Motives and History of Military Uprising in Suriname
F-1988-00163
SUMMARY: There was no outside influence in the military action which occurred here February 25, so far as we can discover. Though the NCO leaders were exposed to much radical ideology, the course of events seems to confirm that their action was not politically motivated.
Basically, it was a narrow labor dispute, escalated beyond imagination by government failure to act.
The action was not long or widely planned, and in fact was not intended as a coup d’état at all. Once achieved, however, the politically inexperienced NCO leaders have made wise choices at least up to this point, in carrying out the responsibilities which fell into their laps. The present situation will remain inherently unstable for some time to come, however, since regardless of the success of any formula to return to constitutional rule, the NCOs’ distrust most politicians and intend to keep a “watching brief” to ensure good government and progress toward development, but their only sanction is ultimately a return to force of arms.
Should the become dissatisfied with achievements in these areas, either justifiably or as a result of efforts to influence them, it would ill for the country.
We think outside influnces will inevitably seek entry here. One effective deive thorugh which the NCO group might be influenced in positive direction, and which might be used to limit inimical outside influence, is the close informal relations built up over the years between the Suriname military and the Dutch military mission here, and the very great respect the young leaders eem to have for some members of the mission as individuals.
END SUMMARY
The ostensible cause of the mutiny was NCO grievances over pay, advancement, and benefits. Though trivial when viewed against the background of what they brought about, these were of long standing and, in large measure, publicly seen as justified. There was little public support for one key NCO demand, the right to form a union, though this right is guaranteed by the constitution. But government foot-dragging and failure to deal with the NCO complaints brought much public sympathy. The government compounded its image of inefficient muddling by first appearing to recognize the union, then botching half-hearted measures to suppress it.
The root cause of the NCO-government conflict, however, was the fact that since independence the GOS had never decided on a role for the Army. As a result, the Army had no mission, no spokesman in government, and not even adequate resources to maintain minimum training and other levels of activity. This situation, deteriorating over five years, led to mounting frustration among the NCOs, most of them well-trained professional veterans of the Dutch Army.
There was no officer/NCO rivalry in the usual sense: with few exceptions, NCOs had little but scorn for their officers, whom they saw—in many cases correctly—as weak men, unable to lead and professionally unqualified, more interested in perquisites and private speculation than in commanding their units. The small officer corps, moreover, was itself divided by cronyism and the same political allegiances which prevail in the general population.
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The specific event which triggered the revolt was the rumor that the Prime Minister would disband the NCOs and discharge them immediately after sentences had been pronounced on the union leaders. Word of this leaked out, sparking the NCOs to action.
In the aftermath, some here speculate that the coup must have been long planned and well rehearsed. We disagree, as do other knowledgeable sources. Government ineptitude led to a situation in which 20 good men literally could have taken over the country. The NGO’s themselves say it was only 15.
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For the future, the NCO leaders have indicated they intend to increase the army to an “effective size” and have vague talk of transforming it into a “development army” ( a la U.S. Corps of Engineers). There is some capability within the present body, but the NCO’s now in control probably have simply not had time to give any real thought to possibilities so far in the future. Control of the army, and the staffing of the officer corps remain similarly undefined at present. No “instant colonels” have been created, and no former active officers reemployed, although there are indications that some respected officers of the former SKM may well be offered the chance to work with the new body.
The present leadership’s success in defining an acceptable role for the Suriname Army, and in achieving success in that role, will be of considerable importance not only for the future of the army itself, but for popular support, and hence political stability, in the coming months.
OSTRANDER
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Americas Embassy PARAMARIBO
Department of State
BRAZILIA, BRIDGETOWN, CARACAS, CURACAO, GEORGETOWN,
HAVANA, LONDON, MARTINIQUE, PARIS, PORT OF SPAIN
USCINCSO
DATE: March 7, 1980
AE WA E-045
XDS-4 (3/8/00) OSTRANDER, Nancy (OR-M)
PINT MILT NS
MOTIVES AND HISTORY OF MILITARY UPRISING IN SURINAME
REF: (A) Paramaribo A-005, March 6, 1980
(B) 79 Paramaribo 0323 (both NOTAL)