The Grenada Invasion: ’Use Force When You Should, Rather Than When You Must’ -format

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COURSE5603
BEST PAPER IN SEMINAR “E”
Student: Lisa Bobbie Schreiber Hughes
FSL John Blackton
Thursday, December 19, 1996
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    The Grenada Invasion: ’Use Force When You Should, Rather Than
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    Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
    Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
    National Defense University
    National War College
    THE GRENADA INVASION: “USE FORCE WHEN YOU SHOULD, RATHER
    THAN WHEN YOU MUST”
    Core Course Essay
    Lisa Bobbie Schreiber Hughes/Class of 1997
    Course 5603, Semmar “E”
    Mr. John Blackton
    Dr. Mel Goodman
    Introduction. Grenada m October, 1983
    On October 25, 1983, a U S. task force conslstmg of Navy and Marines, together
    with Army Rangers and the 82nd Alrbome, was tasked with rescumg hundreds of U S
    medical students who were being held on the island of Grenada by the hard-hne
    commumst forces that had Just executed Grenadlan Prime Mmlster Maunce Bishop
    Eventually, the task force was also charged with elirmnatmg the commumst Cuban
    presence from Grenada, thereby securing the island. This was Operation Urgent Fury.
    After four days of sometimes intense combat, mostly agamst Cuban forces, the students
    were rescued and all other U S obJecDves were secured ’ What rmx of factors shaped the
    U S decision to choose nuhtary force 111 Grenada, and why &dn’t the U S nabonal
    secunty pohcy process give greater consideration to the usual sequencing of pohcy
    mstruments,2 such as the econormc and poht~al pressure advocated by Bntish Prime
    Mu&ter Margaret Thatcher ?3 Former Secretary of State George Shultz offered a short,
    but not so simple answer: “The use of force obviously should not be taken hghtly, but
    hefter to use force when you should rather than when you must; lust (in other words, the
    use of force as a last resort) means no other, and by that time the level of force and the
    risk mvolved may have mulnphed many tunes over ‘d A review of the issues confrontmg
    ’ Ashley J Telhs, “Termmatmg mtervenhon understandmg exit strategy and U S. mvolvement m
    mtrastate conkt~“, Studies zn ConJkt and Terror-urn Voll9 (Apnl/June 1996), 135
    2 John Elackton, advice for core course 3 paper, NatIonal War College, Washmgton, D C (21 November
    1996)
    3 George P Shultz, Turmori and Trrumph My Years as Secretary of State (New York Charles Scnbner’s
    Sons, 1993), 331
    4&glat345
    2
    the key stakeholders who concluded that force “should” be used m Grenada makes clear
    that the decision was taken for a variety of pohcy reasons, takmg into account pohtrcal,
    btireaucrauc and logrsucal concerns
    The Stakeholders: Uang force “when vou should” m Grenada
    President Reaoan
    When President Reagan announced the “rescue nussron” to Grenada, his decrsron
    represented the first use of Amerrcan combat troops rn the Caribbean u-r almost 20 years
    and the first major use of Amerrcan rmhtary force smce the Vietnam War. Cnucs charge
    that, “the rmssron also rescued the Reagan adnumstratron from a senes of embarrassmg
    forergn pohcy farlures “’ In the mtervenmg years since the mvasron, some analysts have
    Indeed concluded that Grenada represented the “most successful smgle foreign pohcy
    event of Ronald Reagan’s presidency”.6
    There 1s some truth to the charge that Grenada “rescued” President Reagan’s
    foreign pohcy. As the cnucs note, the Reagan Adrmmstratron was faced with senous
    polmcal concerns m the Western Henusphere in the early 1980’s The Soviets seemed to
    be wmnmg the Cold War one small country at a time. Nicaragua had already Joined Cuba
    III open emulation of the Soviet system. El Salvador was wrdely expected to be the next
    country to “fall” Then, “Grenada entered the picture as an example of what the Reagan
    adrmmstrauon feared might happen to the rest of the region If radrcahsm were allowed to
    ’ Terry Kardu~ and Kathleen Pntchard, Ethrcs and Interventron the Unrted States in Grenada, 1983 (Pew
    Cz+se %&es 111 Intemahonal Affam, copywnght 1990 by the Carnegie Councli on Ethics and
    International Affairs), 2
    6 D Brendt Hard& “Grenada Reconsidered,” Fletcher Forum (Summer 1987), 305.
    3
    flounsh “’ To date, the United States had been powerless to stop this forward expansion,
    frustratmg President Reagan’s ovenrdmg politrcal objectrve for the region.
    The moment seemed ripe for decisive U S. actron when the Presrdent was
    awakened at the Augusta Natronal Golf Course early Saturday morning, October 22, to
    learn that Grenada’s neighbors, all members of the Orgamzanon of Eastern Canbbean
    States (the OECS) had requested that the Umted States Intervene nuhta.rrly to “dislodge
    the radicals’* from Grenada Reportedly, Grenada’s neighbors had been concerned that,
    under PM Bishop, there appeared to be a large, Cuban-sponsored rmhtary burldup which
    was vastly disproportionate to Grenada’s needs. With Bishop’s death, the OECS was
    worried that Grenada was now under the control of “even more radical Manusts (who)
    had launched a murderous reign of terror against therr enermes. Unless they were
    stopped, the Canbbean nerghbors said, rt was Just a matter of time before the Grenadrans
    and Castro moved on thezr countries “9
    Recogmzmg the Reagan Admimstration’s pohtrcal concern for the spread of
    Marxism 111 the Western Hemisphere, and talung into account President Reagan’s ability to
    take decisive actron,” as well as his mstmctrve appreclatron for the value of sendmg
    “srgnals” to alhes and enermes al&e,” Natronal Security Advrsor Bud McFarlane and
    Secretary of State George Shultz could be reasonably confident that the President would
    agree to honor the OECS request when they brought it to hrs attenuon early that Saturday
    ’ H W Brands, Jr, “Decleons on Amencan armed mtervenhon Lebanon, Domuucan Repubhc, and
    Grenada,” Pohca,’ Sczence Quarterly Vol 102 (Wmter 1987-88), 610.
  • Ronald Reagan, An Ameruzan Lfi (New York Suuon & Schuster, 1990), 450
    9m
    lo Shultz, 84
    ‘I Reagan, 266
    4
    mornmg 111 Augusta. As Reagan described it, “We couldn’t say no to those SIX small
    countnes who had asked us for help. We’d have no credlblhty or standmg m the Americas
    If we did. If rt ever became known, whrch I knew rt would, that we had turned them
    down, few of our friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally agarn l2
    There was another, 111 some respects overndmg reason why Presrdent Reagan
    agreed to intervene m Grenada the specter of hundreds of potential hostages, the
    American medical students who had been rounded up and threatened by the new
    Grenadlan regime. Cntics have charged that tlus was a false Jusnficaaon for the invasion,
    that the students were never actually m danger and that the Grenadlan rmhtary leaders had,
    111 fact, offered to let them leave the island I3 Although a difference of oprmon rema.ms on
    this point, the threat that a potential hostage situatron would have posed for the Reagan
    Administration should not be discounted.
    All too aware of the role that the Iranian hostage cnsls had played m destroying
    the presidency of his predecessor, and worried by the prospect of Amencan hostages m
    Grenada, an exhausted and depressed Reagan 1s quoted m the Econormst saymg, “I’m no
    better off than Jnnmy Carter.“14 In fact, the U.S troops who executed the Grenadlan
    operatron were mstructed that therr overndmg ObJectrve was to rescue the Amencan
    students. For members of the 82nd Anborn, the decision to invade Grenada came “totally
    out of the blue”, an emergency response to late-bretig events (the executron of Bishop
    and subsequent takeover by his hardhne deputy, Bernard Coard) which had placed
    Americans m danger. It was to be a “perrmssive non-combatant evacuation operatron”,
    l2 Reagan, 45 1
    l3 Larry Speakes, Speahg Out (New York Charles Scnbner’s Sons, 1988), 161
    l4 Nardm and Pntchard, 10.
    5
    where the 82nd Anborn expected to peacefully escort the students (who they understood
    had been rounded up and threatened by the Grenadrans) off the island. They would not
    wart for another Iran hostage cnsrs because, “there isn’t much that you can do when there
    1s a gun to somebody’s head.“15 Although the rrnssron subsequently expanded to include
    destructron of the People’s Revolutronary Army (the PRA, wl-nch consisted mostly of
    hard-fighting Cubans) the pnmary rnrssron, the rescue of the Amencan students, took
    place through a show of Amencan mrhtary presence III the first twenty-four hours of the
    evasion. l6
    The politrcal concerns that confronted President Reagan when he decided to
    mtervene mrhtanly m Grenada seemed to pornt him mexorably to the chorce of force m the
    first instance (rather than as a “last resort”) Put before a different President, these
    concerns could well have prompted a drfferent reacuon. Reagan, however, “with hrs
    mstmct for srmphficatlon and the brg story,“‘7 took less than twenty-four hours to
    conclude that the Umted States should launch a nuhtary mvasron of Grenada In the first
    place, Grenada’s Canbbean neighbors had asked for the rmhtary mterventron to keep
    Marxist expansromsm m check, a concern which Reagan also shared. In the second place,
    President Reagan was convmced that American hves were at stake. Force under these
    cncumstances “should” be used, to have delayed could have closed off pohcy options as
    surely as rf there had been a “gun put to somebody’s head”.18 Of course, another factor
    l5 Lt Co1 Charles Jacoby, mtervlew by author, Xanonal War College, Washington, D C , 12 December
    1996
    =IJ&i
    I7 Donald T Regan, For the Record From U’ail Street to Washrngton (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
    Jovanovltch, 1988), 293
    ‘* Jacoby mtervlew
    6
    rnfluencrng Presrdent Reagan’s decision was the realrzatron that there was broad consensus
    among his hrghest level pohcy advisors, pnncrpally Natronal Secunty Advisor Bud
    McFarlane and Secretary of State George Shultz, that mrhtary mterventron should be used
    III Grenada.”
    The Stakeholders Secretary of State Shultz and the State Denartment:
    Reports indicate that Secretary Shultz and NSA McFarlane were among the
    leading advocates of rnterventron from the ume they heard of PM Brshop’s October 19
    death.” In fact, rn hw memorrs George Shultz noted that, “The entrre Grenada operatron
    was driven by the State Department.“” Secretary Shultz and his pohcy makers at State, rn
    the nudst of the Cold War and nundful of the rncreasmg Marxrst presence in the Canbbean
    region, feared that the Grenada crisis could prove parnfully remrmscent of then- recent
    lnabrhty to prevent Surmamese strongman Des1 Bouterse (a creole army sergeant maJor
    who had overthrown Sunname’s elected government in 1980) from rounding up and
    murdering over a dozen promment cmzens on December 8,1982, and movrng to turn
    Surmame rnto the first commumst state on the mainland of South Amenca
    At that tune, and wrth all other potentral optrons consrdered and reJected, Shultz
    had also proposed utrhzatron of a hmited U.S. rmhtary presence. His proposal had been
    reJected by Secretary of Defense Wernberger and the Jomt Chrefs, leavmg the Unrted
    States wrth no option but to do nothmg of any srgmfrcance r.n Suriname.” Shultz
    recogmzed the retrcence of Wemberger and the Jornt Chiefs as a reactron to the contmumg
    lg Brands, 617,618
    2o gel@
    21 Shultz, 343
    22 jj& at 292-3.
    7
    legacy of Vretnam. “they mstrnctrvely opposed the small-scale use of Amerrcan forces,
    fearmg rt rrnght undercut then effort to equip themselves as a counterpoint to the
    Soviets “23
    However, Shultz also saw that this reticence had the potentral to hamper the
    Uruted States’ abrhty to conduct foreign pohcy, m that rt effecuvely took the nuhtary
    mstrument out of the U S Inventory of polmcal tools- “Often, one hears the argument
    ‘Force should be used only as the last resort.’ Thrs makes people feel good, and rt sounds
    statesmanlrke. In fact, I feel strongly that rt 1s poor public pohcy and an unsound
    apphcatron of the law The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are
    legmmate rnstruments of national pohcy and should be viewed as such. Wamng to use
    force as a last resort would have meant possrbly endurrng hostage takrng and having to use
    force then.“=
    With the legacy of the Vietnam war the use of force, or the threat of rts use, had
    lost any credrbilrty as an mstrument of United States pohcy. The loss of thus tool
    represented a bureaucratic problem for George Shultz, who felt it was necessary for the
    Unrted States to take decisive action m Grenada and therefore needed to bnng the rest of
    the United States government around to this reahzatron The appeal for U.S. rrnhtary
    assistance to repel the Marxist forces m Grenada, made by Domnucan Pnme Muuster
    Eugema Charles and the other members of the OECS, helped George Shultz tremendously
    111 thrs effort Despite credible charges that the OECS appeal had in fact been drafted m
    the U.S. Department of State,25 and that foreign service officers had orchestrated the
    8
    meeting at which the OECS agreed to request U S nulitary assrstance, the appeal
    nevertheless provided the Reagan Admmistratron with some claim to a legal authonzauon
    for the mvasron,26 as well as proof that the U.S. was not acting unrlaterally m Grenada, but
    rather wrth the comphcrty and approval of the other island natrons rn the region. When
    President Reagan was awakened Saturday mommg with news of the OECS request for
    mfhtary assrstance, Secretary Shultz and NSA McFarlane were at his side m Augusta,
    bnefing the President and recommendmg that the OECS request be granted The
    President agreed. Ultunately, so kd Secretary of Defense Wemberger and General
    Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chrefs of Staff
    The Stakeholders Secretarv of Defense Wemberger and JCS Chamnan Vessev:
    Although hrs memorrs give httIe mdicatron that Defense Secretary Wemberger had
    any misgrvrngs about the advlsabrhty of the Grenada rnvasron,” other accounts Indicate
    that the Secretary had serious pohtrcal and logistical concerns about the operation
    Foremost, of course, was the legacy of Vretnam, whrch “ . rllunnnated the dynanucs by
    whrch lmuted wars tend to carry wrtlun themselves the potentral for unproductive
    es&anon and, by extension, the ever-present possrbrhty of entenng mto a quagmrre This
    fear . . . is one of the permanent legacres of (Vietnam). It is not surpnsmg that policy
    makers ever since have become increasrngly wary of comrruttrng mrlitary forces m
    srmations where the pohtrcal drmensrons of mtrastate disputes are overly complex and the
    mihtary condmons uncomfortably flurd.“28
    ” ,Caspar Wemberger, Flghtmg for Peace Seven Crmcal Years m the Pentagon (New York Warner
    Books, 1990), 101-133
    28 Telhs, 118
    9
    Always aware of the ovemdmg polmcal concerns generated by the Vretnam
    legacy, Weinberger and the JCS seemed to feel they needed to provide a cautronary
    counterweight to an aggressive State Department and White House and therr mchnatron to
    advocate “early” nuhtary rnterventron 29 Accordmg to one account, Secretary Wemberger
    contmued to evmce little enthusiasm for the mterventron, even after the the death of PM
    Bishop had forced the JCS to “reluctantly” agree to partrcrpate.30 Weinberger’s
    ovemdtng pohtrcal concern, sttll remnuscent of Vietnam, appeared to be the fear that
    mtervenuon rn Grenada would “whet the admuustratron’s appetrte for nskrer operatrons m
    Central Amenca “31
    Asrde from therr po1n~1.J concerns about mterventron m Grenada, Secretary
    Wemberger and General Vessey had senous logrstrcal concerns about the feasrbrhty of the
    Grenada rescue mrssron The specter of the Iran hostage rescue mtssron of 1980 provided
    potent memones of the cost of farlure. Moreover, the Grenada cnsrs had developed so
    qtuckly that the U S forces tasked with executrng the rescue operation had vrrtually no
    tune to prepare Consequently, accounts rndrcate that as late as Sunday afternoon,
    October 23, Secretary Wemberger remarned adamant that there had to be far greater
    preparatron and a much larger force before a rescue operation could begin, Secretary
    Shultz interpreted Wemberger’s protests to be the equivalent of advocatrng “no actron at
    ,Jl 9.31 Shultz understood that Vietnam contmued to present a potent deterrent to the use
    of Amencan force in anythrng but the most lunited of operauons. He nevertheless felt that
    2g Jacoby mtervlew
    3o Richard A Melanson, American Forergn Polrcy Since the Vtetnam War the search for consensus from
    Ntxon to Clrnton (Armonk, New York ME Shaqe, Inc ,1996), 169
    31 m
    32 Shultz, 33 1
    10
    there were compellmg reasons to Intervene, and argued forcefully for the mterventron,
    taslong State Assistant Secretary Langhorn Motley wrth “brrngmg the Jornt Clnefs along.
    He (Motley) convinced them that the problem was severe. And he showed them the way
    to get out qurckly once the Job had been done. He convrnced them that . . rf we didn’t go
    rn quickly, we would have to do so eventually under much worse con&trons.“33 If hrs
    memorrs are a reliable reflectron of hrs state of rmnd at the time, then Secretary
    Wemberger agreed with Secretary Shultz that n-nln.ary mterventron was the correct course
    of actron for Grenada m October 1983.34 If thrs was not the case, then Secretary Shultz’
    bur eaucrauc maneuverrng was nevertheless sufficient to compel Wemberger and JCS
    Chref Vessey to agree to the operatton
    Conclusion: Grenada after the Invasion
    By most accounts, the Grenada mvasron was a success The students were
    rescued, casuahres were light, the Cubans were expelled, and the Grenadian people were
    appreciative. The Grenada operatron sent many signals: “(P)eople began to get the
    message- Ronald Reagan 1s capable of action beyond rhetorrc.“35 FrnaIly, even Sunnamese
    strongman Bouterse got the message. “He threw out the large Cuban contingent and all
    but broke drplomauc relatrons with Cuba “36 In the esumation of many, the Reagan
    Adrrnnistrauon had succeeded in employing force “where rt should” rn Grenada. And the
    result of that decision resonated throughout the region, and the world.
    33 Shultz, 343
    w Wemberger, 101-133
    35 Shultz, 344
    3b &c.J
    Blbhography
    Brands, H.W., Jr., “Declslons on Amencan armed mterventlon: Lebanon, the Domuucan
    Republic, and Grenada,” Pulztzcaf Sczence Quarterly Vol 102 (Winter 1987-88).
    Hardt, D. Brendt, “Grenada Reconsidered,” Fletcher Forum (Summer 1987)
    Jacoby, Lt. Col. Charles, mtervlew by author, National War College, Washmgton, D.C ,
    12 December 1996.
    Melanson, &chard A., Amencan ForelEn Policy Since the Vietnam War: the search for
    consensus from Nixon to Chnton Armonk, New York M E Sharpe, Inc., 1996.
    Nardln, Terry and Pntchard, Kathleen, Ethics and Intervention the Umted States zn
    Grenada, 1983 Pew Case Studies III International Affaxs the Carnegie Council on
    Educs and International Affa~s, 1990.
    Reagan, Ronald, An Amencan Ltie. New York Simon & Shuster, 1990.
    Regan, Donald T , For the Record: From Wall Street to Washmgton New York.
    Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovltch, 1988.
    Shultz, George P , Turmo11 and TnumDh My Years as Secretary of State. New York
    Charles Scnbner’s Sons, 1993.
    Speakes, Larry, SpeakmE Out. New York: Charles Scnbner’s Sons, 1988
    Tellis, Ashley J., “Termmatmg mtervention: understandmg exit strategy and U.S.
    mvolvement m mtrastate confhcts”, Studies zn Conflzct and Terronsrn Vol 19 (Apnl/June
    1596)
    Wemberger, Caspar, Fighting for Peace: Seven Crmcal Years m the Pentagon. New York
    Warner Books, 1990.

Source:

Lisa Bobbie Schreiber Hughes

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Date:
December 19, 1996
Categories:
Greneda Invasion, U.S. Interventions
Tags:
Boxes:
Thesis
Years:
1996
Persons:
Desi Bouterse
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