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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris 16e., on Tuesday,
12th September, 1967 at 10.15 a.m. and 3 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

Baron J. Papeians
de Morchoven
Mr René Fourdin

CANADA

Mr. Ross Campbell
Mr. O.M. Cornett

DENMARK

Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen
Mr. O. Bierring

FRANCE

Mr. J. Schricke

GERMANY

Mr. D. Oncken
Mrs. E. von Puttkamer

GREECE

Mr. J. Pasmazoglu

ICELAND

Mr. H. Sv. Björnsson

ITALY

Mr. C. Gasparini
Mr. G. Derege

LUXEMBOURG

Mr. P. Reuter
Mr. A. Meisch

NETHERLANDS

Mr. H.N. Boon
Mr. J. Meijer

NORWAY

Mr. G. Kristiansen
Mr. A. Arnesen

PORTUGAL

Mr. V. da Cunha
Mr. Bonifacio Miranda

TURKEY

Mr. Nuri Birgi

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Bernard Burrows
Mr. P.T. Hayman

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harlan Cleveland
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General: Mr. J.A. Roberts
Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs: Mr. J. Jaenicke
Deputy Executive Secretary: Mr. F.C. Menne

ALSO PRESENT

Military Committee Representative: Major General J. de Visschere

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1. The first part of the document discusses the general principles of the law of torts, including the elements of negligence and the concept of duty of care.

2. The second part of the document discusses the law of contract, including the formation of a contract and the remedies available for breach of contract.

3. The third part of the document discusses the law of property, including the acquisition and transfer of property and the rights of ownership.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the law of evidence, including the rules of evidence and the burden of proof.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the law of procedure, including the rules of civil procedure and the rules of criminal procedure.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the law of torts, including the elements of negligence and the concept of duty of care.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the law of contract, including the formation of a contract and the remedies available for breach of contract.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the law of property, including the acquisition and transfer of property and the rights of ownership.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the law of evidence, including the rules of evidence and the burden of proof.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the law of procedure, including the rules of civil procedure and the rules of criminal procedure.

11. The eleventh part of the document discusses the law of torts, including the elements of negligence and the concept of duty of care.

12. The twelfth part of the document discusses the law of contract, including the formation of a contract and the remedies available for breach of contract.

13. The thirteenth part of the document discusses the law of property, including the acquisition and transfer of property and the rights of ownership.

14. The fourteenth part of the document discusses the law of evidence, including the rules of evidence and the burden of proof.

15. The fifteenth part of the document discusses the law of procedure, including the rules of civil procedure and the rules of criminal procedure.

16. The sixteenth part of the document discusses the law of torts, including the elements of negligence and the concept of duty of care.

17. The seventeenth part of the document discusses the law of contract, including the formation of a contract and the remedies available for breach of contract.

18. The eighteenth part of the document discusses the law of property, including the acquisition and transfer of property and the rights of ownership.

19. The nineteenth part of the document discusses the law of evidence, including the rules of evidence and the burden of proof.

20. The twentieth part of the document discusses the law of procedure, including the rules of civil procedure and the rules of criminal procedure.

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DISCUSSION ON THE WORK OF THE 22ND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Document: PO/67/590/1

1. The CHAIRMAN said that this special meeting had been called to discuss problems of interest to the Alliance which might come up at the 22nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly and it was his pleasant duty to welcome to the meeting the distinguished experts who had joined the Council for this exchange of views on United Nations matters which had already become a tradition in NATO.

2. Representatives would have received documents PO/67/590 and PO/67/590/1. These lists were not, of course, exclusive and any other subject of interest might well be raised. He thought, however, that attention should be concentrated on those issues which required further clarification in the Council, or those which some delegations felt should be drawn to the attention of the Allied governments.

3. From contacts with delegations, it appeared that three groups of questions were of general interest at this stage. The Middle East question which the United States Delegation would introduce into the discussion, mentioning also Vietnam; the South African problems, which might be raised by the United Kingdom Delegation; and the disarmament and arms control question, which the Canadian Delegation would be ready to present. This list of subjects was not of course exhaustive and any other delegation was free to suggest, at this time or later, other themes for discussion.

(a) Middle East

4. Mr. SISCO (United States) noted the fact that for the first time in the Organization's history, the Assembly was likely to be led by a Communist President, and supported the candidature of the Rumanian Foreign Minister. Certainly there existed in so unmanageably-sized an institution a relative disequilibrium of power, but the opportunity for private diplomacy and official exchanges of views on key issues afforded by this "Trades Union of Foreign Ministers" was a most important development. The United States were only too conscious of the effect of NATO votes in the General Assembly where they continued to constitute a bulwark in matters of financial and other importance.

5. Noting the prime importance which the Middle East situation would doubtless assume on the General Assembly's Agenda, he recalled that at the deliberations of the Special Emergency Session, which was to meet again only briefly before the opening of the Assembly, the problem had been referred to the General Assembly for priority consideration, according to the desires of the Arab States. The United States' position in the question had been clearly stated on 19th June there must be a stable durable peace established in the Middle East, friendly relations between all Middle East countries, political independence and territorial integrity, including the disengagement and withdrawal of armed forces, guarantees of free passage in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, a satisfactory solution to the refugee problem, the limitation, or at least registration of arms possessions, and first and foremost, the recognition of the right of all Sovereign Nations to exist in peace and security.

6. Four main factors would condition the progress of discussion, not least the existence of instability and disagreement amongst the Arab States themselves. Any development which would contribute to stabilising the Arab world should be welcomed and encouraged, since there could be no peace if the voice of the Arabs was one of militancy. In the second place, there existed a danger of confrontation in the area between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the Glassboro talks, and in the United Nations, efforts had been made to seek common ground with the USSR, and it had appeared that the Soviets too were eager to avoid conflict. Thirdly, the United States were limited in their ability to help Arabs and Israelis to a satisfactory solution because of highly sensitive public opinion; there had been a strong public reaction to false assumptions about United States and United Kingdom participation in the recent hostilities. Finally, and most important, an end to belligerence and war in the Middle East depended on the relations between the Israelis and Arabs themselves. It was, in the United States view, wrong for the Arabs to reserve the right to invoke belligerence, and to place on Israel all obligations for peace. Israel itself made clear its desire for mutual commitment; to approach the problem on a de facto basis could only produce further difficulties.

7. Since the end of the Special Emergency Session, several important developments had taken place. Although disappointingly it had proved impossible to hold a constructive discussion in the Security Council before the General Assembly, the signs of reconciliation and indications of a possible political solution which had emerged at the Khartoum meeting, could only be welcomed. On the other hand, there remained in the Arab camp a certain reluctance to renounce belligerence and adopt direct negotiations leading to a formal peace treaty. Also, in recent weeks, the Soviets

had privately approached the United States Government asking if, in the light of common ground reached during the Emergency Session, the United States wished to pursue discussion on the situation in the Middle East. Regrettably, no further contacts had been made, and the United States Authorities now wondered whether the Soviet Union was still willing to subscribe to the points agreed during the Emergency Session. A written formulation which was aimed at ending the state of war without mentioning belligerency, had been tried out on the Arabs by the USSR, but unfortunately rejected by radical Arab elements. The Soviet Government had accepted only this one commitment.

8. Whilst welcoming the efforts made by President Tito to give an active rôle to the United Nations in solving the Middle East situation, the United States felt that some elements of his proposal made it both unacceptable and retrogressive, tending even to destroy those measures of accord achieved between the United States and the USSR. A call for the withdrawal of forces could not be accepted independent of a cessation of belligerency and settlement of basic problems. Furthermore, withdrawal to the pre-5th June positions meant a clearly unacceptable return to the unstable conditions existing before the hostilities. Israel, for her part, was still firm in her call for direct negotiation and a formal peace treaty, although there were indications that the Israeli Authorities were willing to moderate demands in order to obtain a durable security.

9. The United States Government hoped that the broad measure of consensus achieved in NATO on this problem would be maintained. In the face of a demand by the USSR for withdrawal at any price, it would be most valuable to have a bloc stand favouring an approach of mutual responsibility. The United States continued to hope that the appointment of a United Nations mediator in the area might be a helpful and constructive move.

10. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) said his Authorities would support the probable election of a Communist President to the United Nations General Assembly and they too attached great importance to the opportunities afforded by this unique forum for informal discussions between national representatives.

11. He had listened with interest and agreement to Mr. Sisco's comments on the Middle East situation which was indeed likely to be foremost in most delegates' thoughts at the 22nd Assembly. He agreed that whatever happened on a bilateral level the United Nations must ultimately be the source of a peaceful solution and that the Security Council was the best place to carry matters forward profitably.

It was a disappointment to many interested nations that the Arabs wished to take the problem directly to the Assembly where opportunities for propaganda were rife. The unfortunate lack of response to Washington by the USSR was probably due to Soviet prudence in assessing Arab reactions, following their failure to achieve outright condemnation of Israel in June. Moderation had been shown at Khartoum but the impact of this apparent change of attitude was diminished by the absence of Algerian and Syrian representation.

12. His Authorities' position broadly resembled that of the United States, and their inability to agree to a "time-block" between withdrawal on the one hand and a cessation of belligerence on the other had determined their opposition to Tito's proposal, which contained this crucial fault. The British Foreign Secretary had declared in June his belief in a pragmatic approach, namely that the Security Council reach general agreement in principle to the issues described, followed by a detailed effort to solve practical problems such as the re-opening of the Suez Canal to all ships, the future of a United Nations presence in the area (it was tentatively suggested that the existing observer system be built on rather than replaced), the refugee problem, and, perhaps most difficult because most laden with emotion, the future of Jerusalem.

13. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE shared his colleagues' thoughts on the principles of the Middle East situation and their indications for a solution. He doubted from past experience that recourse to the General Assembly constituted a positive measure and felt it was wiser to avoid the kind of discussion common to that body which might serve only to deepen confusion. A global attack on the problem was required - the definition in advance of basic principles on which a solution could be found. His first reaction was to favour a further meeting of the Security Council where an effort might be made to reach a resolution on these lines.

14. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE reaffirmed his Government's adhesion to the views already expressed by the NATO Allies. The United Nations and in particular the Security Council was the only forum where a solution on the lines described by Mr. Sisco could be reached. Denmark too considered the Tito proposal a retrogressive step in several important respects and felt it would be deplorable if the limited ground achieved jointly by the United States and the USSR were lost.

15. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE emphasised the importance of transforming into positive action the views which had been expressed and with which his Authorities were in general agreement. Discussion on the Middle East problem had been in suspension since June and the situation in the area might

deteriorate. Furthermore, failure to act, even in the absence of new elements, would be detrimental to United Nations prestige. It was to be hoped that the USSR would keep up the commitment it had accepted in July.

16. The Canadian Government placed its hopes in the Security Council and saw no reason why the latter should not meet at the same time as the General Assembly. Of the two possible courses open, a simple resolution by the Security Council authorising the Secretary General to send a representative to the area, and a procedural resolution on the lines already described, the latter was probably preferable since the Arabs would accept with difficulty a simple resolution containing no mention of withdrawal.

17. Mr. MEIJER (Netherlands) reported no change in his Government's views since the declaration made at the Special Emergency Session in June. He therefore shared the views of his United Kingdom and United States colleagues on the Tito proposal. Long and heated debates in the General Assembly could only jeopardise a successful outcome to the situation. The Assembly debate should therefore be kept as brief as possible with the aim of getting discussion back to its rightful place in the Security Council. For this reason, consultation and concerted action were essential. The Netherlands were prepared to support moves to strengthen United Nations presence in the Middle East, either by the despatch of a mediator or by a build-up of present arrangements. In conclusion, he informed the Council of his Authorities' recent intervention with the Israelis in Jerusalem in favour of bona fide refugees wishing to return to the other bank of the Jordan. There had so far been some success.

18. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE, speaking as the representative of a country that was not a member of the United Nations but had an observer status only, said the outcome of the Special Emergency Session showed that the possibilities open to the United Nations to act on the Middle East problem were limited. However, Germany felt that the United Nations would continue to be a significant forum for discussion of this question. In this context, Germany would, as in the past, support all measures contributing to a peaceful solution and was in full agreement with the views of other delegations. His Authorities were particularly interested in the humanitarian problems of the Middle East and had given aid to the area immediately following the cessation of hostilities. Plans were under study to relieve refugees through several channels.

19. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE stated that the annual review of the Agenda of the United Nations General Assembly was not merely a useful procedure but part of the necessary process of mutual consultation. The aim was not to reach a NATO line in facing international questions, but to proceed to a frank exchange of views on the questions that would be examined during the General Assembly Session. According to information from an Eastern bloc capital, the Under Secretaries of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact countries were holding, at this time, a similar meeting with a view to formulating a common policy on the General Assembly Session. He believed this was very significant.

20. The Greek Government's views on the Middle East had been clearly explained on several occasions both in this forum and in the United Nations. A peaceful settlement should be found as soon as possible, otherwise the influence of the Soviet Union in the area would increase. A settlement must be reached on the status of the Holy Places because there again there was Soviet interest in trying to acquire privileges and advantages for the Russian Orthodox Church.

21. His Authorities had heard of no other candidature to the presidency of the General Assembly, except that presented by the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and they would support Mr. Manescu.

22. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE recalled the three principles at the basis of his Government's position on the Middle East situation, namely, that all states had a right to live in peace, that military conquest in the field should not be considered as conquest once and for all, and that only a settlement freely negotiated and subscribed to by all parties could bring peace. Such negotiations should cover all those problems evoked by earlier speakers with whom he was generally in agreement. He thought the Khartoum Conference had been interesting, if not entirely satisfactory; the existence of extremist elements such as Algeria, and at closer range Syria, was indeed a great disadvantage to the Arab bloc. On the Soviet side, it was his impression that Moscow, despite propaganda, was genuinely eager to prevent the situation from going too far, although this did not mean that Soviet goals were the same as Western goals. The Tito proposal could only be regarded with scepticism, since it was inconceivable that it would be accepted by Israel. As to the appropriateness of the Security Council as a forum for discussion on the Middle Eastern problem and the possible convocation of a meeting at the same time as the General Assembly, he could only say this view reflected his Authorities' opinions on the respective responsibilities of the two United Nations bodies.

It was important neither to ignore the difficulties felt on the Israeli side, (Jerusalem, the occupied territories, the military frontier established on the Jordan river and the Suez canal) nor forget the problems posed in the Arab camp by progressive tendencies, and a feeling of deep humiliation which was very dangerous, even in diplomatic negotiations. The work in hand was difficult, but should not be abandoned.

23. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE had no illusions as to the possibility of achieving positive action at the United Nations General Assembly, but he felt the aim was to prepare ground for the future, rather than provide an immediate solution, and he therefore heartily supported the proposal to seek a procedural resolution only. He did not see that either Israelis or Arabs had any interest in a further outbreak of war at this time and there seemed to be a tendency to moderation on the part of the Arabs which should be encouraged on a political level by continuing negotiations and consultations in the General Assembly and in Chanceries in order to achieve a reasonable political solution. He thought his Authorities would agree that for the immediate future it would be unwise to press for a debate in the General Assembly. President Tito's initiative was based on several interesting ideas which could possibly be exploited to encourage the Arab States to extend their tendency to moderation.

24. The Turkish Authorities also intended to vote in favour of the Rumanian Foreign Minister.

25. Mr. MIRANDA (Portugal) informed the Council that his Authorities would support the Rumanian Foreign Minister's candidature as President of the 22nd General Assembly and hoped that a Communist President might provide a more positive approach to the opening Session.

26. Portugal did not feel called to take a specific position in the Middle Eastern question and had abstained from voting in the Special Emergency Session. However, his Authorities hoped for peace and a solution satisfactory to all parties, and in this context had made clear their views on the internationalisation of the Holy Places and the principles involved in a withdrawal of forces.

27. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed support for Mr. Manescu's candidature for the presidency of the Assembly, and stated his gratitude for the support received by his country for its candidate to the Chair of the Sixth Committee.

28. There was no change to report in the Norwegian position stated at the Special Emergency Session in June. Earlier speakers had already evoked the risks of inaction by the United Nations, and the imperative need to use the occasion of the General Assembly Session to renew and strengthen all-round efforts to solve the basic issues of the Middle East conflict. Like them, he believed the United Nations was the right place for such efforts, and that realistic and practical solutions could only be obtained through Security Council action. Furthermore, he fully agreed that a minimum understanding between the United States and the USSR was essential to any satisfactory settlement. He noted Mr. Sisco's statement that the United States was willing to continue bilateral contacts and hoped that the Soviet Union would make a timely and positive response. He supported wholeheartedly the United Kingdom and United States Representatives' view concerning desirable elements for a durable settlement, and in particular emphasised that such a solution could only be based on a withdrawal of forces from conquered areas, and the elimination of the refugee problem. Norway was prepared to make continuing contributions to the solution of this particularly difficult aspect of the situation.

29. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE paid tribute to the valuable statements he had heard and which he would report to his Government. He would inform the Council as soon as possible of the results of Mr. Harmel's visit to Belgrade. Mr. Manescu's candidature continued to be supported by his Authorities.

30. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought it was important to draw attention to one crucial factor of the Middle East problem, namely, the closure of the Suez Canal and the effect of this action on maritime countries. This situation posed immediate economic difficulties of course, but more alarming were the long-term effects, since the fate of the Mediterranean Sea might be considerably modified by a prolonged closure of this geo-politically vital seaway.

31. The CHAIRMAN noted a common orientation of the views expressed by speakers along the lines of Mr. Sisco's opening statement, particularly in connection with the essential principles for a peaceful settlement, including a solution to the Suez Canal problem, of the desirability of Security Council rather than General Assembly action, of continuing informal consultation, and of the essential, if difficult, agreement between the West and the USSR. Clearly the basic principles for a common approach by the NATO countries had been established.

(b) Vietnam

32. Mr. SISCO (United States) suggested four ways in which the United States might be involved in possible United Nations action on Vietnam. First, the presence of Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, at the General Assembly Session would provide an opportunity for informal consultation; second, it seemed likely that the Vietnam problem would be raised during the general debate; third, the Soviet Union would doubtless use the conflict as propaganda material in the context of an item on non-intervention or aggression; and finally, possible action might be proposed in the United Nations Security Council. It was hoped that the Foreign Ministers of member nations would favourably mention United States policy in South-East Asia.

33. Public opinion in the United States found it difficult to understand United Nations inability to act on the Vietnam situation, and the Government was determined to explore every possible opportunity for a satisfactory solution to the conflict. The following courses of action had already been considered together with Security Council members:

- (i) the Security Council might express its concern regarding the threat posed to international peace and security by the situation in Vietnam;
- (ii) the Council might state its conviction that a peaceful solution to the conflict should be found through negotiations;
- (iii) the Council might indicate that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 would constitute a workable basis for peace in South-East Asia;
- (iv) on the basis of the Geneva Agreements, the Council might re-affirm certain principles for bringing about peace, along the following lines:
 - (a) Complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel in both North and South Vietnam at a certain date.
 - (b) No military forces or bases to be maintained in North or South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective governments, with withdrawal or demobilisation of all

other armed troops and personnel and abolition of all other military bases as soon as possible under an agreed timed schedule.

- (c) Full respect for international frontiers of states bordering on North and South Vietnam and the demilitarised zone between North and South Vietnam.
 - (d) Vietnamese people in both North and South Vietnam to settle the question of re-unification peacefully, without foreign interference.
 - (e) International supervision of the foregoing agreed machinery;
- (v) the Security Council might call for an international conference to establish permanent peace in South-East Asia based on the Geneva Agreements.

34. The United States would welcome the views and criticism of NATO member countries on these proposed actions, since the Government was unwilling to push for their consideration at the United Nations without sufficient support. Unfortunately, Security Council action was severely restricted by the unchanging attitude of the Soviet Union and Hanoi's uncompromising position on non-intervention by the United Nations.

35. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) recognised the difficulties posed by Hanoi's anti-United Nations policy, but said the United Kingdom Authorities felt it fell to the Organization within the terms of its Charter to give all possible assistance to all efforts at bringing peace to the world. On the other hand, they too disliked the use of the General Assembly as a propaganda forum, and were open-minded as to Security Council action.

36. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE had doubts about introducing the Vietnam question to the Security Council as matters now stood. He understood this to mean a decision to re-adopt the Agenda, which would make possible a count of seven votes against United States policy and would give rise to considerable invective which would not help matters at the present time nor be welcomed by the Soviet Union in its current state of quasi co-operation over the Middle East. If the question were nevertheless debated in the Security Council, the Soviet Union's present policy of endorsing Hanoi might lead to the rejection of all resolutions except for one calling for unconditional

cessation of hostilities. Alternatively, the unacceptability to the majority of the United States conditions, however reasonable, might give rise to amendments favouring unconditional cessation, a situation which would put several Allies in a particularly awkward situation. Finally, several interested parties were not United Nations members and had made clear their views on the Organization's competence to intervene in the dispute. On the other hand, the Geneva Conference was a forum in existence with a legal right to do so; perhaps those actions proposed for Security Council consideration could be used there.

37. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE, as a delegate of one of the member nations sitting in Security Council at this time, said he had much sympathy with the underlying motives which encouraged the United States to bring this matter up in the Security Council. However, he shared some of the doubts expressed by his Canadian colleague as to the timeliness of using this forum. Whilst keeping an open mind on the subject he was inclined to prefer quiet "corridor diplomacy" as being a more fruitful approach at the present moment.

38. Mr. MEIJER (Netherlands) agreed that a political solution to the problem must be found and that the Geneva Agreements could provide a proper basis for stability in South-East Asia. On this understanding his Government would be prepared to support an initiative to bring the problem before the Security Council, although there were doubts as to the chances of success for all the reasons expressed by his Canadian and Danish colleagues.

39. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE also considered it unwise to seek Security Council action on Vietnam, a problem which was of more relevance to the Geneva Conference.

40. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE supported the settlement of the Vietnam question through appropriate channels, and deplored the lack of response from Hanoi to repeated United States gestures towards stopping air raids and the achievement of a satisfactory settlement.

41. Mr. DEREGE (Italy) had no doubt that the United Nations was legally competent to deal with the Vietnam problem, but from a practical point of view, he thought the absence of certain major participants would make the task of the Security Council difficult if not impossible. On the other hand, he wondered if a member of the Security Council could not take the initiative of introducing a resolution to the Council requesting the two Presidents of the 1954 Geneva Convention to study ways and means of settlement.

42. Mr. SISCO (United States) thanked his colleagues for their observations, and expressed his Authorities' pleasure at the opportunity presented by the occasion of the General Assembly for continued consultation both on the Vietnam and Middle-East crises.

(c) South Africa and Rhodesia

43. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) recalled that the formal Agenda Item 55 dealing with South Africa referred to Resolution 2248 of 19th May, 1967. A report from the Special Committee on implementing the process for granting independence to South-West Africa, a report from the United Nations Council for South-West Africa, and a report on the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner for that territory were not available and their contents were unknown. He personally suspected that the report of the United Nations Council for South-West Africa would contain little more than a letter to the Government of South Africa asking how the latter proposed to transfer its power to the Council. Obviously there would be no reply to a body which the South African Government did not consider constitutionally legal. No candidate for the post of the United Nations Commissioner for South-West Africa had been nominated or was expected.

44. The position of the United Kingdom Government was well known and unchanged. The policy of apartheid was strongly opposed and the United Kingdom could not agree that the United Nations had legal or constitutional powers to proceed as it had done over South-West Africa. The 1967 Resolution had been passed through the General Assembly by an uncompromising use of African votes, and United Kingdom refusal to take part in the Council was justified in the event.

45. The only hope for constructive long-term progress lay in the establishment of a dialogue between South Africa and the United Nations, but such an approach was inadvisable at a moment when South Africa was enjoying the consequences of the closure of the Suez Canal.

46. Although not formally listed on the Agenda, the Rhodesian situation might well be debated at the forthcoming Session and the United Kingdom wished to recall the three principal points of its policy, namely that it could not use force against the Rhodesian population, that it would not accede to an action which might lead to major economic confrontation with South Africa, and finally that it hoped that some form of mandatory sanctions would continue to influence the Smith régime to compromise with the United Kingdom Government. In this context he informed the Council

that the sanctions already imposed were working slowly but surely, and that strong measures were being imposed by Britain to ensure full efficacy. He hoped that all nations who had subscribed to the United Nations Resolution were making similar efforts to prevent any form of leakage.

47. Mr. DEREGE (Italy) recalled his Authorities' earlier conviction of the possibility of commencing a dialogue with South Africa in order to reach a solution, however remote, on the South-West African Territory. However, the results of the Special Meeting showed that the possibility of holding such a dialogue was now much limited. His Authorities were particularly concerned at recent news from Pretoria concerning measures taken for the "unification" of the administration of the two territories. If such a step were taken, or if there was an indication that the South African Government had annexed de facto the South-Western territory, a most difficult situation for United Nations discussion would be created. This being so, it would be wiser to defer United Nations action on the question.

48. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and South Africa were normal and in many respects good. The country was Germany's biggest overseas trade partner after the United States and commanded much sympathetic public opinion since a proportion of its population was of German origin. His Government had noted with satisfaction the attempts made by Pretoria to contact the nations of Black Africa and to give aid to the latter. On the other hand, it had subscribed to the United Nations Resolution against discrimination and the apartheid policy, and exercised a strict embargo on arms exportation, despite East European propaganda to the contrary. It could not be denied that other situations in Africa diminished the force of German public criticism of South African domestic policy and he could therefore see little chance of support for an economic or trade embargo. The German Government agreed that Pretoria should be denied the administration of South-West Africa and welcomed any efforts to promote the development and establishment of the principle of independence and self-determination for the territory, but it had no desire to see the administration passed to the United Nations, and saw the South-West Africa Committee as the only practical step which could be made at this time.

49. His Authorities fully supported the United Nations Resolution on mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.

50. Mr. MIRANDA (Portugal) explained that the Portuguese Government's reasons for voting against the General Assembly Resolution on South-West Africa, were based on the view that the territory had a Class C mandate

originally given to South Africa and not since revoked, that the United Nations was not the legal successor to the League of Nations, and that the United Nations Charter contained no provision allowing the Organization to impose solutions on the mandated power or to set up United Nations administration over mandated territory. The South African Republic was known to exercise a stabilising power over the territory, and furthermore, whilst unwilling to support a racial policy so totally different from its own, Portugal considered apartheid an internal matter for the South African Government.

51. If, as had been stated, the Rhodesian situation was based on a constitutional question, it was, in the opinion of the Portuguese Government, the internal problem of a member-state of the United Nations and there were no valid grounds on which other member-states could interfere. Portugal had adopted and would continue to adopt, a position of neutrality, and would apply, as before, rules of international good conduct as consecrated by international conventions. Portuguese trade with Rhodesia was negligible, but Portugal would continue to carry trade to and from the country according to the principles of international law towards land-locked countries. This was an unassailable position which rendered the attempts of other member nations to involve Portugal in the disputes painfully surprising.

52. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE saw little likelihood of change in the nature of this dispute. The basic problem for South Africa lay in ineffective decisions taken by the United Nations despite South African opposition. He agreed this was an inopportune moment to exercise pressure on the Government of the Republic who, in any case, were handling the affair with confidence. The United States were not inclined to support the use of forceful measures, and thought it better to allow the Council on South-West Africa to continue its rôle of peaceful observation as a safeguard against illegal action or any move to annex the territory piecemeal.

53. His Authorities would continue to co-operate with the Security Council in operating the selective mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia.

54. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities could only regard the system of apartheid with regret. However, whilst admitting that the United Nations might examine the situation, he did not think that the Organization should exceed its competence in this matter. They did not consider that the South-West African mandate had been revoked by the United Nations General Assembly, and as a

consequence, felt that Africa still had a corresponding responsibility. Any initiative to annex the territory would be contrary to this mandate. Given the South African decision and attitude, and the United Nations lack of means, he was inclined to oppose pressing for initiatives and resolutions in the United Nations. It would be not only ineffectual but of detriment to the prestige of the Organization.

55. He had nothing to add to earlier French Government statements on the Rhodesian situation.

56. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE reported that his Government's limited trade with Rhodesia had now been completely abolished in accordance with its strict support of the sanctions policy agreed in the United Nations. However, it was his Authorities' impression that leakages existed in the system, and they were concerned that it might become increasingly difficult for them to apply the embargo, since its apparent inefficiency would make control of national imports and exports agents difficult. Did the United Kingdom envisage steps to increase or reinforce the effectiveness of the policy?

57. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) said his Government had the sanctions question constantly under review and had initiated special machinery to increase effectiveness. He sympathised with the situation described by his Norwegian colleague, and hoped that other member nations were doing their utmost to ensure the elimination of all possible loopholes.

58. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE believed South Africa had clearly lost the right to administer the mandated territory of South-West Africa, and agreed that a way to pass over its administration to the United Nations should be the subject of a dialogue proposed at an appropriate time and not imposed by force.

59. He thought the majority in the General Assembly would judge the existing sanction system ineffective, would ask for a travel ban, and the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, or even demand the use of force. At the moment Rhodesia appeared to be prosperous and it was not necessarily true that an increase of sanctions would speed up the country's economic collapse although this might have an important psychological effect. It was better to avoid a debate in the General Assembly which might tie the hands of member nations at a future meeting of the Security Council where action on Rhodesia most probably belonged.

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60. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government was totally opposed to South African policy and accordingly was convinced of the need to use United Nations and other bilateral means to keep up realistic pressures capable of commanding overwhelming majority support: if economic sanctions were applied these must be adhered to by all trading countries big and small. He could assure the Council that Denmark used its full efforts to make the sanctions against Rhodesia work to best effect.

61. His Authorities were to take the same position in respect of South-West Africa as they had at last year's Assembly, and would support any effort to promote a revised resolution on these lines.

62. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) thanked his colleagues for this opportunity to put forward the United Kingdom point of view on the Rhodesian situation and said he would inform his Authorities of the successful application of the mandatory sanction policy.

63. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council was unanimously opposed to South Africa's apartheid policy and with little exception agreed that South Africa had not accepted the conditions of the South-West African mandate. On the other hand it was not considered opportune at this time to increase pressure on the Republic, and there was a tendency to favour moderation combined with firm resistance to possible piece-meal annexation of the territory. As a long-term measure the Council appeared to agree on the value of initiating a dialogue between South Africa and the United Nations.

64. With few exceptions, member nations had re-affirmed their adherence to the sanctions policy against Rhodesia, although some anxiety and uneasiness had been expressed that the existence of leakages might jeopardise the application of the policy as a whole.

(d) Gibraltar

65. Mr. HAYMAN (United Kingdom) made the following statement:

"Our NATO Allies have a double interest in Gibraltar, first as an important military base used by NATO and secondly as a question in which they are concerned as members of the United Nations. Gibraltar is situated in the NATO area and contains a NATO sub-headquarters. A NATO exercise is currently in progress based on Gibraltar and we are glad that Allied forces are participating. But, although we have kept our NATO Allies up to date on developments in the Gibraltar dispute through statements in the Political Committee (for example on the Spanish Prohibition Area),

I would now like to make a more detailed statement about developments in the Gibraltar dispute at the United Nations and about our attitude to these.

"In December 1966 a resolution was passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for us to expedite the decolonisation of Gibraltar in consultation with Spain and taking into account the interests of the inhabitants. H.M.G. accordingly proposed to Spain that talks should start in London on 16th April. But Spain caused these talks to be postponed by announcing on 12th April a large Prohibited Area for flying near Gibraltar. This was an act of duress clearly directed against the Gibraltarians and contrary to the intentions of the United Nations Resolution (which expressed regret at the occurrence of similar acts in the past which had prejudiced the smooth progress of negotiations between Britain and Spain).

"In June Spain made clear, during talks on the effects of the Prohibited Area on flying at Gibraltar, that she would only go on discussing the matter if Britain first met two far-reaching political preconditions. These preconditions, which Spain well knew would be quite unacceptable to H.M.G., were that Britain should recognise Spanish sovereignty over the southern part of the Isthmus, on which the airport at Gibraltar is built, and that our military use of the airport should cease.

"Thus talks with Spain of the kind envisaged by the United Nations Resolution had not been possible when the British Government announced later in June that it had been decided to hold a referendum in Gibraltar under which the inhabitants would be asked to say whether they thought that their interests would best be served by either.

- (a) passing under Spain or
- (b) retaining the link with Britain.

The British Government offered to consult the Spanish Government about the formulation of the first of these alternatives and also offered to make every facility available in Gibraltar for Spain to explain her case to the Gibraltarians. Spain turned down both these generous offers.

"On 1st September the United Nations Committee of Twenty-four passed an obnoxious Iraqi-sponsored resolution on Gibraltar declaring that the referendum would contradict the provisions of the previous December's General Assembly Resolution and endorsing Spain's claim that first Gibraltar must be returned to Spain and only then should the interests

of the inhabitants be consulted. Britain voted against this partisan resolution which contradicts the spirit of the United Nations Charter, Chapter 11 of which requires the political aspirations of the people of non-self-governing territories to be taken into account. It also goes beyond the competence of the Committee of Twenty-four, which represents the General Assembly in matters concerning decolonisation but is not qualified to take sides in a territorial dispute. In a letter dated 6th September to the Secretary General of the United Nations the United Kingdom Permanent Representative said that 'The referendum..... is in no way invalidated by this opinion of the Committee of Twenty-four'.

"The referendum took place on 10th September as planned. Out of an electorate of 12,757 the number of votes cast was 12,237. Of these 44 were for Alternative (a) (passing under Spain) and 12,138 for Alternative (b) (retaining the link with Britain). This overwhelming vote demonstrates quite clearly that the Gibraltarians do not think that their interests would be served if they were to be handed over to Spain. This fact, of which the evidence is provided by a free vote by the people of Gibraltar in the presence of independent observers from Commonwealth countries of four Continents, is of crucial importance and cannot be ignored by the United Nations when it next discusses the question of Gibraltar. In these discussions we will seek to have reversed the unacceptable and premature judgment passed by the Committee of Twenty-four on 1st September. We shall be disappointed if our NATO Allies, in deciding their attitude, do not take full account of this new element in the situation, namely the clearly expressed view of the Gibraltarians on their own future."

66. Mr. DEREGE (Italy), speaking as representative of one of the Western members of the Committee of Twenty-four, spoke in clarification of his country's reluctant position on the Gibraltar Resolution. Self-determination was indeed a pillar of the United Nations Charter, but in this particular case, Italy did not feel that the principle of self-determination was involved per se. Another consideration existed, namely, the need to bring together the two parties to discuss and agree on a common solution. The referendum would preclude such an action. Moreover, agreement must be based on a substantial number of elements, not simply those related to self-determination. The Italian Government was entirely disinterested in colonial matters, and considered its rôle in the Committee an unrewarding one. However, it did take seriously its responsibility to help promote through compromise the irreversible fact of decolonisation by acting in the interests of all parties.

The original resolution on Gibraltar, which was, he assured the Council, totally unacceptable, had been greatly modified in favour of the United Kingdom position, and if Italy had in the end refused to vote, it was more than likely that the original would have been passed. Ultimately, both Spain and the United Kingdom had complained of the outcome.

67. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE referring individually to specific items on the Agenda of the forthcoming Assembly, made the following statement.

"Item 28(a) - Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

"It seems highly probable that disarmament discussions at the 22nd United Nations General Assembly be dominated by the non-proliferation issue. The Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro, the subsequent tabling of a treaty in Geneva and the recent Soviet proposal, circulated by the United States to the Council on 6th September on safeguards (Article III) provide evidence of a Soviet desire to move forward on non-proliferation. They are less likely, therefore, to be obstructive on other disarmament issues and the debate in the First Committee should be much less acrimonious and protracted than in the past. There would seem to be less likelihood of communist propaganda items such as withdrawal of military bases, chemical and biological warfare and nuclear overflights, such as developed last year. Consequently, we would anticipate that at the General Assembly the main effort will be to muster support for the treaty, perhaps in the form of a simple resolution urging early agreement on a text and the maximum number of signatories to the treaty. We would expect the non-proliferation debate will find the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee non-aligned group seeking to establish bargaining positions in order to achieve an acceptable balance of obligations under the treaty. In doing so, they may concentrate on such issues as security assurances to non-nuclear powers, inequitable application of safeguards provisions of the draft treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions. The Japanese for example, are expected to seek more specific treaty language obliging the nuclear powers to engage in nuclear disarmament. However, at present the non-aligned group in Geneva are divided on these issues and on the basis of present information it seems questionable whether they will be able to rally a substantial majority in support of any particular position.

"Item 28(b) - Conference of Non-Nuclear States

"This proposal stems from a Pakistani initiative last year for a conference of non-nuclear powers to consider.

- (a) how to ensure the security of non-nuclear states;
- (b) how non-nuclear states may co-operate in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons; and
- (c) how nuclear devices can be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

As originally proposed, the nuclear powers would not have been invited, but the resolution was amended to permit their attendance and to provide for the appointment of a preparatory committee to consider arrangements and propose an Agenda. The preparatory committee has concluded its proceedings and has produced a lengthy draft provisional Agenda which in several ways impinges on matters under negotiation at the Eighteen Nation Committee in connection with the non-proliferation treaty. The Agenda also embraces a number of highly controversial items including an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states which have renounced production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons (reminiscent of the Kosygin guarantee proposal), the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and bilateral as well as international safeguards inspections in respect of peaceful nuclear activities. The Committee has also adopted extensive rules of procedure which, inter alia, would not accord a vote to nuclear states participating in the conference (although these would, nevertheless, be invited to attend), and is to recommend that the conference be held in Geneva in March-April 1968. Apparently the intention is that the proposals of the preparatory committee should be brought before the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly for consideration and approval.

"We see numerous difficulties in the preparatory committee's proposals as they stand. Among them are:

- (a) conflict with non-proliferation negotiations which may still be in train at Geneva leading to confusion among many countries which might jeopardise the prospects of NPT;
- (b) probability that the conclusions on security guarantees will either be meaningless, if involving only non-nuclear countries, or unacceptable to the nuclear powers which may not wish to attend and which, in any event, would have no vote in the conference;

- (c) duplication of the ground covered in the United Nations Secretary General's report on nuclear weapons;
- (d) discussion of the technical question of international safeguards in yet another international forum;
- (e) the probability that the conference might come to supplant the ENDC where the major nuclear powers and an adequately representative group of non-nuclear countries interested in arms control and disarmament are represented.

"Thus the holding of a non-nuclear conference would be likely to raise several difficulties and will require careful handling. One of the major objectives will be to avoid slowing up progress on the NPT. Hopefully, concentrating on significant progress at Geneva may produce diminished interest in the proposed non-nuclear conference and lead to its postponement.

"Item 29(a) - General and Complete Disarmament

"This item is regularly placed on the Agenda by the United Nations Secretary General to provide an opportunity for general debate on all disarmament issues and to discuss the work of the ENDC. We expect the discussion on general disarmament will be fairly cursory and perfunctory.

"Item 29(b) - Study on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons and on their Economic and Security Implications

"The United Nations Secretary General hopes that his report on this item will be completed in time for presentation to the 22nd United Nations General Assembly. The Advisory Committee of Experts is meeting early in October to put the finishing touches to the report. In consultation with others, Canada has been considering how the report might be handled when presented to the General Assembly. It is felt that the best method might be by means of a straightforward procedural resolution drawing attention to the report and urging its wide distribution both through United Nations outlets and by member governments. Preliminary approaches have been made to the governments sponsoring last year's resolution (Poland, Norway, Japan, Mexico and Nigeria) and these have indicated a willingness to sponsor a procedural resolution this year provided the report contains no objectionable material. Our Norwegian colleague may be able to comment further.

"Item 30 - Suspension of Nuclear Tests

"At Swedish initiative some attention has been given to a comprehensive test ban in the ENDC, Geneva, though the issue has not been discussed at great length. Statements made by United States and United Kingdom spokesmen, with which the Canadian Authorities are in general agreement, have challenged the technical basis for the Swedish assertion that techniques of long-range seismic detection and an identification of underground explosions have been developed to the stage where there is no longer serious risk of a clandestine violation of a comprehensive test ban. Since the discussion at the General Assembly will take place in the context of continued atmospheric testing by some countries and underground testing by others, there will undoubtedly be the usual reference to such tests during the general debate. However, since differences on the necessity of on-site inspections are far from being reconciled, it is unlikely that the Assembly will be able to do anything more than refer the question back to the Geneva Committee. It is also possible that Sweden may attempt to gain nuclear power support for its proposal for the international exchange of seismic data as an aid to verification. Our Danish and Norwegian colleagues may be in a position to comment on this aspect. This is a project with which Canada has been directly associated, but it has languished through diminishing interest on the part of the USSR.

"Item 31 - Elimination of Foreign Military Bases

"The elimination of foreign bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been placed on the Agenda because last year's resolution called for it. However, the subject has not been discussed in ENDC and it seems unlikely that the communist states responsible for this anti-Western propaganda initiative will want to press it again this year for fear of complicating the negotiations on NPT. Consequently, it may be postponed by referring it back to the ENDC or otherwise quickly dispensed with.

"Item 32 - International Co-operation in
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

"The 28-member United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will meet on 13th September to consider the report of its Legal Sub-Committee (which held its sixth session in Geneva in July) and its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee (which held its fifth session in New York 28th August to 8th September). On the basis of these reports, it will make its own report to the 22nd United Nations General Assembly. Two of the main issues before the latter Sub-Committee are

- (a) an Iranian proposal, seconded by Austria and the United Arab Republic, for consideration to be given to the creation of a United Nations international space agency analagous to the IAEA. The Canadian position is that any assessment as to whether the United Nations should expand its rôle in the peaceful uses of outer space, such as by establishing an information centre or an international space agency, should be based upon a thorough prior expert study of the adequacies and inadequacies of existing facilities and resources (including the activities of the United Nations and Specialised Agencies viewed in relation to the activities of other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations). Only if it were concluded that there were serious inadequacies in the existing system should a decision be made as to how these gaps should be remedied most expeditiously and economically;
- (b) consideration of a French questionnaire, transmitted by the Legal Sub-Committee, concerning the scientific criteria for a legal definition of outer space. Our French colleague may wish to comment further.

"Item 92 - Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America"

"A treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean was signed in Mexico in February. It is open to accession by all independent Latin American and Caribbean countries and bans the testing, use, fabrication, production or acquisition of nuclear arms in the area, as well as the receipt, storage and installation of such arms. It also provides for IAEA safeguards arrangements. There are two protocols, one calling on the five nuclear powers to respect the non-nuclear status of the area; and a second calling on extra-regional states exercising jurisdiction over dependent territories within the zone to observe the treaty in respect of their dependencies. The treaty has a number of positive features

- (a) it establishes the first nuclear-free zone in an uninhabited part of the world (i.e., as distinct from Antarctica);
- (b) it provides for verification by inspection utilising IAEA safeguards;

- (c) it provides for the establishment of an organization to operate and regulate the treaty.

"However, the treaty also has certain limitations:

- (a) the region will become an effective nuclear-free zone only when all independent states in the area accede to it and when all the nuclear powers and all extra-regional states accept its protocols;
- (b) it is ambiguous on the question of peaceful nuclear obligations;
- (c) it presents different conditions for the nuclear powers.

"It is expected that Mexico and the other prime movers of the treaty will be anxious to enlist general support in the General Assembly and will introduce a resolution calling for general recognition and support of the zone. Despite some uncertainty about its entry into force and about its effectiveness (for example, Cuba will not be a member), there would appear to be a good prospect of the treaty obtaining substantial support at the United Nations General Assembly. On the whole we think it merits support especially if some of the shortcomings I have mentioned are overcome."

68. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE commented that the present status of the non-proliferation treaty meant that for the first time many nations were compelled to come face to face with their real positions in matters of arms control. Latest developments meant an increase in the complexity of debate but also an increase in national responsibility. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's evident desire to make progress would tend to focus the attention of the Assembly on more realistic discussion, and the draft treaty itself would be a working basis for debate. There might well be serious consideration of the safeguards issue which was gradually assuming vital concern in the minds of many governments.

69. He thought that a conference of non-nuclear states was at best unnecessary and at worst highly dangerous since it would raise insoluble representation problems and cause general delay in the process of negotiating a non-proliferation conference. The Middle East debate might well give rise to discussion on arms control in that region, a subject to which his Government attached great importance and which he would wish to discuss at a later date with his NATO colleagues.

70. The drafting of a practical text for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America constituted a major accomplishment and represented an initiative which should be encouraged and accommodated as far as possible.

71. He thought the Maltese proposal about the use of the deep ocean floor for peaceful purposes was an intriguing and interesting item deserving of attention at national and international level.

72. Mr. MEIJER (Netherlands) had been instructed to state that his Government regarded the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as a matter of vital importance, and therefore welcomed the submission by the United States and the Soviet Union of an agreed draft text to the Eighteen Nation Committee, even though this draft was still incomplete. They were happy to note the progress represented by the recent Soviet proposals and sincerely hoped further consultations would give rise to a complete draft in the General Assembly before the debate on this issue began in the First Committee.

73. Regarding the still unsolved safeguards problem, his Government deemed it of great importance that the non-proliferation treaty be based on really international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency. It believed that for the application of such safeguards arrangements could be made which did not harm industrial interests and co-operation within the EURATOM framework and which were compatible with the EURATOM treaty. Such arrangements would provide the IAEA with a real possibility of verifying the non-nuclear EURATOM countries' compliance with the treaty obligations for not manufacturing nuclear weapons.

74. Any proposals with regard to the safeguards article of the non-proliferation treaty would be examined by his Government in the light of these basic points of view.

75. Although Latin America was outside the NATO area, he wished to make some remarks with reference to Item 92 of the Agenda, as two parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands were situated in the western hemisphere. In the view of his Government, the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America would be a valuable step towards promoting a stabler and safer world. In the last few years his Government had expressed several times its readiness to participate, with respect to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, as an equal partner in this project. He regretted, therefore, that the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, as signed in Mexico on 14th February, did not permit the Kingdom of the Netherlands to participate on an equal footing. However, his Authorities' general attitude

towards this regional non-proliferation project remained positive, and they were studying the possibility of taking part in it by signing the protocol I annexed to the treaty.

76. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government welcomed the constructive step forward represented by the draft non-proliferation treaty and naturally maintained its position on safeguards, and the necessity of ensuring widest possible participation in the agreement. In the absence of a report on the proposed conference of non-nuclear states, his Authorities were not able to take a definitive position at this time but they felt it to be more constructive to concentrate on the Geneva talks rather than convene another committee with a wide and very controversial agenda and they would therefore positively support any resolution for the postponement of this meeting.

77. On questions of general disarmament the Turkish position remained unchanged. Gradual balanced disarmament should be brought about under an efficient control and should include conventional arms. Discussion on this subject should continue even if its realisation in the near future appeared unlikely if not impossible. Turkey attached great importance to the conclusion of a test ban agreement and would support all attempts in the United Nations to further a treaty of this kind.

78. A procedural resolution aimed at the elimination of foreign military bases would be backed by his Authorities, unless such a resolution was inspired purely by anti-Western feeling. His Government saw no reason why the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America should not go ahead if that was the desire of the countries concerned, but it did not agree that such a treaty should in any way constitute a precedent for other areas of the world.

79. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said the tentative Agenda for a conference of non-nuclear states served only to increase his doubts as to the value of such a meeting; it seemed unrealistic to discuss these highly controversial questions in a forum where nuclear powers had no vote. It was not clear how this proposal would be presented at the General Assembly but clearly a further temporary solution such as postponement must be sought. It would be good to have the views of other non-aligned nations at Geneva.

80. Norway was particularly interested in the report to be presented on the effects of nuclear weapons and their economic and security implications and would hope to get the broadest possible group of sponsors for this study.

81. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities had always supported the principle of non-proliferation and appreciated the exhaustive and detailed consultations conducted on numerous occasions in the NATO Council. They were grateful to the United States for their efforts in this field and particularly for the successful talks between the two Co-Chairmen in Geneva, but nevertheless had some doubts whether such a project would have the necessary character of universality. He was not criticising the formulation of the various articles, but wished only to stress that non-proliferation must be universal, otherwise the very essence of this principle was missed. Although Greece was far from even planning to become a nuclear power it was convinced that the plans for a nuclear defence of the NATO area should be implemented as soon as possible because a nuclear shield was an absolute necessity for security.

82. Whilst favouring complete and general disarmament, the Greek Government was extremely apprehensive about proposals for establishing limited denuclearised zones. On the other hand it favoured the denuclearisation of large zones extending to continents and supported the recommendation for the denuclearisation of Africa as well as the proposal for a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

83. Greece had some reservations on voting for the elimination of foreign bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, mainly because this action was suggested by the Soviet Union and its satellites for well known propaganda reasons.

84. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE considered that the submission of a partial draft treaty constituted a significant step towards non-proliferation and confirmed his Authorities' willingness to continue in constructive collaboration. He noted that the EURATOM countries were to meet shortly to consider a common posture on Article III.

85. Mr. BIERRING (Denmark) informed the Council that his Authorities had received a communication from the International Red Cross concerning the dangers to the civilian population of indiscriminate warfare, together with a request that this subject be brought to the General Assembly for possible inclusion as an instrument of the United Nations Charter. Such a request naturally gave rise to considerable problems within NATO but for humanitarian reasons it would be difficult to refuse.

86. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities were convinced of the positive value of the non-proliferation draft and were prepared to co-operate in the creation of a text susceptible of signature by the greatest number of countries.

87. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE had nothing to add to earlier French statements on non-proliferation. He too shared the caution expressed by previous speakers on the advisability and profit of convening a conference of non-nuclear nations. It was difficult to give an opinion on Item 32 as no report on the peaceful uses of outer space had yet appeared, and whilst acknowledging his Government's interest in the definition of outer space from a legal and physical point of view, he preferred to leave this item to experts. There were no objections to the general concept of a nuclear free zone; the Latin American protocol, however, might give rise to questions especially in connection with an ideal zone which could stretch very far into the Atlantic and the Pacific.

88. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE agreed entirely with the points made by his Canadian colleague especially in connection with the non-proliferation treaty. This was a vital enterprise, both for its intrinsic importance and its attainability and the priority which must be assigned to it coloured his views of other items such as the committee of non-nuclear states. His Authorities felt a report on the economic implications of nuclear weapons would be helpful and looked forward to its public circulation.

89. The British attitude to proposals for the elimination of foreign bases was well known and his Authorities again requested the understanding of the Allies in this matter. Despite their rapidly decreasing number certain bases remained as inescapable commitments, although the Government felt their need was decreasing and had issued a statement that they would not be retained against the wishes of the inhabitants.

90. It was to be hoped that the Latin American states would allow their treaty to enter into force. The protocol posed difficult questions, but ways and means to associate with the treaty must be considered.

91. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Council at its next meeting would be discussing in detail the substance of agreement reached on non-proliferation but said that this look at a wide number of allied questions based on the Canadian Representative's most useful intervention had been of considerable value. Speakers had been uniformly apprehensive of the possible effects of a conference of non-nuclear states, and, although the benefits of creating a nuclear free zone in Latin America were acknowledged, a general feeling of caution had been expressed in this connection. Discretion was requested in matters concerning foreign military bases and the United States Representative had pointed to the connection between the question of arms control and the Middle East problem. Finally, several

points had been evoked which were worthy of special attention such as the economic effects of nuclear weapons, the peaceful use of the ocean floor and the proposal of the International Red Cross.

(c) Germany

92. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities, not being represented at the United Nations, had again addressed a world-wide call for assistance in the General Assembly, requesting friendly nations to stress that a relaxation of tension in Europe was dependent on a satisfactory solution to the German problem, and to oppose any move to fix the partition of Germany by recognition of the Soviet zone régime and to emphasise that free self-determination as an accepted principle was also the right of the German people.

(f) Peacekeeping operations

93. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE recalled that from the outset of discussions on this subject Greece had strongly supported the principle of peacekeeping operations and had shown special interest in finding possibilities for financing such forces as that in operation in Cyprus. However, Greece considered the existing system of financing the UNFICYP by voluntary contributions as unsound and therefore warmly supported the Irish proposal. The latter had been countered by the French and Soviet Delegations and was not adopted. The Greek Government had also followed the same line during the last General Assembly but all efforts to adopt either the Irish or the so-called Canadian proposals had been undermined by the Soviet Union.

94. The COUNCIL.

took note of the statements made in discussion.

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Paris, (16e).