Soviet Interests and Options in the Caribbean
USSR Monthly Review 1983
In the past year or so, the Soviets have expanded their
military and security links with Nicaragua, strengthened ties with Grenada, and welcomed Suriname as
another revolutionary regime. These developments
underscore Moscow’s broad strategic interest in undermining the US position in the hemisphere. The
ongoing airfield construction projects in Nicaragua
and particularly in Grenada will improve the two
countries’ capability to support an increasing Soviet
military presence and Cuban interventionism in the
hemisphere. If port development programs materialize, Nicaragua and Grenada could also provide some
support to Soviet naval forces.
Although the USSR probably does not currently
assign high priority to a dramatic expansion of its
military presence in the Caribbean Basin, it will
probably continue incrementally to expand its limited
military activity there. Moreover, it might consider
limited use of Nicaragua and Grenada for periodic
deployments of maritime reconnaissance or ASW
patrol aircraft, such as the TU-95 Bear D or TU-142
Bear F, or for occasional visits by naval combatants.
Soviet Objectives
Soviet policy toward the Caribbean region, in general,
is largely motivated by the competition with the
United States and the ideological commitment to
support leftist causes. Moscow’s basic aim presumably
is to challenge US influence there by expanding its
own political, economic, and military ties in the region
and by promoting radical political change. To this
end, the Soviets have been gradually establishing
influence with the leftist regimes in Nicaragua and
Grenada in the hope they will act as conduits to other
revolutionary groups in the region and contribute to
the emergence of similarly oriented regimes. Moscow
anticipates that continuing instability in the region
will divert US attention and resources-including
military forces-from more distant problem areas and
undercut Washington’s credibility in the eyes of its
hemispheric neighbors as well as other Third World
countries!
Bilateral Ties
Nicaragua. The USSR’s military and security role in
Nicaragua gradually expanded as it helped entrench
the pro-Soviet Sandinista regime. During the past
year, military and security relations became closer
and more publicized, and top Nicaraguan officials,
including Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, Defense
Minister Humberto Ortega, and Interior Minister
Borge visited Moscow for consultations.
Moscow’s current efforts to strengthen the Nicaraguan military suggest a special interest in bolstering
Sandinista ability to cope with the insurgency. Recent
Soviet deliveries of armed MI-8 helicopters, AN-26
transport aircraft, trucks, and communications equipment improve the mobility of the Sandinista forces
and their counterinsurgency capabilities.
During the past year, Moscow continued to encourage
its allies to support Nicaragua. Growing East European military cooperation with the Sandinistas was
almost certainly undertaken at Soviet behest, and the
Soviets probably also encouraged Libya and other
countries to provide military assistance and training.
Grenada.The Soviets have steadily increased their
influence in Grenada since Maurice Bishop and his
New Jewel Movement took power in the March 1979
coup. This trend has been reflected in the past year by
the establishment of the Soviet diplomatic mission on
the island and in the growing number of high-level
Grenadian visitors to the USSR. During this period,
Prime Minister Bishop visited Moscow and met with
Premier Tikhonov last July. Bishop also stopped over
in Moscow last April en route to North Korea.
In the last year, the Soviets have agreed to increase
agricultural and technical assistance and have signed
new trade accords.
Soviet technicians have been sent to Grenada to help
install a Soviet-supplied satellite communications station. More recently, a small number of Soviet economic advisers reportedly were posted to the island to
assist with economic planning.
Suriname. In contrast, Moscow has been less active in
promoting ties with the leftist regime in Suriname, in
part because Moscow appears much less certain about
the extent of support for Army Commander Bouterse
or his staying power. The Soviets have welcomed
Suriname as another revolutionary government in the
Caribbean and no doubt see recent political developments as a setback to US influence there. They
opened a resident embassy in Paramaribo last year
and
have recently indicated an interest in expanding economic relations, as long as it does not involve substantial Soviet aid. Moscow apparently does not have any
military or security relationship with Bouterse nor has
it indicated an interest in acquiring military access.
Moscow’s Geopolitical and Military Interests
In general Moscow has no present vital security
interest in the Caribbean region and has consequently
invested only limited resources there. Because the
region is remote from the USSR and important to US
security interests, Moscow has moved cautiously,
primarily relying on intermediaries while it keeps an
eye to US responses. It probably believes that Washington would react with force to any Soviet move to
establish a significant military presence in Nicaragua
or Grenada, especially if this posed a strategic threat
to the United States.
Increased Soviet Military Presence
The Soviets, however, probably are likely to continue
incrementally to expand their limited military activity
in ways that are unlikely to provoke the United
States. For example, they have long deployed TU-95
reconnaissance planes to Cuba and recently sent
TU-142 ASW aircraft, the first potential airborne
weapons carriers, there as well to monitor US strategic submarine testing and transit areas.
There are a number of steps available to the Soviets to
improve either the military capabilities of their Caribbean clients or their own in the region. Many of these
options would be troublesome for the United States,
not only because they would increase Soviet influence
but also because they would force the United States to
factor them into its military contingency planning as
well as divert military resources to counter them.
The USSR could at least give the impression of
enhancing Cuba’s security by modernizing and augmenting the Soviet brigade, whose main function
seems to be to symbolize the Soviet commitment to
Castro. They could also bolster the Cuban military
forces by providing such weapons as SA-5s, more
modern MIGs, and newer coastal defense systems.
The Soviets will probably gradually expand their
military role in Nicaragua. For example, they could
increase the number of military and security advisers-there are apparently about 100 there now-and
become more directly involved in planning and executing counterinsurgency efforts.
If Moscow becomes convinced that the Sandinistas
are securely enough in power to risk tying Soviet
prestige to them more directly, then it could lend
support by delivering weapons directly to Nicaragua
and by sending significant numbers of Soviet advisers
and technicians. Such weapons could include the kind
of air and naval defense systems that have been
supplied to Cuba. Under these circumstances, they
might even station a Soviet military unit in Nicaragua
to provide a symbolic security commitment to the
regime. The Soviets could also play a more active role
in providing military aid to Grenada and Suriname.
Potential Military Options
There are also things Moscow might do to demonstrate growing Soviet involvement in the region and
complicate US defense planning. Such steps would
provide little military capability beyond that provided
by existing facilities in Cuba but could be undertaken
largely for political value.
The USSR might increase port calls by its surface
combatants or attack submarines as a way of demonstrating support and its right to deploy warships to the
area. The Soviets may think such deployments would
serve notice on Washington that the USSR has a
capability to operate in the region in wartime, and
might cause Washington to divert military resources
from other missions.
The Soviets have a small naval force in the Caribbean, usually consisting of one or two research ships and
an auxiliary vessel mainly serving intelligence-gathering purposes. Periodically, they deploy naval task
groups to show the flag, cruise in the Gulf of Mexico,
and exercise with the Cuban Navy-whose forces are
being upgraded. The most recent task group visitswhich typically consist of a guided-missile cruiser and
frigate-took place in April 1981 and November
1982 through January 1983.
Naval facilities in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname are inadequate for providing major logistic
support for these combatants. The Soviets reportedly
have been surveying port development, for civilian
purposes, in two places-at Grenville in Grenada and
San Juan del Sur on the Pacific coast of Nicaragua.
Soviet warships generally are supported by their own
naval auxiliaries and do not require the use of local
naval facilities. They could, therefore, visit these
nations at any time for symbolic reasons. The Soviets
could improvise some logistic support by temporarily
deploying naval auxiliaries outside the local ports.
Auxiliaries used in this manner, however, can only
perform limited services. In the event that the Soviets
wanted to supplement their afloat logistics with landbased support, as they do elsewhere, they would be
more likely to use existing Cuban facilities than to
upgrade the local facilities.
Soviet aircraft could also expand their use of existing
Caribbean fields. The completion of the Point Salines
airfield in Grenada will make it possible for TU-95
Soviet naval reconnaissance planes, which now operate periodically from Cuba, to expand their coverage
somewhat further into the South Atlantic. New airfields now being built in Nicaragua, and other improvements there, will also enable the USSR not only
to show the flag but to extend its military reach by
regular flights over the eastern Pacific (although it
has little military need for such activity). It could also
permanently deploy ASW aircraft or ASW naval
craft in Cuba that could be aimed at monitoring
training and transit areas of US Ohio-class SSBNs. 25X1
Moscow may calculate that such defensive deployments would not violate the US-Soviet understandings
regarding strategic weapons in Cuba.
Potential Strategic Deployments
These pro-Soviet nations in the Caribbean Basin
make it possible for the USSR to take extreme
measures-such as stationing strategic weapons
there-that would pose more substantial military
problems for the United States. Moscow is unlikely to
try to utilize them, however, as forward bases for
Soviet-controlled offensive weapon systems. Such deployments would involve a major confrontation with
the United States, forcing Moscow to choose between
backing down in the face of superior US regional
conventional forces, escalating its response to a global
strategic level, or creating a low-risk diversion elsewhere.
In addition, the Soviets would have to overcome
significant political and logistic constraints before
deploying strategic weapons. Although the USSR is
developing closer political relations with the regimes
in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, its caution in
dealing with them suggests that it is uncertain about
their staying power. Except for Cuba in 1962, the
Soviets have not deployed land-based nuclear weapons
outside the territories of their close allies, where both
stable regimes and stationed combat troops serve to
guarantee their security.
The three Caribbean countries also lack such basic
infrastructure as roads and support facilities to accommodate land-based ballistic missiles such as the
SS-20, and their development would be a costly and
protracted task. Moreover, construction of a regular
SS-20 base with nine launcher garages would take at
least a year and would be quickly detected by satellite
surveillance. Furthermore, Moscow would have to
install air defense systems in these countries to protect
its military facilities from US attack. All of these considerations suggest that the USSR would turn to
Cuba if it again were to deploy strategic systems in
the hemisphere
The Soviets could deploy submarines equipped with
either strategic ballistic or cruise missiles to the
Caribbean, but the move would provide only a marginal military advantage since the SSBNs currently
based in the Northern Fleet and on patrol in the
North Atlantic are already capable of hitting targets
in the United States. Deployment to the Caribbean
would make the submarines considerably more vulnerable to the US ASW forces than they are in their
more secure North Atlantic operating areas. In addition, such a move would be inconsistent with evolving
Soviet SSBN doctrine, which emphasizes placing the
submarines equipped with longer range ballistic missiles increasingly closer to the USSR for greater
security, protection, and control.
While augmenting the USSR’s strategic posture, none
of these moves would significantly enhance the already large Soviet potential for attacking the United
States. They would be taken more with a view to
distract US attention and resources from areas of
more vital Soviet security concern. They might also be
conceived of as bargaining chips to seek the withdrawal of some US forces from areas close to the territory
of the USSR
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