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UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND



Headquarters U.S. Southern Command
Chief of Staff, Major General Jon A. Norman, USAF
Date: 25 JAN 2018 Authority: EO 13526
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Reason: Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
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1982 HISTORICAL REPORT (U)

CLASSIFIED BY USCINCSO

REVIEW ON 31 DECEMBER 1989

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO MIAMI 34003



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SCJ3

15 May 1983

SUBJECT: Annual Historical Report, 1982

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1. Forwarded herewith is the US Southern Command Historical Report for 1982.
2. When separated from the classified inclosure, this letter is regarded UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



Navy

1 Incl
as

Chief of Staff

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UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND HISTORICAL REPORT 1982

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PART I

TOPICAL ITEMS

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PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION

KEY STAFF MEMBERS - HEADQUARTERS, US SOUTHERN COMMAND

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Lieutenant General Wallace H. Nutting, USA, 30 Sep 79

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ambassador George B. Roberts, US Department of State, 16 Nov 81

DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Major General William E. Masterson, USAF, 31 Jan 81

CHIEF OF STAFF

(b)(6) 23 Oct 79 | Navy

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

(b)(6) 18 Mar 81
22 Jun 82

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF - TREATY AFFAIRS

(b)(6) 5 Jun 79
(b)(6) 29 Jun 82

DIRECTOR OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

(b)(6) 2 Apr 80 | Navy
, 22 Feb 81

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, J-2

(b)(6) 26 Aug 79
(b)(6) 27 Sep 82

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, J-3

(b)(6) 4 Jul 79
(b)(6) 21 Jun 82

DIRECTOR PLANS, POLICY & POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, J-5

(b)(6) 10 Mar 81

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS (C3S)

(b)(6) 27 Jun 81

COMMAND CHAPLAIN

(b)(6) 21 Jun 81

COMMAND SURGEON

(b)(6) 10 Sep 79
16 Jul 82

COMMAND PROVOST MARSHAL

(b)(6) 1 Sep 81

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS

[redacted] (b)(6)

2 Aug 81

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

[redacted] (b)(6)

19 Jun 79

16 Aug 82

COMMAND INSPECTOR GENERAL

[redacted] (b)(6)

23 Oct 79

US SOUTHERN COMMAND COMPONENT COMMANDS

COMMANDER, 193D INFANTRY BIRGADE (PANAMA)

Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner, USA, 6 Apr 82

Navy

COMMANDING OFFICER, US NAVAL STATION PANAMA

[redacted] (b)(6)


6 Aug 81

COMMANDER, USAF SOUTHERN AIR DIVISION

Major General William E. Masterson, USAF, 31 Jan 81

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HQ USSOUTHCOM ORGANIZATION



COMPONENT COMMANDS

COMMANDER
193D INFANTRY
BRIGADE
(PANAMA)

COMMANDER
U.S. NAVAL
FORCES
SOUTHERN
COMMAND


COMMANDER
U.S. SOUTHERN
AIR
DIVISION

3/ Dual-Hat performed by 193d Infantry₄ Brigade Staff

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COMAMND RELATIONSHIPS
31 December 1982



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NOTE: Jamaica, Barbados, Haiti, and Dominican Republic were transferred to operational control of CINCLANT effective 1 Oct 82.

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TASKS AND MISSIONS

(S) Area of Responsibility. The United States Southern Command is the regional unified command responsible for all U.S. military activities in non-insular Latin America south of Mexico. For security assistance, the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility is expanded to include Mexico. Security assistance oversight for the Caribbean Islands, formerly a part of USSOUTHCOM's mission, was transferred to LANTCOM on 1 October 1982.

(S) Missions. The primary mission of USSOUTHCOM has evolved over the past year to the coordination and measured utilization of all forms of U.S. military presence and influence toward the promotion of regional stability and coalition. Underlying our role in support of U.S. strategic objectives and foreign policy is encouragement/assistance toward internal defense and development throughout the region. Defense of the Panama Canal remains a principal responsibility for U.S. combat forces assigned to USSOUTHCOM. Under terms of the Panama Canal Treaties, this responsibility is shared with the Republic of Panama, with the U.S. retaining the major part of the obligation through the year 1999 when Panama is slated to assume the total mission. Other USSOUTHCOM missions are to plan for and execute contingency operations within the area of responsibility, as directed, to include disaster relief, search and rescue, evacuation of U.S. non-combatants, and combined operations with other signatories of the Rio Pact.

Organization and Forces.

(S) USCINCSO normally exercises command and control of assigned and augmentation forces through three service components. Additionally, special mission considerations and/or contingency situations may require the formation of tailored joint task forces. He also commands 78 DOD military and civilian personnel assigned to Military Liaison Offices (MLO's) in some 15 Latin American countries. On a day-to-day basis, these personnel and their families represent the U.S. military to respective Ambassadors, country teams, host country governments/military establishments. Following are additional details on the USSOUTHCOM components and their missions:

a. (S) The Army component, headquartered at Fort Clayton, is the 193d INF BDE (PAN), with some 6,900 personnel. The Brigade Commander (BG Fred F. Woerner assumed command from BG Kenneth C. Leuer on 6 April 82) is responsible for planning, coordinating and, when directed, conducting the ground defense of the Panama Canal. He also provides rapid response forces for contingency missions, conducts humanitarian assistance operations, operates the U.S. Army School of the Americas and, within his capability, supports other USCINCSO missions throughout Latin America. He is dual-hatted as Commander, United States Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin American.

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b. ~~(S)~~ The U.S. Air Force Southern Air Division, composed of approximately 1,900 active duty and reserve component personnel, operates Howard Air Force Base and Albrook Air Force Station. Howard is the only jet capable airfield under direct U.S. control in the current USCINCSO area of responsibility. The Air Force Component Commander (MG William E. Masterson) plans, coordinates and when directed, conducts air defense operations in the Panama Canal area, provides air support as required for the commanders of ground and maritime defense forces, operates the Inter-American Air Forces Academy and responds to USCINCSO requirements for regional air support.

c. ~~(S)~~ The U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command headquarters is located at Fort Amador. The Navy Component Commander (b)(6) Navy (b)(6) with some 450 Navy and Marine Corps personnel, is responsible for surveillance and limited maritime defense of canal waters. In addition, he operates the Naval Communications Station and monitors the operation of the U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School. He provides fleet support to U.S. Navy and selected allied ships and supports USSOUTHCOM regional missions as required.

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JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISES AND ACTIVITIES

~~(C)~~ ^{XIII} ~~UNITAS XXII~~. This exercise conducted in USCINCSO territorial waters, was planned by USCOMSOLANT (with assistance of USCINCSO representatives) in conjunction with host countries. The degree of involvement and complexity of training operations were tailored to the capabilities and desires of the participants. Planning conferences were conducted with Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Malvinas/Falklands conflict in the South Atlantic resulted in five countries withdrawing from UNITAS exercises. Only Colombia and Chile participated fully. USSOUTHCOM participation during the operations phase was limited to the combined exercises with Colombia (5-14 Jul 82) and joint exercises in the Panama Canal area including a high value unit transit through the canal.

~~(C)~~ DESPLAZAMIENTO COMBINADO. This exercise was conducted by USSOUTHCOM in Honduras from 25 July to 15 August 82. It was a joint/combined deployment exercise utilizing two C-130's, two UH-1H's, and two CH-47's from USSOUTHCOM assets and resulted in the deployment of one reinforced infantry Battalion from central Honduras to the eastern border with Nicaragua. USSOUTHCOM command, control and communication procedures were successfully tested and evaluated. Additionally, deployment from Panama served to demonstrate US airlift and logistical support capabilities to friendly governments of the region.

~~(C)~~ ESLABON 1982. This was a combined/joint command post exercise conducted in Uruguay during 8-12 November 82. The objective was to become familiar with the planning procedures employed by each armed forces and to provide an opportunity for mutual understanding to facilitate combined security cooperation over the medium and long term. Two scenarios were presented during which the respective staffs analyzed, assigned and implied missions, developed courses of actions, and determined the most appropriate. The first scenario depicted an amphibious landing of Red Forces with a rapid advance toward Montevideo. Uruguayan forces conducted covering force operations and established a final defensive line. The second scenario was a counterattack, spearheaded by the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) to destroy Red Forces and to expel them from the national territory of Uruguay.

(U) KINDLE LIBERTY-82. Exercise KINDLE LIBERTY-82 was a JCS-coordinated USSOUTHCOM sponsored combined/joint field training exercise. The exercise was conducted during the period 10-19 February 82 exclusive of deployment/redeployment dates. KINDLE LIBERTY-82 was an air, ground and naval exercise for the defense of the Panama Canal conducted in the Republic of Panama. In addition to USSOUTHCOM in place forces and units from the Republic of Panama (Guardia Nacional) forces from LANTCOM, REDCOM, MAC and SAC participated in the exercise.

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(U) COMBINED AIRDROP. USSOUTHCOM conducted a combined airdrop in Brazil during 21-22 Nov 82. The airdrop consisted of a US Air Force C-141 along with a combat control team and an elite Brazilian Army paratrooper team. This modest but effective exercise opened the door for future combined training and exercise programs.

(U) COMBINED US/GN TRAINING. The 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) conducted a Field Training Exercise (FTX) 15-21 Oct 82 with the participation of the Guardia Nacional (GN). The primary exercise objective was to refine the Brigade's operational concept and develop a flexible and responsive standard procedure to counter a military threat to the Panama Canal. The First Company, GN participated in the exercise and was given several challenging missions to include: a waterborne operation and an air-mobile assault. Colonel Diaz-Herrera, GN G-3 was a visitor during the exercise.

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COMMAND POST EXERCISES (CPX)

✓ (c) KING POST. The USSOUTHCOM Joint Operations Center conducted nine KING POST Exercises during 1982. The KING POST is a procedural exercise designed to develop and maintain proficiency of the operations teams assigned to the USSOUTHCOM and component command operations centers.

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FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

(U) RELIEF OPERATIONS. During 1982, USSOUTHCOM assistance was requested and provided for two disaster relief operations and one refugee relief operation.

a. (U) Honduras. As a result of massive migrations of Miskito Indians from Nicaragua into Honduras, the Government of Honduras was faced with a tremendous problem of establishing refugee settlements for the Miskitos. Numerous international organizations assisted in resolving the issues. Among the serious problems was the inability to produce and store potable water in the settlements. Toward alleviating that problem --and even though this was a refugee issue, not a disaster relief issue-- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) requested and USSOUTHCOM executed the shipment of four 3,000 gallon potable water tanks from the Panama stockpile to USAID Honduras. The shipment was completed on 26 April 1982.

b. (U) Panama. As a result of the collapse of the Chiriqui River Bridge, the State Department requested and DOD/JCS approved USSOUTHCOM's providing emergency disaster relief support. This bridge served as a key link of the Inter-American Highway in western Panama. The majority of the food, raw materials, and finished products normally are moved between the western farmlands and the eastern industrial areas over the Chiriqui Bridge. Initial support consisted of 16 C-130 sorties on 24-25 May shuttling 763,000 pounds of cargo between Panama city and David. Next, USSOUTHCOM furnished six personnel to operate the shallow draft boats maintained in the disaster relief stockpile. For five weeks, they shuttled goods across the Chiriqui, carrying more than a million pounds of cargo. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM furnished four engineer NCO's who provided technical expertise in the four-week construction of a temporary Bailey-type bridge. By 30 June, the temporary bridge was in place, and USSOUTHCOM participation ceased.

c. (U) El Salvador. As a result of severe flooding in early-to-mid September, thousands of Salvadorans were left homeless. On 23 September, OFDA requested USSOUTHCOM assistance in moving 210 rolls of plastic sheeting from the stockpile to San Salvador. This heavy plastic sheeting is used in conjunction with simple framing to construct temporary apartment-like shelters. The materials were prepared and transported to Torrijos Airport on 24 September, for commercial shipment to San Salvador.

(U) DISASTER MONITORING. In addition to the active operations cited above, USSOUTHCOM monitored twelve other developments which had potential disaster relief implications from the command. They were: flooding in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru; a volcano eruption in Mexico; an earth-quake on St. Lucia; the dislocation of civil strife victims in Guatemala; and a power plant fire in Venezuela.

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(U) STOCKPILE. The USAID-owned, USSOUTHCOM-managed disaster relief stockpile underwent some significant changes during 1982. New items added to the inventory were: five 30KW generators, two water purification units and sixteen 3,000 gallon water tanks. Additionally, OFDA increased the tentage on hand from 2,000 to 2,300, replenished those items used in late-1981 disasters, and added a significant amount of hand tools to the inventory. The only significant losses during 1982 were the 20 foot bowramp barge and 40 hp motor, which sand damaged beyond repair during the Chiriqui Bridge Operation.

(U) STAFF VISITS.

a. (U) By USSOUTHCOM. Mr. Bob Orendas, 193d Inf Bde, LSC, represented the command at a Conference of Disaster Relief Stockpile Managers hosted by OFDA in Washington DC during the period 10-13 May. On 1-2 July, LtCol M.O. Fletcher made staff visits to OFDA and to the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator.

b. (U) By OFDA. During the period 22-29 June, Mr. George Beauchamp visited USSOUTHCOM. Mr. Beauchamp met with the disaster relief coordinators of USSOUTHCOM and its components to discuss issues of common concern. He toured the stockpile and randomly sampled for serviceability and accuracy of count. Next, he visited the Chiriqui Bridge Disaster site and interviewed USSOUTHCOM's boat operators and engineer advisors. And lastly, Mr. Beauchamp monitored a disaster relief material load-out exercise appropriately entitled Exercise STUFFED BIRDS. The exercise was a physical test of a system which OFDA hoped would allow immediate determination of the airlift required for a given amount of material, by comparing the weight and cube of the separate items with the cargo compartment characteristics of various aircraft. For this test, OFDA selected items which its program indicated would fill a C-141 and a DC-8. All items were moved from the stockpile to Howard, palletized, and mock-loaded into marked off areas of the aircraft parking ramp. The load-out exercise was successful to USSOUTHCOM as a training vehicle and to OFDA as it verified, within 2%, their computer-generated data.

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REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITIES

(U) SIGNIFICANT TRIPS. Significant trips are defined as those trips made by the Commander in Chief to Latin American countries. A chronological listing of trips made by the Commander in Chief during calendar year 1982 follows.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
Brazil	6-13 Jun
Cuba (Guantanamo Bay)/ Jamaica/El Salvador	18-21 May
El Salvador	16-18 Feb
El Salvador/CONUS	10-13 Mar
Honduras	26-27 Jan
Honduras	21 Apr
Honduras/El Salvador	1-4 Nov
Honduras/CONUS	7-12 Nov
Puerto Rico	19-21 Sep

(U) IMPORTANT VISITORS. A alphabetical listing of important visitors for calendar year 1982 is as follows:

<u>VISITORS</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
GEN Lew Allen, Jr., USAF Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force	10-12 Apr & 15-17 Apr
(b)(6) Commander in Chief Armed Forces of Honduras, and Party of 3	8-9 Sep & 18-19 Nov
(b)(6) Under Secretary of the Army, accompanied by (b)(6) Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, and Party of 3	21-22 Jan
Hon Thomas Aranda, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay	18-19 Feb & 30 Sep - 5 Oct
GEN Robert H. Barrow, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, and Party of 3	24-26 Aug
Congressional Delegation (CODEL) BAKER: Senator (Sen) Howard B. Baker, Jr. (R-TN) Senate Majority Leader, accompanied by Sen Paul Laxalt (R-NV) Sen Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), and Party of 14	2-5 Jan

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VISITORS

PERIOD OF VISIT

Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, accompanied by (b)(6) principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); (b)(6) (b)(6) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-American Affairs), and Party of 7

22 -24 Apr

Chilean National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies: (b)(6) Director, and Party of 36

14-18 Nov

Mr. Frank P. Cippola, SES-4, Director, Personnel Management, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), and Party of 1

9-11 Sep

Mr. Rhett Dawson, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee

5-6 Apr &
28 Nov-1 Dec

CODEL DENTON:
Sen Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr. (R-AL), Senate Armed Services Committee, and Party of 3

17-21 Feb

Defense Orientation Conference Association
(Party of 31)

24-27 Jan

LTG Welborn G. Dolvin, USA (Ret), Department of Defense Representative for Panama Canal Affairs

9-15 Aug

Hon Robert W. Duemling, U.S. Ambassador to Suriname, and Party of 1

19-24 Oct

El Salvador Military Delegation:
(b)(6) and Party of 2

29 Sep-1 Oct

Mr. Jack W. Flynt, National Commander, American Legion, and Party of 2

26 Feb-1 Mar

Mr. Marvin Garrett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security

6-11 Oct

LTG Philip C. Gast, USAF, Director, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Party of 1

26 Mar-1 Apr

Honduras Military Delegation:
(b)(6) Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Honduras, and Party of 5

2-4 Jun

CODEL HUBBARD: Representative (Rep) Carroll Hubbard, Jr (D-KY), Chairman, Panama Canal and Outer Continental Shelf Subcommittee, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and Party of 1

7-14 Mar

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VISITORS

PERIOD OF VISIT

(b)(6) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Party of 6	26-27 Oct
Japanese Training Ship: (b)(6) Commanding Officer, and Party of 20	25-27 Aug
GEN David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Party of 11	13-14 Mar
VADM Thomas J. Kilcline, USN, Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic, and Party of 10	11-13 Jan
Hon George W. Landau, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela	9-11 Aug
Hon Lyle F. Lane, U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay/Political Advisor (Designate) to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Party of 1	26-30 May
Latin American Attache Conference: LTG James A. Williams, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (60 conferees)	26-28 Jan
Dr. Richard Leshner, National President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Party of 9	18 Nov
CODEL LONG: Rep Clarence D. Long (D-MD), Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, and Party of 2	15-16 Feb
Hon John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army, and Party of 2	28 Apr-2 May
GEN Edward C. Meyer, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Party of 2	9-14 Jan
National Defense University 1982 Field Studies-National War College: Mr. Ray A. Warren, SES-4, and Party of 15	24-28 Mar
Hon John D. Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras	5-6 Jan & 28 Jan
Mr. Clifford G. Olson, Sr., Vice Commander, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Party of 1	9-17 Dec
Mr. Terry Peel, Staff Director, Military Construction Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, and Party of 2	15-17 Apr

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<u>VISITORS</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
Hon Anthony C. E. Quainton, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua	10-11 May
LTG M. Collier Ross, USA, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Forces Command, and Party of 2	31 Jan-4 Feb & 13-16 Dec
CODEL ROSTENKOWSKI: Rep Daniel Rostenkowski (D-IL) Rep Sam M. Gibbons (D-FL) Rep Harold E. Ford (D-TN) Rep Guy Vander Jagt (R-MI) Rep Beryl Anthony, Jr. (D-AR) Rep Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) Rep Thomas J. Downey (D-NY) Rep Richard T. Schulze (R-PA) Rep Peter Stark (D-CA), and Party of 21	17 Nov
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">(b)(6)</div> Minister of Public Security, Costa Rica, and Party of 4	7-9 Sep
CODEL SYMMS: Sen Steven D. Symms (R-ID), and Party of 2	1-6 Jun
GEN Donn A. Starry, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command, and Party of 20	9-12 Feb
Surveys and Investigations Team, House Appropriation Committee: Mr. Peter B. Symonds and Mr. Robert Carroll	5-9 Dec
Hon Gerald E. Thomas, U.S. Ambassador to Guyana	3-6 Feb &
LTG Richard H. Thompson, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Department of the Army, and Party of 1	19-22 Apr
ADM Harry D. Train, II, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Party of 7	19-21 Jan
US Military Liaison Office (USMLO) Commanders' Conference: (57 Conferees)	7-13 Jan
GEN John W. Vessey, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by LTG Vernon A. Walter, USA (Ret), (22-23 Aug), Ambassador-At-Large, and Party of 4	21-23 Aug
LTG Emmett H. Walker, Jr., USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Party of 6	12-14 Oct
Hon Harry W. Walters, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), and Party of 3	15-19 Feb

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VISITORS

PERIOD OF VISIT

Hon Francis J. West, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), and Party
of 3

15-19 Feb

CODEL WRIGHT:

Rep James C. Wright (D-TX), House Majority Leader, accom by
Rep Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI)
Rep Charles B. Rangel (D-NY)
Rep William Lehman (D-FL)
Rep E. Clay Shaw (R-FL), and Party of 18

10-11 Apr

(U) Other Visitors. Including the individuals and groups identified above, this headquarters received 576 visitors during the period of the report. Seventy-one were general officers, 295 were field grade officers, and 210 were civilians (GS-14 or Equivalent, and above).

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MANPOWER

1983

(U) Manpower Program, Headquarters, US Southern Command as of 1 January 1982:
(FQ 1/83)

(U) Joint Manpower Program (JMP), Part II - Active Force:

<u>STAFF FUNCTION</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Command/Chief of Staff	8	2	4	14
Special Asst for Public Affairs	3	1	3	7
Special Asst for Legal Affairs	3	1	2	6
DCS/Treaty Affairs	5	1	3	9
Resource Management Directorate	12	10	7	29
Intelligence Directorate	38	30	8	76
Operations Directorate	31	29	6	66
Plans, Policy & Political Military Affairs Directorate	17	3	4	24
Command, Control & Communications System Directorate	6	3	0	9
TOTAL	123	80	37	240

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	58	49	37	144
Navy	16	11	0	27
Air Force	41	19	0	60
Marine Corps	8	1	0	9
TOTAL	123	80	37	240

(U) JMP Part III, Joint Mobilization Augmentation Totals:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	35	46	2	83
Navy	18	15	0	33
Air Force	27	21	0	48
Marine Corps	8	2	0	10
TOTAL	88	84	2	174

(U) Significant manpower actions within HQ USSOUTHCOM during calendar year 1982:

(U) 13 May 82 - JCS Message 131407Z May 82, Subject: FY83 JMP for HQ USSOUTHCOM approved 240 manpower spaces for HQ USSOUTHCOM in FY83. Spaces were allocated as follows:

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<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	58	49	37	144
Navy	16	11	0	27
Air Force	41	19	0	60
Marine Corps	8	1	0	9
TOTAL	123	80	37	240

(U) This FY83 allocation represented an increase of 38 spaces over FY82. The additional spaces were distributed as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SCJ4 Logistics	1	1	0	+ 2
SCJ2 Intelligence	1	11	3	+21
SCJ3 Operations	2	2	0	+ 4
SCJ5 Plans, Policy & Political Mil Affrs Dir.	3	0	0	+ 3
Command, Control & Communication System Dir.	5	3	0	+ 8
TOTAL	18	17	3	+38

(U) 13 Sep 82 - JCS Message 131626Z Sep 82, Subject: Out-of-Cycle Change to the FY83-87 JMP for USSOUTHCOM approved one additional civilian position for HQ USSOUTHCOM for FY83 which increased the total manpower spaces to 241.

(U) At the conclusion of CY 1982, the approved manpower program reflected the following spaces:

<u>STAFF FUNCTION</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Command/Chief of Staff/INTAFF Sec	8	2	4	14
Special Asst for Public Affairs	3	1	3	7
Special Asst for Legal Affairs	3	1	2	6
DCS/Treaty Affairs	5	1	3	9
Resource Management Directorate	12	10	8	30
Intelligence Directorate	38	30	8	76
Operations Directorate	31	29	6	66
Plans, Policy & Political Military Affairs Directorate	17	3	4	24
Command, Control & Communications System Directorate	6	3	0	9
TOTAL	123	80	38	241

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<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	58	49	38	145
Navy	16	11	0	27
Air Force	41	19	0	60
Marine Corps	8	1	0	9
TOTAL	123	80	38	241

(U) JMP Part III, Joint Mobilization Augmentation Totals:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army	34	46	2	82
Navy	18	15	0	33
Air Force	27	21	0	48
Marine Corps	8	2	0	10
TOTAL	87	84	2	173

(U) Manpower Program, Security Assistance Organizations, CY82: At the beginning of CY82 (FQ 1/82); the following manpower authorizations were allocated to the Latin American (LATAM) Security Assistance Organizations.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL MIL</u>	<u>US CIV</u>	<u>LOCAL CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USMILGP-Argentina	4	0	4	1	6	11
USMLO-Barbados	1	1	2	0	1	3
USMLO-Belize	1	1	2	0	0	2
USMILGP-Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0
USSAMS-Brazil	5	1	6	3	3	15
USMILGP-Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0
USMILGP-Colombia	6	0	6	1	8	15
USODC-Costa Rica	1	1	2	0	3	5
USMAAG-Dominican Republic	3	3	6	0	3	9
USMLO-Ecuador	3	3	6	1	4	11
USMILGP-El Salvador	5	1	6	2	3	11
USMILGP-Guatemala	3	0	3	0	3	6
USDAO-Haiti	0	1	1	0	0	1
USMILGP-Honduras	5	1	6	2	5	13
USMLO-Jamaica	2	1	3	0	0	3
USDAO-Mexico	2	1	3	0	1	4
USMLO-Nicaragua	2	1	3	0	3	6
USMILGP-Panama	5	1	6	2	3	11
USODC-Paraguay	3	0	3	1	4	8
USMAAG-Peru	3	2	5	0	5	10
USODC-Uruguay	3	0	3	1	3	7
USMILGP-Venezuela	8	1	9	2	6	11
TOTAL	65	20	85	16	64	165

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(U) 29 Apr 82 - SECDEF Message 291407Z Apr 82, Subject: Overseas Security Assistance Management Organizations - FY 1983 Personnel Authorizations. This message identifies manning levels & requested development and submission of the FY 83 Joint Manpower Program (JMPs) as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TOTAL MIL</u>	<u>US CIV</u>	<u>LOCAL CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Argentina	4	1	6	11
Barbados	2	0	0	2
Bolivia	4	1	2	7
Brazil	6	2	3	11
Chile	0	0	0	0
Colombia	6	1	8	15
Costa Rica	3	0	3	6
Dominican Republic	6	0	3	9
Ecuador	6	1	4	11
El Salvador	6	2	3	11
Guatemala	3	0	3	6
Haiti	1	0	1	2
Honduras	6	2	5	13
Jamaica	3	0	0	3
Mexico	3	0	2	5
Nicaragua	3	0	3	6
Panama	6	2	3	11
Paraguay	3	1	4	8
Peru	6	0	5	11
Uruguay	3	1	3	7
Venezuela	6	2	5	13
TOTAL	86	16	66	168

(U) On 2 Sep 82, this Hq submitted a proposal to the Administration's CPD in the form of our proposed FY83 JMP. The following reflects the Hq USSOUTHCOM Proposed (FY83) JMP for Security Assistance in LATAM:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TOTAL MIL</u>	<u>US CIV</u>	<u>LOCAL CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Argentina	4	1	6	11
Barbados	3	0	1	4
Belize	2	0	0	2
Bolivia	4	1	2	7
Brazil	6	3	6	15
Chile	0	0	0	0
Colombia	6	1	8	15
Costa Rica	3	0	3	6
Dominican Republic	6	0	3	9
Ecuador	6	1	4	11
El Salvador	12	2	3	17

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Guatemala	4	0	3	7
Haiti	3	0	1	4
Honduras	8	2	7	17
Jamaica	3	0	0	3
Mexico	3	0	1	4
Nicaragua	2	0	2	4
Panama	6	1	4	11
Paraguay	3	1	4	8
Peru	6	0	5	11
Uruguay	3	1	3	7
Venezuela	9	2	6	17
TOTAL	102	16	72	190

(U) 22 Sep 82 - JCS Message 221951Z Sep 82, Subject: Revision of the Unified Command, approved assigning the responsibility for security assistance for the Caribbean, USMLO Barbados, USMAAG Dominican Republic, DAO Haiti and USMLO Jamaica to CINCLANT vice USCINCSO effective 1 October 1982. Spaces were transferred as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TOTAL MIL</u>	<u>US CIV</u>	<u>LOCAL CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Barbados	3	0	1	4
Dominican Republic	6	0	3	9
Haiti	3	0	1	4
Jamaica	3	0	0	3
TOTAL	15	0	5	20

(U) Listed below are the authorized strengths of component commands and tenant activities as of 31 December:

	<u>COMPONENT COMMANDS</u>		<u>TENANT ACTIVITIES</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US Army	482	5155	362	863	6862
US Navy/US Marine	33	88	29	444	594
US Air Force	173	1145	72	369	1759
TOTAL	688	6388	463	1676	9215

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CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MATTERS

(U) JOINT COMMITTEE, SUB-COMMITTEE - CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT. The Subcommittee - Civilian Employment was very active during the year. In October, a new U.S. Co-chairman was appointed and in December a new Panamanian Co-chairman came on board. Major topics of discussion were:

- a. (U) DOD progress in improving Panamanian proportionality in the workforce.
- b. (U) Development of employment data.
- c. (U) Development of a proposed arrangement which would establish procedures for cooperation in recruiting efforts.
- d. (U) No formal arrangements were negotiated; however, agreement on cooperation in recruiting is expected early in 1983.

(U) PANAMA CANAL EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM (PCES). The new PCES, mandated by the Panama Canal Act - PL96-70, was implemented on 31 March 1982 and has been incorporated in Title 35 CFR (Panama Canal Regulations). Major policy features of the PCES important to SOUTHCOM are:

- a. (U) Panama Area Personnel Board which includes membership of the CINC, USSOUTHCOM, is the central personnel policy coordinating body for all U.S. agencies in Panama.
- b. (U) The Central Examining Office would receive policy direction from the PAPB.
- c. (U) The Central Examining Office would serve all using organizations equally.
- d. (U) The Panama Canal Board of Appeals will include DOD representatives.

(U) PANAMA AREA WAGE BASE (PAWB). Various plans for modification of the PAWB were discussed among the principals of the Panama Area Personnel Board during the year. After consideration of the various plans and the views of the Administrator, PCC, and the Commander in Chief, USSOUTHCOM, the Chairman of the Panama Area Personnel Board, together with the principal members agreed that the following modifications to the PAWB were required:

- a. (U) Raise the salaries of all employees on the PAWB by 2 percent retroactive to 1 October 1982. This raise was in addition to the 2 percent already received on that date and made the total annual increase for this wage group equivalent to that received by pre-Treaty employees.

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b. (U) Raise the salaries of non-manual employees in grades 9 and above and manual employees in grades 10 and above on the PAWB to rates equivalent to those paid pre-Treaty employees in like grades. This is to be effective the first full pay period on or after April 1, 1983.

c. (U) Establish increased rate ranges in a few selected occupations, as required, to enhance recruitment and retention in positions below the grade levels mentioned above. A study group will be tasked with identifying such occupations and upon completion of the study will make its recommendations to the Panama Area Personnel Board.

(U) Labor Relations. Union representation elections were held in March 1982 in all DOD components. The competing unions were the DOD Coalition (American Federation of State County and Municipal Employee Locals 1907 (AFSCME) and American Federation of Government Employee Locals 14 & 1805 (AFGE) and the National Maritime Union (NMU). The results of the elections were:

<u>Bargaining Unit</u>	<u>Winning Union</u>
Air Force	NMU
Army/Air Force Exchange Service	NMU
US Army Communication Command	NMU
193d Infantry Brigade and Serviced Activities (Non-Professional)	Coalition
193d Infantry Brigade and Serviced Activities (Professional)	Coalition
Navy	Coalition

(U) The elections were challenged by the "losing" union which resulted in a delay in having the bargaining units certified by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. In November 1982, however the unions withdrew their objections and the units were certified. Contract negotiations are expected to begin in the Spring of 1983.

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PART II

STAFF ACTIONS

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OPERATIONS

(U) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR). During 1982 the US Air Force Southern Air Division Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), USSOUTHCOM agent for SAR operations, processed 133 incidents. Of those incidents reported, 36 developed into missions. Of those 36 missions, there were 13 lives saved and 38 individuals assisted. The 36 missions required 102 sorties flown which took approximately 108 hours.

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INTELLIGENCE

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ GENERAL.

Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

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AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING

(U) WWMCCS ADP REMOTE NETWORK PROCESSOR PERFORMANCE. During 1982 communications circuit performance continued to be an item of concern. The USADCOM line was not performing anywhere near standard until DCA directed 7th SIG to correct the problem. Teams were sent to all locations and testing/repairs were conducted from 25 October until the line was within specifications on 16 December. Both the USADCOM and USREDCOM lines are now performing within DCA standards.

(U) ADP EQUIPMENT (ADPE) CONFIGURATION CHANGES. The two Honeywell Level 6 computer systems were installed in June and July 1982 respectively and passed their 30 day acceptance testing in July and September 1982. In September 1982 we received a second remote terminal console from WESTPAC. This console is a TEMPEST approved inclosure which contains all the space and connections necessary for a VIP 7705W, MODEM and a KG-34. This console along with the previous one procured last year gives USSOUTHCOM the capability to deploy both a WWMCCS and an IDHS terminal to any remote site where electrical power and communication links exists.

(U) COMMAND AND CONTROL APPLICATIONS. Command and control efforts, were concentrated on final preparations for conversion to Level 6 ADPE and investigation and implementation of the H6000 - Level 6 conversion of USSOUTHCOM unique systems.

(U) ACCESS ROSTER SYSTEM. Minor changes were requested by J2 to this system. Their requirement presented the opportunity to test the implementation of a USSOUTHCOM unique system on the Level 6. The system is now fully active on the Level 6 and independent of any communications requirement between USREDCOM and USADCOM.

(U) CALENDAR SYSTEM. The Calendar System was developed to satisfy a J3 requirement to track significant events, which impacted on J3 assets. The system, is now operational and has been expanded to assist all Directorates and Divisions with planning of significant events. Additionally, it provides a vehicle for visibility/coordinates of command activities.

(U) WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK (WIN). During 1982 WIN usage increased significantly. Exercise usage was the area where usage increased most. During one exercise all SITREP's were sent by WIN MAIL. The WIN was also reconfigured to enhance connectivity and availability.

(U) INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS. The year of 1982 was a year of enhancement. All efforts were directed at enhancing USSOUTHCOM's intelligence to J2.

(U) BIOGRAPHICS (BIO). The rewrite effort of this system is nearing completion. Completion is expected by January 1983. In addition to the rewrite of the existing system, a number of system enhancements have been completed and others are underway. The most significant of these is an online update capability which should be operational by the end of the 2nd quarter of FY 83.

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(U) RELOCATION OF IDHS DATA BASE. The major portion of the IDHS data base and source library was installed on the H6000 computer at USREDCOM. This move was necessitated by continuing communication problems with USADCOM. No major problems were encountered and all functions are operational. DIAOLS and COINS processing continues to be done through USADCOM.

(U) NICARAGUAN GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE (GOB). A command unique GOB System for Nicaragua was designed, coded, tested, and placed in service. This action was necessitated because of a need for such information which was not, for the technical reasons, available through national systems. The problems in obtaining this information from the national system, has been resolved and this system, is now inactive.

(U) TRAVELLERS IN PANAMA (TIP). This system was expanded to include information on all bloc travellers and Latin American travellers to bloc countries. The system proponent hired adequate employees to prepare and monitor input to this system thus relieving ASD of this responsibility.

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LOGISTICS

(U) PANAMANIAN PREFERENCE IN PROCUREMENT. One of the significant events accomplished by Logistics Division during CY82 included the Panama Trade Seminars held in July 1982 by the USSOUTHCOM Joint Acquisition Coordinating Board (JACB). In all, 14 contracting activities within USSOUTHCOM and the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) participated in the trade seminars to better inform Panamanian businessmen on how to conduct business with local DOD contracting activities. In addition to providing up-to-date information to over 175 individual local business firms, the seminars also proved to be opportune vehicles in better acquainting contracting officers within the area with the type and availability of goods and services in Panama. The success of the seminars was another significant step in demonstrating the U.S. Forces commitment in complying with Article VIII in implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty.

(U) BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS. During the course of the year, the Logistics Division's representative Co-Chairman of the Business Activities and Non-Profit Organization Subcommittee of the Joint Committee conducted numerous binational sessions with Republic of Panama counterparts and resolved three key subcommittee issues outstanding since the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty on 1 October 1979. Panamanian and U.S. representatives of the Joint Committee, functioning under provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty, have since accepted the respective Joint Committee Arrangements which establish certain exceptions to benefits authorized by the Status of Forces Agreement.

a. (U) Membership of U.S. Forces Credit Unions: This arrangement resolves a SOFA exception whereby it "grandfathers" those employees of the U.S. Forces and the Panama Canal Commission who are not expressly authorized by the Treaty documents but were in fact members of the USARCARTBAIR or Navy Rodman Federal Credit Union on or before 12 March 1982, to retain such membership. To insure consistency in the processing of membership applications for such employees subsequent to the 12 March 1982 cut-off date, the arrangement also authorizes the military component commanders to permit such membership in the said credit unions on a space available basis.

b. (U) Membership in U.S. Forces' Sponsored Recreation, Social and Athletic Organizations: This arrangement also resolves a SOFA exception requiring Joint Committee approval whereby it grants U.S. Forces authority to continue in force current memberships in their command sponsored recreation, social and athletic organizations by persons not expressly authorized such membership under the Treaty and its related documents. With this arrangement, those organizations currently having members not specifically authorized by Treaty documents are allowed to retain such members without jeopardizing their status as U.S. Forces sponsored organizations. Hence, the said organizations are not required to register or establish juridical presence with the Republic of Panama nor pay its associated fees. In turn, the U.S. Forces agree to inform the Republic of Panama, on an annual basis, the number of such present members by nationality. Further, in keeping with the long standing policy of maintaining

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cordial community relations within the Panama Canal Area, the arrangement also authorizes the U.S. Forces to grant new membership to such individuals who make outstanding contributions to the U.S. military community. However, the arrangement precludes the blanket granting of membership in such organizations to the general local population who are not expressly authorized by the Treaty and its related documents.

c. (U) U.S. Forces' Contracted Institutions of Higher Education: This arrangement resolves another SOFA exception whereby it permits residents of Panama, of any nationality, admittance on a space-available basis to colleges and universities operating in Panama under contract to the U.S. Forces. Applicants must meet academic and other qualifications as determined by the institutions concerned and the U.S. Forces. It is inherent in this arrangement that the granting of admittance on a space available basis of such persons will not conflict with those persons who are expressly authorized by the Treaty documents when the said institutions are not capable of accommodating all concerned.

(U) BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT CONSOLIDATION. After consideration of several studies conducted over the past five years and under congressional pressure, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics directed the consolidation of Real Property Maintenance Activities and Family Housing Management in Panama. QASD also hired the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to study the feasibility and desirability to consolidate other areas of base operations support for Defense Complex Panama. By the end of 1982 the following progress has been made:

a. (U) A USSOUTHCOM concept for consolidation of family housing management (including preparation of a draft regulation) has been reviewed and commented on by local components, approved by USCINCSO despite component non-concurrence, and was forwarded to JCS for approval and service concurrence on 30 December 1982. QASD decision expected on or about 11 Feb 83.

b. (U) USCINCSO approved a basic RPMA organizational concept (despite local component differences of opinion) and forwarded to JCS for approval on 30 December 1982. Basic concept calls for a single RPMA manager overseeing a jointly manned organization comprised of three geographical areas; Atlantic, Pacific East and Pacific West. Services retain real property ownership, budget and master planning which is managed through a residual staff. QASD has requested service comments by 11 Feb 83.

c. (U) Request was made of QASD/JCS to assist in the manning and formation of an implementation team to perform at least six months TDY in Panama. Service departments have been asked to expedite this request.

d. (U) LMI has completed its final study report and submitted it to QASD (MRA&L). Summary of the report follows:

- Civilian Personnel Office:
 - Consolidate under Army
 - Use Air Force automated personnel data system

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- Transportation:
Consolidate passenger travel under Air Force
Consolidate vehicle operations/dispatch (local study)
- Vehicle Maintenance:
Do not consolidate at this time
Improve Army productivity, then consolidate
- Food Service:
Consolidate thru Joint Committee
Waiver Army inventory levels
Improve Atlantic supply
Obtain food service engineering advice
Combine food service orders
- Morale, Welfare, Recreation:
Set 10% reduction target (staff)
Establish Joint Services Committee
- Class VI Beverage Stores:
Combine Procurement
Centralize warehousing and records
- Purchasing and Contracting:
Largest potential in RPMA
Increase automation
Centralize service orders
- Supply Services:
Study common-ordering of DLA-GSA items

(U) HOUSING REQUIREMENTS. A growing need for additional DOD military housing reached critical proportions in 1982. Despite pre-Treaty projections for gradual troop withdrawals from Panama, the opposite has occurred. Resolution of the dilemma through use of excess Panama Canal Commission housing has been so far thwarted by divergent USG/GOP opinions concerning treaty interpretations on use rights. Current actions include Departments of Defense and State review and staff development of USG negotiating positions.

(U) INTER-AGENCY HOUSING RENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (IHRCC). At the direction of USCINCSO and the Administrator, Panama Canal Commission, the IHRCC was re-established. The Committee met from May 1982 to October 1982 to determine procedures which would promote consistency in housing rental rates charged by the agencies. On 23 November 1982, USSOUTHCOM forwarded the findings and recommendations of the IHRCC to DOD. These procedure, which were subsequently approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations), are:

a. (U) USSOUTHCOM cancel the implementation of the Realty Researchers' appraisal and, for the purpose of satisfying its latest survey requirement,

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arrange for another appraisal to be conducted as soon as possible for its rental properties, using PCC housing as the comparability base.

b. (U) The two agencies continue to follow the comparability concept in setting their rates, with PCC utilizing a comparability area in accordance with the provisions of OMB Circular A-45, and USSOUTHCOM utilizing PCC housing for the purpose of establishing rental comparability for its housing.

c. (U) The two agencies make the same annual rental adjustments in accordance with the provisions of OMB Circular A-45 and DOD Instruction 4165.2

d. (U) The Interagency Housing Rental Coordinating Committee continue in effect permanently in order to coordinate and act on all rent-related matters.

(U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

a. (U) Phase II Treaty (\$19.3M) was the main military construction (MILCON) ongoing for U.S. Forces. Twenty of the 27 projects in the Phase II construction were completed in 1982. The completed projects were: office space, test facilities, aircraft hangar renovation, barracks modernization, parking lots for HQs, 193d Infantry Brigade, 210th Aviation Battalion, Tropic Test Center, and 470th MI Group.

b. (U) Also completed during 1982 was a transmitter facility for the USAF, and construction of a motor pool for the Tropic Test Center.

c. (U) Military construction projects started in 1982 included air conditioning/mechanical upgrade of eight schools for the Department of Defense School System, replacement of an eight-inch waterline for the Army at Ft. Sherman, tactical equipment shops at Ft. Davis and Corozal, and renovation of the battalion headquarters building for the 210th Aviation Battalion at Fort Kobbe.

(U) REPUBLIC OF PANAMA ROAD PROJECTS.

a. (U) Planning and design work for the Simon Bolivar Highway and bridge from Panama City to Arraijan across Miraflores Lake continued although actual construction was limited to road-way land clearing.

b. (U) Interest waned in the proposed Vera Cruz Road designed to bypass Howard AFB when GOP expressed a need for USG assistance which is unavailable in theater. U.S. Forces capability to accomplish rough survey and construction is limited to already overcommitted RPMA assets and the Army's combat engineer company.

(U) PROPERTY TRANSFER. 1982 Treaty-mandated turnover of USG land and facilities to GOP, valued at over \$3M, included:

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- a. (U) Eighty-eight family housing units at Curundu Heights including related utilities, out-buildings and land.
- b. (U) Building 1008 and 1009, Albrook AFS including utilities fencing, land, storage areas and related out-buildings.
- c. (U) Curundu antenna farm.
- d. (U) Barracks and Dining Facility, Building 213, Fort Gulick.

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PLANS, POLICY AND POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, J-5

INTRODUCTION

(S) The upward trend in regional military-to-military relations and in Security Assistance allocations realized in 1981 continued into 1982, and at first it appeared we were in for another year of progress with a tremendously successful Military Liaison Office (MLO) Commanders' Conference and implementation of our new Security Development Program in January. When guerrilla sappers destroyed a number of Salvadoran Air Force aircraft at Ilopango Airfield on 27 January, the Reagan Administration responded readily to provide A-37, O-2A, and C-123 aircraft in replacement. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative constituted a positive step toward increased regional emphasis. An overwhelming Salvadoran voter turnout for the 28 March election, despite active insurgent opposition, signalled a nation-wide desire for a government truly serving the people. By that time we were well into a major CONUS training program--500 officer candidates at Ft Benning and a 960-man battalion at Ft Bragg--for El Salvador. In addition to substantial support for El Salvador, Congress reinstated MAP for Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, the Eastern Caribbean Islands, Honduras and Jamaica. An \$11M MILCON program was also approved for Honduras. Nearly \$100M worth of F-5 aircraft bought by Mexico in 1981 were delivered, and Venezuela continued with a sizable F-16 purchase. Belize, Paraguay and Uruguay were added into the IMET Program for FY 82, and Brazil was allowed to purchase training at IMET prices.

(S) However, the trend did not maintain a positive slope. It was, we estimated, only a matter of weeks before Argentina would have been recertified to receive Security Assistance when President Galtieri sent a task force to take military control of the Falklands/Malvinas. This occurred on 2 April. As England moved to counter the invasion, Secretary of State Haig declared that the U.S. would support England. That announcement all but devastated the regional good will we had so diligently molded in South America over the previous year, and it was not until the very end of 1982 that it looked like constructive relations with most of our South American neighbors might be possible once again. To make matters worse, we were never able to reinstate security assistance support to Chile, Bolivia or Guatemala. Moreover, funding for the PACAMS was never quite sufficient to cover all requirements. As the year came to a close, it was becoming more and more evident that the situation in El Salvador was far from favorable and that the guerrillas appeared to have taken the initiative. All the while, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua continued to build its military force and consolidate its power with help from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Finally, the December defeat in Congress of follow-on provisions for the Caribbean Basin Initiative was perhaps the most serious blow of all to hopes for ultimate stabilization in the region.

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(U) The foregoing circumstances created a substantial workload for the J-5 Directorate. Primary focus of our efforts was on making Washington aware of the criticality of U.S. interest in the Caribbean Basin and of the need for more effective interagency coordination in countering the Soviet/Cuban threat to the economic, social, political, and psychological stability of the countries in Latin America, particularly those in Central America. At the same time, equal emphasis was directed to re-establishment of the Command's contingency planning capability. Priority was given to manning the Plans and Force Development Division, and by the end of the year significant headway had been made in the formulation of new plans as well as the formal revision of outdated plans. FY 82 manning totalled 24, and one additional Navy space was approved for FY 83, although that space has yet to be filled. Ten more authorizations were requested in the FY 84 JMP.

(U) Organizational structure of the J-5 Directorate has remained constant and includes four main divisions: Policy and Strategy, Plans and Force Development, Politico-Military Affairs, and Security Development. The Policy and Strategy Division is the focal point for the formulation of overall USSOUTHCOM concepts and guidelines germane to the Defense Guidance (DG), Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and other related documents. The Plans and Force Development Division is primarily responsible for preparing and maintaining Command contingency operations plans and for assessing/developing the appropriate force structure for the Command. The Politico-Military Affairs Division consists of respective country analysts who monitor and coordinate region-wide activities and keep USCINCSO apprised of those issues most critical to U.S. national interests. This division also serves as the main conduit of staff interchange with our 15 MLO's. The Security Development Division monitors the implementation of the Security Development Program for Latin America. APPENDIX A depicts the J-5 organization at year's end.

(U) The current director is Colonel Walter E. Hines, III, USAF. The Deputy is LTC(P) Terry N. Rosser, USA. The J-5 Directorate is located on the ground floor, northeast wing, Montague Hall (Building 88), Quarry Heights, Panama.

SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS


General

~~(S,AF)~~ USSOUTHCOM took positive steps throughout 1982 to solidify and expand U.S. military influence and assistance toward building a hemispheric coalition. The turbulence in Central America, however, continued to consume the largest share of our efforts, while the Falklands/Malvinas crisis overshadowed all other events in the rest of the hemisphere. Our efforts to cement relationships, which were showing promise, were set back considerably. Immediate impact was evident. Several nations can-

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APPENDIX A



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celled participation in UNITAS XXIII. Argentina withdrew her guest instructor from USARSA and requested removal of the Air Force and Navy sections from their offices in respective host country headquarters. Brazil terminated the agreement authorizing the Security Assistance Management Staff in Rio de Janeiro and, along with other countries, deferred our first attempts at small unit exchanges/combined exercises. However, while political ties were strained, economic and military-to-military ties began to improve with time and through increased efforts on both sides. The region as a whole continued to receive increased interest/commitment from the highest levels of the United States Government as certain policies toward what the Soviet Union has termed our "strategic rear" were re-examined. J-5 played a key role in the following accomplishments:

~~(SAP)~~ The U.S. Southern Command entered 1982 with a sound plan for support to the Government of El Salvador. This preparation paved the way for training of an OCS Battalion of 477 candidates at Fort Benning GA for 13 weeks. This training was similar to that received by U.S. Army OCS candidates. The Ramon Belloso Battalion of 957 soldiers also received specialized training for a period of 13 weeks at Fort Bragg NC.

~~(SAP)~~ USSOUTHCOM published and distributed CONPLAN 6104, implementing the Security Development Program (SDP) for Latin America, in January 1982. We received the first presentation of individual country three-year SDP projections at our annual MLO Commander's Conference. These country plans utilize the many forms of U.S. military presence as tools to be effectively directed toward accomplishment of specific U.S. security objectives. The three-year projections will allow more coherent planning by USSOUTHCOM, adjacent commands, and the Washington community. As a result, USSOUTHCOM will be better able to orchestrate and enhance the application of U.S. military resources within the region and thus to develop the coalition as specified in the Defense Guidance.

~~(S)~~ In February, a USSOUTHCOM team was dispatched to Costa Rica (CS) to develop/review that country's national military strategy, define defense-related objectives essential to the protection of national sovereignty and territory, further develop requirements for near-term capability enhancements, and look at both the near and mid-term force structure needs of the Costa Rican public security forces. The team returned to Costa Rica in October to analyze the impact of latest developments on the earlier strategy/force development assessment and, more specifically, to study the organizational/command and control problems caused by the peculiar nature of the GOCS security structure.

~~(S)~~ During July, a USSOUTHCOM Tri-Service Training Assessment Team, headed by (b)(6) was dispatched to Honduras to define near-term Honduran training needs, assist the GOH in establishing training priorities, and identify appropriate training resources. This important confidence building initiative culminated in the acquisition of an additional \$2M in training funds to support Honduran force development efforts.

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(U) At our suggestion, the subject of low intensity conflict was placed on the agenda of the Army Commanders' Conference held 13-19 October at the Pentagon. This important initiative culminated in a directive to TRADOC from HQ DA to conduct a study on the needs of the Army in terms of training for low intensity conflict and development of a POI for appropriate school systems to satisfy those needs.

~~(S/AF)~~ During November and December, a significant strategy/force development assessment was conducted in Honduras. The U.S. team, under the aegis of USSOUTHCOM, assisted the Honduran government in developing a realistic strategy for properly staging their forces and logistical support, thereby enhancing responsiveness to likely threats. Upon completion of the study, the Honduran government/military realized the disparity between identified equipment and personnel requirements and current defense expenditures. The team was able to point out that few countries can fully meet their perceived defense requirements and that funding limitations and compromises are normal elements of the force development process. Our team effort was highly successful in that the General Staff now has a better perception of and appreciation for planning and resource allocations. The team chief was (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(U) Representational visits continued to serve as an effective vehicle for expanding military-to-military relationships. A total of 13 visits to eight countries were conducted in 1982.

- CINC: Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras
- INTAFF: Guatemala
- DCINC/USAF Component Commander: Paraguay
- Army Component Commander: Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras
- Navy Component Commander: El Salvador, Honduras

(U) USSOUTHCOM also hosted senior military leaders from five countries during 1982: Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Venezuela.

Policy and Strategy

(U) CY 1982 highpoints again included increased recognition of the U.S. Southern Command in National Defense Guidance and Joint Strategic Planning Documents. For the second year the problems and priorities of the Western Hemisphere were addressed more thoroughly in terms of the Latin American region's effect on U.S. global interests. We presented the Command briefing in one form or another 108 times.

~~(S)~~ By far the major issue of the year was the dichotomy of viewpoints

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between the Southern Command and the Atlantic Command on Command Arrangements in the Caribbean Basin. We have consistently held that the Caribbean Basin should be included in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) because Latin America must be viewed as a strategic entity with a single theater commander responsible for both peacetime and wartime U.S. interests. Scarcity of LANTCOM's naval assets and dual tasking to carry out Caribbean and Atlantic missions in wartime cause CINCLANT to seek to retain the Caribbean within his AOR. A strategic paradigm exists where the Caribbean is viewed by USCINCSO as the front door of the U.S. strategic rear, and by CINCLANT as the back door of NATO. The issue remains unresolved.

(U) The continuing Soviet/Cuban military buildup in Nicaragua and Grenada and support for insurgencies throughout the region, particularly in El Salvador, dominated the U.S. strategic focus in Latin America. The Falklands/Malvinas crisis had an adverse effect on our relations with Latin American nations, but early calls for U.S. isolation from the Inter-American System did not find consensus.

(U) Our primary objective in the Western Hemisphere was to maintain the security of North America (including Hawaii), the contiguous Caribbean Basin, and the air and sea approaches thereto. To this end the following regional objectives were established:

(C) Maintain the capability to neutralize, in times of war, Soviet and Cuban military assets located in Cuba and the Caribbean Basin.

(U) Reverse Soviet gains in the Hemisphere and counter Soviet and Cuban supported insurgency, terrorism, military and political influence, and destabilization efforts directed toward the Caribbean Basin and other parts of Latin America.

(C) Broaden regional political and military relationships with key Latin American countries for purposes of regional territorial and air defense, security of vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and facilitation of air and sea movement.

(U) Maintain access to, and acquire as needed, base and support facilities and operating, transit, and overflight rights for Caribbean SLOC defense and U.S. security efforts in Central America.

(U) Maintain access to strategic raw materials, including energy sources and processing facilities.

(U) Urge key allies to contribute to the security of the Caribbean Basin by providing military and economic assistance to less-developed countries and threatened states in the region.

(U) Identify critical industrial and mobilization base facilities for possible contingency use.

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(S) Seek co-production/co-development arrangements which will contribute positively to U.S. objectives in the region.

(U) These additional objectives were proposed to enhance coalition building:

(U) Seek authority to conduct exchanges of military units with friendly foreign armed forces for the purpose of providing and receiving training.

(U) Seek authority to provide responsive assistance to friendly foreign armed forces using DOD assets, e.g., civic action.

(U) Remove or modify legal restrictions on providing the full spectrum of training (to include human rights) for police elements of friendly foreign national guard forces.

(S) CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF POLICY AND STRATEGY ACTIONS (JAN-DEC 82)

21 JAN 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO HONORABLE JAMES AMBROSE, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

26 JAN 82 USCINCSO COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSAL

29 MAR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO LTG PHILLIP GAST, USAF, J3, JCS

10 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO REP JAMES WRIGHT (D-TX) HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER

15 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO GENERAL LEW ALLEN JR., CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF

15 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO RADM RALPH R. HEDGES, USN, COMNAVFORCARIB

16 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO RADM NORMAN C. VENZKE, CHIEF, USCG OFFICE OF OPS

20 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO LTG RICHARD H. THOMPSON, USA, DCSLOG, DA

24 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO GENERAL ROBERT H. BARROW, USMC COMMANDANT

29 APR 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO HONORABLE JOHN MARSH, SECRETARY OF ARMY

15 MAY 82 USCINCSO BIENNIAL REVIEW OF THE UCP

19 MAY 82 ANNUAL REVIEW OF COMPOSITE SERVICE POMS (JPAM)

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- 25 MAY 82 USCINCSO TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE
- 7 JUL 82 CINC PRESENTATION TO DRB. CINC'S THREAT ASSESSMENT WHICH INCLUDED CURRENT THREAT, RECENT AND PROJECTED CHANGES AND HIS VIEW OF FY 84-88 POMS
- 3 AUG 82 USCINCSO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REGARDING RECERTIFICATION OF EL SALVADOR
- 16 AUG 82 USCINCSO/CINCLANT CONFERENCE. MAJOR ITEMS OF DISCUSSIONS WERE TRANSFER OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND UCP ISSUES
- 21 AUG 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, USA, CJCS
- 23 AUG 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO MG ROBERT L. ENSSLIN JR., USA, ADJ GEN, FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD
- 10 SEP 82 USCINCSO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO DEFENSE GUIDANCE, SECTIONS I THRU IV
- 14 SEP 82 USCINCSO INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH REP MICHAEL BARNES (D-MD) CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
- 27 SEP 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO BG JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, EL SALVADOR
- 29 SEP 82 USCINCSO/CINCLANT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT RENEWED REGARDING COORDINATION, INTEGRATED PLANNING, AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
- 5 OCT 82 SUPPLEMENT TO BIENNIAL REVIEW OF THE UCP, WHICH INCLUDED AREAS OF INFLUENCE, AREAS OF INTEREST, AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
- 6 OCT 82 USCINCSO PRESENTATION TO CJCS "HOW TO FIGHT," IN RESPONSE TO INVITATION TO ALL CINC'S TO EXPLAIN THEIR CONCEPT OF OPERATION. USCINCSO'S BRIEFING INCLUDED REGIONAL THREAT, USSOUTHCOM PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, BUILDING THE REGION'S MILITARY CAPABILITY, AND HOW JCS CAN ASSIST USSOUTHCOM EFFORTS
- 14 OCT 82 USCINCSO PRESENTATION TO ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE. MAJOR ITEMS WERE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

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- 25 OCT 82 USSOUTHCOM REVIEW/COMMENTS TO THE 1977 PROTOCOLS WHICH AMPLIFIED USCINCSO CONCERNS FOR U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOLS
- 25 OCT-9 DEC 82 HONDURAS MILITARY STRATEGY/FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEAM. ASSISTED HONDURAN GOVERNMENT IN ASSESSING ITS MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT
- 8 NOV 82 CTNC PRESENTATION TO DRB ON POLICY, STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING CONCERNS FOR THE FY 1985-1989 DG, SECTIONS I THRU V
- 6 DEC 82 USCINCSO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO FORCE PLANNING SCENARIO FOR THE FY 1989 DRAFT GUIDANCE
- 8 DEC 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO BG JOSEPH LUTZ, USA, CMDR 1ST SOCOM
- 8 DEC 82 USCINCSO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO DEFENSE GUIDANCE, SECTION V
- 13 DEC 82 USSOUTHCOM BRIEFING TO LTG BMMETT H. WALKER, USA, CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
- 30 DEC 82 BIENNIAL REVIEW OF THE UCP
- DEC 82 USCINCSO/CINCLANT JOINT STUDY OF COMBINED USE AIR/NAVAL BASES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA--ON-GOING
- DEC 82 USCINCSO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REGARDING RECERTIFICATION OF EL SALVADOR

Major Conferences.

(S) USSOUTHCOM Military Liaison Office (MLO) Commanders' Conference. USSOUTHCOM conducted a highly productive MLO Commanders' Conference, 7-13 January 1982. Events of the past year impacted dramatically on U.S. national strategic interests in Latin American (LATAM). To focus on the significant challenges ahead, the conference agenda included presentations and dialogue on current policies, priorities, and strategy for the region as well as on specific programs designed to meet U.S. objectives for each country. To highlight concern over evolving regional events, the theme selected for the conference was: "Security Development for the '80's: Building the Coalition." USSOUTHCOM's Security Development Program, a continuing effort which embraces not only security assistance but all other forms of military influence and presence as well, makes possible the coordinated, balanced application of available resources in order to foster optimum hemispheric partnerships and cooperation. A clear signal of rekindled U.S. interest in the region and recognition of serious concerns in the Caribbean Basin were underscored by the presence at the conference of top-level representatives from DOD,

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DOS, and other USG agencies. The conference was held at Howard Air Force Base, Panama.

(U) USSOUTHCOM Tri-Service Training conference. Our annual Tri-Service Training Conference and Workshop, hosted by Headquarters, United States Air Force Southern Air Division (USAFSO), was held in Panama, 8-12 March 1982. Representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Military Departments and their training agencies attended along with training program personnel from the in-country MLO's, Headquarters USSOUTHCOM, and the USSOUTHCOM service components. The principal function of the conference was to bring the various representatives together in an open forum to address on-going training requirements of each LATAM and Caribbean nation participating under the U.S. Security Assistance Program. FY 82 training requirements were revised as necessary and FY 83/84 requirements were submitted. In addition, the workshop portion allowed each country's U.S. military programming representative to sit down with Washington, USSOUTHCOM, and service component representatives and further refine their individual training requirements.

(U) USSOUTHCOM Tri-Service Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) Conference, 1982. Our first annual Tri-Service PEP Conference, hosted by the United States Army Security Assistance Agency for Latin America (USASAALA), was held in Panama on 15-19 November 1982. Representatives from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Department of the Air Force; Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM, as well as personnel from USSOUTHCOM's three service components joined 29 PEP officers at the conference. The purpose of the conference was to bring together all the PEP officers in Latin America in a constructive forum for sharing individual experiences, assignment responsibilities/challenges, methodologies for mission accomplishment, and problems of mutual concern. PEP officers assigned to Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, and Peru attended the conference. The current Latin American contingent of PEP officers consists of 13 Army, 10 Air Force, and six Navy officers. This was the first Tri-Service PEP Conference conducted by USSOUTHCOM and, hereafter, will be scheduled as an annual event. The theme of the conference was "The Exchange Officer's Role in Implementation of the USSOUTHCOM Security Development Program." Topics of mutual interest were presented to all PEP officers during the first day of the conference, with the last three days dedicated to the service components in order to conduct their own sessions on service-oriented matters. Each of the exchange officers presented a short briefing summarizing their day-to-day involvement in the program and the benefits/problems they have encountered. There was a meaningful exchange of ideas, and problems/proposals identified were carried back by the service representatives for staffing.

(U) Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC). Conference was cancelled this year; however, it was rescheduled for June 1983 in Cartagena, Colombia.

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(U) Conference of American Armies (CAA). This is a biennial conference. The last conference occurred in Nov 81 at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. and was hosted by the U.S. Army. Plans are underway for a conference in 1983--site to be determined.

(U) Conference of the Chiefs of the Air Forces of the Americas (CONJEFAMER). CONJEFAMER XXII was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 12-19 April 1982. President of the Conference was BG Basilio Lami-Dozo. All seventeen member nations were represented. The United States was represented by GEN Lew Allen, USAF Chief of Staff, and MG William Masterson, Deputy Commander in Chief, USSOUTHCOM/Commander, USAF Southern Air Division. The Falklands crisis erupted during this period; however, there were no major interruptions of the conference.

Security Assistance.

(U) In FY 82, significant gains were made in security assistance funding to Latin America. IMET funding increased from \$3.943 million to \$10.971 million, a gain from 13.5% to 26.1% of total IMET funding worldwide. The MAP funding increase from \$24.34 million to \$79.5 million represented an increase from 9% to 30% of worldwide MAP funding; however, \$55 million of this funding was provided as special funding to El Salvador under Section 506(a) drawdown authority. FMS financing increased from \$31.287 million to \$64.8 million--an increase from 1% to 1.67% of worldwide financing. Total FMS sales for the region increased from \$226.15 million to \$695.75 million. The most significant single sale was 18 F-16A and 4 F-16B aircraft for Venezuela, a \$615.25 million contract. Total regional FMS sales (both cash and credit) were as follow:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>FMS SALES</u>
BRAZIL	13,701,000
COLOMBIA	13,169,000
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	3,910,000
ECUADOR	7,479,000
EL SALVADOR	19,001,000
HONDURAS	9,388,000
MEXICO	5,409,000
PANAMA	478,000
PARAGUAY	116,000
PERU	2,610,000

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URUGUAY	1,635,000
VENEZUELA	618,859,000
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$695,754,000

(U) Relevant Security Assistance Legislation. In 1982, the only new security assistance legislation passed was Public Law 97-257, the FY 82 Supplemental Appropriations Bill. Provisions of this legislation which affected Latin American countries follow:

- Military Assistance Program (MAP). MAP funding of \$10 million for Honduras and \$2 million for Costa Rica was provided.

- International Military Education and Training (IMET). Additional IMET funding received through this legislation, combined with reprogramming action ongoing at the time of passage, resulted in the following increases: \$1.054M for El Salvador, \$.358M for Honduras, \$.065M for Colombia and \$.200M for the PACAMS.

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credits. An additional \$10 million was provided to Honduras.

- Economic Support Funds (ESF). To support the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative, funds were approved in the amount of \$350 million. Funds not less than the specified amounts were earmarked for the following countries: \$20 million for the Eastern Caribbean, \$41 million for the Dominican Republic, \$10 million for Haiti, \$50 million for Jamaica, \$10 million for Belize, \$70 million for Costa Rica, and \$35 million for Honduras. Not more than \$75 million for El Salvador and not more than \$10 million for Guatemala were also earmarked.

(U) Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMS). The future of the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) remains a clouded issue. Panama has not yet agreed to allow the school to continue operation after 30 September 1984. All three schools, however, experienced rapid growth and are preparing for additional expansion during the next few years. Following a study conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to determine the Navy's role in providing training for this region, the U.S. Naval School became a separate command on 1 October 1982 and was renamed the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS). NAVSCIATTS will report to the Chief of Naval Education and Training through COMTRALANT. For matters concerning security assistance training, CNO, in coordination with USSOUTHCOM, will provide guidance and direction. Noteworthy is the fact that on 19 November 1982 Honduras graduated a class of OCS cadets from USARSA and all were commissioned on the spot by General Alvarez, Commander, Honduran Armed Forces. This was a first for any such class.

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TRAINING SUMMARY (FY 82)

	<u>School</u>	<u>Courses Offered</u>	<u>Students Trained</u>	<u>Mobile Training Teams</u>	<u>Students Trained</u>
Army:	USARSA	25	1,602	80	7,865
AF:	IAAFA	61	894	29	423
Navy:	NAVSCIATTS	20	141	11	551
Totals:		<u>106</u>	<u>2,637</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>8,839</u>

(U) Guest instructors participating at PACAMS for 1982 were as follows:

USARSA: Eleven guest instructors and seven NCO's represented twelve Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela

IAAFA: Four guest instructors represented four Latin American countries: Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela

NAVSCIATTS: None

(U) International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. The following table provides, by country, a summary of IMET funding and students trained under this program in FY 82:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>AMOUNT FUNDED</u>	<u>STUDENTS TRAINED</u>
BARBADOS	70,000	19
BELIZE	26,000	16
COLOMBIA	543,000	658
COSTA RICA	58,000	55
DOMINICA	17,000	8
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	465,000	129
ECUADOR	498,000	254
EL SALVADOR	2,002,000	218
GUYANA	40,000	29

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HAITI	242,000	26
HONDURAS	1,275,000	341
JAMAICA	75,000	20
MEXICO	147,000	72
PANAMA	401,000	224
PARAGUAY	14,000	8
PERU	484,000	367
ST. LUCIA	12,000	5
SURINAME	23,000	2
URUGUAY	6,000	3
VENEZUELA	29,000	27
PACAMS	<u>4,544,000</u>	<u>---</u>
TOTAL	\$10,856,000	2,481

(U) Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS). The FY 82 FMS program was as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>FMS CREDIT</u>	<u>MAP</u>
BAHAMAS	1,000,000	---
BARBADOS	2,000,000	100,000
COLOMBIA	12,000,000	---
COSTA RICA	---	2,000,000 (1)
DOMINICA	---	300,000
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	4,000,000	1,000,000
ECUADOR	4,500,000	---
EL SALVADOR	16,500,000	63,500,000 (2)
HAITI	300,000	---
HONDURAS	19,000,000 (1)	11,000,000 (1)

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JAMAICA	1,000,000	1,000,000
PANAMA	5,000,000	---
PERU	4,500,000	---
ST. LUCIA	---	300,000
ST. VINCENT	---	300,000
E. CARIBBEAN	<u>2,600,000</u>	<u>---</u>
TOTAL	\$72,400,000	\$79,500,000

(1) Includes Supplemental Appropriation funding of \$2 million MAP for Costa Rica, \$10 million FMS and \$10 Million MAP for Honduras

(2) Includes \$55 million 506(a) Authority grant

Plans and Force Development.

~~(S/AF)~~ During 1982, the USSOUTHCOM contingency planning capability, although quite lean at first, matured at a rapid pace as the new division began to flesh out with the required manning after mid-year. The year got off to an active start with a December 1981 CJCS tasking to develop an operations plan for certain contingencies relative to the Nicaraguan situation. This led to the publication of USCINCSO OPLAN 6150-82 in January 1982--a major project. This was the first of several important CONPLAN/OPLAN developments and reviews. The pace never let up throughout the year.

~~(S/AF)~~ For OPLAN 6501-83, two teleconferences were conducted for TPFDD Plans maintenance and OPLAN review with the final product published in October. This plan provides for unilateral defense of the Panama Canal and protection of U.S. lives and property in the Panama Canal area in non-mobilization and mobilization contingencies. Closely related, USSOUTHCOM Regulation 500-1 was published in November. The regulation prescribes procedures to be utilized and restrictions imposed while conducting civil disturbance operations to contain, isolate, and suppress civil unrest and mob action and to restore order in the Panama Canal area. The regulation superseded USSOUTHCOM Emergency Action Procedures, Volume III, CIDREP System; Appendix 12 to Annex C to USCINCSO OPLAN 6501-82; and the USSOUTHCOM Civil Disorder Plan.

~~(S/AF)~~ CONPLAN 6100-83 was reviewed and rewritten with inputs from the component services. This plan, for the conduct of evacuation operations as the result of contingencies throughout Latin America and for the conduct of military operations in Latin America other than defense of the Panama Canal, will be forwarded to JCS for approval in February 83. With CONPLAN 6100-83 as the basis, several other more specific evacuation plans tailored to conditions in certain Central American countries were prepared.

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~~(S/AF)~~ Near the close of the year, planning conferences were conducted for concept development of CONPLAN 6170 and a concept briefing to JCS is scheduled for late January 1983. This plan resulted from a 6 December 82 tasking by the CJCS to prepare for certain defensive operations in the event of Nicaraguan aggression.

~~(S/AF)~~ Also at year's end, planning and close coordination were on-going for USCINCSO Joint Field Training Exercise Kindle Liberty 83, to be conducted in February 83. FTX 6583 will test measures for unilateral canal defense under OPLAN 6501, but will also employ concepts contained in CONPLAN 6700, which provides for combined U.S.-Panamanian defense of the Panama Canal. This office was involved in planning and coordination for Exercise Ahuas Tara, a combined exercise with Honduras to practice/assess concepts of air defense, deployment/employment of U.S. and Honduran forces, and combined operations. This latter exercise is planned for late January or early February 1983.

~~(S/AF)~~ CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF PLANS AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS (Jan-Dec 82)

JAN	PUBLISHED USCINCSO OPLAN 6150 ON 15 JAN 82. CONDUCTED SPECIAL AIR DEFENSE STUDY IN HONDURAS; THE STUDY INCLUDED A SITE SURVEY TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS, CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIMUM LOCATION FOR FACP RADAR.
FEB	CONDUCTED A STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR. REVIEW OF CINCLANT CONPLAN 2360.
MAR	CONTINGENCY PLANNING REVIEW OF CONPLAN 6100 AND RELATED SPECIFIC AREA PLANS.
APR	ATTENDED USREDCOM CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN USSOUTHCOM CONTINGENCY PLANS.
MAY	BIENNIAL REVIEW OF UCP. WORKED ACTION ITEMS ON CHANGE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARIBBEAN ISLANDS FROM USCINCSO TO CINCLANT. PUBLISHED CHANGE 1 TO OPLAN 6501-80 ON 14 MAY 82.
JUN	PARTICIPATED IN PHASE II OPLAN 6150 TPFDD REFINEMENT CONFERENCE HOSTED BY JDA AT MACDILL. CONDUCTED ANALYSIS OF USNAVSO MISSIONS; IN REPLY TO U.S. NAVY AUDIT AGENCY REPORT. REVIEWED LONG TERM CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) STOCKPILE REQUIREMENTS
JUL	REVIEW OF SM 191-79, RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PARTICIPATED IN ELLIPSE BCHO EXERCISE. EL SALVADOR EVACUATION PLANNING STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT.

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ATTENDANCE AT JDS STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING AT MACDILL WITH DCINC.

- AUG RECOMMENDED USSOUTHCOM CHANGES TO FY 84 JSCP AND FURNISHED USCINCSO OPLAN/CONPLAN REVIEW SCHEDULE FOR FY 84 CYCLE. ATTENDED CONFERENCE AT MACDILL TO MERGE RELEVANT TPFDD'S OF CINCLANT OPLAN 2348, CINCLANT OPLAN 2150, AND USCINCSO OPLAN 6150. RESULTING TPFDD WAS TITLED 615AC. CONDUCTED COMBINED PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF HONDURAN ARMED FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH PREPARATIONS FOR AHUAS TARA. SUBMITTED USCINCSO PROPOSED CHANGES TO FY 83 JOPS VOL I AND II.
- SEP PUBLISHED CHANGE 2 TO OPLAN 6501-80 IAW FY 83 JSCP REVIEW SCHEDULE. ASSISTED WITH INPUTS TO USCINCSO FOR A 6 OCTOBER PRESENTATION TO JCS ON USSOUTHCOM'S CONCEPT OF THEATER OPERATIONS.
- OCT HELPED COORDINATE AIR DEFENSE SITE SURVEY CONDUCTED IN PANAMA AND SELECTED AREAS IN THE USSOUTHCOM AOR BY TAC TEAM. ATTENDED PHASE II OPLAN 2348 TPFDD REFINEMENT CONFERENCE AT MACDILL. VISITED USFORCARIB HQ AT KEY WEST FL TO ESTABLISH FORMAL PLANNING LIAISON. PROVIDED INPUT TO JSCP CIVIL AFFAIRS ANNEX TO OBTAIN AREA STUDIES FOR PERU, COSTA RICA, AND GUATEMALA. DEVELOPED RAPID REACTION EVACUATION CONPLAN 6160 IN RESPONSE TO USCINCSO TASKING; INITIAL CONCEPT APPROVAL OBTAINED AT MEETING ON 10 SEP 82 MACDILL CALLED BY J5/J3. SUBSEQUENT USSOUTHCOM PLANNING SESSION HERE ON 6-8 OCT 82 RESULTED IN FINAL COORDINATION.
- NOV SPONSORED TEAMS FROM ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE AND AIR TRAINING COMMAND TO CONDUCT JOPS III/JDS USERS COURSES FOR USSOUTHCOM AND SERVICE COMPONENT STAFFS.
- DEC REVIEWED CINCLANT OPLAN 2360 AND CTF-145 OPLAN 2150-82. COMPLETED CHANGE 1 TO CONPLAN 6100-79. PUBLISHED CONPLAN 6160-83 ON 1 DEC 82. RECEIVED CJCS TASKING ON 6 DEC TO DEVELOP PLAN TO COUNTER POTENTIAL NICARAGUAN AGGRESSION. CONFERENCES AT MACDILL AND KEY WEST LED TO FINALIZATION OF CONCEPT AND ULTIMATE CONPLAN 6170. FORMAL BRIEFING TO CJCS SCHEDULED FOR 26 JAN 83. PER REQUEST OF ASD/COPTROLLER DURING DRB PRESENTATION IN NOVEMBER, SUBMITTED TO CJCS A COMPILATION OF PRIORITY NEAR-TERM USSOUTHCOM FORCE/EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS.

POLITICO-MILITARY SUMMARY

(U) ARGENTINA

(U) 1982 was a tragic year for Argentine military and political relations with the United States. The optimism that developed in the first three months of the year, took a sudden downturn when Argentina invaded the

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Falkland/Malvinas Islands on 2 April. This action set up a chain of events that had a detrimental effect on regional interrelationships for the rest of the year. Argentina's defeat by Great Britain had a sobering effect on their Armed Forces. In June, President Galtieri was replaced with retired General Reynaldo Bignone. Argentina's main moral and material support during the war came from Peru and Venezuela.

(C) The April-June conflict in the South Atlantic between Argentina and the United Kingdom dominated the Argentine political environment in 1982, and gave the USSR an opportunity to expand its influence in Argentina. Initially the Soviets disappointed the Government of Argentina by not vetoing United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 concerning the Falklands/Malvinas; many Argentines had hoped for a veto in subsequent stages. The USSR ingratiated themselves with the Argentine government by privately offering arms and supplies (which were not accepted) and lending Soviet-backed diplomatic and propaganda support for Argentine causes. When the U.S. publicly sided with the UK, the political environment/opportunity became even more favorable for the Soviets. The Soviets have continued to try to build on their diplomatic initiative to expand the relationship and gain Argentine international support.

(C) The net result for 1982 regarding Soviet-Argentine relations must be considered a plus for the Soviets, especially since Moscow regards any perceived diminution of U.S. influence or any spread of anti-U.S. sentiments in Latin America as a victory. For its part, the government of Argentina responded both by sending its Defense Minister to head the Argentine delegation to Leonid Brezhnev's funeral in November, and by declaring a day of national mourning in Argentina on the day of Brezhnev's burial. The Argentine flag was flown at half-mast for three days--a very exceptional expression of sympathy.

(U) Argentina's performance during the war indicated a deficient logistical system, weak anti-aircraft fire support, poor tactical deployment strategy, and overall ineffective war fighting capability. With respect to the U.S. Military Group in Buenos Aires, almost all personal and official ties were broken, and all officers were relocated into the American Embassy complex. Dependents were evacuated to Montevideo, Uruguay. Interest in developing closer ties with the U.S. froze; this chilling effect lasted throughout the rest of the year.

(C) Argentine exports to communist countries in 1982 jumped almost 60% over 1980 levels, while imports increased by a modest 1.1% in the first nine months of 1982. The Soviet Union, Argentina's single most important trading partner, continued to buy large quantities of the country's grain harvest (e.g., 70% of Argentina's wheat during the first 10 months of 1982), which accounted for approximately 60% of Argentina's export earnings.

(U) Argentina's human rights performance continued to improve in 1982. By mid-year the nation's military authorities had committed themselves to elections and the restoration of constitutional government by no later than early 1984. The Argentine Armed Forces have held national power for most of the last twenty years.

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(U) BELIZE

(U) The independence of Belize on 21 September 1981 assured an exciting new year. Belize's neighbor, Guatemala, severed consular relations with the United Kingdom and refused to recognize Belize as a sovereign nation. The new Guatemalan government, however, has shown more moderation than expected on claims to Belizean territory.

(S) The British Forces Belize have remained beyond the original pullout date due to Guatemala's high capability to mount operations against Belize. Their presence also thwarted possible Cuban designs on this tiny new nation.

(S) The Belizean Defence Force commanded by a British Loan Service Officer has a strength of 500-600 men. The newly formed maritime wing, also commanded by a British Loan Service Officer began modestly with one 35-foot vessel and 30 personnel. NAVSCIATTS programs provided the majority of the training for the small maritime wing. The Air Wing is slated to be operational in 1983 with one aircraft.

(S) Belize had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) under 200 million dollars representing mostly sugar cane, timber and other agricultural activity. Monies mailed from Belizeans working in the United States and British Forces Belize expenditures were other major sources of income. Prime Minister George Price continued to dominate Belizean politics. His party, The Peoples United Party or PUP, has never lost a national election.

(U) Belize became home for some 2,000 El Salvadoran refugees who settled in the Belmopan and Orangetown areas. The energetic refugees had planted, harvested and marketed crops before the year's end.

(U) In November the first U.S. trainers ever to operate in Belize arrived from the 3/7 Special Forces Battalion in Panama. They taught a month-long basic medical technician course. A special class for welders was also conducted at NAVSCIATTS in Panama. The modest \$26,000 IMET program was carefully and completely utilized.

(U) A two-man Military Liaison Office was approved in August 1982 and will be filled in early 1983. A two-man Defense Attache Office was approved and manned in 1982. With increased IMET planned for 1983, the USSOUTHCOM military schools (PACAMS) will be able to provide substantial training for the small Belizean Armed Forces.

(U) BOLIVIA

(U) Bolivia continued in political and economic turmoil throughout 1982. In this one year Bolivia was governed by three presidents.

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(U) President Celso Torrelío was unable to hold onto the presidency due to military and political pressure resulting from a faltering economy and dissent within the military. President Guido Vildoso Calderon was sworn into office on 21 July 1982, but military infighting and a stagnant economy limited the effectiveness of his government from the onset. The Bolivian military regime of President Guido Vildoso, undergoing economic and political pressure, agreed to give way to a constitutional government. In October 1982, the Bolivian Armed Forces turned the government over to the 1980 Congress which in turn selected Herman Siles Zuazo as president.

~~(S)~~ Since Siles took office, his Administration has shown little capacity to govern. Critical domestic problems became worse in the face of government disorganization, and foreign policy continually tended toward the non-aligned left. Overall the Siles Administration is characterized by a vacuum of power beset by internal dissention.

~~(S)~~ Soviet policy towards the civilian government in Bolivia was cautious but demonstrated an apparent desire to expand the range of contacts and influence in Bolivian society. The Siles government has drifted to the left wing of the non-aligned movement but is guided more by nationalistic and socialist ideology rather than by commitment to communism or the Soviet system. Following the inauguration of the Siles Administration in October 1982, the Soviet Union made continual efforts to enhance relations with Bolivia. At the end of 1982, this initiative included the offer of Soviet military equipment.

(U) Bolivia did not participate in IMET or FMS credit programs in 1982, due both to the lack of certification by the President of the United States and the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The section of the FAA known as the Brooke/Alexander Amendment calls for countries to pay all arrearages before they can participate in Security Assistance. Bolivia's arrearage totaled over \$45M by the end of 1982. Lines of communication with the Bolivian military power structure were established through our Defense Attache Office, and plans are ongoing for a future reopening of the MLO--an initiative fully supported by Ambassador Edwin Corr, who had become Chief of Mission in Bolivia in late 1981.

(U) BRAZIL

~~(S)~~ The world-wide recession particularly affected Brazil, in spite of an increasingly successful arms industry. By the end of 1982 Brazil's foreign debt stood at \$82 billion. This continuing crisis precipitated an end-of-year request to the IMF for emergency funding. In national elections in November, 58 million voters turned out. President Figueiredo's party retained control of the Presidential Electoral College, a majority of State Governors and the Federal Senate. There was a large opposition vote, however, mainly in the cities and southern part of the country.

(U) In late November President Reagan visited Brazil, returning an earlier visit to the United States by President Figueiredo.

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(e) Because of the nuclear issue, IMET remained unavailable to Brazil in FY 82. However, approval was granted to purchase training at IMET prices, and Brazil made some FMS purchases of arms and training during the year. In one case, the Brazilian Army was somewhat disappointed with a SECDEF decision that they would have to share with Thailand 46 M-1 tanks made available by Japan. IMET funding levels programmed for FY 83 offer a possibility of \$50,000 for Brazil.

(U) Efforts to increase contacts through exchange programs and orientation visits continued. In addition to established PEP billets, there were several other personnel exchanges primarily between the U.S. and Brazilian Armies. Exchanges took place between our JOTC and their Jungle Warfare Training Center (CIGS), and between General Officer guest lecturers. GEN Richard E. Cavazos, CG FORSCOM, delivered a series of lectures in Brazil in September--to the Army General Staff, the Superior War College (ESG) and the Command and General Staff College (ECEME). In return, General De Divisao Haroldo (Ericksen) Da Fonseca lectured at USACGSC and USAWC. Plans were initiated for more exchanges in 1983, to include a proposed exchange of airborne personnel. The Brazilians turned down an invitation to participate in the U.S. Army War College International Fellows Program, but indicated they would be interested in future invitations. The Brazilians did not participate in UNITAS, but did agree to a port visit by UNITAS ships.

(U) The agreement covering the Security Assistance Management Staff (SAMS) expired in June 1982 accompanied by a request for its disestablishment. As the year ended, however, agreement seemed close on both the establishment and composition of a dual-located (Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro) Military Liaison Office (MLO) to continue Security Development efforts. Ambassador Motley personally led the way in successfully pushing the issue with ITAMARATY.

(U) LTG Nutting, USCINCSO, visited Brazil in June. Other distinguished visitors included LTG McEnery, IADB; GEN Jones, CJCS; ADM Hayward, CNO; GEN Barrow, OMC; GEN Vessey, CJCS; GEN Cavazos, FORSCOM; and DEPSBCDEF Carlucci. Brazil's Minister of the Army, GEN Walter Pires, visited the United States at the invitation of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

(U) Joint U.S.-Brazilian consultations were held in Brasilia on 14-18 March. The JCS team was headed by BG Andrew L. Cooley (OJCS/J5-PM); COL Hines represented USSOUTHCOM.

(U) CARIBBEAN ISLANDS

(e) On 12 November 1981 the Unified Command Plan review process resulted in a decision to transfer responsibility for security assistance in the Caribbean Islands. The plan of action and milestones developed jointly by the two commands involved resulted in an orderly transfer ultimately consummated on 1 October 1982. However, in many respects little effective change has occurred, except for the establishment of a security assistance

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management office at LANTCOM headquarters in Norfolk. USSOUTHCOM still provides training to the island nations through the PACAMS and supports logistical needs of the MLO's through the MAC channel airlift operation out of Howard AFB.

(U) The Dominican Republic had a very active Presidential and Congressional election campaign in which Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate, Salvador Jorge Blanco, emerged victorious. U.S. Ambassador Robert Anderson became Chief of Mission in May 1982. The IMET program which was very active in 1981 continued to function smoothly. The Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMS) provided the majority of IMET training. A small program at NAVSCIATTS was reestablished in 1982. The largest group of Dominican Republic students, 142, attended officer courses at USARSA. Fifty-six officers attended a twenty-week infantry officer basic course and four senior officers attended the Command and General Staff course. Officer training in intelligence, joint operations, commando operations and patrolling rounded out the increased Army program. Air force training at IAAFA provided technical training for 24 NCO's and nine officers.

(S) The Seaga government in Jamaica continued its western-aligned, anti-Cuba stance but faced serious economic and internal problems. A USMLO was established with USA Major Steve Hightower as chief. This quickly energized the IMET program. A second MLO officer from the USCG and a semi-permanent power barge project marked increased U.S. military interest and assistance. The new commander of the Jamaica Air Wing, (b)(6) visited USSOUTHCOM and IAAFA. Commonality of USAF50 and JDF aircraft should result in increased interaction in 1983, although Canada will remain the primary source of training for the JDF Air Wing. President Reagan has chosen to make Jamaica the Caribbean showcase of democracy, with the focus on economic assistance.

(S) Haiti's economic problems continued to constitute a seedbed for unrest. The continued Haitian emigration drew national focus, and strict measures by civil authorities and Florida based task forces slowed the flow to a trickle. Haiti was invaded in early January by an exile group operating out of Florida. The invading force was reduced enroute from a strength of 44 to the eight that entered the northern island of Tortue by boat. By 16 January the government troops had restored control, but the overall performance of the supposedly elite Leopard Forces was disappointing and internal realignments were made in the Armed Forces. Roger Lafontant became Secretary of State for Interior and National Defense on 12 July 1982. Difficulty in identifying qualified candidates limited the use of allocated IMET funding.

(S) Barbados continued to lead the southern Caribbean joint security arrangement. (b)(6) Commander of the Barbados Defense Force (BDF), has become author and chief proponent of collective defense. A mobile training team from the 3/7 SF Battalion provided medical technician training to the BDF. NAVSCIATTS trained BDF patrol boat commanders and provided technical training for crews. The BDF prefers to use English

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oriented training when able and will shift focus to CONUS schools and future naval training to be offered in Puerto Rico.

(U) The U.S. foreign policy focal point of 1982 for the Caribbean Islands was the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In October 1982, a \$350M one-time aid package for the Caribbean Basin was approved. Unfortunately the ten percent incentive tax credit was withdrawn on 9 December 1982, and the portion which lifted trade restrictions was not brought to a vote before the lame duck session of Congress adjourned and the bill died. The supplemental appropriation of \$350M primarily provided economic assistance to countries in which the private sectors were threatened by lack of foreign exchange. Jamaica as might be expected was the largest Caribbean Island recipient (\$10M).

(U) CHILE

~~(S)~~ In spite of continuing depletion of foreign reserves, signs of unrest and loss of public confidence, President Pinochet's government remained in control with apparently solid support of the military. Pinochet demonstrated his accommodation with the military of placing more and more retired Army officers in key civilian and economic positions.

(U) Longstanding tension with Argentina over the Beagle Channel was eased somewhat when the 1972 Treaty was extended, due largely to the efforts of the Pope and his representative, Cardinal Samore.

~~(S)~~ There was no significant improvement in relations with Bolivia which were clouded by Bolivia's continuing desire for access to the sea. Meanwhile, traditional suspicion regarding Peru's intentions continued.

~~(S)~~ As a prelude to return to democratic rule, President Pinochet announced in October the creation of a commission to study the question of Chilean exiles. Acting on that committee's December recommendations, the government released a list of 125 persons who would be allowed to return home.

(U) Again, Chile remained ineligible for Security Assistance. Our continuing failure to obtain certification caused deepening disappointment and disillusionment. Nevertheless, Chile participated extensively and professionally in UNITAS. The good will generated by this participation, however, was marred slightly by SECSTATE hesitation, debate and finally rejection of an invitation by the Chilean Navy for U.S. forces to participate in amphibious exercises in the vicinity of Punta Arenas.

(U) Other positive events included a visit to USSOUTHCOM and CONUS by the Director five faculty and 26 students of Chile's National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE). Also, Chile provided a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

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(U) Distinguished visitors to Chile included ADM Hayward, CNO; GEN Jones, CJCS; DEPSECDEF Carlucci and personnel from the National War College and Air University. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter POLAR STAR called in Chile enroute to Antarctica.

(U) Joint U.S.-Chilean consultations were held in Washington D.C. in February. VADM Bigley, JCS/J5, led the U.S. delegation; (b)(6) represented USSOUTHCOM.

(U) COLOMBIA

(U) During 1982 Colombia experienced continuing economic problems and a discomfiting level of terrorist activities. March saw the departure of a Colombian Army battalion to join the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, supporting Mid-East peace efforts. In August, President Turbay's four-year term ended, with Conservative Party candidate Belisario Betancur becoming the new head of state. Despite the above mentioned problems and active territorial disputes with Nicaragua and Venezuela, Betancur is proving to be a nimble politician and has apparently maintained considerable popular support. In an effort to reduce Colombia's perceived overdependence on the United States, he has associated himself more closely with the Non-Aligned Movement. As part of the effort to defuse insurgent activity, President Betancur signed an amnesty program into law on 19 November. It is still too early to judge the effects of this program. In early December, President Reagan visited Colombia--his only other South American stop on a brief swing through the region was Brazil. Vice-President Bush visited Colombia earlier in the year.

~~(S)~~ Military interaction was extensive. In FY 82, Colombia used \$543,000 IMET and \$10M in FMS guarantees. For FY 83, the IMET funding level has been programmed at \$700,000. FMS purchases included six UH-1H helicopters and overhaul of eight 105MM howitzers, although the latter case was marred somewhat by a significant upward price adjustment. During the year, Colombia showed continued interest in adding fighters and an air defense system. (b)(6) USSOUTHCOM/J5, and (b)(6) USSOUTHCOM/J3, went to Bogota in September to consult with host military and country team officials on the acquisition of defense radar. Plans were subsequently firmed up for purchase of TPS-43 and TPS-63 radars, and a U.S. radar survey team was invited to visit. After obtaining U.S. Congressional approval for transfer of two ships (PG's TACOMA and WELCH), plans have been made for crew training and a turnover MTT in 1983.

~~(S)~~ There were several particularly successful training initiatives. These included OJT provided for two groups of officers and NCO's in M113 (APC) Maintenance/Tactics, OJT in Infantry Arms Weapons Training and a CONUS Orientation Training Tour (OTT) by 59 Colombian War College officers. Personnel exchanges were active between all three services.

~~(S)~~ Participation in UNITAS was extensive and the UNITAS ships were received cordially in Cartagena. UNITAS activities dovetailed with a

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close air support exercise in support of an amphibious landing conducted under FUERZAS UNIDAS. They showed interest in future participation in KINDLE LIBERTY and a combined air defense exercise.

(U) LTG Nutting, USCINCSO, and MG Masterson, Deputy USCINCSO, both visited Colombia during the year. Other significant visits included BG Woerner, CDR, 193d; ADM Train, CINCLANT; GEN Jones, CJCS; RADM Venzke, USCG Chief of Operations; RADM Taylor, COMTRALANT; and DEPSECDEF Carlucci.

(U) COSTA RICA

(U) On 7 February 1982, the National Liberation party's Luis Alberto Monge won the Costa Rican presidential elections by a landslide. He named (b)(6) a young lawyer, as his Minister of Public Security. The primary military concern of the new government was the Costa Rican/Nicaraguan border.

(U) The Monge government inherited a ruined economy. The economic decline begun in 1981 continued. High inflation rates, the devalued colon and two failed agreements with the IMF and the world bank had all but destroyed public and international confidence. The new government took immediate measures to reverse the trend. After actually taking office on 8 May, the Monge Administration moved with deliberate speed to reduce the public sector deficit. Utility prices were increased and spending cuts and hiring freeze were implemented. Negotiations with private banks resulted in a repayment schedule for interest arrearages.

(U) The 193d INF BDE's 210th Aviation Battalion conducted high altitude training in the Spring. The 210th complemented their training with an extensive program of civic action that won national acclaim. A one-week 79th Army Band visit, the visit of the UNITAS flagship and its band, and renewed security assistance highlighted a flurry of activities during the summer. The ODC had saved the majority of the \$50,000 DMET to be spent after the new Administration and new Public Security Forces were in place. The resultant training focused on patrolling courses at USARSA, Search and Rescue training at IAAFA, and patrol boat commanders courses at SCIATT.

(U) The Minister of Public Security and his staff visited Panama and the PACAMS in September. Shortly afterward, a \$2M MAP grant for Costa Rica was approved in the Caribbean Basin Initiative supplemental. Field gear purchases through USASAALA quickly utilized \$40,000 of the MAP aid as priorities were established to professionalize and improve the capabilities of the Public Security Forces. Subsequently \$700,000 in field gear, \$350,000 in ammunition, and \$500,000 in tactical communications equipment were ordered in the capability upgrade program. LCDR Bernie Wilhite from the J-5 staff augmented the ODC for approximately one month to assist with the critical planning job.

(U) President Reagan visited San Jose in December and brought added strength to a growing U.S.-Costa Rican partnership. Teams from USAFSO and the 193d INF BDE provided valuable support to Ambassador McNeil's staff during the visit. President Reagan promised the Monge government U.S. "Seabee" assistance for the drought-stricken Guanacaste region. As the year ended we saw an enriched U.S.-Costa Rican relationship and a very positive outlook for the coming year.

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(U) ECUADOR

(U) Ecuador's fragile democracy survived through 1982, although rumors of coups persisted throughout the year. President Oswaldo Hurtado was barely able to maintain control of the country in the mist of pressure from the military and trade unions. The business community's interest in backing a military coup receded toward the end of the year, mainly due to doubts about armed forces leadership and awareness of divisions and rivalries within the military structure.

(U) Although an OPEC member, Ecuador's economic condition progressively deteriorated throughout 1982. At the end of the year, the country had gone through two devaluations and severe civil unrest directly related to the economy. A decrease in oil revenues along with a general slowdown in the economies of all regional countries seemed to be major contributing factors to the decline. Impact on the military was a significant reduction in operations and maintenance funds and a resultant downgrading of operational capability.

(U) The border dispute with Peru continued at a very quiet level. The border area itself remained relatively calm, with only occasional reports in the press of Peruvian troop movements in the area and periodic allegations of overflight on the part of Peru. The perceived threat to Ecuador throughout 1982 continued to be Peru. As result of regional tensions brought about by the South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, Ecuador did not participate in the UNITAS naval exercise.

(U) During 1982 ADM Harry D. Train, CINCLANT, visited Ecuador from 21 to 25 June 82, and BG Fred F. Woerner, Commander 193d INF BDE, visited 26-29 October 82.

(U) EL SALVADOR

(U) The year 1982 began on several positive notes--recent completion of a new ES National Strategy/Force Development Plan; the fielding of a new U.S.-trained Quick Reaction Battalion (the ATLACATL); initiation of a major four-month CONUS training program for a second QRB (the BELLOSO) at Fort Bragg; the training of approximately 500 OCS candidates at Fort Benning; the start of U.S. training in-country of a third QRB (the ATONAL) within El Salvador; and continuing progress on land reform, preparations for the March Constituent Assembly election, and reduction of extra-legal violence. However, the perspective at the end of the year was far less optimistic--the GOES and ESAF had largely squandered the political and military impetus provided by the March election and the major infusion of U.S. aid. Year's end found the ESAF virtually moribund due to a devious internal leadership struggle, declining morale, and fears of a U.S. aid cut-off; a political regime more interested in personal power struggles than in creating a cohesive, unified political structure which could provide desperately needed guidance and support for the war effort; an economy declining toward collapse (both from insurgent destruction and from capital flight and investor retreat); and, most ominously, strategic military initiative passing clearly to the insurgents.

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(S) On 27 January, the guerrillas launched a spectacular and crippling attack on the ES Air force base at Ilopango. Slipping through totally inadequate security (and after repeated U.S. warnings as to the base's vulnerability), the guerrilla sappers destroyed or damaged 15 aircraft, including six UH-1H's, critical to the nascent ESAF air mobility capability. However, the attack eventually proved counter-reproductive to the insurgents, as it provided an opportune rationale for a Presidential declaration of emergency and the immediate approval of \$55M in Section 506A drawn-down authority for military equipment, supplies, services and training. Combined with the already authorized \$25M in FMS credits/MAP, \$1M IMET, and a \$1M IMET supplemental in September, a major expansion/upgrade of the ESAF was undertaken. In addition to completing the training and equipping of the OCS cadets and the BELLOSO QRB, the FAS's UH-1H helicopter fleet was restored and enlarged to twenty aircraft; Project ELSA (providing six A-37 Dragonflies, four O2A Super Skymasters, and two C-123K Providers, with pilot/maintenance training, a four-year supply of spares, and a large quantity of ordnance) was rapidly and extremely effectively implemented; a major national secure and tactical communications upgrade was initiated; the training program (in-country, at the PACAMS, and in CONUS) was greatly expanded; and major quantities of individual and unit equipment, supplies and ammunition were provided. With the completion of the training/equipping of the ATONAL QRB in June and the welcome addition of two Venezuelan MTT-trained Cazador mini-battalions, the ESAF by August had virtually completed a major phase of the planned force expansion. Minor but significant additions to the fledgling (and heretofore ineffective) ES Navy followed later in the year, turning that arm into an effective contributor to the war, particularly with respect to interdiction efforts.

(S) On the political front, the 28 March national election for the Constituent Assembly was a watershed event. Not only did the ESAF demonstrate a firm commitment to the democratization process, and provide startlingly effective protection for the election itself (only in Usulután were the guerrillas successful in their nation-wide campaign to disrupt the election), but over 80% of the eligible voters of El Salvador braved guerrilla death threats to walk miles and wait hours in line to cast their votes. The outcome was a severe political and psychological blow to the guerrillas, both in El Salvador and world-wide, as the internationally supervised election was almost universally acclaimed as having been virtually fraud and intimidation free. For the U.S., however, the victory of the democratic process was a mixed blessing, as the ultra-right wing ARENA party, led by the infamous Roberto D'Aubuisson (linked by rumor to the AIFLD murders and possibly to that of Archbishop Romero) formed a majority coalition in the Constituent Assembly, and appeared on the verge of creating a far-right government. At this point, however, MOD General Garcia, with both U.S. and ESAF backing, "persuaded" the ARENA-led majority and D'Aubuisson to accept a moderate candidate as the interim president, and the relatively unknown Dr. Alvaro Magana was selected as the provisional president of the nation. The rest of the Assembly's year was largely spent in divisive internal squabbling, with the low and high

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points of the session being respectively an aborted attempt by the right to scuttle the land reform program (again, the military--i.e., Garcia--successfully intervened on behalf of reform) and the 3 August signing by all but one political party of the Magana initiated Pact of Apaneca (calling for creation of three key commissions--Political, Human Rights, and Peace). In retrospect, as perhaps should have been anticipated, the new government was unable to generate the consensus and unity of effort so critical to the effective prosecution of the war, restoration of the economy, reestablishment of a viable judicial system, and resolution of a host of other pressing needs. But it did survive, and even began a painful maturation process.

(C) To return to the military side of the equation, early promise turned to disappointment by year's end. Following the major ESAF contribution to the 28 March election, the guerrillas in June seized the strategically insignificant but psychologically important town of Perquin in northern Morazan Department, a move designed to entice the ESAF into a battle of attrition on the insurgents' home field and terms. The ESAF, in characteristic reactive fashion, complied, throwing an increasing number of largely uncoordinated and unsupported companies piecemeal into the fray. But unlike past operations, the guerrillas, fighting from well fortified positions, stood firm rather than retreating. Their attack stalled, the ESAF threw the newly arrived BELLOSO QRB into the battle, soon to be backed with great effectiveness by the just arrived-from-Panama A-37's and O2A's. Additionally, of major political significance, the Honduran military, in a first-ever coordination with the ESAF, moved units to the disputed ES-HO border as blocking forces. Guerrilla resistance crumbled, Perquin was retaken, and the guerrillas, with significant losses, melted away (despite the Honduran support, but rather because of ineffective ESAF pursuit). At this point, the ESAF itself withdrew, again abdicating control of the area to the guerrillas. This major action typified ESAF strategy and tactics for the remainder of the year-- reactive response after locally initiated operations by department "warlords," using largely uncoordinated, unsupported large scale "sweeps" highly wasteful of resources, usually minimally productive, with no follow-through. While several operations--Azenon Palma in San Vicente in August, led by the controversial LTC Ochoa; Chavez Melendez in Chalatenango in November; and the December BELLOSO QRB operation on Guazapa volcano--demonstrated several positive, but evidently transitory, improvements in ESAF planning, use of intelligence, coordination, human rights observance (e.g., taking of prisoners), and tactics, these actions were not indicative of the general pattern of ESAF operations. In October, and on into November, the guerrillas launched a wide-spread, increasingly well-coordinated "general offensive." Again, the ESAF was put on the defensive. It was during this offensive in particular that the insurgents not only demonstrated an increasing capability to seize and hold towns, at least temporarily, but also began to expand a highly effective "amnesty" campaign. That is, the guerrillas, rather than killing captured ESAF soldiers, or keeping them as prisoners, began turning them loose after taking their weapons and equipment and giving them a "political" lecture. Over the course of the last

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few months of the year, the guerrillas, offering safety for surrender, were able to capture numerous isolated outposts or cut-off units; seize a significant quantity of weapons, radios, personal equipment, etc; sow the seeds of a major psychological/morale problem for the ESAF; and, as importantly, achieve an international propaganda coup for their "humane" treatment of captured soldiers (especially as compared to the notorious record of the government with respect to its "prisoners"). By year's end, the ESAF was largely in a state of paralysis. Fears, apparently at least partially justified, of a U.S. Congressional aid reduction or cut-off, and an increasingly debilitating internal leadership squabble centered around MOD Garcia's ineffectiveness in prosecuting the war, caused the ESAF to "hunker down." With the exceptions of the above-mentioned BELLOSO operation in December; the return of the Panama trained LRRP company (also in December); the continued effective, though often inadequately coordinated, operations of the FAS; and the resurgence of the ESN as an effective interdiction force, the year ended on a distinctly downbeat note on the battlefield. Perhaps more disturbing, however, was the fact that though the force expansion had been largely completed, essential U.S. training of the ESAF had been severely constrained by the self-imposed 55-man ceiling, leaving the vast bulk of the ESAF essentially untrained for counterinsurgency warfare. Of equal importance, the ESAF itself had failed to follow through on its National Strategy, i.e., developing and implementing an integrated political-economic-military (IDAD) campaign plan, and hence had failed to seize the strategic and psychological initiative. The year ended with no significant improvement for any of these critical shortcomings in sight.

(S) On the U.S. domestic political scene as well, there also occurred a downward trend in willingness further to underwrite El Salvador. Following a relatively "routine" certification of El Salvador's worthiness for continued U.S. security assistance in January, and the support generated by the 28 March election, the Administration ran into increasingly skeptical, if not hostile, Congressional recertification hearings commencing in July. (The CINC provided personal testimony to Sen Percy's Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 3 August, and to Congressman Barnes of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs on 14 September, in addition to a pre-hearings meeting with Congressman Long's House Foreign Operations Subcommittee on 25 May.) Human rights progress was strongly challenged (lack of progress on the AIFLD and U.S. churchwomen's murders caused particular concern), as was progress on land reform (given the right's attempt to sabotage the reforms in the Constituent Assembly). While the Administration and El Salvador survived the hearings, it was clear that Congressional support for continuing military assistance to El Salvador was waning. As noted earlier, by late in the year, unhappiness over lack of substantive progress in the AIFLD and churchwomen's murders, and perceptions of continuing right wing efforts to undermine land reform, led to increasingly vociferous Congressional opposition to continued aid and threats of an actual cut-off. The political climate going into 1983 and the January recertification was distinctly pessimistic.

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(S) 1982, then, proved to be a year of modest progress in the development of the ESAB force structure and, to a lesser extent, performance, but more importantly one in which an increasingly well trained, equipped, and coordinated insurgent movement had gained the all-important strategic and psychological initiative, both at home and abroad.

(U) GUATEMALA

(S) 1982 brought dramatic changes to the people of Guatemala. Under the Lucas Regime the Army had adopted a strategy of conducting sweeps of areas of concentrated guerrilla activity, declaring the problem solved in one area and moving on to the next area of conflict. While meeting with some success, the areas swept were not entirely freed of guerrillas as claimed. Guerrilla infrastructures remained intact. Meanwhile, perceiving itself in a fight for survival, the GOG proceeded to eliminate many non-combatants considered to be guerrilla sympathizers thus creating an ambience of terror. Corruption pervaded the military and civil ruling sector. The government actions were self-defeating and set the stage for the young officers' coup on 23 March 1982. To his surprise the young officers asked retired BG Ephraim Rios-Montt to lead the junta.

(S) The Coup of 23 March 1982 produced a fundamental policy/strategy change for the military institution and civil government. The process of change continues to be carefully managed under the charismatic leadership of BG Ephraim Rios-Montt. He enjoys popular support and shows the ability to gain and maintain the confidence of his countrymen, including a large part of the Indian population in the highlands. The Rios-Montt civil-military government engages the guerrillas on military and socio-economic fronts unlike its more recent predecessors.

(U) The new government quickly rejected the policies of the Lucas Administration and pledged to combat insurgency by increasing civic action programs, by eliminating governmental corruption, and by making the government responsive to the needs of the people. The government has also shown interest in reversing the Lucas Administration attitude of going it alone. While extremely successful in defeating the guerrillas using their own resources and minimal outside help, the Guatemalans recognize the fact that economic recovery requires a reintegration into the international community.

(S) The major threat continues to be the Cuban supported leftist insurgency. After the coup, the guerrillas resumed their activities but popular support for the guerrillas diminished. This was largely due to the decrease in GOG sponsored violence and reprisals, the dramatic reduction in right instigated violence, and the amnesty programs. Still the coup demonstrated the continued dominance of the Armed Forces in Guatemalan affairs.

(U) The objectives of the new government offer an excellent opportunity for renewed U.S. influence and dialogue. The objectives are:

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- Reestablishment of a Democratic government dedicated to respect for human rights,
- Denial of the use of Guatemala by forces hostile to the U.S. and its interests,
- A peaceful resolution to the Belize question,
- Active Guatemalan participation in regional economic and political cooperative relationships, and
- End of the internal conflict which has so polarized and paralyzed the country and its economy. (This final objective is primordial and in fact prerequisite to the others.)

(U) The Victory 82 Campaign initiated by the new government highlighted by its "Beans and Bullets" program was extremely successful. It was designed to be a 20% military and 80% civic action effort combined to win the confidence and support of the population and eliminate the guerrillas in the rural highlands. It was a national program pursued by all governmental agencies. The word "Guatemalidada" was heard describing a revived sense of nationalism.

(e) The border issue vis-a-vis Belize has changed with a significant reduction in the Guatemalan territorial claim. They now only claim the Toledo district of southern Belize which is ethnically closer to Guatemala.

(U) The economy continues to suffer with depressed cotton, sugar, coffee, and beef markets while imports experience double digit inflation. Tourism remained depressed due to regional and internal violence. Guatemala's large cash reserves were seriously depleted by the end of 1982 when total cash on hand equalled only one week's imports. Foreign exchange was rationed and the parallel market, previously unknown in Guatemala, reached 15% to 20% premium for U.S. dollar exchange. The GOG maintains the economic recovery will follow the re-securing of the countryside. Guatemala's new direction in 1982 was further institutionalized with the inauguration in November of Rios-Montt's program of "Justice and Power." This program is marked by far-reaching reform in which 130,000 high public officials and employees have taken an oath not to steal, lie, or abuse power. It's a program and concept without precedent in the political history of the nation. Guatemala still has a long way to go towards electoral process, judicial reform, and human rights, but for the moment "Guatemalidada" is on a positive course.

(U) GUYANA

(U) Economic crisis after economic crisis continued to plague the Government of Forbes Burnham as he steadfastly clung to his policies of socialization and public management of the major means of production. Whenever it seemed that bankruptcy was imminent, they managed to find a

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new "low," but as usual at the expense of the Guyanese people.

(S) In recent years, the economy has been hard hit by price increases on oil and imports and the low world price for Guyana's sugar and bauxite. Nationalization of foreign firms has discouraged private investment. Poorly run state corporations, which control 80 percent of the economy, have incurred ever increasing foreign debts. Production and efficiency, never strong points in the economy, have suffered from continuing emigration of skilled labor. The Governments austerity program to adjust the budget deficit and the balance of payments have led to labor unrest and several labor protest demonstrations. The economic crisis, bringing high prices, unemployment, general deterioration in services, fewer items in the shops, and drastic reductions in imported goods (e.g., there is absolutely no wheat flour) have caused general public discontent and an erosion of Burnham's firm hold on the government.

(S) On the international scene, Burnham still fancied himself as a major player among the non-aligned nations; however, his efforts were focused primarily on securing financial assistance and foreign investment from the major industrialized nations and international banking institutions. Simply, assistance from Marxist and/or non-aligned nations had not proven adequate or timely. His efforts met with only limited success as most nations and financial institutions were extremely wary of Guyana's solvency and ability to pay. Although their relationship cannot be characterized as especially warm Cuba still provided the major source of technical assistance with doctors, agricultural specialists and teachers. A limited amount of economic and military assistance was provided by North Korea and the People's Republic of China.

(U) U.S. assistance was limited to very modest AID and IMET programs. Guyana was not eligible for any FMS. In 1982, the Guyanese Defence Force continued to send students to the 48-week aircraft maintenance course at IAFA and 11 individuals graduated in December. Additionally, 20 students attended varied patrol boat operations/maintenance courses at the NAVSCLATS. In all cases, the Guyanese made an excellent account of themselves. FY 82 IMET funding was at the \$50,000 level and a like amount was budgeted for FY 83.

(S) Aside from the economic problems, Burnham's major controversy still remained the unsettled border dispute with Venezuela. In June 1970, Venezuela and Guyana signed the Port-of-Spain Protocol, which embodied a mutual undertaking to respect the present boundary until 1982. In April 1981, Venezuela announced its intention not to renew the Protocol when it terminated in 1982 and did in fact let it lapse. This action heightened Guyanese fears of an imminent Venezuelan invasion, and Burnham was able to use this threat to divert some of the public attention from the state of the economy. Negotiations just barely inched along, with the central issue being Guyana's proposal to internationalize the debate and refer the dispute for arbitration by the United Nations. On the other hand, the Venezuelans want to maintain the negotiations as a strictly bilateral

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matter. Both nations have doggedly maintained their positions and, as a result, 1982 ended in a virtual stalemate. The only apparent "victory" for either side was Guyana's successful effort in blocking Venezuela's bid to join the Non-Aligned Movement.

(U) The new U.S. Ambassador, Gerald E. Thomas, arrived in Georgetown in February. We were fortunate to have hosted him at USSOUTHCOM enroute to his new post.

(U) HONDURAS

(U) Honduras began 1982 with the inauguration of President Roberto Suazo Cordova and the first truly democratically elected government in 18 years. The transition from military rule to pluralistic democratic institutions was supported fully by the Honduran Armed Forces.

(S) Internal and external security concerns dominated Honduras' political fabric and posed an ominous challenge to the newly elected government. More than 40 acts of terrorism (i.e., kidnappings, hijackings, bank robberies and bombings) resulted in the government passing a tough anti-terrorism law. Captured subversive safehouses and operatives revealed that the majority of terrorist activity had been orchestrated by external sources (e.g., FMLN, FSLN and Cuba) in order to intimidate the GOH. A growing Nicaraguan conventional military threat was coupled with an equally hostile anti-GOH propaganda campaign. This external threat was heightened by Salvadoran guerrilla (FMLN) violation of Honduran territorial integrity. Honduras sought to diplomatically reduce regional tensions by advancing a six-point peace plan on May 23 to the OAS; NU rejected this initiative.

(S) U.S. Security Assistance initiatives with HO were designed to build confidence in U.S. commitment and professionalize HO's Armed Forces. FY 82 support included \$19M FMS, \$11M MAP, and \$1.275M in IMET funding. Major hardware purchases included six additional A-37's and acquisition of the dx-USCG buoy tender Walnut (YQJOA). Training focused on basic move-shoot-communicate skills, logistical improvements, and the training/commissioning of 100 OCS cadets at USARSA. This OCS class graduated on 19 November and was commissioned on-the-spot by General Alvarez--a significant first at USARSA.

(S) Major USSOUTHCOM initiatives included a formal tri-service training assessment on 19-23 July and assistance with a national military strategy and force development study from 1 November to 16 December 82. Both of these efforts involved USSOUTHCOM teams of hand-picked experts and were in response to requests made by President Suazo and General Alvarez during visits to Washington (1-3 July 82 and 13-16 July 82). Additionally, \$12M in MILCON was approved for runway improvements at Comayagua and La Ceiba (only \$13M allocated). In July, a combined U.S.-HO exercise, Desplazamiento Combinado 25 July thru 15 August 82, moved the HO 5th BN from Comayagua to Mosquita in order to establish a permanent military presence in the Gracias

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a Dios Department. Finally, on 9-13 August 82 USSOUTHCOM helicopter assets transported USAID water systems as part of an expanded civic action program for HO.

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] Sec. 3.3(b) (1)
[Redacted] Sec. 3.3(b) (1)

DIA

(U) Honduras became the home for more than 30,000 ES, GT and NU refugees. These camps posed special security and political dilemmas for the GOH. The majority of refugees consisted of NU indians and persons displaced by the Salvadoran guerrilla movement. The willingness of CENTAM's poorest country to accept the refugees and offer protection reflected well on GOH performance in humanitarian and human rights terms.

~~(S)~~ In addition to President Suazo's and General Alvarez' visits to Washington, the following U.S. VIP's visited HO: USCINCSO, 26-28 Jan, 21-23 Mar, plus numerous one day trips; BG Woerner, Cdr 193d INF BDE, 27-29 Jul; ADM Train, CINCLANT, 11-13 Aug; RADM Taylor, COMTRALANT, 22-23 Aug; [Redacted] (b)(6) COMUSNAVSO, 31 Aug-2 Sep; BG Bruno, CDR ILC, 20-21 Oct; [Redacted] (b)(6) Under SECDEF for Policy, 29-30 Oct; RADM Paulson, DIA, 16-17 Nov; and President Reagan on 4 Dec. General Alvarez, Chief of the HAF visited USSOUTHCOM on 19 Apr, 8-9 Sep, and 18-20 Nov 82. Navy

(U) MEXICO

(U) Mexico's economic crisis intensified over the course of 1982. The February devaluation of the peso and April economic adjustment plan did little to restore international confidence in the government and capital flight continued.

~~(S)~~ In August the U.S. and other countries provided a short-term assistance package and a one billion dollar advance payment for oil deliveries to the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve.

~~(S)~~ The De La Madrid government which began its six-year term on 1 December 1982 has taken steps to restore domestic and international confidence. The elections brought few surprises. The United Socialist Party of Mexico, formed by the merger of four smaller leftist parties and the Mexican Communist Party, received four percent of the vote in 1982 and lost a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The total leftist vote was 8% compared to 68% for Miguel De La Madrids Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which has dominated Mexican political life.

(U) Security Assistance to Mexico in 1982 included two Gearing class destroyers, and 12 F-5 aircraft under the Peace Aztec Program. The Security Assistance function was maintained under the overall auspices of the USDAO which was upgraded to a Brigadier General position. USAF LtCol Mike Brazelton became the senior security assistance officer, increasing that section to a total of three. He brought an extensive F-5 background

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to the Peace Aztec Program. The F-5 program has become the focal point of the U.S.-Mexican military-to-military relationship. USSOUTHCOM has provided extensive logistic and training support through USAFSO and IAAFA, and IAAFA provided the mobile training team cadre for follow-on technician training at Williams AFB AZ on 3 May thru 24 Aug 82. With the arrival of the first supersonic F-5's in September, the Mexican Air Force significantly upgraded its capabilities and regional prestige. Third country military equipment purchases, primarily of Swiss Pilatus PC-7 trainers and coastal patrol craft from Spain, and the domestic production of DN-111's, an armored vehicle, highlighted a year of significant acquisitions to modernize militarily.

(C) During the sexennium of President Lopez Portillo, the military achieved substantive upgrading and modernization. Mexican Subsecretary of Defense, LTC Portillo-Vurada, suprised many visiting U.S. National War college students in December when he cited that the most noteworthy change in the Mexican Armed Forces structure was improved military education. He went on to point out that Mexico sees no major threat and lives in peace with its neighbors. He believes the prestigious National Defense College will allow a more constructive military role in future national planning, similar to that exercised by the military in the U.S. The U.S.-Mexican military relationship grew in 1982 as did the security assistance program. Economic measures will slow acquisitions in 1983 as Mexico looks inward to rebuild its economic infrastructure.

(U) NICARAGUA

(C) 1982 was characterized by Nicaragua's growing estrangement from her regional neighbors and increasing hostility toward the United States. Nicaragua used its newly acquired seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to denounce United States regional policies and support for the "contras." Political and border disputes with Costa Rica resulted in the June expulsion of two diplomats from each country. Nicaraguan forces exchanged fire with Honduran forces along their common border and with El Salvadoran gunboats in the gulf of Fonseca.

(C) Little dialogue took place between the Sandinista government and the United Staes Embassy. Based on this lack of contact, AMB Quinton decided to close the MLO Upon LTC Kelly's departure in summer 1983. IN May Nicaragua criticized United States flood/disaster assistance as meager and insulting. In June a Nicarguan gunboat fired on a United States helicopter operating off the USS Trippe in international waters. Finally in August, Nicaragua rejected \$5.1M in United States aid to its private sector. United States-Nicaraguan relationships continued to deteriorate throughout 1982, even though trade with the United States still constituted an important source of capital to the Nicaraguan economy.

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(S) The growing "contra" movement posed annoying security and political problems for the FSLN. Although primarily localized in the departments of Zelaya, Nueva Segovia and Jinotega, the movement experienced a growing popular base and focused media exposure on the shortcomings of the Sandinista regime.

(S) USSOUTHCOM sponsored two contacts with Nicaragua during 1982. First was AMB George Roberts' (Special Asst to USCINCSO for International Affairs) visit in June. AMB Roberts met with acting Foreign Minister Victor Hugo, and explained USSOUTHCOM's functions. Additionally, USAFSO representatives presented a Search and Rescue (SAR) briefing on 27-29 October. The briefing was designed to enhance regional air safety by the creation of a Nicaraguan SAR Organization.

(U) PANAMA

(S) 1982 proved to be a year of political turmoil and in-fighting within the Guardia Nacional (GN) and civilian government. In March, GN Commanader Flores was forced into retirement and replaced by GEN Paredes. GEN Paredes' distain for President Royo's rhetoric and uncoordinated actions resulted in the latter's ouster for "health reasons." The replacement of President Royo with Vice President De La Espriella not only publically exposed the GN as the real power in Panama, but also promoted a period of reduced criticism of U.S. regional policy. On 30 July, GEN Paredes initiated a constitutional reform commission and made known the possibility of a presidential bid in the 1984 elections.

(S) No progress was made during the year on a resolution of the future of USARSA. However, the Panama National Guard started their own intelligence course and opened it to other countries. The Panama National Guard also initiated an important training program in Costa Rica to upgrade the Civil Guard's readiness and capability.

(S) Panama's economy experienced a near zero growth rate during 1982. This economic dilemma was complicated by a 20% unemployment rate and one of the highest debt to GDP ratios in the world. Due to the poor economic situation, coupled with ominous regional instability, the Panama National Guard requested MAP funds and the expeditious attainment of \$50M in treaty-mandated FMS credits to support force development efforts. Although \$5M in FMS credits were provided, other requested funding was denied.

((U) PARAGUAY

(S) Organizational changes completed in 1982 placed the Armed Forces directly under the president as Commander in Chief, thereby further consolidating President Stroessner's firm grip on the country.

(U) Improvement in human rights continued during the year. After several years without Security Assistance funding, Paraguay's modest

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participation in 1982 represented a small but significant step toward improved military-to-military relations. IMET funds totalling \$14,000 were used exclusively for training at the PACAMS. FMS cash purchases of \$116,000 consisted primarily of two excess UH-1B helicopters. IMET funding for FY 83 is programmed at the \$50,000 level.

(U) Although Paraguay's riverine Navy did not participate in UNITAS, their Army provided a guest instructor at USARSA and an agreement was signed in July on a personnel exchange with the U.S. Army.

(U) MG Masterson, Deputy USCINCSO, visited Paraguay during August and GEN Vessey, then VCSA, also made a successful visit 21-24 February 82.

(U) PERU

(U) Peruvian political-military affairs with the U.S. throughout 1982 were significantly influenced by the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. Peru took a staunchly pro-Argentine stance and strongly criticized the U.S. for supporting the British position. During and after the war, Peru supplied Argentina with critically needed supplies and equipment. As a result of the South Atlantic conflict, Peru did not participate in the UNITAS naval exercise.

(U) The international recession was reflected in Peru's economy in low world prices for exports, a cumbersome foreign debt, 70% inflation and high unemployment. The troubled economy understandably had an impact on domestic tranquility. An agrarian strike during 25-26 November resulted in the blocking of Peru's main highway and snared road transportation, yet failed to deplete food supplies.

(U) Maoist guerrillas, known as the Sendero Luminoso, grew in strength and audacity. They blacked out the capital itself twice in 1982 by blowing up power lines. In Ayacucho they shot the major and dynamited the principal bridge over the Pampas river, which connects Ayacucho with the Andahuaylas province of Apurimac. Toward the end of the year, President Belaunde authorized the Army to provide support to the police in the Ayacucho region.

(S) Peruvian interest in U.S. equipment and training was keener in 1982 than in previous years. One sour note for the year, however, was the reluctance on the part of the U.S. to provide Peru any information of the F-16A aircraft. Although no direct statement was issued by the Department of State refusing to sell F16A aircraft, the Peruvians perceived that they would not be offered the aircraft. Their reaction was to initiate the purchase of Mirage 2000 aircraft from France. On the positive side, however, was increased interest in purchasing M-60A3 tanks from the U.S.

(U) From 5 October to 5 November 1982, 104 Peruvian Military Academy cadets attended the Cadet Orientation Course at USARSA In Panama. This

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has been an annual event over the last six years. The course provides cadets with an overview of U.S. combat doctrine and techniques and practice in specialized branch-related skills. COL Luis Merino Gonzales, Peruvian Army Attache accredited to Panama, gave the graduation address.

(U) Although not as critical as last year, the border conflict with Ecuador remained a concern.

(U) Ambassador Frank V. Ortiz, from USSOUTHCOM INTAFF, had become Chief of Mission in Lima in late 1981.

(U) SURINAME

(U) 1982 was a year characterized by continued economic decline, further repression of personal liberties, and an ever-alarming drift towards the Cuban camp.

~~(S)~~ The Surinamese strongman, (b)(6) Commander-in-Chief of the Surinamese National Army, continued to consolidate his power and make the ruling inner circle which surrounds him ever tighter. The civilian government of President Chin A Sen was forced to resign in January and was replaced by a provisional government comprised of a mixture of civilian and military officials more entrenched in the Bouterse camp. General elections were again postponed--This time for at least two years.

~~(S)~~ An attempted coup by some dissatisfied military personnel occurred the night of 11-12 March. The plotters were unhappy with Bouterse's drift to the left and desired a return to civilian government with a constitution and free elections. The coup failed due to poor planning and execution, but it did bring out the latent discontent of two of the three racial groups in the country--the East Indian and Javanese--who are held to a second-class citizen role as long as the Creole dominated military remains in power. Those of the coup plotters who did not escape were jailed and tortured. One of the plotters was caught in the interior and was summarily executed. The summary execution, without due process, brought a hailstorm of international denunciation. The Dutch temporarily suspended their economic assistance program in protest to Bouterse's extra-legal action.

~~(S)~~ Following the abortive coup attempt, Bouterse again reshuffled the government and on 1 April established the Policy Center. This body, chaired by Bouterse, assumed authority to determine the policies for the government as a whole and legislate by decree in consultation with the second official governing body--the Council of Ministers.

~~(S)~~ On the international scene, Bouterse's policies attempted to portray Suriname as a turlly non-aligned nation, but he continued to attack the "imperialist" industrialized nations as the cause of inter-

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national discontent and poverty. An ever increasing number of Surinamese military were sent to Cuba for intelligence training, several bilateral cultural and economic agreements were signed, and increasing numbers of Cuban technical advisors were visible throughout Paramaribo. And, a resident Cuban Ambassador arrived to occupy the embassy which had opened the previous year. Increasing contact with North Korea were also evident and in September a resident Soviet Ambassador arrived to take his place among the Paramaribo diplomatic corps. Bouterse also attempted to strengthen relations with two of his South American neighbors--namely Brazil and Venezuela. Brazil promised some modest economic and military assistance. Venezuela sent in a military survey team, and plans were drawn for military training and equipment assistance. However, by year's end not much had materially appeared. Suriname has small economic assistance programs with Belgium, the European economic community, and the Organization of American States, but such assistance totals less than one million dollars annually. The Dutch continued to provide the largest share of economic and military assistance and, until the events of December, were the backbone of Suriname's economic survival.

(*) For FY 82, U.S. support totalled one million dollars in the Economic Support Fund and \$60,000 of IMET. The Surinamese military continued to display indifference toward taking advantage of their IMET opportunities. The only items programmed were a ten-position English language lab and the training of two individuals at IAAFA. In fact, \$36,000 were returned from the FY 81 IMET due to their indecision and/or indifference. The only training to take place in 1982 involved two students at IAAFA in the fall. Due to the events of December, the language lab never materialized.

(*) Fearing further attempts to overthrow him and a general mistrust of all but a handful of extremely loyal subordinates, on the night of 8-9 December Bouterse ordered the bombing of the largest local newspaper and the headquarters of the largest labor union. Then he coordinated the systematic arrest and execution of 15 to 28 (the numbers were never totally confirmed) of his perceived rivals and adversaries. Prominent business leaders, labor leaders, former politicians and military personnel succumbed to the bloodbath characterized by torture and mutilation of bodies after death.

(*) The Dutch and U.S. immediately terminated all economic and military assistance programs. The international community, except for Cuba, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and like-minded Soviet surrogates, heaped condemnation upon Bouterse for the brutality of his actions. The flight of Surinamese out of the country heightened, with many escaping across the border to French Guiana and on to the Netherlands. Many military officers revulsed by these events deserted and fled as well. Bouterse once again dissolved the government and established a new order, essentially placing all power in his personal hands and those of his closest conspirators. The military was completely purged, all news media were placed under his control, and a curfew established in Paramaribo.

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(U) Thus, 1982 ended for this former Dutch colony and the smallest nation on the South American continent in an unfortunate mess. There was no doubt that Bouterse was successful in his naked grab for power, and prospects for the future of the Surinamese people and economy looked decidedly bleak.

(U) The new U.S. Ambassador, Robert W. Duemling, presented his credentials in October. We had the opportunity to host him at USSOUTHCOM while he was enroute to his new post.

(U) URUGUAY

(U) Although events in this country were shaped to some degree by the South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, most of 1982 was characterized by a continual erosion of the economy. The only bright spots in the past, full employment and industrial activity, were both down by the end of the year. Increasing foreign debt problems and budget deficits continued to plague the country. The effectiveness of economic reforms introduced after the 1973 military takeover diminished due to political reasons. The present government continued to squander its energies in programs that had already run the course of their usefulness.

(U) As a result of the South Atlantic conflict, Uruguay declined to participate in the UNITAS naval exercise.

(U) President Gregorio Alvarez continued to move Uruguay toward eventual parliamentary elections which are presently scheduled for November 1984.

(U) Representatives of USSOUTHCOM and the 193d INF BDE (PAN) met with members of the Uruguayan Army Genreal Staff and the Military Institute for Higher Studies (IMES) on 27-29 September 1982 in Montevideo.

(U) Uruguay initiated steps to purchase the U.S. destroyer, USS William C. Lawe. With assistance from VADM Bigley (JCS/J5) and RADM Almstedt (CNO/OP-63), this ship was made available to the Uruguayans for \$1M. Toward the end of the year, the Uruguayans were identifying basic requirements to effect this purchase. Two major problems surfaced: (1) lack of adequate funds for required training and (2) lack of qualified English-speaking naval personnel to receive U.S. training related with transfer of the ship. The Office of Defense Cooperation worked closely with the Uruguayan Navy and, by the end of the year, these problems were well along to being resolved.

(U) General John W. Vessey, Jr., then Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, visited Uruguay during the period 24-28 February 1982. BG Fred F. Woerner, Commander, 193d INF BDE (PAN), visited Uruguay 8-12 November 1982.

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(U) The A-37 is the most modern fighter/bomber in the Uruguyan Air Force inventory, but this aircraft is not capable of keeping up with their perceived requirements. In an effort to modernize, the Uruguayans requested, and were granted, discription and planning data on F-5 aircraft. They were still reviewing the offer at the end of the year, but due to a faltering economy, it is very unlikely that the Uruguayans will make any such purchase in the near future.

(U) VENEZUELA

~~(S)~~ Venezuela continued its efforts during 1982 to provide regional leadership, but with only mixed results. Venezuela's highly emotional support of Argentina in the Falklands crisis and bid for Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) membership later proved to be somewhat embarassing, particularly when rejected by NAM. The Falklands issue was used as a reason for postponing or cancelling several international activities, but all wounds appear to be healing steadily. No progress was made during the year in resolving Venezuela's claim to approximately five-eighths of Guyana. Although economic problems were less severe than those of other countries in the region, decline in petroleum export income continued. This, combined with inefficient fiscal management and debt scheduling problems, placed President Herrera and his government under mounting pressure. Although Herrera likely will make it through to elections scheduled for December 1983, polls predict that the opposition party candidate will then be elected.

~~(S)~~ The Venezuelans made a significant contribution to the region when they sent a 30-man MTT to El Salvador and trained two Cazador mini-battalions. Those battalions have performed well since their training, and the ESAF has decided to adopt the cazador concept in its current force development/upgrade.

(U) In August, Ambassador Luers was replaced by Ambassador Landau, who stopped to visit USSOUTHCOM enroute to his new post in Caracas.

~~(S)~~ Animosity over the Falklands was not so evident among the military, and it was a year of extensive Security Assistance activity. FMS sales of over \$618M included the purchase of 24 F-16's and related support. Also significant was the purchase and installation of two 40-position language labs. The FMS total also included a significant amount of professional and technical training. IMET training came to \$29,000 in FY 82, with the FY 83 funding level set at \$50,000.

(U) Military relations were also fostered by personnel exchanges involving seven PEP billets (one Army, three Navy and three Air Force).

(U) Significant visitors during the year included Gen Vessey, VCSA; VADM Sanderson, Deputy CINCLANT; RADM Venzke, USCG Chief of Operations; and GEN Jones, CJCS.

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TREATY AFFAIRS

(U) During Calendar Year (CY) 1982, implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (i.e., the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty) progressed reasonably well, despite a period of friction and harassment by Panama National Guard (PNG) personnel. The personnel changes in the Panamanian government and in the PNG, as a result of the bloodless coups of 4 March and 30 July 1982, produced a climate for positive cooperation in Treaty negotiations and implementation in the latter part of the year.

(U) The principal unresolved SOFA issues remained in the areas of sovereignty, jurisdiction and finance. As in previous years, Panama continued to attempt to minimize the rights and privileges of US Forces personnel granted under the SOFA and to maximize tax revenues. These issues include.

a. (U) Transfer of Custody: From the onset of the Treaty, Panamanian officials at times have delayed, for periods of up to three or more days, the transfer of custody to the US Forces of personnel apprehended outside of the military bases despite Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) language requiring that such transfer would be made "upon request". The principal point of disagreement centers on the length of time required to make the transfer. Panama desires a period of not less than 24 hours after initial apprehension, while USSOUTHCOM maintains that a period of not more than seven hours should be sufficient. This issue was raised to the diplomatic level in June 1981 after negotiations in the Joint Committee had failed to resolve the matter.

(U) In July 1982, after several months of developing and staffing a proposed diplomatic note with the State Department, the US Embassy presented the Note to the Government of Panama (GOP). Discussions on the note between the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and the Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry revealed that the latter had not seen the note but stated that it might be sometime before his government was in a position to provide an answer. During the latter part of the year USSOUTHCOM legal advisors began receiving indications from the PNG that the transfer of custody issue might be resolved within the Joint Committee. In fact, in December 1982, the Panamanian Foreign Minister and GN Commander indicated to the US Ambassador that they were willing to resolve the issue.

b. (U) Amador Causeway: The GOP continued to prohibit US Forces military police patrol of the Causeway despite SOFA provisions for the conduct of "Combined Patrols". Panama steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the Amador Causeway is a Canal Operating Area, as specifically identified in the Treaty documents. This issue has been at the diplomatic level since August 1980.

c. (U) Drivers' Licenses: The SOFA provides that newly assigned US Forces personnel, who possess US drivers' licenses shall receive Panamanian

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licenses without payment of fees, provided they obtain them within 30 days of arrival. In the US many states provide that regardless of the expiration date, the driver's license of a member of the US Armed Forces is valid as long as that person remains in the military. Many newly assigned personnel have such licenses and are being required to pay for a Panamanian license, even within the 30 day grace period. The issue has been at the diplomatic level since November 1980. On 16 April 1982, the Licensing Department of the Panama National Traffic Directorate unilaterally began subjecting all members of the US Forces and dependents to pay the \$20 fee for a Panamanian driver's license. This fee violates the provisions of Article XV of the SOFA. A partial solution was obtained on this issue as the year ended and complete resolution was expected in the near future.

d. (U) Airline Ticket Tax: In May 1982, the Panamanian Tourism Institute notified all travel agencies and airline companies in Panama that the US Forces and its personnel were not exempt from payment of the tourism fee (4% per \$100.00) which is applied to the purchase of travel tickets. Paragraph (4) (a) of Article XIII of the SOFA provides that the members of the Forces or the civilian component and dependents, shall be exempted from fiscal charges relating to their entry, stay in, or departure from the territory of the Republic of Panama. In August 1982, through the Joint committee, Panama agreed that the US Forces were exempted from payment of this fee.

(U) PANAMA AREA WAGE BASE (PAWB). Since the Treaty entered into force in 1979, the Republic of Panama has protested the establishment of the PAWB declaring it a Treaty violation. While this accusation is totally unfounded, the Panama Area Personnel Board (PAPB) has continued to pursue the means to assure that the wages paid at the end of the Treaty period would be in line with salaries paid in the Republic of Panama to allow for a smooth transfer of operations to the Government of Panama. In January 1982, the PAPB approved the implementation of the New Wage Base which provided for a significant increase in wages for skilled, professional and management occupations for employees hired after 1 October 1979. Notwithstanding these changes, the wage system continued to come under constant attack by the press, union and political officials from March through September 1982 when the USG announced that the issue would be addressed at the earliest opportunity. After several meetings of the PAPB toward the end of the year, another modification to the wage base seemed imminent.

(U) TRANSFER OF FACILITIES. As required by Annex A to the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, Curundu Heights Family Housing, Curundu Antenna Farm; two barracks facilities at Fort Gulick, and warehouse buildings 1008 and 1009 at Curundu were turned over to the Republic of Panama on 1 October 1982.

(U) US/PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD RELATIONS. Strained US/PNG relations continued during the first six months of FY 82, culminating in numerous PNG harassing incidents at Fort Gulick during January-February 1982. Despite this atmosphere of confrontation, the transition period events scheduled

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to end on 31 March 1982 occurred without difficulties. A positive change in PNG attitude toward Treaty implementation gradually surfaced since General Paredes became PNG Commander. It is surmised that the reason for this change in attitude to cooperate with the US Forces is a result of General Paredes' wish to enhance US/PNG relations. Additionally, a full time Panamanian Co-Chairman to the Joint Committee was appointed for the first time in August 1982. Other positive indications of improved relations include: verbal PNG assurances, at different military levels, of a willingness to cooperate; a conscious PNG effort to resolve conflicts harmoniously rather than through confrontations; approval for the Army Air Force Exchange Service to continue using a large warehouse building past the 1 October 1982 SOFA mandated transfer date, until their new warehouse is completed; agreement to resolve the driver's license fee issue in the near future; formal acceptance of the Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard Arrangements, which had been deadlocked for nearly three years; and a solution on the Airline Ticket tax issue.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) GENERAL. The ongoing crisis situation in Central America, primarily focused in El Salvador, was cause for continuing high intensity interest in USSOUTHCOM and its regional activities. This was evidenced by the high volume of news media visits by international, U. S., and local Panamanian news media to USSOUTHCOM. Visiting newsmen received unclassified briefings, and were assisted in their coverage of command activities. In large measure their interest centered on the military/ political situation in Central America. Interviews with the CINCPAC and key staff members were arranged as appropriate. USSOUTHCOM continued the policy of releasing accurate information on USSOUTHCOM activities as promptly as possible. In general, news media treatment of the command was objective.

(U) The USSOUTHCOM Commander in Chief (USCINCSO) was particularly active in communicating U.S. positions and interests, and USSOUTHCOM activity, in Central America. In 1982, he granted 10 interviews to news media, including representatives of New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and the Associated Press. Additionally, he held meetings with the editorial boards of such media as the St. Louis Post Dispatch and Globe Democrat, Miami Herald, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, Business Week, and the National Broadcasting Company. Other USCINCSO activity included press conferences at various locations in the United States, and speaking engagements at World Affairs Councils of Riverside, California and St. Louis, Missouri and the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, New York.

(U) The training of Salvadoran military personnel in Panama Canal Area Military Schools continued to be of particular interest to the news media, with numerous requests to visit the training activity. These requests were honored whenever possible. A positive approach to school curricula was followed, with emphasis on the fact that the schools teach a wide range of subjects, both technical and tactical, and on the long record of service to the hemisphere.

(U) The possibility that the U. S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) might have to move from Panama after 30 September 1984, if the Government of Panama did not extend authorization for it to remain at its present location at Fort Gulick was the subject of press interest. Query responses were to the effect that the matter was under discussion with Panama, and that if suitable agreement could not be reached, then USARSA would be relocated to a new location, either in the United States or Puerto Rico. In any event the school would continue to operate.

(U) Certain elements of the Panamanian press, particularly leftist-oriented columnists, continued with allegations that USSOUTHCOM was violating some provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty, primarily in regard to accusations of contrabanding of exchange and commissary merchandise. The command also was the subject of anti-US propaganda, carried on from previous years, that USSOUTHCOM was involved in regional activity in sup-

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port of El Salvador and other Central American nations which was in contradiction to treaty provisions. By comparison, however, the volume of the anti-U.S. and USSOUTHCOM diatribes were significantly reduced from 1981.

(U) USSOUTHCOM continued to use all available internal information media in continuation of the Panama Canal Treaty-related information and education program for the command's personnel. Concentration was on informing people of changes taking place under the treaty and their effect on the military and civilian residents of the area. The overall program dealt with all facets of life in the Panama Canal Area, and was designed to reduce confusion, tension and personal problems in the period of implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty.

(U) USSOUTHCOM COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM. To further the community relations goals in the Republic of Panama, USSOUTHCOM sent a band to participate for the first time in the La Chorrera Agricultural, Trade and Folkloric Fair in La Chorrera, Panama. Additionally, the band and command parachute team, plus an audio-visual exhibit, participated in the international Trade Fair in David, Panama.

(U) The official USSOUTHCOM Christmas program within the Republic was enthusiastically supported by the U.S. Southern Command and its components. Three Panamanian groups were sponsored by seven organizations within the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters. Twenty-seven groups were sponsored by 25 organizations of the 193d Infantry Brigade. Eleven groups were sponsored by 11 organizations of the US Air Force Southern Air Division, and four groups were sponsored by four organizations of the US Naval Station Panama.

(U) The 79th U.S. Army Band made a total of 14 Community Relations trips to 10 different countries during the year, an increase of three trips over the preceding year. They played before more than a half million spectators and were seen on national television by more than 3½ million viewers during 1982. The band performed numerous other concerts and engagements in the Panama Canal Area on an official basis.

(U) The Command Parachute Team visited six countries on an equal number of community relations trips during the year. The team performed before audiences that numbered nearly a quarter million and were seen on national television by an estimated two million more.

(U) The Defense Orientation Conference Association (DOCA) visited Latin American for the eighth consecutive year. The group's late January - early February visit included a 4-day stay in Panama, followed by 3½ days in Chile and 3½ days in Argentina. Their visit provided another unique opportunity for some 35 interested DOCA members to learn first hand of the situations and conditions common to the U.S. effort in the hemisphere.

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(U) SOUTHERN COMMAND NETWORK, ARMY BROADCASTING SERVICE. The Service on 1 October 1982. The Network was detached from the 193d Infantry Brigade and became a separate unit with full control over its Army assets. Under an MOU with the U.S. Army Tropic Test Center, the enlisted personnel of SCN were housed in TTC barracks at Corozal. A station Sergeant Major was assigned to the Network in April, the first in many years. This enabled the establishment of a dedicated SCN administration section. A new budget officer was also added to the administrative staff. The new administration section began keeping accurate records on manhours to bring the Network in line with DOD workforce standards. An audience survey was conducted in late 1982 with the results being processed by the 193d Infantry Brigade MISO. Data is to be forth-coming in early 1983. A 1981 audience survey was never processed by MISO due to problems with the program.

(U) SOUTHERN COMMAND TELEVISION NETWORK (SCN-TV) OPERATIONS. SCN-TV marked its 26th year of service to the command by providing entertainment and information programming from the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), local productions and satellite TV programming. The number of restricted programs in the AFRTS package remains high with an average between 50% to 60% weekly. SCN continued to be the most heavily restricted AFRTS network in the world.

(U) Even with the high rate of restriction on 1 November 1982 the decision was made to expand the television broadcast day to 19½ hours per day. This is being accomplished by utilizing satellite programming (CNN, ABC, Sports, and the AFRTS SATNET) and by using the SCN feature-film library, one of the most extensive in the AFRTS community. A new locally oriented program, "Community Scene" was initiated on 4 January and was expanded from five to 30 minutes to cover features on local interest stories and to keep the public informed of community activities. Local coverage was moved out of the studio and into the "field" and "on location" with electronic news gathering (ENG) equipment. World news coverage was greatly increased through the use of satellite feeds from the AFRTS SATNET which started a "clean feed" schedule on 4 October. Typically, 36 hours of live national and world news was aired by SCN each week, and live stateside satellite sports events averaged 18 hours a week. The dissemination of command and community public information was also increased and expedited through the use of character generated messages with scenic video background.

(U) EARTH STATION. SCN utilized its earth station to receive television programs to supplement the AFRTS package and to bring timely news, sporting events and special programs to the SCN audience. In October of 1982 the satellite signal was greatly improved and AFRTS contracted with RCA to use a satellite and transponder that provided a higher-quality signal. SCN, in conjunction with the Army Broadcasting Service, also contracted with Scientific Atlanta Corp. for an on-site survey of the earth station

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to further improve the signal quality. The team will arrive in early 1983.

(U) SOUTHERN COMMAND RADIO NETWORK (SCN RADIO) OPERATIONS. SCN radio operated throughout the year with little change in programming philosophy until October when changes were made in conjunction with the automation of FM. SCN-FM and SCN-AM form USSOUTHCOM's 24 hour-per-day, seven day-per-week outlets for information and entertainment through programming provided by the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), and of local origin. SCN-AM radio programming comes from material provided by AFRTS, network line feeds, live local Disc Jockeys, and material provided by various sources such as AIRS, NIRA and AFIS. SCN radio was effectively utilized throughout the year to provide public service and emergency announcements. SCN radio provided the public with over 80 community information reader spots monthly and approximately 15 produced spots monthly. In October 1982, sports programming was switched back to the AM radio network allowing the listener a better choice of music/entertainment selection. SCN-FM was brought back on line as a fully automated system in October of 1982 with the installation of a Broadcast Electronic Control automation system.

(U) SOUTHERN COMMAND NETWORK ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT. New items of broadcast equipment installed included two new television transmitters, one at Ancon Hill serving the Pacific community and one at Fort Davis serving the Atlantic community. Other equipment was received and installed: 12x12 audio/video switcher, video monitoring package, FM automated system, 3 RCA TK 761 color studio cameras, and a studio-intercom system. Other projects completed included a new calibration program, overhaul of video tape recorders, installation of two editing systems, rewiring television control, major repair of film chain #2, installation of On Air master control system, rewiring of earth station and installation of new Heliac cables, minor overhaul of film chain #1 and construction of a portable two-camera mobile remote television production unit.

(U) SOUTHERN COMMAND NEWSPAPER OPERATIONS. The Southern Command Newspaper, known as the SCNews, is the authorized, unofficial, unified command newspaper for USSOUTHCOM and its components. It is colocated with the Southern Command Network in Bldg. 209, Fort Clayton. Policy supervision and direction for the SCNews is provided by the USSOUTHCOM Special Assistant for Public Affairs.

(U) Manning is provided by component services based upon the proportion of their personnel assigned in the area. Authorized and assigned personnel were: three Army enlisted, three Department of Army civilians, one Air Force officer, and one Air Force enlisted. The Air Force Officer (OIC) assumed responsibilities as commander for the Air Force personnel serving both the network and the newspaper, and increased duties in budget and procurement of supplies and equipment.

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(U) Funding for the SCNews, provided through the 193d Infantry Brigade Comptroller Officer, was slightly greater than that for 1981. Budget matters, supply and equipment procurement, and accounting procedures became separate from the network by virtue of the network being incorporated into the Army Broadcast Service organization. Comprehensive upgrade of office equipment and environment was planned and initiated.

(U) During this reporting period, the SCNews continued to support the mission of USSOUTHCOM by providing its personnel with a viable information source. The SCNews continued to publicize major events throughout the year, including exercises, 79th Army Band performances, and other functions of the command and its components. The SCNews staff has begun to take a more active role in newsgathering in coordination with USSOUTHCOM PAO and the component Public Affairs Offices. Staff training at the Defense Information School and at newspaper seminars have yielded ideas for improvement of content and format of the SCNews. Sophisticated computerized in-place A&M copyset equipment was brought on line for the first time, permitting an improved format for the SCNews.

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COMMAND SURGEON

(U) The Command Surgeon also serves as the Commander, Gorgas Army Hospital/ USA Medical Department Activity Panama, and as the Director of Health Services, 193d Chief apprised of the ongoing medical problems on both sides of the Isthmus, throughout Latin America, and to command the only US military hospital in Latin America. He is responsible for providing medical care to the local military and authorized civilian population as well as the USMILGP-USMAAG personnel and their dependents.

(U) In the Command Surgeon role, [redacted] (b)(6) who retired 1 September 1982, served as Team Chief for three Medical Assistance Team trips that visited nine different countries, and [redacted] (b)(6) present Command Surgeon, served as Team Chief for the last Medical Assistance Team trip to Bogota, Colombia; Quito, Ecuador; and Lima, Peru, in November 1982. The team consisted of the Command Surgeon as Team Chief, the Chief Nurse, a general medical officer/family practitioner, a thoracic surgeon, an optometrist, a dental officer, a dental hygienist, a dental assistant, and a chaplain, for a total of four trips visiting twelve countries and caring for over 1,000 USMILGP-USMAAG personnel and their dependents during calendar year 1982.

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CHAPLAIN

(U) 6 - 13 Feb 82, Staff Visit, Chaplain [redacted] (b)(6) Director, Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations, DA Chief of Chaplains' Office, Washington, DC.

(U) 7 - 14 Feb 82, Staff Visit, Chaplain [redacted] (b)(6) FORSCOM Staff Chaplain, Fort McPherson.

(U) 10 Mar 82, Mass for Chaplain [redacted] (b)(6)

(U) 2 - 8 May 82, Staff Visit, Chaplain [redacted] (b)(6) DA Chief of Chaplains.

(U) 28 Nov 82, Reopening of Corozal Chapel. Dedication ceremony of Bldg. 112, Corozal. The chapel's pastor is Chaplain (MAJ) Dennis Camp.

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HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT, USSOUTHCOM

(U) MISSION. To provide administrative and logistical support to Headquarters, US Southern Command, and/or to arrange for the provision of support by staff elements of the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama). Headquarters Commandant also serves as Commander, US Army Element, HQ USSOUTHCOM; Sub-Installation Manager, Quarry Heights; and Commander, Quarry Heights Detachment, HQ Command, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama).

(U) ORGANIZATION. The Quarry Heights Detachment, HQ Command, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) was organized on 14 March 1977 per Permanent Orders 42-21, Headquarters, 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone). The detachment is organized into three sections (administration, supply, and utilities) to accomplish its mission. Staffing is broken down as follows:

Officers: 1
Warrant Officers: 0
Enlisted: 11
Enlisted (Attached): 5
Civilian: 1

Commander - LTC John E. Napper, IN, USA

(U) MAJOR FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. (U) Administration. Provides administrative support to Headquarters Commandant, including personnel administration for all Army personnel assigned to USA Element HQ USSOUTHCOM.

b. (U) Supply. Supply functions include maintaining accountability for all assigned property, and furnishing logistical support as required by USSOUTHCOM staff activities at Quarry Heights.

c. (U) Utilities. Provides minor facilities repair services in working areas of Quarry Heights, and coordinates service and work order requests with the Directorate of Facilities Engineering, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), and telephone service requests with USACC.

d. (U) Additional Functional responsibilities include transportation coordination for HQ USSOUTHCOM, security of the post of Quarry Heights, and any other support as required by the Commander-in-Chief, USSOUTHCOM.

(U) SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS DURING 1982. The continuous support for HQ USSOUTHCOM remained the primary activity for the Headquarters Commandant. Accomplishments that were made during 1982 include:

a. (U) Relocation of TCC and SSO within the Tunnel with the required security upgrade.

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b. (U) Construction for J2 within Building 88 completed on schedule.

c. (U) Electrical modification for installation of New Computer System within ASD, Building 81.

d. (U) Air conditioning upgrade with approximately twenty-five percent increase in capacity for tunnel complex, Building 81.

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LEGAL AFFAIRS (LA)

(U) PANAMA CANAL TREATY. This office continued to play a vital role in implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty. We were actively involved in negotiations in the Legal Subcommittee of the Joint Committee concerning arrangements on notification of arrest or detention, transfer of custody, and service of criminal process. These key issues are now very near agreement. In addition, we actively participated in the Taxation and Customs Subcommittee of the Joint Committee and provided significant legal advice to the Joint Committee, attending all binational meetings. Most Treaty-related documents are reviewed by this office for legal sufficiency and compliance with US and international law. Some substantive issues addressed during this period included: taxation of designated contractors, transfer of real property to Panama, PX and commissary privileges, the role of US Southern Command in Latin America and the Panama Canal Treaty, the future of the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA), combined police patrols and functions, Panamanian preference in the procurement of goods and services, future housing requirements and Treaty limitations, the Treaty status of non-appropriated fund activities; in addition, issues involving security assistance, and the general application of other international agreements were also addressed. Opinions and advice on these matters involved the analysis of the Panama Canal Treaty and the Agreements in Implementation of the Treaty and required frequent coordination with representatives of the Panama Canal Commission and the United States Embassy. Legal advice to the Combined Board on numerous defense related Treaty issues was also provided.

(U) RELATIONS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. This office provided pertinent information used by the CINC or Chief of Staff when visiting Latin American countries. Files and Country Books on each Latin American country continued to be updated. We provided significant assistance to US Embassies and US MILGPs in the following areas: the drafting of a diplomatic note expanding coverage of the 1954 US-Honduras Military Assistance Agreement to US military personnel participating in combined exercise in Honduras; a proposed diplomatic note used as the basis for the United States-Uruguay APO Agreement; advice and assistance to the USMILGP and the United States Embassy in Venezuela in the drafting of a MILGP agreement with Venezuela. We also submitted proposed legislation to amend the Foreign Assistance Act and other federal statutes to allow USSOUTHCOM to better assist friendly nations in its area of responsibility, e.g., Costa Rica, a nation without a military force to which assistance is currently limited by statutory prohibitions against assistance to foreign police forces.

(U) RELATIONS WITH THE PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION. The overlap of interests of the Panama Canal Commission and US Forces continued to require close liaison and coordination with the Commission throughout this period. Examples of sensitive common issues requiring coordination were housing, wage increases and the Panama Area Wage Base, and the use of civilian PCC guards during military operations.

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(U) OTHER LEGAL MATTERS. Legal assistance was provided on a limited basis to personnel assigned to Quarry Heights and to the LATAM military missions. This office coordinates all Freedom of Information Act requests received by the Command, provides legal advice in Law of War, Equal Employment Opportunity, Privacy Act, Civilian Personnel Law, Labor Law, and other legal matters to the Directorates and personnel of the Command, and reviews Federal Standards of Conduct forms submitted by US military and civilian personnel throughout Latin America.

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LAW ENFORCEMENT

(U) The Command Provost Marshal serves as the Army Component Provost Marshal; 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) Provost Marshal; and Commander, Law Enforcement Activity (LEA) which consists of one Headquarters Company and two Strategic Forces MP Companies.

(U) As a result of three Tactical Field Exercises conducted during this period, LEA made considerable improvement in its interoperability and effective use of infantry companies placed OPCON during Civil Disturbances (CD) Operations. Emphasis was placed on training infantry unit commanders and other unit leaders to plan and execute civil disturbance missions while under extreme stress. Increased command emphasis on safety greatly decreased the number of injuries previously experienced during CD training.

(U) The Command Provost Marshal was the proponent for the new USSOUTHCOM Regs 500-1, Civil Disturbance, and 1-19, Procedures for the Suppression of Contraband Activities, which were published 24 Nov 82 and 20 Nov 82 respectively.

(U) During JTX KINDLE LIBERTY 82, LEA participated by providing Rear Area Combat Operations, to include: CD operations, main supply route security, PW/CI operations, security of the CINC and other VIPs, and other MP combat support missions. A platoon from 5th Company, PNG, was attached during the exercise and participated in all combat support missions except CD.

(U) During CY82, US/PNG Military Police combined defense training and operations have increased significantly, serving the interests of both countries in fulfilling the provisions as well as the spirit of the Treaty in our mission of combined defense of the Panama Canal. The law enforcement role of the Panama Canal Commission ended on 31 Mar 82 with the disestablishment of the Commission Police, leaving SCPM as the sole law enforcement point of contact with Panama.

(U) US/PNG Combined Military Police operations have been conducted without incident, demonstrating an air of mutual support and cooperation. During Sep 82, combined training was conducted in the following tasks: weapons training, MSR security, convoy escort, perimeter defense, RACO, and other combat support missions. This training proved extremely beneficial to relations, and it is anticipated that such training will recur. Combined US/PNG MP tactical operations and training were conducted during JTX KINDLE LIBERTY, whereby one platoon from 5th Co, PNG trained alongside elements of the 549th and 534th MP Companies (STRAF). This training was mission related, realistic, and proved beneficial to all.

(U) In the area of law enforcement, the Provost Marshal (PAC) trained five members of the PNG in Traffic Accident Investigation and eight members in Military Police Investigations. In addition, LEA was instrumental in assisting the PNG in the training of its new military police working dogs.

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(U) During this reporting period, LEA reached and maintained a high state of readiness as demonstrated by numerous awards received by LEA and its subordinate units and by performance in Brigade operations, FTXs, and CPWs. The 534th Military Police Company (STRAF) received the Eagle Award as the most combat ready MP Company in FORSCOM for the third consecutive year, and was the 1st runner up for the BG J.P. Holland Award as the most outstanding MP Company in the Army for 1982. A platoon of Headquarters Company, LEA was selected as the best drilled platoon in the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama). Additionally, LEA excelled in Marksmanship. During the Brigade Marksmanship Competition, LEA won first place in rifle and machine gun firing while taking third place in the pistol competition. LEA was the overall winner of the competition winning more events than any other unit.

(U) A marked improvement in LEA's working relationship with the Panama National Guard was experienced mid-82 as a result of the realignment of the PNG command group, the change over of both US and RP Joint Committee Co-chairmen, the appointment of CPT Daniel Delgado as Cdr, PNG Fifth Company Military Police, and LTC Angel Mina as Director, Panama Traffic Bureau. The enhanced working relationship with Fifth Company Military Police counterparts has been significant and mutually beneficial.

(U) During the latter part of the year, LEA initiated a multi-media campaign to combat unacceptable levels of crimes against property. To this end, increased patrolling, selective use of dog patrols, and joint jungle operations were conducted. Additionally, several briefings were given to the military community designed to establish a viable Community Watch Program and sensitize the community at large to crime trends, methods, and countermeasures. Isthmus wide lighting surveys and quarters security assessments were conducted to identify security deficiencies and insure corrective action undertaken. To date, the program has been successful and resulted in inter-component information sharing and multi-lateral action to reduce crimes of this nature.

(U) Over the past year, identified incidents of contraband increased 48 percent (from 148 to 219). This was due largely to the formation of a dedicated SCPM Contraband Control Section and subsequent aggressive enforcement of established suppression procedures/policies.

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(U) USSOUTHCOM COMMUNICATIONS

(U) NEW C3S DIRECTORATE. A new Command, Control and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate was formed at USSOUTHCOM on 1 October 1982. This initiative ended 12 years of borrowed manpower from USSOUTHCOM subordinate commands which was formed into a C-E Directorate to conduct USSOUTHCOM communications planning and coordination. The new C3S Directorate provides USSOUTHCOM with a much needed permanent communications planning and implementation staff and came at a time of ever-increasing requirements for responsive and reliable C2 links throughout the Latin American regions. Initial authorized manning for the Directorate during FY 83 is 9 personnel. JCS has approved a manning level of 17 personnel by FY 85.

(U) C3S CONTINGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PACKAGE. USSOUTHCOM demonstrated its new regional communications capability by rapidly deploying three organic communications teams with secure UHF satellite communication (SATCOM) terminals and HF radio sets following a request by the Government of Honduras during the terrorist attack in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. These communication systems were quickly installed and achieved a high degree of reliability during the seven-day crisis. This was the first time that USSOUTHCOM has been able to respond with organic communications support to a regional crisis outside of Panama without assistance from the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). USCINCSO (C3S) continues to improve C3S contingency capabilities in support of USCINCSO. Current capabilities include secure satellite communications, secure HF communications and Digital Encryption Standard Motorola hand-held radios with base stations. Emphasis is now directed toward the acquisition of hard-copy secure capabilities. The CINC C2 Initiative Funds Program continues to prove its value by enabling rapid procurement of near-term fixes to critical Command and Control Communications requirements.

(U) KINDLE LIBERTY-82. Communications support for the combined/joint Exercise KINDLE LIBERTY '82 was provided by USCINCSO components. Emphasis was placed on joint communication and procedures. The communications provided by the C-E community received laudatory comments by USCINCSO and supporting Commanders.

(U) TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER (TCC) CONSOLIDATION. The USSOUTHCOM Special Security Office's (SSO's) TCC at Quarry Heights and USACC's TCC were consolidated during October 1982. This effort culminated a long period of coordination and planning and provided USSOUTHCOM with a highly responsive telecommunication center for all of our message requirements. The new consolidated TCC is supported by direct dual circuits (alternate routing) to CONUS, each possessing a high-speed traffic handling capability. This configuration eliminated the need for all intermediate switching points.

(U) USNAVCOMSTA BALBOA SECURITY UPGRADE. In December 1982 installation of closed circuit television monitors at the mador Headquarters, Farfan

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Receiver and Summit Transmitter sites was completed, enhancing the physical security of the command. Also a new alarm system was installed in the CMS vault, upgrading the CMS material storage security.

(U) ALTERNATE CIRCUIT PATHS. During November 1982 an alternate routing capability was established for wideband service. This is the first time that the AUTOSEVOCOM wideband and WWMCCS circuits were able to be routed over the military satellite communications (SATCOM) links at Howard AFB to CONUS as a back-up means for transmission. This alternate routing success was achieved through close working relationships with engineers from 7th Signal Command.

(U) ELECTRONIC TANDEM NETWORK (ETN). The final phase of the ETN installation was completed during July 1982. The Gorgas Army Hospital electronic telephone switch was installed and integrated into the U.S. military ETN in July. This equipment increased the traffic handling capability of the Corozal switching center and is the ninth and final electronic switching center to be installed in Panama.

(U) DESPLAZAMIENTO COMBINADO-HONDURAS. The combined/joint Exercise DESPLAZAMIENTO COMBINADO-HONDURAS provided the 193d Infantry Brigade with an excellent opportunity to exercise its long range teletype communications capabilities. Lessons learned will be invaluable for future deployments. The 1978 Communications Group (AFCC) provided the secure voice communications for this exercise and their support was near flawless.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS STAFF ASSISTANCE. C3S made several staff visits to finalize actions for an upgrade of military communications in EL Salvador. Arrangements were made for systems installation, training of personnel and the establishment of a logistics base for these up-grades. Additionally, C3S worked with the US MILGP in EL Salvador on several other tactical communications initiatives as well as steps to enhance the communications security of the US MILGP headquarters. C3S is currently working a communication security assistance effort in coordination with the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Costa Rica. Personnel conducted a detailed communications site survey in Costa Rica for the new Costa Rica National Reaction Force.

(U) JOINT EXERCISES AHIAS TARA/KINDLE LIBERTY 83. The communications staffs of USSOUTHCOM, the 193d Inf Bde, USAF50, USNAVCOMMSTA Balboa, and USACC Panama worked together closely to finalize planning and coordination. These two upcoming joint exercises are very important to these communication staffs as they will exercise a large portion of several USSOUTHCOM and component command contingency plans. The experience gained in providing joint military communications support, long-distance communications outside of Panama, and the integration of tactical and fixed communications systems should provide valuable feedback for refining contingency plans.

~~(S/AF)~~ USCINCSO REGIONAL VOICE NETWORKS. A Required Operational Capability (ROC) was in its final planning stages in December 1982. This

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ROC outlined a multi-phased timed approach that will provide the means to extend the Defense Communications Systems (DCS) from Panama to DOD activities in Central and South America. This capability is critically needed to support USSOUTHCOM'S operational and intelligence requirements in Latin America.

(U) 1978 COMM GP COMMANDER. On 13 August 1982, [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) assumed command of the 1978th Communications Group. [redacted] (b)(6) also serves as Director, Communications - Electronics, USAF Southern Air Division (USAFSO), and Chief, Communications-Electronics, 24th Composite Wing (TAC). [redacted] (b)(6) arrived from Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, where he served as project manager for TRI-TAC System Program Office and program director of Jam Resistant Secure Communications for Electric Systems Division (ESD).

(U) MISSION RADIO MAINTENANCE. During 1982 the maintenance branch of the 1978th COMM GP performed a variety of duties here in Panama, as well as other countries throughout Central America. The 1978th sent maintenance personnel to Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay. The radio and antenna maintenance shops conduct most of the TDY's, often traveling as a working team. These trips were in support of the USMILGP's and the Mission Radio System in accordance with USSOUTHCOM regulation 105-4.

(U) DIGITAL SATELLITE. The MSC-46 satellite at Howard AFB was converted from analog to digital. This project was completed in November 1982. These changes gave us 12 additional channels and also provides for better communications security.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABS	ARMY BROADCASTING SERVICE
ADCOM	AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
ADP	AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
ADPE	AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT
AECA	ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
AFIS	ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
AFGE	AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
AFSCME	AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTRY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
AFOSI	AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
AFRTS	AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE
AFRTS-PC	AFRTS-PROGRAMMING CENTER
AM	AMPLITUDE MODULATION
AMEMBASSY	AMERICAN EMBASSY
AGR	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
ARTEP	ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (US)
ASD	AUTOMATED SYSTEMS DIVISION
ASD/ISA	ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
AST	AREA SPECIALIST TEAM
BDF	BARBADOS DEFENSE FORCE
BIO	BIOGRAPHICS
CAA	CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES
CAT	CRISIS ACTION TEAM
CCO	CONTROLLED COLLECTION OBJECTIVES
CD	CIVIL DISTURBANCE
CDTS	COMPUTER DIRECTED TRAINING SYSTEM

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CE	COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
CHUSMAAG	CHIEF, US MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
CIDREP	CIVILIAN DISTURBANCE READINESS POSTURE
CINC	COMMANDER IN CHIEF
CINCLANT	COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC (US)
CNO	CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CODEL	CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
COINS	COMMUNITY ON-LINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
COMSEC	COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
COMUSAFSO	COMMANDER, U.S. AIR FORCES, SOUTHERN COMMAND
CONDECA	CENTRAL AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
CONJEFAMER	CONFERENCE OF THE CHIEFS OF THE AIR FORCES OF THE AMERICAS
CONPLAN	CONCEPT PLAN: OPERATIONS PLANS IN CONCEPT FORMAT
CONUS	CONTINENTAL U.S.
COPECODECA	PERMANENT COMMISSION, CENTRAL AMERICAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
CPD	CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENT
CPX	COMMAND POST EXERCISE
CPSD	CONTINGENCY PRODUCTION SUPPORT DIVISION
CSOP	COMBINED STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
CW	CHEMICAL WARFARE
C2	COMMAND AND CONTROL
C3	COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
DA	DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DAO	DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
DAST	DISASTER AREA SURVEY TEAM
DATT	DEFENSE ATTACHE

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DCA	DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DCM	DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
DCS	DEFENSE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
DG	DEFENSE GUIDANCE
DIA	DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIAOLS	DIA ON-LINE SYSTEMS
DOCA	DEFENSE ORIENTATION CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION
DOD	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DODCI	DOD COMPUTER INSTITUTE
DODDS	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPENDENT SCHOOLS
DFE	DIRECTOR OF FACILITIES ENGINEER
DSAA	DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
DSCS	DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
EI	ENGINEERING AND INSTALLATION
ETN	ELECTRONIC TANDEM NETWORK
ESF	ECONOMICAL SUPPORT FUNDS
ESD	ELECTRONIC SYSTEM DIVISION
FAA	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
FBIS	FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FICEURLANT	FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTER EUROPE/ATLANTIC
FLRA	FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
FM	FREQUENCY MODULATION
FMS	FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
FORSCOM	U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
FSLN	SANDINISTA FRONT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
FTX	FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GENSER	GENERAL SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

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GEO	GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
GN	GUARDIA NACIONAL (PANAMA AND OTHER LATAM COUNTRIES)
GO ()	GOVERNMENT OF (COUNTRY)
GOB	GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE
GORM	GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
HC	HOST COUNTRY
HF	HIGH FREQUENCY
HUMINT	HUMAN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
IAAFA	INTER-AMERICAN AIR FORCES ACADEMY
IANC	INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL CONFERENCE
IANIN	INTER-AMERICAN NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
IDHS	INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM
IDDD	INTERNATIONAL DIRECT DISTANCE DIALING
IG	INSPECTOR GENERAL
IHRCC	INTER-AGENCY HOUSING RENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE
IMET	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
IMF	INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDS
IMINT	IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE
INTAFF	INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ISO	INDUSTRIAL SECURITY OFFICE
ISSA	INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT
I&W	INDICATIONS AND WARNING
JACB	JOINT ACQUISITION COORDINATING BOARD
JCS	JOINT INTERSERVICE RESOURCE STUDY GROUP
JDA	JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY
JDS	JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

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JITF	JOINT INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE
JMA	JOINT MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION
JMP	JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM
JOC	JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER
JOTC	JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER
JOPS	JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM
JPAM	JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM
JRG	REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT
JSCP	JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
JSPD	JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
JTD	JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION
JTF	JOINT TASK FORCE
LATAM	LATIN AMERICA (N)
LANTCOM	ATLANTIC COMMAND (U.S.)
LEA	LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
LMI	LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
LERTCON	ALERT CONDITION
LST	LANDING SHIP TANK
LWR	LOCAL WAGE RATE
MAG	MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP (U.S.)
MAC	MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND (U.S.)
MAP	MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
MEDDAC	U.S. ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT ACTIVITY
MFO	MULTINATIONAL FORCES AND OBSERVERS
MI	MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
MILCON	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
MILGP	MILITARY GROUP (U.S.)
MILSAT	MILITARY SATELLITE

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MLO	MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE (U.S.)
MOU	MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
MSAP	MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION
MP	MILITARY POLICE
MIT	MOBILE TRAINING TEAM
MULA	MILITARY UNIVERSITY OF LATIN AMERICA
NAM	NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT
NASA	NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NAVCOMSTA	U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION
NAVSCIATTS	NAVAL SMALL CRAFT INSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL
NISRA	NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE RESIDENT AGENT
NMU	NATIONAL MARITIME UNION
NM	NAUTICAL MILES
OAS	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
OASD	OFFICE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OCS	OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL
ODC	OFFICE DEFENSE COOPERATION (U.S.)
OFDA	OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
OMB	OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
OPEC	OIL AND PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
OPLAN	OPERATIONS PLAN
OTT	ORIENTATION TRAINING TOUR
PACAMS	PANAMA CANAL AREA MILITARY SCHOOLS
PAO	PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
PAPB	PANAMA AREA PERSONNEL BOARD
PAWB	PANAMA AREA WAGE BOARD

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PARPRO	PEACETIME AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
PCA	PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY
PCC	PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
PCES	PANAMA CANAL EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM
PDC	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
PEP	PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAM
PNG	PANAMA NATIONAL GUARD
PML	PERSONNEL MOVEMENT LIMITATION
PRC	PANAMA REVIEW COMMITTEE
PUP	PEOPLES UNITED PARTY
QRB	QUICK REACTION BATALLION
REDCOM	READINESS COMMAND (U.S.)
RCC	RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER
RNP	REMOTE NETWORK PROCESSOR
ROC	REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
SA	SECURITY ASSISTANCE
SAAM	SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT
SAO	SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICE
SAR	SEARCH AND RESCUE
SATNGT	SATELLITE NETWORK
SCI	SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
SCIF	SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY
SCIATT	SMALL CRAFT INSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL TEAM
SCN	SOUTHERN COMMAND NETWORK
SDN	SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT NOTIFICATION
SDP	SECURITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
SESO	SENSITIVE SOURCE

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SITREP	SITUATION REPORT
SLOC	SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SOFA	STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
SPINTCOM	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS
SSO	SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE
TA (DCS/TA)	DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, TREATY AFFAIRS, HQ, USSOUTHCOM
TAC	TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (U.S.)
TCE	TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT
TIARA	TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
TIP	TRAVELLERS IN PANAMA
TLCP	TELECONFERENCE, SPECIFICALLY WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK
TPFDD	TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA
TPFDL	TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT LIST
TTIG	TREATY TRANSITION INFORMATION CENTER
UCP	UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
USACC	U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND
USADCOM	U.S. AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
USAFSO	U.S. AIR FORCE SOUTHERN AIR DIVISION
USAID	U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
USARSA	U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS
USASA	U.S. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
USASAALA	U.S. ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY FOR LATIN AMERICA
USCINCSO	COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
USCOMSOLANT	U.S. COMMANDER SOUTH ATLANTIC
USG	U.S. GOVERNMENT
USMAAG	U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP

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USMILGP	U.S. MILITARY GROUP
USMLO	U.S. MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE
USNR	U.S. NAVAL RESERVE
USODC	U.S. OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION
USREDCOM	U.S. READINESS COMMAND
USSAMS	U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT STAFF
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
UNSC	UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
UTM	UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR
UW	UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
VHF	VERY HIGH FREQUENCY
VLF	VERY LOW FREQUENCY
WIN	WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK
WWDMS	WORLDWIDE DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
WWMCCS	WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

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