Issues and Recommendations for IG Consideration
Paper
— Issues and Recommendations for IG Consideration DECL: OADR ## EASTERN CARIBBEAN SECURITY
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IG CONSIDERATION
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
I. U.S. Commitment to the Protection of the Eastern Caribbean In an effort to offset the growing projection of Cuban and Soviet power in the sub-region, it is essential that the U.S. signal its support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean states. A public statement underscoring our commitment to the security of the Eastern Caribbean would carry significant psychological impact.
II. Emergency Transportation for the Regional Defense Forces The five Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) signatories are located at distances of 25 to 300 miles from one another. A regional security request for one state to assist another will require indigenous or externally-provided transportation, for example:
- (a) ship transportation requiring access to port facilities;
- (b) fixed-wing transport which normally would require access to airfield facilities (although a short takeoff and landing type of fixed-wing aircraft such as the Caribou might be landed on a flattened strip approximately 1000 feet in length or used for airborne personnel); or
- (c) vertical lift capability which would require only a small clearing of land for setting down or could disembark troops while hovering over rocky or forested land.
III. Relationship with the Regional Security System We are at a critical juncture in our relationship with the five Eastern Caribbean states which have formed a common security assistance arrangement. In addition to providing for mutual assistance in coping with natural disasters, drug smuggling, environmental protection, etc., the arrangement enables any signatory state suffering or fearing external or internal attempts to overthrow its government by armed extra-constitutional means to request assistance from the other signatories. The signatories could help or not help, depending upon their individual evaluations of the situation. Essential to the establishment of the mutual security arrangement is the availability of arms and supplies for each state to use in its response. What types of equipment and training should be provided by the U.S. and/or others?
IV. U.S. Military Presence The United States should maintain sufficient military presence in, and sense of commitment to, the Eastern Caribbean to deter external aggression and to respond to any such aggression, as needed. A U.S. military peacetime presence in the region should be maintained at least at present levels if not increased.
SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
I. The United States should signal its support for efforts of the democratic Eastern Caribbean states to enhance their collective security against external aggression and extra-constitutional armed seizures of power. Accordingly, the following steps should be taken:
- a. The President should respond positively, through a private letter, to a communication from Eastern Caribbean heads-of-government or the Council of Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System requesting U.S. support for regional security efforts. The Presidential letter should indicate our intention, in the event of an armed attack or other threats to the security of the democratic states of the region, to consult with a view toward providing appropriate contributions to the collective defense of the United States and the Caribbean nations, for example, emergency transport or assistance for states of the region.
- (PRE-IG VIEWS: While it would be worthwhile to establish a written record of our commitment to the common defense of the United States and the Eastern Caribbean states, we should be careful not to heighten the EC governments’ perceptions of what the U.S. can and is prepared and able to do in terms of providing U.S. military troops, transport and security funding for the sub-region. Any Presidential letter would have to be carefully drafted to avoid creating expectations beyond our ability and willingness to respond in time of crisis. Such a “security commitment” also raises difficulties in terms of congressional sensitivities and our legal practice and is related to consideration of the role of the Rio Treaty.)
- b. The President and Secretary of State should reaffirm, in the context of speeches and public declarations, our continuing commitment to prevent export of Communist subversion in the Hemisphere and, in particular, in Central America and the Caribbean. They should underline our support, through the Caribbean Basin Initiative and our bilateral security assistance, for the maintenance of stability and prosperity of the Central American/Caribbean democracies. In this context, we should express our support of, and willingness to assist, regional self-help efforts.
- (PRE-IG VIEWS: An effort to raise public consciousness of the strategic importance of the Eastern Caribbean to the U.S. is worthwhile and should be undertaken. Such public declarations should be embodied preferably within speeches or addresses on broader topics so as to avoid giving the impression that the RSS is a USG creation and to avoid exposing the Eastern Caribbean leaders to criticism by domestic leftists.)
II. Until Eastern Caribbean states are able to do so themselves, the United States should provide funding and emergency air and sealift, if necessary and consistent with applicable legal requirements, to allow one or several of the members of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to respond to emergencies on another island. Accordingly, the following steps should be taken:
- a. The JCS should prepare contingency plans for the provision of emergency air and sea transport using DOD or Coast Guard assets. DOD, the Department of State, and the NSC staff should prepare and preposition, to the extent possible, paperwork needed to execute a U.S. response. Contingency planning should assume either funding by security assistance or Department of Defense funding, if the national interest so warrants.
- (NOTE: Existing contingency plans provide for assistance to local governments, cooperation with regional and indigenous forces, and restoration of peace and order. Execution of an approved plan is implemented by JCS upon direction of the National Command Authority.)
- b. For eventualities appropriate to security assistance funding, $50,000 of MAP resources should be set aside to be used for troop airlift or other logistical support in time of emergency.
- c. The Department of State should study the desirability of encouraging Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent to sign the Rio Treaty.
- (NOTE: Agreement was not reached in the Pre-IG regarding whether the U.S. should encourage the independent states of the EC to accede to the Rio Treaty or whether instead the U.S. should remain essentially passive. The U.S., for over thirty years, has had a well-known policy of encouraging dual adherence by American states to the OAS Charter and Rio Treaty as fundamental and complimentary hemispheric commitments. It was noted that, in time of emergency it might prove easier to deflect criticism of U.S. emergency provision of assistance to an EC government by being able to invoke Rio Treaty commitments to that government. An added advantage is that Rio Treaty membership might heighten deterrence of aggression. An opposing view was expressed that the U.S. should not be perceived by the Latins as packing the Rio Treaty with English-speaking countries. An increase in Rio Treaty membership might also complicate the problem of obtaining the required two-thirds majority for action on a number of potential issues, particularly when a leftist Latin regime is involved. Moreover, adherence to the Treaty by Caribbean states could provide other donor nations, such as the U.K., with a rationale to pull back on their own security assistance efforts. Evidence for this is found in the U.K.’s present interest in having Belize sign the Rio Treaty.)
- d. The Department of State, working with regional governments, should design a coordinated approach to France, the Netherlands, the U.K., Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic on possible contingency air and naval transport assistance.
- e. DOD should conduct a study comparing the feasibility and costs of: (A) long-term use of charter or CONUS-based DOD/Coast Guard assets for emergency transport, (b) provision to Eastern Caribbean governments of, and maintenance, through security assistance funding, for indigenous helicopter, STOL or seaplane lift, and appropriate airborne or heliborne training; or (c) permanent or rotating deployment of DOD or Coast Guard air/sea transport assets in the Eastern Caribbean. (Permanent or rotating deployment in Barbados or Antigua of 2-3 helicopters for search and rescue, drug interdiction, humanitarian/civic action, and contingency emergency transport purposes, as recommended by Embassy Bridgetown, should be specifically considered.)
III. The United States should provide security assistance that will provide for eventual autonomous response by the Eastern Caribbean nations to any threat short of overt aggression by an outside power. To this end, the following steps should be taken:
- a. The immediate equipment requirements of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System should be met out of available FY 82/83 MAP resources.
- b. Should the DOD study (II.e. above) recommend acquisition of indigenous lift, the Department of State and DOD should raise the priority of the Eastern Caribbean in allocating MAP and IMET resources for FY 85 and the out-years.
- c. Equipment for the Regional Security System ground forces and, depending on the outcome of the DOD study (and the Ambassador’s and Embassy’s views) (II.e. above), air transport equipment should receive priority funding out of FY 83/84 MAP resources. Remaining FY 83/84 resources, if any, should be allocated in response to explicit requests toward beginning purchases of deep-water-capable patrol boats for the coast guards of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts. Further funding for the coast guards should be requested for FY 85 and the out-years.
- d. Specialized training should be provided, as appropriate, to Eastern Caribbean personnel in inter-island communications, airborne operations, and heliborne transport and assault operations out of available FY 83/84 IMET.
- e. Anti-terrorism training should be given highest priority after approval of the Department of State’s anti-terrorism training program.
- f. The intelligence community should reassess the priority of intelligence collection and analysis on the region with a view toward possible increased emphasis. Foreign intelligence-sharing with regional governments should be increased as local intelligence and organizational infrastructure improve.
- g. The Department of State should work with regional states to approach the U.K., France, Canada, the Netherlands, Venezuela, and Jamaica for possible additional contributions of training, equipment, and advice for participants in the Regional Security System.
IV. The United States should maintain sufficient military presence in, and sense of commitment to, the Eastern Caribbean to deter external aggression and to respond to any such aggression, as needed. To this end, the following actions should be taken:
- a. DOD should undertake a study of anticipated mid-to-long-term changes in the Eastern Caribbean threat environment and consequent requirements for enhanced U.S. military presence (military facilities, ship and air deployments). The study, which may incorporate the emergency transport analysis requirement (II.e. above) if desirable, should recommend alternatives for varying or upgrading the U.S. presence. Alternative military uses of U.S. facilities scheduled to be closed should be considered in the study.
- b. The Department of State should approach the U.K., Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Venezuela to encourage increased Western military assistance in the region.
- c. DOD should review the possibility of additional “show-the-flag” demonstrations in the Eastern Caribbean (e.g. Blue Angels, Thunderbirds, flagship visits).
- d. JCS and CINCLANT should reassess the adequacy of the CINCLANT contingency plan for providing timely response in the Eastern Caribbean in light of possible new Cuban, Soviet, and Grenadian threats and force presence.
- (NOTE: The contingency plan is produced annually through a process initiated by CINCLANT and submitted for review and approval by JCS. Approval is based on perceived threat and military requirements in the area.)
- e. JCS and CINCLANT should hold a command post (CPX) and force training (FTX) exercise in the Eastern Caribbean in CY 1983 to test emergency Regional Security System response in conjunction with U.S. forces. Similar exercises should be programmed annually in JCS Exercise Planning Guidance (EFG). CINCLANT should include Eastern Caribbean participation in JCS and service exercises in the region.
Drafted: S/P: JGlassman / ARA/CAR: JHelgerson 6/8/83 632-8451 W-2714E
Cleared:
- ARA/CAR – Richard Morefield / Richard Brown
- ARA/ECP – Jay Dehmlow
- ARA/PPC – Michael Skol
- ARA/RPP – Datus Proper / Charles Shapiro
- ARA/USOAS – Phil Johnson
- INR/IAA – Robert Dubose / Howard Davis
- M/CT – Ambassador Marks / Sidney Friedland
- P – Robert Perry
- PM/RSA – Angel Rabasa
- CIA – [Name Redacted]
- Coast Guard – Dave Simcox
- DOD/ISA – Joseph Becelia
- OJCS/J-3 – JOD – Cdrs. Mike McQuiston / Paul Hansel / Jarrett Crowley
- OSD/PA&E – Wade Hinkle
- NSC – Alphonso Sapia-Bosch
- Ambassador Bish
E.O. 12356 As Amended Sec. 1.3 (a)(4)