Suriname: Situation Update – December 1986

CIA-RDP91B00874R000200200007-2

Text:

  1. The army has the momentum after retaking Albina and Moengo. But the rebels have strengthened their ties to the prodemocratic exiles in order to establish political legitimacy and to overcome tactical weaknesses.
  2. A senior Surinamese military leader recently reported that the army regained control of the road from the capital to Albina and now has 300 troops at Albina and 200 near Moengo. Moreover, he said that 100 more troops are in Brokopondo District and will, together with those at Albina and Moengo, move southeastward deeper into rebel territory. Atrocities said to have been committed by a purported Libyan force aiding the military were more likely carried out by Surinamese Amerindians whom the army employed to infiltrate and kill Bush Negroes, including women and children. The official Libyan presence in Suriname is limited to 14 officials and dependents of the Libyan People’s Bureau in the capital.
  3. Meanwhile, the rebels have solidified ties to moderate exile and former president Chin A Sen, and former army officer Van Rey, who is now a tactical adviser to rebel leader Brunswijk. A recent meeting between the exiles and rebels addressed the prospect of forming a provisional government in Suriname.
  4. ☐ Comment: The exile-sponsored rebellion is in a crucial phase because the army may now intend to press forward toward the rebel bases, no doubt employing the recently purchased armed Venezuelan Bell 205 helicopter. Regarding the rebels, the issue of political legitimacy has been stymied by their failure to take Moengo or Albina. Although overt ties to Chin A Sen and Van Rey may help, the ad hoc composition of the 200- to 300-member rebel band—Bush Negroes, exiles, criminals, and mercenaries—apparently has dissuaded potential foreign benefactors from providing aid despite Chin A Sen’s past efforts to solicit support. Van Rey is probably a more capable tactician than Brunswijk, and his violent break from the junta in 1980 over Commander Bouterse’s refusal to reestablish a democracy underscores the validity of the frequently stated rebel goal of democracy for Suriname. How much the new exile encouragement and advice will help the depleted rebel force in the face of the army offensive remains unclear.

Prep:
Decl: Oadr

End of message

Date:
December 10, 1986
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP91B00874R000200200007-2

Secret
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Incoming
Secret
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Frp: . .3.
Military
86 3113743 .Msp Page 001
Tor: 100849Z Dec 86
Nc 3113743

Ruekjcs 7124
Pp Rueaiia
De Ruekucs #7124 3440844
Zny Sssss
P 100351Z Dec 86

Fm Dia Washington Dc//Jsi-7//
To Aig 970
Rucbsaa/Uscinclant Norfolk Va//J2//
Rueoeha/Uscincso Quarry Heights Pm//J2//
Rueofaa/Usoc Fort Bragg Nc
Ruwsmxi/Hq Mac Director Of Intelligence Scott Afb Il

25X1
Dia vieues 25X1

Bt

Secret Wnintel Noforn Nocontract Orcon

Serial: Diadin 343-6D

Subj: Suriname: Situation Update

Do1: 9 Dec 86 (As Of 1805 Est)

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