everyone “so that imperialism would not get too excited, and would say ‘well, they have some nice fellas in that thing; everything all right. And as a result wouldn’t think about sending in troops” (US-DS-DOD, 1984: 1-19).

Whether this was an accurate reflection of PRG views or not, Grenada did receive vastly more aid after the revolution, mostly from non-western sources, than it had before the revolution, and more than its neighbors. In 1978, Grenada received grants of EC$ 1.6 million; in 1979, they received EC$ 17.5 million; in 1980, EC$ 34 million; in 1981, EC$ 34.9 million; and preliminary estimates for 1982 were EC$45 million (Grenada Government and Caribbean Development Bank, 1984: 101).

Three months later, the same Administration – and most of the same actors – chose a “co-optation strategy” for approaching the new revolutionary government of Nicaragua for many of the same reasons that it chose a regional strategy toward Grenada. In Central America, most of the regional actors – the nations the US cared about most – wanted the US to aid the revolution, which was genuinely nationalistic and included all sectors. The Eastern Caribbean was concerned about the adverse effects upon their own regimes if the US rushed to help Grenada.

For this and some other differences, see the testimony of Sally Shelton before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs (US House, 1982: 59).

US aid to the Caribbean, through the Caribbean Development Bank, had increased from $7.2 million in 1977, to $45.1 million in 1980; but, in 1981, the Reagan Administration refused to make any contributions to the organization (US-GAO, 1983: 6-19).

Author’s conversations with Foreign Ministry officials in Barbados on 22-23 October 1982, with Prime Minister Eugenia Charles in Dominica on 30 October 1982, with Foreign Minister Lester Bird in Antigua on 30 October 1982, and with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and Finance Minister Bernard Coard in Grenada, 25-27 October 1982.

Author’s interviews with Bishop and Coard and confidential interviews with a knowledgeable State Department official on 21 February 1984, and with a senior official of the US Embassy in Barbados. In his testimony before Congress on 2 November 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam revealed the substance of the US Government’s conversations with Bishop, but he did not indicate that any attempt to negotiate the airport issue had been made.

In particular see the report summarizing Grenada-Soviet relations written by Grenada’s Ambassador W. Richard Jacobs on 11 July 1983 in THE GRENADA PAPERS (Seabury and McDougall, 1984: 196-216).

An economic report in 1984 noted that the “tourism industry was declining rapidly” during the period in which the PRG governed (Grenada Government and Caribbean Development Bank, 1984: 22).

The decision to give tourism the highest priority is all the more incomprehensible because the PRG already believed the US was undermining tourism, and the PRG would have needed to negotiate a civil aviation agreement with the US before US airlines could land at Grenada’s new airport.

REFERENCES

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(1983b) “We Proudly Share the Noble Dreams of Martin and Malcolm,” address of 8 June, p. 237 in Bishop’s Speeches.

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