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E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 4 06-09/95 (LA ROCHE, RICHARD R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINR, CU, NS
SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS OF ROY HORB

REF: A) PARAMARIBO 0891, B) STATE 111888

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. CHARGE ATTENDED INFORMAL PRIVATE DINNER JUNE 7 AT RESIDENCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT CHIN A SEN. PRESENT IN ADDITION TO HOST AND HIS WIFE WERE GARRISON COMMANDER ROY HORB, MINISTER FOR PUBLIC WORKS M. ATAPELLAH, AND ST. VINCENTIUS HOSPITAL DIRECTOR PAUL FAVERY. (ATAPELLAH HELD THE SAME PORTFOLIO IN CHIN A SEN'S GOVERNMENT AND IS A FRIEND OF LONGSTANDING AS IS DR. FAVERY.) HORB, JUDGING BY HIS DEFERENCE AND EVIDENT WARMTH, IS FOND OF CHIN A SEN AND HIS WIFE AS A NEPHEW MIGHT BE FOND OF A KIND UNCLE AND AUNT. (THEY SINCERELY LIKE HIM). THE INTERACTION AMONG THE SURINAMERS WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED BORDERING ON INTIMATE AND THE CONVERSATION RANGED FREELY FROM RIVER FISHING TO SURINAME'S POLITICS. THE PRESENCE OF AN OUTSIDER SEEMED TO CAUSE ONLY A SLIGHT INHIBITION. CHARGE LEFT AT MIDNIGHT BUT DISCUSSION CONTINUED UNTIL LONG AFTERWARDS AND CHIN A SEN PASSED ALONG (PROTECT) A FEW OF THE REVELATIONS THAT CAME BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND 4:00 A.M. WHEN THE LAST GUEST, HORB, FINALLY LEFT.

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3. DIALOGUE AND ONLY IN PARTING WAS CHARGE ABLE TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO HORB ABOUT BILATERAL TOPIC (IMET; HORB SAID IT WAS BOUTERSE'S RESPONSIBILITY RATHER THAN HIS) BUT IN THE GROUP CONVERSATION, HORB'S DEMEANOR WITH RESPECT TO CHARGE WAS CORDIAL IF DISCREET; THERE WAS NO HINT OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS IN ANY OF HORB'S COMMENTS AT ANY TIME DURING THE NIGHT.

4. HORB LEFT THE IMPRESSION THROUGH HIS BEHAVIOR AND REMARKS OF

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Adolph Eisner, Senior Reviewer

A MAN ORIENTED TOWARD PRAGMATIC ACTION AND IMPATIENT WITH ABSTRACTIONS. HE ADMITTED OPENLY THAT IN CONTRAST WITH BOUTERSE, WHOM HE FOUND EXCESSIVELY TOLERANT OF CRITICS AND EVEN OPPOSITION, HE WAS INCLINED TO GROUP PEOPLE AS OPPONENTS OR SUPPORTERS AND TO TREAT THEM ACCORDINGLY. HIS COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY SUGGEST A FUNDAMENTAL NAIVETE AND THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT HE WISHED TO LEARN MORE IN THAT AREA THAN HE NEEDED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO GET THROUGH HIS DAILY AFFAIRS. HE ACTS AS A CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BOUTERSE; CLEARS MATTERS SUBMITTED BY MINISTERS FOR POLICY CENTER CONSIDERATION; OVERSEES CERTAIN PROJECTS (MOST CURRENT IS THE NEW LAND POLICY); AND ACTS FOR BOUTERSE AS OVERALL COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

5. IN CHARGE'S PRESENCE, HORB MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

ON LEFTIST INFLUENCE. IN RESPONSE TO CHIN A SEN'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN OVER INCREASING INFLUENCE OF THE RADICAL LEFT IN SURINAME, HORB REPLIED THAT HE FELT THE FEAR WAS UNWARRANTED. HORB "KNOWS" THAT BOUTERSE IS NOT A COMMUNIST; HE HIMSELF IS NOT, AND THE ARMY WAS WELL ABLE TO PROTECT THE REVOLUTION FROM BEING SUBVERTED BY ANY FACTION.

ON RESUMPTION OF TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACY. A RETURN TO THE OLD
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FORMS NOW WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY TO A RETURN OF THE OLD POLITICIANS, WHO WERE IN HORB'S OPINION, CORRUPT AND INCORRIGIBLE MEN. IT WOULD TAKE PERHAPS TWO YEARS TO "CHANGE THE PEOPLE'S MIND" ABOUT POLITICS. WHEN CHIN A SEN SUGGESTED THAT A COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT--ONE USED ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA--COULD ALLOW FOR AN ENLARGED ROLE FOR THE ARMY (THEY MIGHT EVEN "REGULATE THE ELECTIONS" OR AT LEAST APPOINT THEIR OWN MINISTER), HORB SAID THAT THE ARMY HAD TO TAKE THE LEAD IN "EDUCATING"THE MASSES FIRST; THEN IT MIGHT RETURN TO BARRACKS.

ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH BOUTERSE. BOUTERSE IS THE UNCONTESTED "LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION." HORB RESPECTS HIS CHIEF FULLY AND FEELS THEY COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER IN THE LEADERSHIP. THEY, IN FACT, "NEED ONE ANOTHER" HE SAID WITHOUT EXPLAINING. ALL MAJOR DECISIONS REQUIRED BOUTERSE'S FINAL APPROVAL AND HORB FELT IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WAS MET.

6. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOT, HARRASSMENT, AND POSSIBLE OFFER OF CUBAN ARMS. CHIN A SEN TOLD CHARGE THAT DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS AFTER OTHER GUESTS HAD GONE, HORB TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE ARMY HAD UNCOVERED A PLOT RECENTLY WHICH INVOLVED THE ASSISTED ESCAPE FROM SANTA BOMA MILITARY PRISON OF A NUMBER OF MILITARY PRISONERS WHO WERE TO HUNT DOWN AND ASSASSINATE BOUTERSE AND HORB. A SECRET INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY TO DISCOVER WHO MIGHT BE BEHIND THE PLOT.

HORB ALSO SAID WITHOUT ELABORATION THAT HE AND BOUTERSE WERE SUBJECTED TO WHAT THEY BELIEVED WAS A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HARRASSMENT INVOLVING THREATENING TELEPHONE

MESSAGES.

DISCUSSING THE ARMY'S READINESS, HORB SAID THE ARMY WAS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING MORE AMMUNITION. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE COMPARED WESTERN SOURCES OF MILITARY AID UNFAVORABLY WITH CUBA. HIS COMMENT WAS THAT WHILE THE DUTCH WERE NIGGARDLY AND CONDESCENDING IN OFFERING, FOR EXAMPLE, FIFTEEN JEEPS WHEN THE SURINAME REQUEST WAS FOR THIRTY, THE CUBANS WERE PREPARED TO "GIVE AMMUNITION FREE." CHIN A SEN DID NOT PROBE BUT ACCORDING TO HIS RECOLLECTION, HORB DID NOT SAY UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE CUBANS

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HAD OR WERE ABOUT TO PROVIDE ARMS ASSISTANCE TO SURINAME.

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7. THE QUICK STUDY PROVIDED BY THE DINNER REVEALS HORB AS AN ACTIVE, ALMOST APOLITICAL NATIONALIST, CONFIDENT OF HIS OWN ABILITIES AS A MILITARY LEADER AND DEVOTED TO HIS COMRADE AND SUPERIOR, BOUTERSE. THIS WAS THE LONGEST AND MOST SERIOUS DISCUSSION CHIN A SEN HAD HAD WITH HORB SINCE FEBRUARY AND CHIN A SEN CONCLUDES FROM IT THAT HORB, WHILE PROBABLY NOT IN FAVOR OF AN INCREASED INFLUENCE HERE FOR THE DOMESTIK LEFT OR FOR THE CUBANS, IS NOT LIKELY TO ACTIVELY RESIST A COURSE CHOSEN BY BOUTERSE WHICH LEADS TO THAT OUTCOME. THE CONVERSATIONS DID NOT TOUCH ON BOUTERSE'S RECENT GRENADA TRIP OR POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO CUBA--ABOUT WHICH CHIN A SEN HAD HEARD RUMORS--SO THE EXTENT OF HORB'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEVELOPING CUBAN TIE REMAINS UNKNOWN. JUDGING MORE BY THE CONTENT OF HORB'S CONVERSATION THAN ANY PARTICULAR SIGNAL CONVEYED, CHARGE DOUBTS THAT THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING "A HIGH LEVEL CHANNEL TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITY" WAS ACHIEVED. HORB LEFT THE MESSAGE THAT DOUTERSE (AND OF COURSE NAARENDORP), NOT HE, WAS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MATTERS DEALING WITH THE WORLD OUTSIDE.
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