Summary Record of NATO Meeting 6 April 1983 -format

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on Wednesday, 6th April 1983 at 10.15 a.m.

_ CONSEIL DEATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH SUMMARY RECORD
28th April 1983 C-R(83)14


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| PRESENT
Chairman: Mr. È. da Rin |
| BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
| Мг. J.J.M.G. Cassiers Mr. S. Drakopoulos Mr. K. Vibe
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| CANADA PORTUGAL
ICELAND |
| Mr, J.H. Taylor Mr. J. de Lemos
| Mr. H.5v. Björnsson Godinho
| DENMARK SPAIN
ITALY Mrs. B. Lindsay- Mr. J. de Ojeda Poulsen Mr. A. de Franchis | TURKEY
| FRANCE LUXEMBOURG Mr. 0. Clcay
Mr. J-M Merillon Mr. P. Wurth UNITED KINGDOM
GERMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES
Dr. A. Böcker Mr. B.R. Bot Mr. М. Tapley Bennett
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| Sir John Graham
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| INTERNATIONAL STAFF
| | Assistant Secretary General for | Political Affairs: Mr. F. Dannenbring
Acting Executive Secretary: Mr. A. Synadinos
| | MILITARY COMMITTEE
Deputy Chairman: Lt.Gen. S.L. Meiner
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CONTENTS
subject Paragraph Nos,
Statements on political subjects – (Restricted Attendance)
The situation in Latin America and the
Caribbean | — 1 – 47
Future meetings of the Political Committee 48
with Experts |
Forthcoming Geparture of Ambassador Bennett 49
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i, DIATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS
(Restricted Attendance)
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  1. THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
    Document: C-M(83)9 dated 17th March 1983.
  2. Introducing the report by the Expert Group on the
    Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean, the CHAIRMAN noted that the region was still characterized mainly by serious economic
    problems, a generally poor human rights record, and, as far as
    Central America was concerned, by continuing instability. However,
    he urged the Allies not to overlook the hopeful signs for a return
    to democratic government in a number of countries, a trend which
    it was in all their interests to support.
  3. The САМАОТАМ REPRESENTATIVE informed the Council that he would be circulating some additional remarks concerning Central
    America, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Chile and reporting the
    talks which had taken place on 16th March when the new Mexican
    Foreign Minister had visited Ottawa. In his discussions with the
    Canadian Government, the Mexican Foreign Minister had spoken of
    the international oil market and his country’s position on that
    subject, as well as on the Summit Meeting of the Non-Aligned
    Movement and his Government’Ss view on the situation in Central
    America.
  4. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities considered that the Experts! report was a sound and balanced
    representation of events in Latin America and the Caribbean during
    the period under review. The International Staff had again put
    together a report of high quality. Although there were many
    important developments elsewhere in the region, he wished to focus
    his remarks during the present discussion on recent developments
    in Central America.
    4, He recalled that, as a first step in the new peace
    initiative which had emerged for Central America, a meeting would
    be convened of the Foreign Ministers of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
    Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala. This meeting would be
    witnessed by the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
    Panama and the Dominican Republic. The Foreign Ministers of
    Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras had already issued a Joint
    statement endorsing such a meeting on 24th February,
  5. For their part, the United States had indicated a
    positive attitude towards such a meeting on several occasions.
    President Reagan had done so in speeches on Zend February and
    10th March, and the Secretary of State had echoed this position
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    in public Congressional Hearings on 16th and 22nd March.
    Washington had been in touch with the meetingt!s sponsors, but
    had not been a party to diplomatic efforts to organize it,
  6. However, 1$ now appeared that plans for the meeting
    were faltering for lack of a positive response from Nicaragua
    and possibly Mexico too. Other governments had indicated a
    willingness to participate.
    т. With regard Фо specific countries, he noted that the
    report singled out El Salvador and Guatemala for human rights
    abuses but said that it was unfortunate that it did not mention
    Nicaragua, where the Sandinista Government hadbecome increasingly
    oppressive towards opposition groups, the private sector, and even
    the Church.
  7. In Nicaragua, the recent fighting appeared to be
    confined largely to Boaco, Matalgalpa, Jinoteja, Nueva Segovia,
    Madriz and Esteli, with little or no fighting in the other eight
    Nicaraguan provinces. There was also some fighting between
    Miskito Indians, large numbers of whom had been expelled from their
    homes by the Nicaraguan Government, and the Sandinistas in Zelaya
    province.
  8. Although scant information was available, it was suspected
    that Sandinista and rebel claims alike were exaggerating casualties.
    Thus far, it appeared that the Sandinista militia, rather than its
    better trained army, had borne the brunt of the fighting.
  9. The opposition to the Sandinista Government comprised
    Miskito Indians, former national guardsmen, former Sandinistas,
    such as the rebel leader Eden Pastora, former members of the
    governing junta such as Alfonso Robelo and other anti-Somocista
    groups. The opposition was diverse, nationalistic and independent.
  10. He went on to say that the Sandinista government was also
    attempting tc obscure its refusal to engage in any meaningful
    diplomatic attempts to defuse regional tensions. The San José Final
    Act explicitly addressed the very concerns raised by the Sandinistas,
    including the presence of foreign advisors or trainers, arms flows
    and external support for insurgency in neighbouring countries.
  11. For their part, the United States would continue to search
    for a peaceful solution to regional disputes in this part of the
    world where right and wrong were so often confused and would hope
    that those Allies in a position to do so would support such efforts.
  12. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed his appreciation
    to the International Staff and to the Expert Working Group for a
    most useful survey of developments in the region during the period
    under review,
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    14, Norway, too, believed that the report struck the correct
    balance on the relative importance of internal political and
    social factors on the one hand and external factors on the other,
    However, it was felt to be slightly too descriptive here and there
    on certain events, at the expense of assessments and evaluations.
  13. He went on to say that the situation in Nicaragua was
    still somewhat unsettled, in spite of the ongoing consolidation
    efforts, and relations between Nicaragua and its neighbours
    remained tense, particularly in the case of Honduras from which
    anti-Sandinista forces were operating. Norway believed that armed conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras could not be entirely
    ruled out and therefore welcomed the peace initiative referred to
    by the United States Representative.
  14. In paragraph 18, reference was made to the continuing
    Soviet assistance to Nicaragua, particularly in the military
    field. Norway was of the opinion that the Sandinistas, nevertheless,
    continued to attach great importance to improving their relations
    with the West European nations as a means of restoring and
    developing the Nicaraguan economy. An assessment of these relations
    might have been useful in the report since there could be room for
    positive Western influence, although the Sandinista takeover had
    brought many disappointments.
  15. As far as Peru was concerned, Norway agreed with the
    assessment of the situation in that country but believed that, in judging the viability of the present government one should bear
    in mind that the opposition in Peru was divided and diverse. With
    regard to paragraph 44 of the report on the resurgent Sendero
    Luminoso group, he recalled that its support was limited to the South Eastern part of Peru, which was largely populated by
    non-Spanish speaking Indians. Consequently, he did not believe
    that one should attach too much importance to this group in spite
    of the latest incidents reported in that day’s press.
  16. Turning to Argentina, his Authorities agreed with the
    evaluation in the report that the political dynamics seemed to have shifted decisively in favour of the civilians and that the
    performance of the military régime was subject to mounting criticism, In the present situation, what appeared to be really lacking was a
    generally recognized and respected central political authority with
    the ability to take coherent and consistent decisions. Norway
    believed that Argentina might be facing a further period where
    authoritarian measures might alternate with democratic social
    measures in response to conflicting tensions. A real stabilization
    of Argentinian society might still be far away.
  17. Finally, in light of the attention which had been devoted internationally to human rights problems in Chile over the last
    decade, his Authorities felt that somewhat more extensive coverage
    should have been given in the report to the human rights record
    of this country, which, on the whole, had shown no improvement in
    the period under review, even if some encouraging moves had been
    registered here and there.
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    20, The SPANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were grateful to the Group of Experts and its Chairman for the report which it had drafted on the situation in Latin America and
    the Caribbean, The report was all the more valuable and important
    since it dealt with developments in a part of the world which, as he had pointed out on previous occasions, was the only so-called “Third World” region that was definitely a part of the West, and
    as such, was of great importance and interest to the Alliance. To this fact was added the increasing concern of the Spanish Authorities at the difficulties which the region was undergoing at present and its political instability in the future.
  18. He recognized that the report was subject to shortcomings
    by the very fact of its joint elaboration by experts of various
    nations with different approaches to the same problems. As had been
    the case with previous reports on Latin America and other areas,
    the document engaged the sole responsibility of its drafters and he
    would therefore go no further in developing the extent to which the Spanish analysis was somewhat divergent from that contained in the
    report, both with regard to particular issues and on its overall
    approach contained in Part I “General Trends and Main Events”.
    Developments in Central America, in particular, appeared to be influenced by a set of factors of a social, economic and political
    nature which were not sufficiently highlighted in the report. The
    same could apply to situations as complex as the aftermath of the
    Falklands Conflict.
  19. He recalled that his Delegation had already expressed
    its views on these outstanding questions during the Council’s
    examination of the previous report on developments in the region.
    He wished to inform the Council that the Spanish Authorities
    expected to contribute to the preparation of the next report in a
    more comprehensive and detailed way so that the general considerations
    which he had outlined might find their way into its text.
  20. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE wished to be associated
    with earlier speakers who had already congratulated the Expert
    Working Group and its Chairman on a fine report.
    24, In supporting his United States colleagues! remarks in
    favour of the proposed peace conference on the situation in Central
    America, he would recall that the United Kingdom had already
    welcomed the efforts underway in this direction in the recent
    Security Council debate and had suggested that the United Nations
    Secretary General might play a useful rôle in overcoming any
    remaining obstacles to such a gathering.
  21. With regard to relations between Belize and Guatemala, the United Kingdom deeply regretted the breakdown of negotiations
    and the lack of any immediate prospect for their revivial. At the
    same time, the United Kingdom Government would like to encourage
    broader economic support for Belize in order to demonstrate the
    isolation of Guatemala!ls claims, In the meantime, the small British
    garrison would remain in Belize, although it was recognized that it
    could not do so indefinitely. The need was to ensure Belize*s
    security, and the United Kingdom was considering ways of developing
    the country’s small national defence force to this end.
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    26, Turning to the Falklands, he said that the position of
    the United Kingdom Government was well known. The United Kingdom
    could see no possibility of negotiating the sovereignty of the
    Islands with Argentina as if nothing had happened. As the report
    itself pointed out, there had still been no formal declaration by
    Argentina of the cessation of hostilities and, indeed, warlike
    statements continued to emanate from Buenos Aires. Consequently,
    the United Kingdom Government remained concerned that Argentina
    should not obtain military supplies which were likely to increase
    the threat tothe Falkland Islands. It therefore hoped that
    potential arms suppliers would exercise restraint, or would at
    least co-operate with the United Kingdom in providing in confidence
    information on sales of sensitive weapons.
  22. On this subject, the United Kingdom Government had been
    somewhat disappointed with the resolution resulting from the recent
    summit of the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, This had been adopted
    in preference to the original Indian draft which had, at least,
    suggested a genuine attempt at pursuing a moderate line between the
    parties concerned. The United Kingdom found it hard to understand
    that, despite the events of 1982, the Non-Aligned Movement should
    still feel able to support Argentina’s extreme position virtually
    without qualification. Moreover, the United Kingdom found it
    offensive to suggest that its military presence in the South
    Atlantic affected stability in the region. The garrison in the
    Falkland Islands was essential while the threat remained, as was
    pointed out by the report, and would stay there,
  23. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he, too, wished to
    express his appreciation to the Expert Working Group and to its
    Chairman for a valuable report. His Authorities could agree in
    general with its contents and his remarks would therefore concentrate
    on the events since its compietion.
  24. As far as the situation in Argentina was concerned, his
    Authorities believed that President Bignone was serious in his
    intention to hold elections on 30th October. The announcement of
    these elections had relaxed considerably the tensions between the
    Government and the political parties on the one hand and the trade
    unions on the other. However, there were visible rifts between the
    two major parties in Argentina and he feared that this might lead
    to their disintegration before elections could take place.
  25. He went on to suggest that the growing political pressures
    on Bignone, as demonstrated by the call for an illegal strike on
    28th March, seemed to explain Buenos Aires! more neutral line and
    might have enabled Argentina to secure stronger support for her
    claim to sovereignty over the Falklands at the Non-Aligned summit,
    even though Bignone!s meeting with Castro and Arafat had been
    sharply criticised on his return,
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  26. Turning to Brazil, he said that in spite of the
    success of the Brazilian Government in obtaining IMF credits,
    it was doubtfui whether this would solve the country’s balance
    of payments problem for the current year. Certainly, the objective of a § fixed billion budget surplus in 1983 was
    uniixely to be achieved, and debt re~scheduling negotiations
    might well prove necessary before the end of the year. On the
    other hand, it was premature to assess the effect on Brazil’s
    balance of payments of falling interest rates and falling oil
    prices. The overall economic situation remained very bad and
    could well account for the most recent eruptions of violence,
    32, As far as the situation in Bolivia was concerned,
    there appeared to be increasing concern in some neighbouring
    countries that Cubans and Nicaraguans who recently entered
    Bolivia might establish training camps for terrorists and
    subversive activities in the region. The situation should
    therefore be carefully monitored.
  27. The German Authorities also believed that some attention
    should have been paid in the report to the situation in Ecuador,
    where the Government and Ecuador’s democratic system as a whole
    appeared to have been weakened by recent events, The strike which
    had been called by both the unions and the employers? organizations on 23rd and 24th March had paralyzed the economic life of the
    country almost completely. Although, by skilful tactics, the
    Government had been able to avoid clashes between the military and
    the police on the one hand and the strikers on the other, the
    large following which the strike had received demonstrated the
    grave discontent within the country, which the German Authorities
    expected to worsen rather than improve.
    34, In Central America, Nicaragua was and would no doubt
    remain an element of instability for the foreseeable future.
    The German Government welcomed the proposed meeting of Foreign
    Ministers of the region referred to by the United States Representative
    and hoped that it would be the beginning of a regional settlement.
    Overall, the situation continued to be tense and unsatisfactory.
    IT was for this reason that Germany had instructed its Ambassador to
    the United Nations Security Council to express its disappointment at
    the evolution of Nicaragua since 1979,
  28. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that since the
    comprehensive and useful report by the Expert Working Group had not
    given rise to specific comments by his Authorities, he wished to
    use this occasion to say a few words on Surinam,
  29. Since the execution of the fifteen leading critics of
    the military régime in December 1982 and the murder of former deputy
    Army Commander Horb in February 1983, no blatant violations of human
    rights in Surinam had been reported, However, there was still no
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    question whatsoever of a return to democracy, or of the
    restoration of press freedom and of the independence of the
    Judiciary. Moreover, there were clear signs that prisoners
    were still treated very harshly.
    57, With respect to the composition of the new Surinam
    Government formed at the end of February, it could be said that the new cabinet carried clearly the personal signature of Army
    Commander Bouterse, The leftist-radical Progressive Workers and
    Farmers Union (PALU) was strongly represented, although it lacked
    any significant popular support. Furthermore, Bouterse remained Chairman of the so-called “policy centre” where the important
    decisions were taken and one might therefore expect that the
    future direction of Surinam and its relations with the Netherlands would be determined largely by him. At the same time, it could
    be expected that the Progressive Workers and Farmers Union, which
    often took a strongly nationalistic and anti-Netherlands line,
    would endeavour for economic reasons to obtain the re-activation
    of the Netherlands development assistance programme, which had
    been suspended following the events of December 1982. To Judge
    from statements by high-ranking Surinamese, they hoped and expected that the Netherlands could soon resume its aid relations
    with Surinam. However, this hope was completely without foundation
    as long as the present situation continued. Moreover, the
    Netherlands Authorities had informed the Surinam Prime Minister
    of their views on this subject.
  30. In the ideological field, recent developments had shown
    a growing anti-Netherlands attitude on the part of Surinam. In
    this context he recalled the position taken by the Surinamese
    Government at the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries
    at Managua, as well as the attempts by Bouterse and his Delegation
    to include in the final communique of the non-aligned summit a
    paragraph condemning the position taken by the Netherlands
    Authorities towards Surinam. In the end, the paragraph adopted was
    very moderate in nature and failed to refer explicity to the
    Netherlands.
  31. As for Surinam!s policy vis-à-vis Cuba and Libya, he
    suggested that the rapprochement towards these countries still
    fell short of what would be called extensive military or economic
    operations. There were no large numbers of advisers from these
    countries in Surinam,
  32. With respect to military co-operation, an informal
    agreement had been rumoured to exist for military assistance
    between Cuba, Granada and Surinam. Under this agreement, the
    Cuban air force would be allowed to use the airport of Point
    Salinas.
  33. Finally with regard to Surinam’s economic relations, it
    was likely that Bouterse would be forced by the rapidly deteriorating
    economic situation of his country to seek new resources abroad at
    short notice. It was too early to tell where and on which conditions
    such economic assistance could be obtained.
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    42, The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities
    were grateful to the Expert Working Group for an excellent report
    and wished to be associated with the expressions of congratulation
    to its members and Chairman.
    43, Italy followed closely events in this part of the globe
    because of her ties of culture, language and civilization. It was
    for this reason that the Italian Government had been somewhat
    concerned at the deterioration in relations between Latin America ,
    and the West at the time of the conflict in the South Atlantic and
    had decided to try and contribute to a solution by the visit of
    the Itallan Foreign Minister to a number of countries in the region.
    44, However, the affinities which tied Italy to these
    countries did not prevent her from criticizing certain régimes
    when human rights and fundamental freedoms were abused. At the
    same time, the Italian Government believed that it was in Western
    interests to encourage greater economic co-operation and development,
    since it was only by meeting the most fundamental material needs of
    the region and in widening popular participation in the government
    of these countries that a truly democratic evolution could take
    place to an extent which would allow them to stand up directly or
    indirectly to attempts at de-stabilization by the East.
  34. Summing up, the CHAIRMAN noted that the Council was
    unanimous in its appreciation for the report by the Group of Experts.
  35. Permanent Representatives had expressed their concern
    at the situation in specific countries such as Brazil and Surinam,
    as well as their interest in current developments in the region
    such as the on-going peace efforts. At the same time, they had
    ‘underlined certain weaknesses in the report, which tended to be
    rather too descriptive for some nations at the expense of in-depth
    assessments of the complex, economic, political and sociological
    problems involved. Such shortcomings would be amended in the next
    report by the Group of Experts.
  36. The COUNCIL:
    took note of the report by the Expert Working Group
    on the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean,
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    III. FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WITH EXPERTS
    48, The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE enquired whether it would be
    possible to re-schedule the meetings of the Political Committee
    with Disarmament Experts and with Legal Experts, which were to be
    respectively held on 3rd/4th May and 6th May 1983, so as to avoid
    national representation problems arising from their coincidence with the meeting in Geneva on 2nd/6th May 1983, of the Seabed Treaty
    Preparatory Committee.
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    IV. FORTHCOMING DEPARTURE OF AMBASSADOR BENNETT
    49, The CHAIRMAN said that it was with regret that he had
    learned of the Imminent departure of Ambassador Bennett,
    Permanent Representative of the United States. The Council would have the opportunity to bid him an official farewell in due course,
    NATO,
    1110 Brussels.
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Date:
April 28, 1983
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