Eastern Caribbean Security
Jonathan Howe to Under Secretary Eagleburger re Eastern Caribbean Security
Washington, D.C. 20520
TO: P – Under Secretary Eagleburger
FROM: PM – Jonathan T. Howe
SUBJECT: Eastern Caribbean Security
The security environment in the eastern Caribbean has deteriorated markedly in recent months as the result of the deepening Soviet and Cuban presence in Grenada and the radicalization of the Bouterse regime in Suriname.
In Grenada, direct Soviet involvement has expanded since PM Bishop’s visit to the Soviet Union last summer. The Soviets opened a resident embassy, agreed to train Grenadans in intelligence techniques in the Soviet Union, and are expected to begin shortly a feasibility study of the Greenville deep water port, which could be used as a station for the Soviet Navy in the Caribbean. Joint Grenadan-Cuban military maneuvers reportedly will be held later this year. A major military base at Calivigny has been completed, but not yet occupied. There is reason to believe that the battalion sized facility may be intended as a staging base for Cuban or other foreign forces. A road between Calivigny and the airport in construction at Point Salines is also being improved for use by heavy equipment. Construction at the airfield is proceeding at a substantial pace; when completed, probably early next year, it will be able to accommodate TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft and the IL-62 aircraft used to support the Cuban forces in Africa (IL-62s cannot fly directly to Angola from Cuba, but could do so from Grenada, which is 900 miles closer to Africa).
In Suriname, the assassination of democratic leaders decapitated potential opposition to the regime. While the Cubans have been keeping a low profile, the violence in Suriname was preceded by a series of events that suggest a pattern of Cuban covert activities. We anticipate a period of consolidation and growing ties with Cuba, following which Suriname could become a base for subversion against Guyana and the islands on the rim of northern South America. Suriname is, of course, close to the South Atlantic narrows through which 60% of Europe’s oil flows.
Cuba. Access to eastern Caribbean facilities, together with its conventional military build-up, has enhanced Cuba’s ability to project force beyond the periphery of the island. In the past year, Cuba took delivery of its first Mi-24 HIND attack helicopter squadron and of two Polnocny-B amphibious landing ships, which have given Cuba its first over-the-beach landing capability, in addition to its substantial existing capacity to airlift forces in the Caribbean with its AN-26 transport aircraft.
The emergence of a Cuba/Grenada/Suriname axis is of major geopolitical import, particularly in view of the relative absence of countervailing forces. The eastern Caribbean island-states are for the most part small and vulnerable to takeovers. Potential instability has increased in recent years because of deteriorating economic conditions, labor unrest, the activities of criminal elements associated with the drug traffic and rising dissidence in some of the islands.
Recognizing their individual vulnerability, Barbados, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Lucia and Antigua signed a Memorandum of Understanding last fall establishing the eastern Caribbean Regional Security System. The arrangement provides that a state whose security is threatened could request assistance from the other states. The Barbados Defense Forces have identified fifty personnel who would be ready to move to a threatened island within two hours of a call for assistance. Selected rapid response personnel have also been identified on other islands.
We are working closely with S/P in an effort it is coordinating with input from ARA and DOD to develop a security strategy for the region, centering on U.S. support of the Regional Security System. The strategy will include the following elements:
— Provision of U.S. transportation support. Emergency transport is a key requirement of the Regional Security System. However, there is only a limited fixed wing transport capability in the Regional Security System states. Over the long run, development of indigenous vertical lift would be the most satisfactory solution to the transportation problem, but neither Barbados nor the other states currently have the financial or technical resources to acquire and maintain helicopters. In the short run, therefore, the system will have to rely on outside sources for vertical lift. We have asked JCS to develop a contingency plan or amplification of existing plan to provide U.S. airlift to the Regional Security System in an emergency. This would include, at Embassy Bridgetown’s request, an assessment of the feasibility of prepositioning U.S. military helicopters in the eastern Caribbean.
— Training and equipment support of Regional Security System. We are seeking to design our security assistance program to meet the immediate requirements of the system’s rapid reaction force, and to make possible eventually an autonomous response by the system to potential threats.
— Level of U.S. military presence. Since maintaining an adequate U.S. presence is necessary in order to demonstrate our commitment to the security of the region, we are recommending that an appropriate exercise schedule be considered for the region. We also propose to ask DOD to search for alternative missions for the U.S. naval facility at Antigua, which it plans to close by July 1984. A separate memorandum with a suggested letter from you to Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer on this subject is being prepared.
What will emerge from this process will be basically a containment strategy, which does not attempt to address the fundamental problem of Cuban and Soviet involvement in the eastern Caribbean, but it may harden the targets of Cuban subversion and slow down the deterioration of our security position in the area.
Drafted: PM/RSA:ARabasa
3/09/83
Clearances: PM:ARaphel
S/P:JGlassman