The Cuban Military Buildup – Options for Castro
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SCOPE NOTE
Cuba’s geographic position relative to the United States has attracted the attention of American strategists for over a century—especially as they searched for an American base from which to protect the approaches to the Panama Canal, and much later when Castro came to power on the island and aligned his regime with the Soviet Bloc.
The buildup of Cuban military forces, supported by an increased volume of Soviet military deliveries over the last few years, has posed new threats for US strategic interests in the region. In peacetime, Havana’s growing military strength helps to support leftist governments and revolutionary movements worldwide and to provide a shield for destabilizing activities in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. During a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, Cuba’s forces could threaten the southeastern United States, access to the largest source of US-imported oil, strategic facilities and pro-Western governments in the Caribbean Basin, and NATO shipping passing through the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel.
This NIE addresses Cuba’s improved military capabilities, the political and economic benefits that accrue to Cuba and the USSR therefrom, and the threats these might pose to US interests in the future. In addition, the NIE examines Castro’s options and intentions concerning offensive actions in peacetime, as well as under the conditions that might accrue in the event of a European war fought short of a strategic nuclear exchange.
KEY JUDGMENTS: Cuban Military Capabilities and Intentions
Since the mid-1970s, Cuba’s leaders have modernized their obsolescent armed forces as a result of their armed intervention abroad and their concerns about a direct US military reaction to their foreign operations. The Cubans—with the support of the Soviet Union—have improved their military capabilities by:
- Incorporating substantial numbers of new weapon systems—particularly more modern jet fighters, air defense systems, and naval combatants—into the force.
- Conducting more sophisticated training, including joint service exercises and occasional combined exercises with Soviet units.
- Acquiring additional civil air and merchant fleet assets to improve support for their forces overseas.
- Increasing the capability and size of their reserve forces by incorporating thousands of combat-experienced reservists, and forming a huge popular militia.
- Constructing redundant and hardened facilities to improve the island’s ability to withstand a conventional attack.
Prior to this buildup, Cuba was capable of defeating any invasion force short of a full-scale effort by a major power. Now a campaign designed to render Havana’s armed forces impotent would require about double the effort that would have been needed about four years ago.
We believe that over the next five years Havana and its Soviet patrons will continue to raise the cost of any military effort against Cuba by integrating more modern weapons into the Cuban armed services. By the end of this decade, Cuba will be an even more difficult opponent—better able to defend itself, more capable of responding to requests from revolutionary governments, and more useful to the Soviets as a surrogate in Third World disputes.
Anticipated Weaponry
We believe that over the next five years Havana will receive more of the same types of weapons now in its inventory. In addition, new systems that are likely to be introduced in Cuba include:
- Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol boats.
- Truck-mounted Styx coastal-defense missiles.
- IL-76 heavy transport aircraft.
- Advanced versions of the MIG-23 interceptor.
- A new tactical surface-to-air missile, such as the SA-8.
Likely Behavior During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War
We judge it likely that Castro would seek to ride out the conflict, hoping to avoid a major attack by US forces. Havana almost certainly would mobilize and disperse its forces in preparation for the worst, but the unpredictable nature of events would keep Cuba’s leaders cautious—fully aware of their vulnerable position and the strength of US forces.
We do not believe the Cubans would directly attack strategic regional facilities such as Mexican and Venezuelan oil refineries, the Panama Canal, or Guantanamo Naval Station because of fear that such actions would provoke a direct US response against Cuba. However, Cuban forces may engage in low-level harassment and sabotage, including covert efforts against these targets.
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