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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1982

At 3:30 this afternoon we had a longish meeting of the Situation Room group on policy toward the Soviet Union. This is the working group that I have been chairing, and this was the third meeting. Fred Ikle of Defense finally came forward with some propositions on the INF negotiations with which we could all generally agree. The thrust of the important proposition was that the Soviets cannot be expected to agree upon any INF agreement that allows the United States to have other than zero missiles in Europe until such time as it is completely clear that U.S. missiles will be deployed. Eagleburger had a corollary, which was that no missiles will be deployed unless there is some change in the U.S. position. When one puts those two together with the tactical notion that any agreement that is reached during the coming year will have to be phrased as an interim agreement looking toward a zero-zero outcome (that is, zero INF missiles on both sides), then we have a series of propositions upon which all people can agree. It still remains to be seen whether Ikle can receive permission from Cap Weinberger to produce a paper along the foregoing lines. Ikle is going away on vacation, as is Weinberger, and therefore, no answer to that question can be expected until the first full week of January.

The meetings with King Hussein were fairly promising today. Although I did not attend them, the King characterized his conversations here in Washington as "successful." They certainly were successful for the King, who received two letters, one for publication and one not for publication. It was made clear to him in the paper not for publication that once he made a public announcement of his intention to enter the peace process, he would not be pressured to begin actual substantive talks until such time as the settlements had been stopped on the West Bank.

As for Lebanon, it was made clear to the King that he would not be expected to announce his intention with regard to entering the peace process, or at least not to actually enter that process, until such time as agreement was reached with respect to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Sharon threw another curve ball by saying that the Lebanese had to sign at the bottom of the three-page paper, which is described by the Israelis as an agreement and by the Lebanese as a working paper or agenda. Moreover, the Israelis actually unilaterally added the words "agreement"

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above the first page of the document. In addition, Sharon threatened to make trouble between the Christians and the Druze in the Schouf if there wasn't prompt agreement by the Lebanese to the document.

At the end of the day I took part in a departure ceremony for King Hussein. Secretary Shultz left late in the afternoon for California for the Christmas holidays.

Today there was a good deal of discussion in the Department about Surinam. The situation there is that the Bouterse government has killed about 15 to 20 of their opposition. We have cut off all aid, and it is likely that Bouterse, who is opposed by his military and most of the professional elite of the country, will be bringing in Cuban troops. The question is what the response will be. An options paper for the President is due tomorrow at noon.

Dictated December 23, 1982.

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