BOOTS, BOOTS, BOOTS:

INTERVENTION, REGIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARIZATION IN THE CARIBBEAN 1979-1986

Humberto García Muñiz

PROYECTO
Caribeño de Justicia y Paz

Militarism Series 2

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To the memory of Orlando Marrero, a journalist from the Dominican Republic, murdered by the Armed Forces in March 1975, and in recognition of Guyanese journalist Rickey Singh's struggle for freedom of the press and self-determination of Guyana and the Caribbean.

Boots*

Is it necessary to have so much soldiers in this small country?
[Chorus:] No, no, no, no.

Is it necessary to shine soldiers boots with taxpayers money?
[Chorus:] No, no, no, no.

Well don't tell me. Tell Tommy.** He put them in St. Lucy.***

Unemployment high, and the Treasury low
And he buying boots to cover soldiers toe
[Chorus:] I see them boots, boots, boots, and more boots.

On the feet of the young trigger-happy recruits
Marching, threatening army troops
Tell Tom I say, that wouldn't do
He got to see about me and you
And most all of the children
And stop them soldiers from marching
...Can we afford to feed an army
When so many children naked and hungry
[Chorus:] No, no, no, no.

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* This calypso, written and sung by "Mighty Gabby" in 1983, was immediately banned in Barbados.

** Refers to the Prime Minister of Barbados, Tom Adams, who died in March, 1985.

*** U.S. naval installation that closed in 1978 and is now used by the Barbados Defense Force.

Boots, Boots, Boots: Intervention, Regional Security and Militarization in the Caribbean 1979-1986*

Humberto García Muñiz**

"That we are not as yet under the American flag, whether we like it or not, is not due to our opposition to the people of that country or to the esteem in which we are held by the mother country: it is simply a matter of time".[1] Thus wrote, with foresight, a Jamaican doctor in a most interesting book entitled *Confederation of the British West Indies versus Annexation to the United States*, during the height of the economic and military imperialism of the United States in Central America and the Caribbean. The intervention of the United States in Grenada is, in a way, the culmination of a process that began early this century with the British retreat from the Caribbean region. The most obvious manifestation of that policy occurred at the beginning of World War II when Great Britain leased land sites in some of its Caribbean colonies to the United States for military bases. The overthrow of Cheddi Jagan by the colonial power in 1953 ratified the servile British acquiescence to United States hegemony, in a case where both powers had common interests. The destabilization process that got rid of Jagan in the early sixties, placing Forbes Burnham in power in Guyana, demonstrated that the United States was ready to dirty its hands even within a British colony. The Chaguaramas dispute left a military presence in the midst of the Federation of the West Indies, at the same time that it inflicted a costly defeat to the nationalist movement. In his classic work, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies*, Gordon K. Lewis rightly pointed out in 1968 that:

> *The grant of independence, frankly, merely signalizes the fact that the Caribbean societies have passed from the older British protective umbrella to the new hemispheric power system. The implications of that transfer, to say the least, are ominous. It means that the American presence—which by geographical location and historical interest alone will always be there—will shape, for good or ill, the region's future development unless countering forces make themselves felt.*[2]

As follows from this brief introduction, the aim of this essay is to present some facts, commentaries and ideas about the relationship between the United States and the Caribbean, in particular about the intervention in Grenada and the militarization of the Caribbean region. This work deals almost exclusively with the Anglophone Caribbean, but it also includes an analysis of the United States military commands in the Caribbean Basin. Our goal is to describe and analyze several fundamental events that have taken place in the region from 1979 to the early part of 1986, and whose impact on the internal political scenario of the Caribbean societies may be of vital consequence. The insertion of the Anglophone Caribbean into the military infrastructure of the United States in the Western Hemisphere originated during World War II and although it has undergone some variations, there is no doubt that the area lies within the sphere of influence of the United States.[3]

The bulk of this work is devoted to the penetration of the security forces of the Anglophone Caribbean by the military apparatus of the United States, a fact that implies the partial displacement of Great Britain to mere training of police forces of some of the islands. This offensive, which started full force in 1981, has resulted in an incipient homogenization and professionalization of the Caribbean security forces, together with a modernization process and an increase in their military capacity within the politico-ideological framework of the United States.

After a description of the offensive, comes a brief analysis of the new system of regional security that the United States is establishing in the Eastern Caribbean, and some of the consequences of this system in addition to other trends that are on the rise.[4]

Grenada Under Fire

The intervention of the United States on October 25, 1983, together with some members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States,

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1944



Barbados and Jamaica, did not surprise anyone given the constant and invariable hostility of all of them against the New Jewel revolution.[5] If there was any shock it was due to the bloody events that gave rise to the invasion. At least two covert intelligence operations against Grenada, were masterminded by the United States. The first one was under Carter in 1979 and the second one under Reagan in 1981. The one under Carter was planned after Grenada's support of the USSR in Afghanistan and its request to Cuba for economic aid. Carter vetoed any kind of action except propaganda attacks.[6] Only general details are known about the operation under Reagan, but a source says that it was not accepted by the Senate Intelligence Committee because it had "unusual and unspecified elements."[7]

During the first three years of Reagan's presidency, military maneuvers in the Caribbean Basin multiplied as never before. Operation Ocean Venture, in 1981, placed near the Cuban coasts the greatest concentration of warships since World War II; a total of 250 ships, 1,000 planes and 120,000 men.[8] Operation Safe Pass '82 was an exercise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Gulf of Mexico and the Cuban Straits. Operation Readex '82 included 39 warships, among them two aircraft carriers and 200 planes. Its high point was a landing in Guantanamo. All the branches of the U.S. Armed Forces participated in Operation Ocean Venture '82. Sixty warships (two aircraft carriers among them), 350 planes and 45,000 men gathered in the Caribbean Basin. There were other operations, but the first one mentioned simulated the invasion of a make believe island in the Eastern Caribbean—Amber and the Amberdines—a clear reference to Grenada.[9] The motive for the war games was the rescue of some U.S. citizens taken as hostages. In fact, most U.S. interventions in the Third World during the postwar period have been under the pretext of protecting U.S. citizens.[10]

The final rehearsal for the invasion of Grenada took place on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, under the name Universal Trek I-83, just four months before the invasion of Grenada. These maneuvers involved a simulated air, ground and sea attack to capture an airport, while the invading forces defended themselves from an enemy ambush.[11]

The Structure of Military Commands: SOUTHCOM and LANTCOM

In addition to the increase in military exercises, the new policy towards the Caribbean generated a heated debate in U.S. military circles over the adequacy of the existing structure of military commands. Because of the importance of this subject to the launching of the new policy, it is necessary to stop here for a moment to clarify the subject of the commands.

One of the most common mistakes is thinking that the geo-strategic concept of the Caribbean Basin is reproduced in the structure of U.S. mili-

tary commands in the region.[12] It must be made clear from the outset that the commands, which may be unified or specified, are in charge of all the forces that are prepared and ready to fight. The various military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) organize, train and equip the forces of their respective services, but they have no role in the operational use of those forces.

The unified commands consist of significant forces from two or more services, and the specified ones of only one service. The function of the commands is to plan and, if necessary, to execute military operations to support U.S. national security objectives. The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of a unified command has a component member of each assigned element reporting to him. Each Component Commander reports operational matters to the CINC, but reports directly to his department regarding matters of personnel and supplies.

Six unified commands have been assigned geographical regions as their primary area of responsibility a identified in Map 1. They are the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM), the Readiness Command (REDCOM), the Pacific Command (PACOM), the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). The other two commands are specified: the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC).

The organization of the Caribbean Basin commands is divided between two unified commands: SOUTHCOM and LANTCOM. The Steadman Report describes the area of responsibility of SOUTHCOM as Central and South America (excluding Mexico), with the exception of aerial defense and the protection of maritime communications.[13] According to Steadman, SOUTHCOM is responsible for the defense of the Panama Canal, contingency planning (specially oriented toward the evacuation of U.S. citizens and disaster relief), and all matters related to security assistance activities and to training missions.

By recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SOUTHCOM was on the verge of being dismantled and in 1978 its personnel was greatly reduced.[14] Steadman recommended that it be retained, at least until the period of negotiations and transfer of responsibilities and facilities resulting from the Panama Canal treaties, and that another study be made after this transition period is over in the light of the prevailing political/military environment.

The report prepared in the Strategic Studies Institute favored the consolidation in SOUTHCOM of all the military activities in the Caribbean, as can be seen in this telling quote:

> *Focusing on wartime requirements is putting the cart before the horse in an area that is fundamentally unstable. The need for internal security and the need to develop influence in the internal politics of countries suggest a need to work closely with the armies and national police forces of the region as a priority endeavor. USSOUTHCOM can and should play the major role in this process. This is indeed the unique mission of this command. Moreover, from a psychological, geopolitical, economic, and, indeed, long-term military perspective, the Caribbean Basin is a single strategic entity. Events in Grenada, Jamaica, etc., influence attitudes in Guatemala, El Salvador and elsewhere. Proximity permits the quick and facile shipment of arms to and between the countries in the insular Caribbean and Central America. Propaganda broadcast from Grenada*

COMMANDERS' AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



will be heard in Venezuela. A failure of democracy in the English traditioned insular Caribbean will affect attitudes in newly independent and democratic Belize. A command responsible for the entire region can best coordinate military efforts designed to secure US peacetime interests.[15]

In 1983, SOUTHCOM was assigned the responsibility of "counter(ing) Soviet and Cuban militarization and other destabilizing undertakings." By 1985, SOUTHCOM had already developed into a "sophisticated military apparatus in Central America... prepared for contingencies." The person responsible for that development was General Paul Gorman, who before his retirement in 1985, said:

There would not even be a United States Southern Command today, I am convinced, had it not been for the propensity of these Marxist-Leninists to pursue their own goals, ignoring the aspirations and needs of their own peoples.[16]

SOUTHCOM has grown in such a way that by 1985 it was expected to have, among other things, eight airfields in Honduras, built by engineering battalions during the military exercises that have taken place there, and an infrastructure for intelligence gathering which includes even electronic eavesdropping installations in Tiger Island in the Gulf of Fonseca and in other places. Moreover, it is the only command that has all its oil requirements in storage. It has 9,600 men in Panama and an average of 1,200 in Honduras. In case of conflict, there are troops available from REDCOM in MacDill Air Force Base in Florida and from LANTCOM in its headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia.

SOUTHCOM contacts with the Anglophone Caribbean countries apparently have been limited to training men from Barbados, Dominica, St. Vincent and Jamaica in the school devoted to coastal patrol operations in the Canal Zone. Since all the infrastructure of the training schools in the Canal Zone has been relocated or is in the process of being relocated, gathering information has become harder. The well-known School of the Americas was transferred to Fort Benning, Georgia and in April 1985 it was reported that 61 cadets from the Dominican Republic were there for officer's training.[17] One can safely speculate that the few contacts between SOUTHCOM and the security forces of the Anglophone Caribbean will be even more reduced with the new training center to be established in Antigua, which should fall under LANTCOM and to which reference will be made later on.

This other command, LANTCOM, is in charge of the Atlantic Ocean (excluding European coastal waters), the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean in the western coast of South America and part of the Arctic Ocean. The Commander-in-Chief of LANTCOM is also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a NATO command and of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Naval forces predominate in LANTCOM, while in SOUTHCOM the Army prevails. Steadman recommended that at the appropriate moment, in order to transform LANTCOM into a truly unified command, it should be assigned additional responsibilities in other areas such as Panama and the Middle East.

LANTCOM and the Invasion of Grenada

The invasion of Grenada was executed directly by LANTCOM, which means that the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command had little to do with this military operation. This LANTCOM subcommand, created at the beginning of this decade consists of the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force, the Antilles Defense Command of Puerto Rico, and a naval force with Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force units. The area under its responsibility includes "the waters and islands of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and parts of the Pacific Ocean that border Central America."[18] William Arkin, military affairs analyst of the Institute for Policy Studies, affirms that the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command was excluded from the operation because its main objective is to keep an eye on Cuba, which means that the Atlantic priority for Roosevelt Roads has been redefined to one whose priority is Cuba.[19] The official report of the intervention in Grenada, an operation known as Urgent Fury, ratifies this function of Roosevelt Roads when it says that:

CTF [deleted] was the operational commander of U.S. Air Forces at Roosevelt Roads, P.R., where Tactical Air Command F-15 and AWACS aircraft were positioned to provide surveillance and defense against possible interference by Cuban forces.[20]

The invasion of Grenada, then, upheld the division of responsibilities in the Caribbean Basin under the SOUTHCOM and the LANTCOM commands. The general staff of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (USCINCLANT), Commander, Second Fleet (COMSECONDFT), Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), and other subordinate staffs that participated in the planning and execution of Ocean Venture '82 are the same ones that were involved in the invasion of Grenada. In all probability the men who participated in this operation must have taken part in the intervention also because:

In any real world crisis, military commands at all levels try to use the most experienced personnel to plan and execute operations. This expertise is

primarily gained through participation in exercises such as Ocean Venture. Those staffs and individuals who participated in both were able to apply applicable expertise gained during Ocean Venture and make significant contributions to the success of the Grenada operation.[21]

Grenada: Strategic Danger?

The controversial Point Salines airport, which Reagan so often referred to as a threat to national security, was ironically the place where the U.S. troops landed in the island. The necessary dredging of some salt ponds and some unstable material for the construction of the landing strip of this alleged threat was carried out by a Florida firm, and a British company, Plessey, was going to install the complete air traffic and communications system.[22] The Point Salines landing strip would have been 9,800 feet long, comparable to the ones the United States built in Antigua and St. Lucia during World War II. This length would allow bigger jet aircraft to land, thus opening the way to increased tourist-oriented air traffic and making the stop in Barbados to change planes unnecessary. In an answer to Congressman R. Dellums' query, NATO and U.S. Air Defense Command officers said that the airport did not represent a threat to U.S. security.[23] In none of the annual "Military Postures" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor in the annual reports of the Defense Department from 1979 on, is there any reference to the airport and less yet to its being dangerous. In May 1984, the United States allocated $21 million to finish the airport, of which $2.1 million were to compensate the contractors, Plessey included, for their losses.[24]

The New York Times informed that on October 15, a day after the house arrest of Maurice Bishop, the U.S. began talks with "friendly Caribbean governments" about the use of military force, which implies that it had been under consideration at an internal level.[25] The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States made a request and consequently was the instrument to legitimize the military intervention by the United States and other "friendly governments," in this case Barbados and Jamaica. The newspaper confirms this statement saying that:

The formal request that the United States and other friendly countries provide military help was made by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States last Sunday [October 23] at the request of the United States, which wanted to show proof that it had been requested to act under the terms of the group's treaty. The wording of the formal request, however, was drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissaries. Paradoxically, the driving force for seeking American aid was Mr. Adams, whose country is not a member of that organization.[26]

The Pressures on the Caribbean Development Bank

Grenada was subjected to considerable pressure by the United States, which was not limited to military operations. Another type of pressure was to demand that the Caribbean Development Bank, the primary financial development institution in the Anglophone Caribbean, leave out Grenada from an aid program, in spite of the damage this implied for the integration movement, which was experiencing enough problems anyway. In 1981 the U.S. Agency for International Development cancelled the continuation of a project to provide employment and construct and repair roads, water supplies, health clinics and drainage systems, in which Grenada was included, when the Bank refused to exclude this island which formed part of the original project. The Bank, based on the fact that its charter prohibits interference, refused the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development since its acceptance "would result in the Bank appearing to be operating as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy."[27]

The consequence of this new approach was a marked reduction in U.S. Agency for International Development funds to the Bank, thus leaving out the institution that had been "the cornerstone of AID's regional strategy."[28] Although U.S. Agency for International Development assistance rose from $13 million in 1981 to $52 million in 1983, said aid was channeled through bilateral projects with the governments or with the private sector, thus strengthening U.S. ties with each particular island, while at the same time undermining the intergration movement. Of course, these pressures and their possible consequences did not pass unnoticed in the region. In February, 1982, an unidentified reporter wrote the following in *Caribbean Contact:*

The policies of the extra-regional actors towards the members of the integration grouping will also have its divisive effects and cause foreign policy coordination to be a frustrating experience. The OECS members have already a taste of this. US attitude towards left-leaning Grenada has caused the Americans to put conditions on US multilateral assistance to the region: either Grenada is excluded from the assistance through the CDB, or the region does not receive the aid. Caribbean countries chose the latter. Within the OECS grouping itself, the US seems to be stalling on Grenada's participation in the Agricultural Planning Project funded by USAID. How long can the OECS members continue to stay together and resist such pressures on the cohesiveness of the grouping?[29]

Regional Security: The 1982 Agreement vs. the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

The agreement establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States was signed on June 19, 1981 by Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.[30] What stands out in the agreement are the clauses referring to defense and security which are without precedent in regional history. The agreement was signed by Grenada since it was not threatening to the survival of the regime. Unanimity was a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the organization and, in particular, necessary to activate the defense and security component.

It was precisely for this reason that the regional system relating to military and security cooperation was established in 1982, leaving out Grenada but including Barbados as the axis of the system.[31] In 1983, an analyst of the Heritage Foundation, one of the major conservative academic and research centers in the United States, interpreted it that way, when he stated that the 1982 agreement is "clearly a response to the Grenadian revolution and has received strong moral support in the United States."[32]

The agreement defines among its areas of cooperation the preparation of contingency plans of mutual assistance in case of national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control and threats to national security. The central policy-making body is the Council of Ministers, composed of the Defense Ministers of each island. The position of regional security coordinator is created with a central liaison office under his charge and he is responsible for coordinating the objectives of the agreement. The coordinator, in this case Colonel Rudyard Lewis, Commander-in-Chief of the Barbados Defense Force, serves as consultant for the Council of Ministers in matters of national security. The regional coordinator's main power, at least potentially, is that he is allowed to negotiate with

Barbadian ex-P.M. St. John (left) and Chief of Staff, Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, at St. Lucia's Vigie airport.

FIGURE 1

FORCE SIZES OF THE VARIOUS EASTERN CARIBBEAN NATIONS

Nation	*Defense*	*Reserves*	*Police*	*Police Sp. Serv. Unit*	*Coast Guard*
Antigua	60	—	350	55	19
Barbados	270	250	1,500	50	90
Dominica	—	—	375	80	25
St. Kitts	—	—	300	30	—
St. Lucia	—	—	425	80	23
St. Vincent	—	—	420	65	25
	330	250	3,370	360	182

Source: Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American countries of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, February, 1984, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 42.

extra-regional agencies, in behalf of the subscribing countries, with the catch that the island members are bound by it only if they ratify it in writing.

The agreement also provides for a General Fund, to which Barbados will contribute 49% (close to $240,000) and the remaining 51% ($35,000 each) is divided equally among the other subscribers. A coordination and planning committee is established, composed of the heads of security forces of each island: the defense forces of Barbados and Antigua and the police forces of the other islands, as can be seen in Figure 1:[33]

According to the agreement, training of personnel will be carried out on any island with the consent of the participating forces commanders. A joint procurement program for purchasing arms, ammunitions, equipment and stores is considered desirable. All matters pertaining to the coast guard will be centralized in Willoughby Fort in Barbados.

Another important clause is the one about limited assistance by which a member may request assistance from one or more of the other subscribing members. When a request arises, the Ministers in charge of defense and the commanders of the security forces will form two committees respectively for that limited purpose.

Conflict Resolution and Regional Construction in the Caribbean

In a forgotten but significant essay, Yves Collart wrote, 17 years ago, that "the problems of conflict resolution and regional construction are intimately connected because there can be no prospect of a successful regional scheme of integration without a minimum of political stability in the area covered by the scheme."[34] This Swiss writer outlined three general ways of cracking regional stability. The first one was an open or potential dispute between two or more project members. The second one, a dispute between an active member of the project and a third party, or a state of tension between a member and a natural candidate to membership in the project. The third way, the one which concerns us, was a conflict which would seriously affect the scope of the project without originating from the integration process nor involving directly any of its members, but which would hamper the functioning of the project. Collart said:

> *This would be the case if... the region in question had such a strategic value that any local political disturbance was likely to upset the world balance of power, or if it had such attractive assets or small resources for self-protection that it would be particularly vulnerable to outside influence, thus becoming the battlefield—in the proper or figurative sense—for rival external powers.*[35]

In the case of Grenada, Reagan perceived it from the point of view of the East-West conflict, in which U.S. national security was at stake.[36] In Grenada there was the conjunction of two elements which lead almost inexorably to the intervention of the United States if they occur in the Caribbean region. In the first place, the strategic element when the United States perceived a meddling of the USSR in what it calls its "backyard."[37] In the second place, the systemic element, when the United States perceived Grenada's non-capitalist model of development as threatening to the capitalist system.[38]

The mechanisms for the settlement of disputes outlined in the treaties of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States are different. CARICOM's Chaguaramas Treaty is extremely vague—"Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty... shall be determined by the Conference"; and the Conference, composed of all heads of government or their representatives, makes decisions and recommendations with the affirmative vote of all the parties.[39] Only the decisions are mandatory. The Chaguaramas Treaty does not say anything else, except a reference to disputes that may arise within the Caribbean Common Market, where the decisions are by majority vote and it even provides for a court to be established in these cases. In sum, no specific provisions were included concerning defense or security.[40]

On the other hand, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States provides the establishment of a Defense and Security Committee whose function is to advise the Authority, the supreme policy-making institution composed of all the heads of government of the island members. The decisions and the directives handed down by this Committee must be unanimous. This Committee also coordinates the efforts of the members:

> *...for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties... in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements...*

At one time, CARICOM's mechanism for settling disputes was considered to be "an element of potential flexibility and dynamism—the effectiveness of which will depend on the willingness and consent of the States."[42] It resembles the one proposed by Luciano Tomassini just after the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) crisis, which consisted of a consulting organ, at the highest political level possible, with flexibility regarding its summoning power, the grounds invoked to promote collective action and the measures to be applied.[43] It would "couple a powerful political engine to the regional machinery that now exists," an organ

"that would complement the OAS and the ITRA and focus on our own problems."[44] Tomassini clearly points out that in the current security system of the Organization of American States and the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the United States plays the dual role of main guarantor and aggressor. Another role should be added, the role of transgressor.[45]

During the Grenadian crisis the CARICOM mechanism was in motion when a majority of its own members, some of whom were also members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, jointly with the United States, violated the treaty of this regional organization to intervene and end once and for all whatever might have resulted from the complex Grenadian situation. It could be argued, as Henry Gill does, that the foreign policy of the New Jewel Movement led Grenada to estrangement and hostility from its natural region.[46] Nevertheless, the fact is that new mechanisms for the settlement of disputes should be found and applied, before the United States or any other regional external initiative, utilizes the obvious regional division and fragmentation for its purposes, placing still bigger obstacles on the difficult and rough road to integration.[47]

CARICOM's mechanism for settling disputes has not functioned up to now. The heads of government simply could not agree to meet for many years. It was not until 1981 when George Chambers was elected Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago that the summit meetings again have taken place with some regularity. This fact did not prevent important issues from being sidestepped, as in the July 1984 summit where no reference was made to the invasion of Grenada, which had imperiled the weak foundations of the integration movement.

The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force: Origins and Development

The Urgent Fury report informs that the military operation in Grenada began on October 25 and that the hostilities ended on November 2, 1983. The executive order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to LANTCOM, the command which executed the operation, reads as follows:

> *conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly governments participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government in Grenada.*[48]

The Caribbean Security Force which included troops from Jamaica, Barbados and from almost all the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, under the command of Colonel Ken Barnes from the Jamaican Defense Force was sent together with the invading force of over 6,000 U.S. troops.[49] Apparently, this contingent was organized in Barbados on October 24 and at some point after the invasion its name was changed to Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. That same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the executive order to incorporate the reference to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force and to the assistance in restoring democracy. The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force landed on October 25, but it was kept away from military operations and was ordered to guard certain installations.

It seems that the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was a cosmetic effort to legitimize the invasion. In its evaluation of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, the Urgent Fury report says:

> 2. *Matter: 'CARIBBEAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE'*
>
> *a. COMMENTS: Initially, the role and composition of the CPF was not clear. During preliminary and final planning, the control of the CPF was not coordinated with CJTF [deleted] and created early confusion on the planning for inserting the CPF. Once missions and locations were assigned and liaison effected, the hard problems dissolved. CJTF [deleted] recommended that the CPF be placed in direct support of the Governor General. This was received by the CPF in a positive manner...*[50]

According to the report of a congressional delegation in 1984, the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force received its supplies and manpower from the security instrument of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States: the regional defense force.[51] That is a half truth. Everything points to the fact that the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was created at the last minute. Actually, it was sired by the regional security system of 1982, the mechanism which fostered its formation. Under the treaty of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Grenada had the veto power which would have prevented the creation of a security force which obviously threatened its existence.

Over one quarter of the troops of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, which at one time had close to 900 men, were from the security forces of Jamaica. At a given moment, there were over 300 men from the Jamaica Defense Force in Grenada. The remaining members of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force belonged to Barbados and to some members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Early in 1985, Colonel Barnes reported the departure of 160 Jamaican soldiers, thus reducing by half the Jamaica Defense Force contingent in Grenada.[52] This contingent stayed until mid July to train the security guards of the Richmond Hill prison while carrying out security duties.[53]

Information about the development of the regional security system since its creation in 1982 is scarce and difficult to locate. In March, 1983,

the police commissioners of St. Lucia and St. Vincent, Collin Barrow and E. Banjamin Jackson, respectively, were appointed to the staff of the regional security system.[54] Both had more than 30 years in the service. In addition, in August of that same year, 34 participants of the system, from Barbados, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Montserrat, and (surprisingly?) Trinidad and Tobago, received from the hands of Barbados' Prime Minister, Tom Adams, their graduation certificates for a basic weapons and military training course.[55] At the end of that same month, Adams reported that a team of British Royal Marine Infantry had attended a regional security scheme, in which members of the police forces of Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and "other territories" had participated.[56]

In February 1984, the Caribbean countries which participated in the Grenada invasion decided to keep the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force and asked the United States to leave its Military Police until a government was elected in Grenada. In May of that year, the Grenadian Police Force had 410 men who, together with the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force and the U.S. Military Police, patrolled the island. An ex-Police Commissioner who had served in various islands, commented:

> *...no mention was made of the excellent assistance rendered to Grenada by the Military Police of the U.S. Armed forces after the intervention. ...members of the Military Police were actually 'sworn in' as constables in order to give these additional police authority under the appropriate legislation and in doing so, history was created.*[57]

In December, 1984, Anthony Gillespie, Under Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs, announced that the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force would receive $15 million, which would be:

> *...security assistance money... to provide the defense forces of those governments with the wherewithal to begin to establish the kind of security shield that they, and we, believe is most likely to be effective in assuring the longer term security of the region.*[58]

Included as part of that sum were 17 jeeps, 11 trucks of over one ton, 2 two and a half ton trucks, spare parts for the trucks, weapons, uniforms, communications equipment, rations for six months and other equipment.

On December 14, 1983, with the departure of all combat forces, U.S. troops in Grenada were reduced to 250 men. In February 1984, the military presence of the United States was composed of the 82nd Airborne Division Military Support Element, whose role supposedly was to support the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force; a group from the U.S. Coast Guard; and a detachment from the Army with maintenance tasks. The 82nd Airborne Division Military Support Element consisted of 100 Military Police and 20 soldiers who carried out support tasks in communications, logistics, helicopter, airlift, and medical care.[59] During that month it was reported that there still remained 20 members of the U.S. Army Psychological Operations. They were the same units that four days after the invasion established a radio station called Spice Island Radio.[60] The U.S. troops left Grenada on June 11, 1985, leaving behind a team of less than 30 men, security specialists in charge of police training.[61]

The Role of Great Britain

After an initial negative reaction against the invasion, Great Britain has played a very active role, mainly in matters related to the police force. In December, 1983, it signed a US$1.06 million aid agreement with Grenada, the first since 1978, nearly five years after Bishop came to power, to assist in some projects, including police training and the rehabilitation and construction of buildings for that force. In April, 1984, it opened a training center in the former police barracks, with funds from the British Development Division.[62] The restoration of the building was made by the Construction Ministry of Canada.[63]

British participation in the security area has been due, in part, to U.S. urging since this country was not pleased with the hasty British retrenchment from the region; a move which left most of its former colonies in the Eastern Caribbean with what the U.S. considered inadequate security forces.[64] In May 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said in London that the Caribbean was "fertile soil for radical exploitation... Many Caribbean governments are so weak that they can be toppled by 25 men with 25 submachine guns."[65] Vance believed that to prevent that possibility it was necessary to increase U.S. aid to that region, specifically to assist in the creation of a regional police corps and to promote regional integration of the smaller islands.[66]

Just as outlined by Vance, U.S. aid was increased and greater integration among the smaller islands was achieved through the creation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. However, what happened to the regional police? The proposal was first advanced in the Caribbean area by Antigua at a meeting of the West Indies Associated State Council late in March. The plan collapsed with the victory in July of the Labour Party in St. Lucia, which did not favor it, although it did support the concept of regional defense.[67] Thus emerged the emphasis on a regional coast guard with which Great Britain cooperated by giving $10 million for communications equipment and officers in secondment from the Royal Navy. During this first stage, Great Britain practically took charge of forming the regional coast guard. In August 1980, the British Foreign Minis-

ter, Lord Carrington, declared:

> *If they ask our help in the development of the training of their police, or help in small ships, or whatever it might be, or in technical assistance of any kind, we shall be ready to consider it.*[68]

Violations to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act

The touchy point was that, due to internal reasons, the United States needed Great Britain for training the police. On July 1st, 1975, Congress, through Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, had determined that it was illegal to use aid funds to provide training, advice or financial support to the police force, prisons or any other foreign law-enforcing body of a foreign country.[69] As a result, the Office for Public Safety was dismantled after Congress objected to its repressive nature and record.[70]

Before the dissolution of the Office for Public Safety, its drug-related functions were transferred to the State Department's International Narcotics Control Program and to the Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Administration. In this manner, training, equipment donations and advice to foreign police forces were continued.[71] Under the International Narcotics Control Program, no Anglophone Caribbean government received assistance, at least from 1973 to 1981. Nevertheless, the International Narcotics Control Program did fund the training offered by th Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Customs Service to foreign police officials. This training included "executive seminars," "management" courses and equipment to provide training in national schools.

The number of trained persons and the training site as shown in Figure 2 are very revealing for the Anglophone Caribbean. The total number of Jamaican policemen trained under this program and the Programme for Public Safety is 230. It must be pointed out that 89% of those trained by the Drug Enforcement Administration and 82% of those trained by the U.S. Customs Service received their training in the United States. Of course, it is understandable that Antigua, where tourism is a very important economic sector, train its customs personnel, and that the Bahamas train its police force in the drug area, since it is in a key position for this traffic due to its proximity to the United States. The same applies to both Jamaica and Barbados where tourism is an important economic sector. It is known that the illegal export of marihuana to the U.S. market was vital for the

FIGURE 2

TRAINING OF POLICE PERSONNEL IN THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN BY THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE DURING FISCAL YEARS 1969-1978

	DEA			*USCS*		
	U.S.	*Foreign*	*Total*	*U.S.*	*Foreign*	*Total*
Antigua	—	—	—	5	26	31
Bahamas	11	38	49	7	—	7
Barbados	7	55	62	2	20	22
Dominica	—	—	—	1	—	1
Jamaica	14	124	138	6	56	62
St. Lucia	2	3	5	—	—	—
St. Vincent	—	2	2	—	—	—
Trinidad & Tobago	1	64	65	—	—	—
Turk Caicos Islands	—	1	1	—	—	—
TOTAL	35	287	322	21	102	123

Source: Data taken from Michael T. Klare, Cynthia Arnson, et al., *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad*, Table IV, pp. 35-36 whose sources are the U.S. Justice Department, *DEA International Training Statistics;* U.S. Customs Service, International Narcotics Control Training Programs and documents received by the authors through the Freedom of Information Act.

economy during the critical years of Michael Manley's administration and at present during the even more critical ones under Edward Seaga.[72]

The point is that, according to the General Accounting Office, "Overseas narcotics advisers perform essentially the same functions that public safety advisors used to perform."[73] The General Accounting Office adds that statistics from the U.S. itself show that those U.S.-trained officials use what they learn for other not drug-traffic-related purposes. Up to now, according to the information available, no studies have been made on this matter regarding the Anglophone Caribbean.

The police school established at Roosevelt Roads Navy Base, in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, by the FBI on request of the State Department, is another example of the links between the Anglophone Caribbean police and the United States.[74] By 1984, the school had been functioning for at last two years, offering monthly courses on field research, "interview" tactics, seeking and preserving of evidence, and dangerous arrests of armed suspects.[75] Its establishment was never officially announced and its existence was only casually revealed by El Salvador's President Alfredo Magañá. In 1985, it was reported that five Grenadian policemen were receiving training from the FBI in Puerto Rico.[76]

It can be assumed that the links between the police forces of the Anglophone Caribbean and the United States must be wider than what is generally known. The drug traffic training in the United States and the FBI school at Roosevelt Roads are matters that deserve more scrutiny.

Although police training seems to have continued in these two ways, it seems it was not satisfactory because in 1981 Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, in a congressional study, was described as problematic for Latin American countries "which have 'unitary' forces (that is forces which have national defense and law enforcement functions)." The study said that according to the State Department's interpretation of Section 660, it did not forbid aid if: (1) said aid was not related to police performance or other functions of civil law enforcement, (2) those receiving aid did not carry out those functions, and (3) those receiving aid were not transferred to any other unit in charge of civil law enforcement until "sufficient time" had elapsed after the training.[77] It was an obvious subterfuge to defeat the purpose of the prohibition.

In 1982, the homologous Senate committee recommended that U.S. Agency for International Development funds be used for training the police forces of the small Caribbean islands since this exception "should not undermine the legislative intention of preventing U.S. complicity in internal repression." The study says that the islands should maintain a well trained police force similar to a Special Weapons Assault Team (SWAT), "capable of handling terrorist or organized group violence."[78] Now it is known that what was being done in the Eastern Caribbean had the additional purpose or eroding the congressional ban on extending these activities to Central America. Under the pretext of creating antiterrorist units, the United States already had a comprehensive training program, at a cost of $4.8 million, for the police forces of Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.[79]

Great Britain Trains Police Corps

While this matter was debated in the United States, from 1980 on Great Britain intensified its police training program in several Eastern Caribbean islands, especially in the Police Training Regional Centre in Seawell, Barbados. This Centre was established in 1956 to serve both the Windward and the Leeward Islands. Its initial facilities were enough for 60 men. The police commissioner of Barbados directed the training, and a commander was in charge of the Centre, with a staff of six instructors, one from each of the islands served by the Centre. At the beginning, in 1956, there were two officers in charge of military training.[80]

In the early seventies, training went up to the rank of sergeant. Higher ranking officers were sent to the Metropolitan Training School in London. Scotland Yard was called upon for expert assistance when necessary.[81] In 1981 it was reported that 21 detectives from seven Caribbean countries (Barbados, Belize, Dominica, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) took an advanced course in criminal investigation at the Centre. A first course in "police management" was offered in October 1983 with participants from Barbados, Antigua, St. Vincent and the Cayman Islands.[82] The graduation of 60 recruits from Barbados, Montserrat, Turk and Caicos Islands, Anguilla and British Virgin Islands took place in November, 1983.[83]

Early in 1985, Paul Channon, British Trade Minister, reported that British financial assistance to the Anglophone Caribbean had doubled in the last five years and that his country would continue to contribute to the security and stabilization of these countries through the Military Loan Service Personnel and other police and military training schemes.[84] Towards the end of 1984, close to 200 members of the security forces had completed training courses in Great Britain. Over 1,500 officers and recruits from the Anglophone Caribbean have received training in the Centre since 1980, of which 900 were sponsored by Great Britain at a cost of $2.5 million.[85]

With regard to Grenada's case, it was reported that a British adviser had been provided to assist the Grenadian police in administrative matters and that Great Britain would be in charge of relocating police headquarters, reopening rural stations closed by the New Jewel government, and of

providing uniforms and equipment for personnel and vehicles for rural patrols. Two Scotland Yard officers arrived in January 1984, at the request of the provisional government of Nicholas Braithwaite, to develop the Criminal Investigations Department. Also, during that month several prison officers were sent to Barbados for training. That was the first time Grenadian personnel of this type went to Barbados, while personnel from St. Lucia and St. Vincent had gone there before. By May 1984, only 70 Grenadian policemen had received training in Barbados. It was expected that out of a future force of 540 men, including firemen, coast guard and immigration personnel, 180 would be trained by the end of the year.[86] In February 1984 it was reported that of the 3,370 policemen in the Eastern Caribbean, some 360 men, about 10%, had received paramilitary training.[87]

The United States Trains the Special Service Units, the Regional Defense Forces and the Regional Coast Guard

Early in February 1984, Secretary of State George Schultz visited Barbados and Grenada, and as a result of that trip, U.S. and British newspapers learned that "without fanfare, U.S. military training teams from Fort Bragg, N.C., had been operating on five Eastern Caribbean islands since December."[88] In fact, there were six islands because besides Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, they had also been in Jamaica. The teams consisted of eight men from the U.S. Army Special Forces, better known as the Green Berets. There teams trained 80 men in each of the islands of Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in two six-week courses. The first course ended on February 13 and the recently trained men were sent to Grenada to replace the components of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force who in turn went to take the course. In addition, 10 policemen from St. Kitts were trained in the Regional Police Centre in Barbados. At the beginning, some men from Grenada were also trained but on other islands.

In addition, regional coast guard training began after the Grenada invasion under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forces Caribbean (COMUSFORCARIB). For this assignment COMUSFORCARIB recruited the U.S. Coast Guard, which from 1984 and under the International Military Education Training Program, has sent Technical Assistance Field Teams to Antigua, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia.[89] In 1985 these teams went to St. Vincent and St. Kitts. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia have received patrol boats under the Military Assistance Program. Red tape was cut to give a patrol boat to Grenada

> *...in part by a perceived need to have a vessel in place in Grenada prior to the holding of national elections in early December, 1984. Members of the provisional government and the U.S. Embassy country team in Grenada felt that the presence of Tyrrel Bay would help insure a smooth election process, and the boat itself was used to transport balloting material from the outlying island of Cariacao [sic].*[90]

It should be pointed out that Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent participated, with the U.S. Navy, in the UNITAS XXV exercises.

In all, close to 100 Green Berets and a dozen U.S. Coast Guard officers have been involved in the two training programs. Commander Donald Dunn, liaison officer of the Navy in the U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown, was the coordinator of both programs. Early in 1984, Dunn states that "the next step would be to train the trainers."[91] No information regarding this matter has been found, but probably some of those in training under the International Military Education and Training will be in charge of that task.

The units of the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States that have received training are the policemen of each island that belonged to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. These units, now called Special Service Units, constitute the foundation of the regional security system established in 1982, to which Grenada and St. Kitts have been incorporated. The latter achieved independence in September 1983 and was admitted to the Council of Ministers of the regional security system in February 1984.[92] By January 1985, in Grenada, the Special Service Unit was still in training. A month later it was reported that its police force was still not totally trained and deployed.[93] By the end of February, Grenada became, still with the U.S. troops in its territory, the seventh member of the regional security system.[94] The Barbados Defense Force, which includes 80 riflemen, is regarded as "the strategic military reserve" within the system.[95]

Forty-two men paraded during the graduation of the first members of the Special Service Unit in Dominica on February 28, 1985. The training was held in secret in the police school, several miles from the capital, Roseau. In February, St. Lucia sent 37 policemen for the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, while Antigua sent 18 men to replace an equal number. That same month it was reported that 48 policemen from St. Vincent received a six-month training and were integrated into the Special Service Unit of the Royal St. Vincent and Grenadines Police Force.[96]

The impression intended is that this training program was formally requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and Barbados in November 1983 to a bipartisan delegation of U.S. congressmen.[37] Another congressional delegation that visited Barbados and Grenada in February 1984 reported "the need to increase the amount of paramilitary training that the police force receives."

This delegation pointed out that "although Section 660 allows training of police paramilitary units of most of the countries that do not have a defense force..., this poses a special problem to Barbados since its defense force is small." The delegation sanctioned the Special Service Unit training in the member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, and added that it:

> *...understands the motivation for section 660 but believes that due to the current threat in the Caribbean, some legislative or administrative exemption for Barbados from the provisions of section 660 is absolutely imperative if the newly constituted Regional Defense Force is to become a viable instrument for security in the Eastern Caribbean region.*[98]

The truth is that the Special Service Units were already on the way before the intervention in Grenada. The hullaballoo raised by the invasion only served as a smoke screen for the United States to launch a military aid offensive, specially in the training area, under the ruse of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. On August 18, 1983, two months before the invasion of Grenada, the *Lucian Times* reported the visit to St. Lucia of a delegation from the U.S. Embassy in Barbados. The delegation consisted of the ubiquitous commander Dunn, chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Office in the Embassy; Wade Winkle from the U.S. Department of Defense (program analysis and evaluation) contingency force division, and major Eugene T. Gwynn, U.S. Forces (Caribbean) operations officer and special warfare specialist. This group met with chief of police Cuthbert Phillips and other local security personnel to discuss the composition, training and future of the Special Service Units.[99] The talks also touched upon the present and future of military aid programs (Military Assistance Program, MAP and International Military Education and Training Program, IMET) that the island was receiving since 1981.[100]

Section 660 became dead letter with regards to the Anglophone Caribbean. First came the exception that permitted police force training of those islands that did not have a defense force. Then, in the name of national security, training of defense forces as such was allowed. The pretext for the latter was the regional defense force, a true farce because, as we will see now, the U.S. military never favored it.

The Stillborn Caribbean Defense Force

In January 1984 the Prime Minister of Barbados, Tom Adams, suggested two areas in which the Eastern Caribbean states could achieve "a full measure of unity," as a result of the events in Grenada.[101] One of them was the judiciary, that should be integrated, to begin with, into the appellate system. The other one, the one that concerns us, is the incorporation of a land force element to the regional security system. Adams said:

> *A study is now underway to determine whether we can establish a full regional defence force, thus extending the protection available against mercenary adventure, other external aggression, domestic revolution or other violent episodes.* My feeling is that one regional army rather than a number of national armies will give us an additional safeguard, namely the protection of small governments against their own armed forces.[102]

According to Adams, the force would be several hundred strong, trained by Great Britain as Commonwealth partner, and with boats provided by the United States. Headquarters would be in Barbados and there would be garrisons of 50 to 90 men on two other islands.[103]

The clearest exposition of this proposal was made by the now brigadier of the Barbados Defense Force, Rudyard Lewis, to the congressional delegation that visited Barbados in mid-February, 1984.[104] The project, which would be a five-year plan, would expand the regional defense force into a permanent Caribbean Defense Force of 1,800 men, 700 of whom would be combat infantry troops and the remainder coast guard and air support elements. Brigadier Lewis indicated that the events in Grenada "not only highlighted the need to have this type of 'defense force,' but also the limitations of the actual 'defense force' structure." The Caribbean Defense Force would function on the principle of minimum force, which meant that in most cases the regular police forces would respond to any small scale disturbances. If the regular police failed, then the Special Service Unit would intervene and if unable to counter the threat, the Caribbean Defense Force would be deployed. To implement this scheme, brigadier Lewis stated that outside financial assistance was necessary because the small Caribbean states lacked the economic base needed to support the Caribbean Defense Force.

Just as Adams must have contrived, the proposal was discussed during Shultz' visit. Shultz reported that a breakdown of the cost of the system had been made and he promised to study the kind of support the United States could give, as well as the "organizational issues... involving the extent to which we are able to relate to a regional security force as such, as distinct from individual countries and their needs."[105] The disagreement between the United States and Adams was obvious. That same day Adams acknowledged the fact:

> *We have had some difficulties in so far as we've found that the American attitude outside the Grenada intervention has tended to be bilateral*

rather than multilateral. They have approached each island and, very generously, they have offered special training to the police special service units and to the military units in each island. But they seemed to have been a little hesitant about dealing with the regional security system as a body.[106]

Shultz' position was to be expected since that same month it was reported that the initial reaction to the proposal had been "disdainful."[107] The cost of the Caribbean Defense Force (the sum mentioned was $100 million) provoked this comment from a U.S. military source in May: "There isn't any money. It's a very expensive proposition."[108]

In Barbados itself, Opposition Leader Errol Barrow rejected it as undesirable if it was meant to suppress the local population, and useless if it was meant to prevent a foreign intervention. Barrow added: "I don't think the islands are ready for it. If we had federal government, it would make sense. Individually, we can't afford it." He pointed out rightly that it would mean relying on the United States for "weapons and training, and that throws us more under the U.S. military establishment."[109]

The former Prime Minister had been questioning the use of the Barbados Defense Force for some time. In March 1984, he said in Parliament that "Nowhere is there any mention of the Defense Force in the 1984-85 estimates of revenue and expenditure. We are completely in the dark concerning the Defense Force ...that is a military secret."[110] However, in spite of Barrow's position and that of other leaders of the Democratic Labour Party, such as Erskine Sandiford and Branford Taitt, the party has not pronounced itself officially on this matter, leading one to think that it may be divided on this issue.

James Mitchell, Prime Minister of St. Vincent, has stated on several occasions that "militarization of the region is a threat" and that the need is "for funds for development, money for programmes oriented to the people, rather than military assistance." On one occasion he declared: "My government has no intention of releasing one cent for the creation of a regional army or to waste money on security matters in preference for a basic needs programme."[111] Although Mitchell's stand appears to contrast with the ones of the previous Cato government and of his Eastern Caribbean counterparts, if there is a real difference it would surface in his position toward the military aid offered gratis under the International Military Education and Training Program and the Military Assistance Program. Mitchell must not forget the inextricable ties between economic aid and military aid. Some time later a U.S. military officer, talking about St. Vincent's stand, said, "They won't get more economic aid if they do not get military aid."[112] Another point is that at present St. Vincent will have to spend almost nothing on security, but in the future it will have to assume the cost of equipment maintenance and replacement that the United States now provides free.

It was certainly disturbing that the defeated Prime Minister, Milton Cato, rejected his unexpected defeat, banned the celebration of the New Democratic Party, and requested armed assistance from Barbados.[113] It is worth asking what would have been Barbados' reaction to a progressive party victory.

At the end of the year, Mitchell's posture was echoed by the Prime Minister of St. Lucia, John Compton, who declared that "we never agreed to participate in a regional army. We are not going to send men to be billeted in Barbados." By the same token, Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, said, "I was never fully convinced of the need for a regional army."[114]

The Caribbean Defense Force never had a chance. Adams' death only made his counterparts in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, who had once favored the proposal, admit publicly that the proposal was buried with its main advocate. In March 1985, the reliable publication, *Caribbean Insight*, said that it was "apparent that such plans would be unworkable, as no one is prepared to provide the substantial funding needed for logistical support."[115]

"Who Will Guard the Guards?"

The ostensible consequences of the establishment of the Sepcial Service Units in the police organization itself are already a source of concern, since they have become a sort of gendarmery. Hans Morgenthau described this type of paramilitary organizations as follows:

...the functions of such paramilitary organizations are primarily political in the sense that they are a visible and effective demonstration of the power of the state for the benefit of the citizenry and, more particularly, of its actually and potentially recalcitrant members. These organizations are generally, as they are intended to be, reliable instruments in the hands of the government. But they can also become a state within a state, pursuing policies of their own.[116]

After his election as new Prime Minister of St. Vincent in the elections of July, 1984, Mitchell ordered all the policemen who were wearing the army fatigues used during their Special Service Unit training to don the police uniforms.[117] Special Service Units are armed with M-16 rifles and move around in camouflaged vehicles or in jeeps provided by the United States. Mitchell wondered out loud: "Who will guard the guards?"

In St. Lucia, the opposition newspaper, *The Crusader*, said that:

The whole thrust and attitude of the police force has changed overnight. The skills of criminal

investigative work and good police methods have all been swamped by the new militaristic thrust. Now our special service units strut and swagger around Castries with automatic weapons in their hands... This cannot be good for the state especially as a number of raw recruits have come into the force at the deep end and have plunged into the techniques of killing before they have learned the responsibility of policemen and the sanctity of life.[119]

The situation in Dominica probably parallels that of the other islands. There are two commands, a commissioner in charge of the regular police force and an assistant commissioner, the latter "somebody who is trained in Virginia... and he is in charge of the green people, that is the policemen who have now become soldiers." Atherton Martin adds:

Tension is beginning to result. There is tension because the people in green consider themselves soldiers, and they have been told by the Green Berets: 'You are soldiers.' They refuse to take orders from senior police officers who are not wearing green, and there are increasing cases of tension between the men in green and the police officers.[120]

As the saying goes, where there's smoke there's fire. Here are three islands with a similar problem: a divided police organization as a result of the military training of a so-called elite, whose role in maintaining internal law order is not clear and probably depends on the final form of the regional security arrangement. The U.S. lieutenant colonel in charge of this training, who refused to be identified, declared: "We're not training in police skills. *We are training in military skills.* We don't teach them to direct traffic or use handcuffs."[121]

In April 1985, after the announcement by rear admiral Ralph Hedges of joint exercises between the Special Service Units and U.S. military forces, doubts began to surface among the same Eastern Caribbean political leaders who fervidly supported the invasion of Grenada and the subsequent creation of the Special Service Units.[122] The Prime Minister of St. Lucia expressed his fear that training of the Special Service Units in combat techniques would in the long run result in a potential threat to his own government, as had been the case in Dominica in 1981.[123]

Not much time has elapsed since the creation of the Special Service Units and already they have raised fear among their own advocates because of several incidents on different islands. Six members of the police force in Dominica, including three from the Special Service Unit, were arrested and charged with manslaughter in the killing of a man whose body was found at the foot of a cliff in 1981. They were arrested after an investigation by

St. Lucia's P.M. Compton at press conference culminating war games, stated that the U.S. was "invited" to the military exercises by the Caribbean participants and that the maneuvers did not respond to American geopolitical interests.

a senior officer from the Barbados police force, Mervyn Holder, who later served as police chief in Grenada during the first months after the intervention.[124] Similar cases have taken place in St. Vincent and St. Lucia and "in all the cases the policemen being accused of being trigger-happy or being called 'executioners' are in some way or other linked to the Special Service Unit of the police force on the respective islands."[125]

In Grenada, the struggle between the George Brizan and Francis Alexis factions within the governing New National Party brought into the open how easy it was to bring the Special Service Unit into the political arena. Ben Jones, acting as Prime Minister during the absence of Prime Minister Herbert Blaize, was pressured by the Alexis faction to sign an order mobilizing the Special Service Unit. Once the order was signed, the Special Service Unit carried out an operation in Grenville during which it took possession of the equipment of a radio station and arrested its owner, Stanley Charles, provoking a small crisis for the government when the population protested in the local police station.[126] What was striking about this operation was the ease with which the Special Service Unit was put in motion for an insignificant matter, which only responded to the intrigues of the Alexis faction against Prime Minister Blaize. This action reawakened accusations that the Special Service Unit was at the service of the governing party and that if the need be it would serve as a puppet of Washington.

If there is something that cannot be adduced in this situation it is that no one sounded the alert. The warning was given by no less than the present director general of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Vaughan A. Lewis, who in 1982, while serving as director of the prestigious Institute for Social and Economic Research of the University of the West Indies cautioned that:

The fact of the matter is... that in small countries, the reinforcement of the local security systems leads to an upsetting of the balance between the various socio-political sectors in the countries giving the military or national security

sector a decisive weight and tendency to eventual pre-eminence in the political systems.[127]

In his present post, Vaughan Lewis sustained in 1984 that "it is not feasible for these small island states to have individual armies. It is precisely for this reason that there's a need for a collective regional security system." Lewis added that, as a consequence of the commitment of the concerned governments to have a defense mechanism, "the arrangement of a political formula for the controlling of this security system from any outside forces to guarantee its independence" must be seriously considered.[128]

It is difficult to reconcile this position of the highest regional officer of the Eastern Caribbean with the silence he has kept during the implementation of a regional security system, that is based precisely on individual armies or gendarmeries and a security system controlled by an outside force, in this case the United States. Maybe Lewis' silence merely reflects impotence before the community of interests that exists between the United States and the dominant elites of the Eastern Caribbean. These elites see the militarization process, including the larger expenditures of local public funds, as necessary to maintain the *status quo* and as a way of absorbing a very small number of the unemployed.[129]

U.S. Security System for the Eastern Caribbean

The nature of the regional security system that the United States is implementing in the Eastern Caribbean can now be analyzed. The first key component of this system is the security forces that have been trained and equipped: the Special Service Units of Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The second component consists of the defense forces of Antigua and Barbados. The regional coast guard is also found at this level. The Jamaica Defense Force has to be taken into consideration in view of its role in Grenada. However, the integration of Barbados and Jamaica into the system is still somewhat up in the air. The activation mechanism for these two components is the regional cooperation and security agreement of 1982. The magnitude of the crisis that may arise will activate the third component of the system: the armed forces of the United States.

The second-in-command of COMUSFORCARIB, colonel Wayne R. Topp, has said that the value of the security system lies on the fact that it creates a structure or framework for a reaction from the United States, while at the same time serving as a kind of "tripwire" in a strategically important perimeter. Topp added that the system can deal with "small situations."[130]

The creation of the Special Service Units and a regional coast guard, and the strengthening of the

P.M. Compton (St. Lucia) and now ex-P.M. St. John (Barbados) take a close look at a sophisticated sound locating equipment.

defense forces have a clear strategic objective: to tie up the least possible number of U.S. military forces in the Caribbean given the wide range of U.S. strategical interests.[131] Secretary of State Shultz asserts that "the least desirable method for preserving our strategic interests and ensuring stability in the Third World is using U.S. forces."[132] On the political level, the objective is to penetrate the Caribbean security forces and to create a dependency on the U.S. military establishment.

In September 1985 the budding security system rehearsed its functioning in what, according to Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, was the first of a series of routine exercises. The U.S. commander in the Caribbean, Rear Admiral Hedges described the operation as a "graduation exercise... where we actually give the Special Service Units' people an opportunity to exercise the things they have learned during training."[133] The exercises which took place in St. Lucia consisted of seaborne landings of 500 men taken from the Special Service Units and the coast guard of St. Lucia, St. Kitts/Nevis, Dominica and Grenada, and the Defense Forces of Antigua, Barbados and Jamaica, with military support from the United States and Great Britain.[134] The joint exercises, called (very appropriately) Exotic Palm, were planned to be similar to the Ocean Venture '81 exercises that took place in Vieques and during which U.S. troops landed in Amber and the Amberdines to help an elected government deposed by force. Although not yet confirmed, it may have been the first time that regular British troops participated in an exercise of this type in the Caribbean.[135]

Already in August 1984, Washington sources had reported that the security system that the United States would implement would be based on the strengthening of the police force and the defense forces.[136] Another element then mentioned—the establishment of "facilities for rapid deployment of an intervention force"—is just beginning to make its appearance now in the context of a military base in Antigua, that would also have communications facilities and specialist training schools.[137]



U.S., British and Caribbean ships at Castries harbour (St. Lucia) during maneuvers.

Antigua: the Key to the New Military Arrangement

At the time of this writing, it was announced that a training center for regional security forces was to be established in the U.S. naval installation in Antigua, at a cost of $11 million.[138] The government of Antigua confirmed that the training would be directed against drug trafficking and the "exploitation of territorial waters" of the Caribbean states.[139]

A 10-day exercise code-named Upward Key also took place, beginning on November 11, in which close to a hundred U.S. soldiers participated together with members of the Antigua Defense Force and Special Service Unit. The cost of this exercise, approximately $250,000, was footed by the United States.[140]

The selection of Antigua for a training center is in a sense the most convenient one for the United States. Three days before the independence of Antigua, the Caribbean-page editor of the *Miami Herald* commented:

> *Perhaps more so than the others, Antigua looks to the U.S. to fill whatever vacuum might be left by the departing British. Our government acknowledges privately that there are many Antiguans who would like to become part of the U.S. Already there is a large official American presence, with a U.S. Voice of America transmitter and small Air Force and Navy installations, each with about 100 personnel, a U.S. Consulate, and more that a score of Peace Corps volunteers.*[141]

U.S. installations in Antigua have their origin in World War II, when the United States gave 50 destroyers to Great Britain in return for the right to lease naval and air base sites for a 99-year period on that island, and on Terranova, Bahamas, Bermuda, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Trinidad.[142] An airfield was built on Antigua which today is the island's Coolidge Field Airport. In 1961 the agreement was revised, and the U.S. was granted the right to build two installations, one for the Navy and the other for the Air Force.[143] The Naval facility monitors oceanographic phenomena such as currents and underwater sound transmission, for which acoustic hydrophones have been planted off-shore.[144] This installation, which belongs to the undersea surveillance system (SOSUS), was to be dismantled in 1984 because of its technological obsolescence, but "in June, 1983, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to continue leasing the base from the government in Antigua *pending the result of a study into the potential military value of the base to the United States.*"[145] The recently announced training center is clearly the result of that

study. The Air Force installation is part of the U.S. military and space missiles program tests, launched from Cape Kennedy in Florida. The United States signed an 11-year agreement with Antigua on September 30, 1977 for the use of these facilities at a cost of $1.4 million.[146]

The Voice of America operates in Antigua a medium wave relay transmitter beamed at the Eastern Caribbean. The Deputy Prime Minister, Lester Bird, son of Vere Bird, at first did not authorize its construction because "every Caribbean government, whether Right, Left or Center in political orientation, would feel that Antigua had become a bastion of U.S. military presence in the Caribbean."[147] Some time later, after a State Department intervention, Prime Minister Bird reversed this decision. Nonetheless, Lester Bird's protestations were very short-lived. In December 1985, as Foreign Affairs Minister, he was responsible for negotiation the redefinition of the U.S. installation into a training center, and he defended his action alleging that it was necessary because of the East-West conflict in the region.[148]

The timing of the announcement of the training center was opportune since the only dissenting voice of any weight against the increasingly repressive government of Vere Bird, Tim Hector, was jailed in July for a period of six months. Hector, the main leader of the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement, was committed when he



Open House at Vigie playing field (St. Lucia) featuring the exhibition of U.S. military equipment.

was found guilty of the charge of undermining the confidence in a government officer.[149] The Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement, through its paper *Outlet*, has unmasked numerous corruption scandals in the Bird administration.

In April 1985, the Antigua government deported over 30 board members of the Agricultural Missions Inc., a U.S. church-sponsored rural development organization. No explanation was offered other than the usual one of subversion but the true motive seems to be that Hector was due to address their meeting.[150] In another incident, for which Antigua had to apologize to Canada, a Canadian diplomat, who visited the office of the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Move-

FIGURE 3

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOME COUNTRIES OF THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA DURING FISCAL YEAR 1986 ($ IN MILLIONS)

			FMS			
Country	*IMET*	*MAP*	*Concessional*	*Treasury Rate*	*Total*	*Total*
Bahamas	0.050	——	——	——	——	0.050
Belize	0.100	1.000	——	——	——	1.100
Eastern Caribbean	0.400	10.000	——	——	——	10.400
Guyana	0.050	——	——	——	——	0.050
Haiti	0.475	0.500	——	——	——	0.975
Jamaica	0.275	8.000	——	——	——	8.275
Dominican Republic	0.800	6.000	4.000	——	4.000	10.800
Surinam	0.050	——	——	——	——	0.050
Trinidad & Tobago	0.050	——	——	——	——	0.050

Source: Data taken from "Foreign Assistance Program: FY 1986 Budget and 1985 Supplement Request, May, 1985," *Special Report No. 128, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State*, Washington, D.C., p. 14.

ment in May, was detained and questioned.[151]

The Antigua Defense Force has received military training and assistance from the Space Research Corporation, the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago.[152] The latter also collaborated with Barbados in military matters when they seconded major David Dopwell, second-in-command of the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force, to serve as commander-in-chief of the recently activated Barbados Defense Force.[153] This secondment must be a result of the agreement signed by Barbados and Trinidad on April 30, 1970 in which they took note that due to "the growing complexity of the security problems of the Caribbean region, [they] agreed to consult from time to time thereon."[154] This collaboration of Trinidad with Antigua and Barbados, after a history of isolation and lack of cooperation in security matters, can only have one reason: the coming to power of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada. Antigua and Barbados were the two most rabid opponents of the New Jewel, while Trinidad, in this case Prime Minister Eric Williams, was successful in conveying the false impression that he was indifferent to what was happening in Grenada and was ignoring all of Grenada's initiatives for fostering relations with his two-island state.

U.S. Military Aid to the Caribbean

Nevertheless, what has marked a new stage in the security policy of Trinidad and Tobago was its inclusion in the International Military Education and Training Program in 1985 with an allocation of $50,000. For the first time ever Trinidad became a recipient of a U.S. military aid program, becoming the last country in the Anglophone Caribbean to fall into the net. According to Figure 3, Trinidad's allocation will be the same for 1986.

According to Figure 4, from 1980 to 1983, 286 members of the Anglophone Caribbean security forces received training under the International Military Education and Training Program. If a minimum figure of 400 members of the Special Service Units of the island members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States that were trained is added to this number, then at least over 680 men have received training, and the total has to be larger if the defense forces from Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Guyana and now Trinidad are included.

Another surprise is undoubtedly the inclusion of Surinam in this program; additional proof of the right turn of the opportunistic dictatorial regime of Desi Bouterse after the invasion of Grenada.[155] In June, 1983 Brazil agreed to provide arms, equipment and training to the Surinamese army.[156] Early that same month, the House and Senate Intelligence committees of the U.S. Congress rejected a CIA plan to depose Bouterse.[157]

In the cases of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, because of their long term relation with the U.S. military establishment, certain tendencies

FIGURE 4

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL OF SOME CARIBBEAN BASIN COUNTRIES TRAINED UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM, 1950-83

	1950-73	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1950-83
Antigua	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
Barbados	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	12	11	24	60
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	19	35
Dominica	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	1	8	16
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	22	10	43
Haiti	573	—	3	13	12	14	17	10	27	25	31	735
Jamaica	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	20	73	112
Dominican Republic	327	229	201	235	73	90	113	47	163	129	154	4,711
St. Lucia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	8	13
St. Vincent	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	8	9

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, September 30, 1983*, Washington, D.C., Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, 1983, pp. 92-93.

can be pinpointed besides the obvious one: the intensification of military assistance under Reagan. Nevertheless, in the case of Haiti, it must be noted that under Carter's administration there was an increase in the number of military personnel trained in the U.S., while at the same time the administration was supposedly pressuring the Duvalier regime for its continuous violations of human rights.[158]

Even though a detailed analysis of U.S. military assistance programs in the Anglophone Caribbean will not be part of this work, a reference to the International Military Education and Training Program is of vital importance since its purpose is to establish relationships and ties between the U.S. military establishment and the Caribbean security forces, with all the political and ideological connotations this carries.[159] In addition, it creates a homogenization of the various security forces in the Anglophone Caribbean. Let's take a look at the Joint Chiefs of Staff's evaluation of the program:

> *IMET has provided many benefits for the United States by building shared objectives of collective security with recipient states. The training environment gives the U.S. the opportunity to establish ties with future military and political leaders around the world. It is also an ideal opportunity to offer students a personal appreciation of U.S. interests, attitudes, and way of life while influencing allied and friendly forces toward pursuit of mutual readiness and interoperability goals. The quality of U.S. professional education program is highly regarded in the international community, and foreign graduates of* U.S. schools often rise to positions of responsibility and authority within their own government. *IMET grants are a relatively inexpensive way for the U.S. to gain influence with these governments and in some cases can be more effective than relatively high-cost equipment transfers. The returns from this program, however, do not accrue fully in the short term.* Rather, benefits from IMET tend to grow through the years as foreign graduates of U.S. military schools achieve positions of greater importance and influence in their governments.[160]

Figure 5 shows that the U.S. military establishment maintains a strict record of the trajectory of IMET graduates. Nowhere is there any mention as to how the graduates reach political posts, and even less of discouraging or disparaging these aspirations.

The Caribbean Basin: Factory for the U.S. Military Establishment

Another new element, which seems to be still in an experimental stage, is to lure to the Caribbean Basin manufacturers of defense components that operate in the Pacific and in other parts of the world, far away from the United States.[161] The relocation or establishment of those plants in the Basin is deemed convenient because the region is stable, the United States can defend it during a crisis, and, given the Caribbean Basin Initiative, it would contribute to the economic development of the region. The defense components to be manufactured (missile systems, electronic circuits, engines and other equipment) are important strategically and security wise. A study of this matter was entrusted to the Industry College of the Armed Forces in 1984 and it was reported that in July 1985 it was almost completed. Some of the countries where the plants would be located would be Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad, Barbados and Antigua.

Recently an officer of the Department of Defense declared that it looks to all appearances as if Vieques (again!!!) is being used as guinea pig to test this new policy:

> *Vieques is like a microcosm. Different factors can be moved and adjusted, and since it is such a small island, the results can be observed immediately. If we can obtain the results we want with*

FIGURE 5

FOREIGN LEADERS TRAINED IN IMPORTANT U.S. MILITARY SCHOOLS

Presidents / Heads of State	25
Cabinet Ministers / Legislators / Ambassadors	160
Chiefs of Staff	258
Generals / Flag Rank	1,834

Source: DSAA Survey, February, 1980. Quoted in: The Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1984*, p. 53.

The reason of Force...

our program, we could use Vieques as a model, implementing some of these ideas in other parts of Puerto Rico or the Caribbean.[162]

During Fiscal Year 1983, Puerto Rico registered a total investment of $147 million in contracts with the Department of Defense, and this number went up to almost $500 million in 1985.[163]

Final Considerations

The continuance of the Caribbean under LANTCOM seems to indicate that this area is considered NATO's backyard and that there is still emphasis on the probability of a European war and thus, the need to protect maritime communications.[164] LANTCOM has priority because the Soviet threat that Cuba represents links the region to NATO's main concern: the East-West struggle.[165] Early in 1985, admiral McDonald declared that the Navy with its 600 ships, now has the necessary flexibility to maintain a Caribbean presence.[166]

The creation or strengthening of the Caribbean security forces should strike fear in our hearts. It is like talking about the rope in the home of a hanged person. *(Mentar la soga en casa del ahorcado)*. The history of U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America is full of precedents for this policy. That is what happened during the first half of this century in the Dominican Republic and the result was the thirty-year tyranny of Trujillo. The same goes for Nicaragua with the Somozas, Haiti with Paul E. Magloire and Cuba with Fulgencio Batista.[167] U.S. historian Walter LaFeber confirms this when he writes about recent history in Guatemala:

The U.S. military provided help of an unusual but essential kind: it developed the Guatemalan army into an institutional force that could use modern North American weapons. The process had begun in the mid-fifties when the U.S. advisors took a rag-tag force and through reorganization, the teaching of political as well as military tactics, and the development of a centralized communications and transport system, created a mobile, more efficient army and growing institutional pride and allegiance. This transformation explains why the military stood ready to govern the country in 1963, and why the United States accepted its rule.[168]

Are the consequences of this military aid really so ominous for the democratic system of a country? In an article published in December, 1985, a U.S. political scientist answers this question after studying the consequences of this policy in several countries during the sixties:

In sum, an interaction between the condition of economilitary dependence on the United States and the overwhelming priority given by the Johnson and Nixon administrations to the Cold War containment of Communist doctrine appears to have been a principal or at least contributing cause of democratic breakdown in Brazil (1964), Greece (1967), Turkey (1971), the Philippines (1972), Uruguay (1973), and Chile (1973)—two thirds of the developing democracies that experienced authoritarian regime transformation during 1964-1973.[169]

However, the reaction of St. Vincent's Prime Minister Mitchell is symptomatic of the fact that there is no unanimous criteria among the political leaders of the region on security matters. If Michael Manley and Earl Barrow are elected in the next elections, as voting polls indicate, it is very probable that, if they do not withdraw completely from the security system, they will at least reduce the participation of Jamaica and Barbados.[170]

That might be the reason why the United States wants to stamp a traditional military presence on the Eastern Caribbean through the redefinition of the naval installation in Antigua. This military presence has a dual purpose. The first one is that its mere presence serves as an element of deterrence, and the other is that it serves as a beachhead in case military intervention is judged necessary. The latter is a very real option, as the U.S. Ambassador in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Milan Bish, warned during a visit to Dominica in early 1984: "I think we never want to go through the things that happened in October, but I will say this: If we have to we will."[171]

To conclude, the purpose of this study has

been to call attention to some aspects that already demand important definitions and that must be taken into consideration when pondering the actions required by new policies, more so before the tendencies toward militarization continue to grow, strengthen and solidify. It is necessary to be on the alert for two concomitant factors of the militarization process. The first one is the adoption and enforcement of draconian security legislation, as has happened in Dominica and Antigua. The second one refers to the economic problem involving an increase of millions in military expenditure within a context of socio-economic crisis. It is only a question of time until the tab for this process reverts to Caribbean societies. What is at stake here is the creation of a regional security system, built by the Caribbean societies and compatible with the development of internal democracy in these same societies.

NOTES

* I want to thank Dr. Jorge Rodríguez Beruff for his critical observations as well as for his generous sharing of some of the valuable documents used in this work. The loving support and critical sense of "mi piroca" Betsaida Vélez Natal was indispensable and of immense value. She continually encouraged me and she revised the first draft of this essay. The responsibility for the text is, of course, mine.

** Assistant Researcher, Institute of Caribbean Studies, Social Sciences Faculty, University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus. Member of the Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace.

1 L. Meikle, M.D., D.D.S., *Confederation of the British West Indies versus Annexation to the United States. A Political Discourse on the West Indies*, New York: Negro University Press, 1969, p. 123. (Originally published in 1912.)

2 G.K. Lewis, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968, p. 413.

3 This was one of the reasons offered by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain for her initial lukewarm reaction to the United States invasion of Grenada. See: *London Times*, October 31, 1983.

4 W.M. Arkin's book, *Research Guide to Current Military and Strategic Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: Institute of Policy Studies, 1984, 2nd ed., has been an indispensable source for this work since it serves as a guide and bibliographical source of the organization, structure, operations and other important aspects of the U.S. Armed Forces.

5 Montserrat did not participate in the invasion because Great Britain did not allow it to do so. During a meeting of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, in June 1984, Premier John Osbourne showed interest in leading Montserrat to independence, complaining that colonial status "subjected to the overruling and myopic power" of Great Britain was shameful. *Latin America Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, July 30, 1984, rc-84-07.

6 Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada stated in a speech of May, 1979, that a reliable source had revealed to him a CIA plan, the first step of which was to destabilize the country by means of propaganda and the second included the use of violence. See: D. Jules and D. Rojas, ed., *Maurice Bishop Selected Speeches 1971-1981*, Havana: Centro de Estudios Caribeños, Casa de Las Américas, 1982, pp. 22-23.

7 P.E. Tyler, "U.S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada," *Washington Post*, February 27, 1983. See also John M. Goshko, "Invasion Caps 4 Years of Tensions between Mini State and the U.S.," *Washington Post*, October 26, 1983.

8 For more information see: R. Roundtree, "Ocean Venture '81," *The San Juan Star*, (Puerto Rico), August 2, 1981.

9 For more information regarding this operation see: EPICA Task Force, *Grenada. The Peaceful Revolution*, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 92, 112-113.

10 See: S.A. Hosmer, "Constraints on U.S. Military Strategies on Past Third World Conflicts," The Rand Corporation, N-2180-AF, July, 1984, pp. 72-74.

11 See: P. Cruz, "Puerto Rico in the Invasion of Grenada: A Threat to the Sovereignty of the Caribbean and Central American Countries," in *Dossier 2*, Río Piedras: Proyecto Caribeño de Justicia y Paz, 1984, p. 6; and J. Rodríguez Beruff, "Puerto Rico en la Militarización del Caribe, 1979-1984," *Dossier 4*, Río Piedras: Proyecto Caribeño de Justicia y Paz, 1984, pp. 21-22.

12 See: J. Cintrón Tiryakian, "The Military and Security Dimensions of U.S. Caribbean Policy," in H.M. Erisman, ed., *The Caribbean Challenge: U.S. Policy in a Volatile Region*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p. 49, and G. Black, "MARE NOSTRUM: U.S. Security Policy in the English-Speaking Caribbean," *NACLA*, XIX, No. 4, July/August, 1985, p. 17. It must be pointed out that the concept is not reproduced in the Caribbean Basin Initiative either since the latter does not include Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.

13 The Steadman Report, a study of the military command structure ordered by President Carter, found that "by and large, the system has been generally adequate to meet our national security needs in peacetime, crisis, and wartime. We did find however, a general perception of some fundamental shortcomings which may make it incapable of dealing adequately with our future needs." R.C. Steadman, *Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1978, p. 1.

14 A report drawn up in the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College stated that in 1981: "A credible and effective US military presence requires a Command that is adequately staffed and properly trained. Today USSOUTHCOM is neither." Dr. R. Kennedy, Col. C. Wallis, *et al.*, "The Role of the Military in the Caribbean Basin (Final Report)," Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 26, 1981, p. 68.

15 *Ibid.* Another position was in favor of SOUTHCOM becoming a unified sub-command of LANTCOM, responding directly to this command's CINC. See: J.A. Fesmire, "United States Military Command Relationships in Latin America: Could They be Better?," (Individual Study Project), U.S. Army Command,

May 6, 1982. This study, in spite of the many deletions, offers an excellent summary of the discussion of the structure of commands.

16 B. Keller and J. Brinkley, "U.S. Military Is Termed Prepared for Any Move Against Nicaragua," *The New York Times*, June 4, 1985, pp. A1, A10. Gorman mentions as other goals "regulating the displacement" of refugees and the control of drug traffic. For more detailed information see: "The Role of the U.S. Southern Command in Central America," *Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives*, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, August 1, 1984, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

17 See: *Latin American Weekly Reports: Caribbean Report*, December 3, 1982, wr-82-47; R.C. Halloran, "U.S. Army School for Latins Starting New Life in Georgia," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1985, p. A10; and G. Selser, "Las Bases de EE.UU. en Panamá. El Destino del Comando del Sur y de la Escuela de Las Américas", *Nueva Sociedad*, No. 63, November/December, 1982, pp. 57-74.

18 Quoted in: J.C. Tiryakian, "The Military and Security Dimensions of U.S. Caribbean Policy," *op. cit.*, p. 49. The Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force, located in Key West, Florida, was created by order of President Carter as a result of the incident involving the Soviet brigade in Cuba. See: *Report of the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-85 Defense Programs*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980, p. 115.

19 See: W.M. Arkin, "The Growing US Military Presence in the Caribbean and Central America," paper presented before the Seminar on the Threat to Peace in the Caribbean and Central America, Aguas Buenas, Puerto Rico, October 5, 1984. According to Moorer and Fauriol, this sub-command is "...the primary operator and planner for all joint military matters in the region... also directs regional intelligence gathering and the more diplomatic function of goodwill port visits." This sub-command has no permanently assigned operational forces. See: T.H. Moorer and G. Fauriol, *Caribbean Basin Security*, Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1985, p. 15.

20 W.L. McDonald, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, *Operation Urgent Fury, October 25-November 2*, 1983, p. 2. In the chronology of the operation, the report states that on October 23 "E3A and F-15 aircraft (were) deployed to Roosevelt Roads PR to detect and deter any Cuban aircraft flights from transitting from Cuba to Grenada."

21 This quotation is part of a written answer delivered by the Under-Secretary of State, K.W. Dam, to a subcommittee of the Commission on Foreign Affair of the House of Representatives. "U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean," *Hearings before the Sub-Committee of International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, November 2, 3 and 16, 1983*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, pp. 51-52.

22 For a brief analysis of the economic need for the airport, see: B.J. Hudson, "The Changing Caribbean: Grenada's New International Airport," *Caribbean Geography*, 1, No. 1, May 1983, pp. 51-57.

23 R. Singh, "Caribbean Media and the Grenada Affair," *Caribbean Contact*, (monthly paper of the Caribbean Council of Churches, published in Barbados), January/February 1984. The Deputy Prime Minister of Antigua, Lester Bird, stated that there was no evidence that the airport was for military use. See: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, May 13, 1983, rc-83-04.

24 See: *The Grenadian Voice* (Grenada), May 5, 1984, p. 2.

25 For an analysis of the role of Puerto Rico before and during the invasion of Grenada, see: P. Cruz, "Puerto Rico: A Threat to the Sovereignty of the Caribbean and Central America," *op. cit.*, pp. 5-10.

26 B. Gwertzman, "Steps to the Invasion: No More Paper Tiger," *The New York Times*, October 30, 1983. (Our emphasis) For an analysis of the decision of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, see: C. Sunshine and P. Wheaton, *Muerte de una Revolución. Un Análisis de la Tragedia de Granada y la Invasión Norteamericana*, Washington, D.C.: EPICA, January, 1984, pp. 43-49, and K.I. Boodhoo, "Grenada: The Birth and Death of a Revolution." *Dialogues*, (Occasional Papers Series), Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, pp. 45-53.

27 Quoted in: General Accounting Office, "AID Assistance to the Eastern Caribbean: Program Changes and Possible Consequences," GAO ID-83-50, July 2, 1983, p. 16. This comprehensive report mentions, among other things, some measures that could have been taken so that United States aid would not reach Grenada, while continuing to cooperate with the Bank.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

29 Correspondent, "OECS--Key Jobs and Challenges." *Caribbean Contact*, February, 1982, p. 7.

30 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is the successor of the "West Indies (Associated States) Council," that was established in 1966 as an administrative arrangement to foster common joint services among the seven Associated States. The achievement of independence by some islands led to the creation of this organization with its own legal personality which brought together the independent, and even dependent, islands. Some of the common services of a functional nature are the Eastern Caribbean Common Market and the Eastern Caribbean Monetary Authority. See: "OECS--A New Beginning," *Caricom Perspective* (Guyana), July, 1981.

31 Two pretexts for the signing of this agreement were: (1) the possibility that Grenada contribute actively to the subversion of its neighbors, and (2) that Grenada might become a center for exporting Cuban or Soviet influence, or that facilities or military bases of these two countries be established on the island. See: N. Linton, "Facing up to Ideological Pluralism," *Caribbean Contact*, February, 1982.

32 E. Lynch, "Moscow Eyes the Caribbean," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No. 284, August 17, 1983, p. 9.

33 The Antigua Defense Force which was established in the seventies when the Island was still an Associated State is unusual since Great Britain maintained juris-

diction over everything related to defense and foreign affairs under this status. Nevertheless, what is truly unheard of is the fact that this defense force was trained by the Canadian company Space Research Corporation. The government of Premier V. Bird was later forced to expel the company when it was proven that it had sent arms to South Africa. See: "The Premier Must Explain," *Caribbean Dialogue* (Canada), 3, No. 3, April/May, 1977, pp. 6-7.

34 Y. Collart, "Regional Conflict Resolution and the Integration Process in the Commonwealth Caribbean," in R.M. Preiswerk, ed., *Regionalism and the Commonwealth Caribbean*, Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1969, p. 172.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

36 See: "Sally's Salvo," *Caribbean Contact*, April, 1983. For an analysis of perception as determined in the conflicting behavior, see: J. Dedring, *Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research: A Critical Survey*, California: Sage Publications Inc., 1976, pp. 141-144.

37 J. Lloyd Mecham states that the United States developed a "Caribbean consciousness" after 1900 upon building and controlling the Panama Canal, and when it began to perceive the region as a 'sphere of influence' vital for national security. See: J. Lloyd Mecham, *Survey of United States-Latin American Relations*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1965, pp. 239-241, 258-263.

38 See: S. Marksman, "The Caribbean: An Overview," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 10, August/September, 1980, pp. 4-6.

39 H.J. Geiger, P. Alleyne and C. Garaj, *Legal Problems of Caribbean Integration, A Study on the Legal Aspects of CARICOM*, The Netherlands: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, and A.W. Sijthoff, 1976, p. 196. The complete text of the Chaguaramas Treaty and other related documents are included in this work.

40 A Barbados senior police officer, Clovis Boyce, suggested the creation of a security office at the CARICOM level but, up to now, no reaction has been forthcoming. See: "Need for a Security Desk," *Advocate News* (Barbados), February 7, 1984, p. 1.

41 The complete text of the Treaty is published in: J. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and the Caribbean: A Contemporary Record, 1980-1982*, Vol. 1, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983, pp. 687-697.

42 H.J. Geiger, P. Alleyne and C. Garaj, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

43 L. Tomassini, "Hacia un Sistema Latinoamericano de Seguridad Regional," *Estudios Internacionales*, XV, No. 60, October/December, 1982, pp. 533-541.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 539.

45 For an analysis of the difficult possibilities for collective security in the Caribbean, see: A.P. Maingot, "National Sovereignty, Collective Security and the Realities of Power in the Caribbean Area," in R.M. Preiswerk, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 220-247.

46 See: Henry Gill, "The Foreign Policy of the Grenada Revolution," *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs* (Barbados), 7, No. 1 1981/1982, pp. 1-5.

47 It is important to point out that in a recent study, a U.S. Army colonel stated that "Venezuela is already involved in regional defense planning with the United States." S.L. Perkins, *Global Demands: Limited Forces, U.S. Army Deployment*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984, p. 89. A study of the Rand Corporation states that, although at this time neither the political-diplomatic nor technical-military requisites are being fulfilled, "Venezuelan officers have from time to time discussed the feasibility of creating some kind of limited rapid deployment force to assist friendly governments in resisting externally supported insurgencies." D.J. Myers, "Venezuela's Pursuit of Caribbean Basin Security," The Rand Corporation, R-2994, AF, January, 1985, p. 40.

48 W.L. McDonald, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

49 See: S. Farrell Lewis and D.T. Mathews, compilers, "Documents on the Invasion of Grenada," *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, Supplement No. 1, October, 1983, p. 67.

50 W.L. McDonald, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, *op. cit.*, p. I-2.

51 See: "Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries," Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, February, 1984, p. 42. Interestingly enough this report always refers to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force as the Caribbean Police Force.

52 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 2, February, 1985, p. 5.

53 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 7, July, 1985, p. 6.

54 See: *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, 17, Nos. 3-4, March/April, 1983, p. 46.

55 See: *Ibid.*, 17, Nos. 7-8, July/August, 1983, p. 59.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

57 W.H.R. Armstrong, QPM, CPM, JP, HM Colonial Police and Overseas, Civil Service (Retd.), "Getting Aid for Police in Grenada," *Advocate News*, December 2, 1983, p. 4. See also: "U.S. Troops Pull Out," *The Grenadian Voice*, December 17, 1983, p. 3, and "Snippets of News," *The Grenadian Voice*, January 28, 1983, p. 3. The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was quartered in the Sandino house factory, which was built with Cuban aid and inaugurated in March, 1983. See: "Sandino Plant a Military Base?", *Indies Times* (Grenada), April 21, 1984. In mid-1984 reports were circulating that "a paramilitary training school" would be build in Carriacou. See: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, August 24, 1984, rc-84-07.

58 "U.S. Plans to Open Embassy in Grenada," *Advocate News*, December 19, 1983, p. 12. See also: "Americans Keep Peacekeeping Force Mobile," *The Grenadian Voice*, 2, No. 10, n.d., p. 1.

59 See: "Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries," *op. cit.*, p. 40. The task of the U.S. Coast Guard, that consisted of 95 men, was to provide coastal surveillance and aid to the Grenadian customs authorities. It had two coast guard boats and a boat for buoys. The maintenance detachment, made up of 20 men, took care of the equipment and also trained the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. See also: W. Rilong, "A Good Cop Is Hard to Find in Grenada; 'Grenadian, American, Caribbeans Patrol While Island Slowly Rebuilds Police." *Los Angeles Times*, May 24, 1984.

60 See: The American Friends Service Committee, *Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean. A Report of a Delegation*

Visit between December 27, 1983 and January 9, 1984, Philadelphia, 1984, p. 26. This report is essential for the study of the first months of United States military occupation of Grenada.

61 *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 7, July, 1985, p. 6.

62 See: "Britain, Grenada Sign Accord," *Advocate News*, December 23, 1983, p. 12, and "Britain Resuming Her Aid to Grenada," *Advocate News*, January 5, 1984, p. 3.

63 In general terms, Canada seems to have continued to offer its traditional aid to the security forces of the former British colonies in the Caribbean. See: "Police training centre opens," *The Grenadian Voice*, April 14, 1984, p. 9. For an evaluation of Canada's security policy carried out at the end of the sixties, see: R.A. Preston, "Caribbean Defence and Security: A Study of the Implications of Canada's 'Special Relationship' with the Commonwealth West Indies," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 70, No. 3, Summer, 1971, pp. 317-331.

64 See: G. Hovey, "Caribbean Nations Still in U.S. Focus," *The New York Times*, February 3, 1980, and K. De Young, "Island Nations Suddenly in Limelight (First of a series)," *Washington Post*, September 28, 1980.

65 "U.S. May Help Islands Guard against Any Coups," *Miami Herald*, May 27, 1979. See also: R. Dole, "U.S. Concern at Instability in the Caribbean," *Financial Times*, May 25, 1979.

66 The United States Ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Sally Shelton, stated in July, 1979 that her country "had not in the past provided security aid for individual territories in the area, but might be prepared to do so in the context of a regional approach to the subject agreed upon by OECS." D. Renwick, "Caribbean aid is aimed at halting instability," *Financial Times*, July 13, 1979.

67 See: J. Bloch and P. Fitzsimmons, "The Eastern Caribbean 'Coast Guard'," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 11, December, 1980, pp. 22-23.

68 Quoted in: *Ibid.*, p. 22.

69 For information and an excellent analysis of this complete process see: M.T. Klare, C. Arnson, *et al.*, *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982, pp. 17-28.

70 For an analysis of the implementation of these counter-insurgency programs in the Anglophone Caribbean during the sixties see: H. García Muñiz, "Apuntes sobre la Política Militar de Estados Unidos en el Caribe Angloparlante," *El Caribe Contemporáneo*, No. 11 (forthcoming). The classic work on this topic is: W.F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power. Counterinsurgency and Civil Action in Latin America*, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966.

71 See: M.T. Klare, C. Arnson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-38.

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73 M.T. Klare, C. Arnson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

74 For a stimulating and detailed analysis of Puerto Rico's role within the United States military policy in the Caribbean, see: J. Rodríguez Beruff, "Puerto Rico en la Militarización del Caribe, 1979-1984," *op. cit.*, pp. 17-30.

75 "El Salvador Leader Says the FBI is Training Investigation Squad," *The New York Times*, May 30, 1984, p. 1. See: H. Lidin, "FBI Runs Carib Police School at Roosevelt Roads," *The San Juan Star*, May 31, 1984.

76 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 4, April, 1985, p. 3.

77 "US Security Assistance and Arms Transfers for the 1980's," Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 13.

78 Quoted in: The Resource Center, *Focus on the Eastern Caribbean: Bananas, Boots and Bucks*, Albuquerque, N.M.: by the author, 1984, p. 28. An excellent descriptive and analytical work on the present situation in each island of the Eastern Caribbean.

79 See: D. Farah, "EE.UU. entrena a la policía salvadoreña," *El Nuevo Día* (Puerto Rico), February 16, 1986, p. 49.

80 See: *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police of Barbados for the Year 1956*, Barbados: Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 7.

81 The Leewards Islands Police Force had its headquarters in Antigua in the XIX century and its jurisdiction covered Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. This force was eliminated in 1960 and the Antigua, Montserrat and Virgin Islands Force was then established. In 1966, "Royal" was added to the title. In 1967, when Antigua became an Associated State, this subregional police force was also eliminated. See: Claudia Colbi, "In Focus: the Police in Action," *B.V. Islander* (British Virgin Islands) 1, No. 4, April, 1974, p. 5.

82 *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, 16, No. 9-10, September/October, 1983, p. 31.

83 In the British Virgin Islands, the police received British aid for capital expenses. The British government financed the cost of construction and the local government took care of maintenance. In 1971, the local membership in the force was 40%. In 1974, a communication system was established that communicated the police from this colony with all the other islands of the Eastern Caribbean. See: C. Colbi, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

84 See: "Britain Has Not Lost Interest in the Caribbean," *The Caribbean and West Indies Chronicle*, February/March, 1983, p. 6.

85 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 7, No. 12, December, 1984, p. 11.

86 See: "Fifty Police Officers for Training in Barbados," *The Grenadian Voice*, January 21, 1984, p. 1; "Scotland Yard Helps," *Advocate News*, January 22, 1983, p. 3, and "Snippets," *The Grenadian Voice*, January 21, 1984, p. 3.

87 See: "Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries," *op. cit.*, p. 42.

88 D. Bohning, "Grenada Invasion Feeds Militarization of East Caribbean," *Miami Herald*, February 9, 1984; F.J. Prial, "U.S. Teaching Defense in the Caribbean," *The New York Times*, February 19, 1983, p. 3; H. O'Shaughnessy and C. James, "Shultz Visit to Grenada

Underlies U.S. Interest," *Financial Times*, February 19, 1984.

89 Actually, the U.S. Coast Guard wanted to go along with the tide in the offensive of military aid as expressed by Commander Joseph Fannelli, Latin American Military Affairs Directorate of HQ SOUTHCOM, "The Coast Guard in the Caribbean Basin: A Role for the 1980's," Summer 1981.

90 HQ, U.S. Forces Caribbean, "The Caribbean Regional Coast Guard," *DISAM Newsletter*, Fall, 1985, p. 57.

91 F.J. Prial, *op. cit.*

92 See: "St. Kitts Admitted," *Advocate News*, February 9, 1984, p. 1. Prime Minister Kennedy Simmons stated that without the military training of the United States, the country would be "at the mercy of mercenaries and other international agents." The Resource Center, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

93 See: J.B. Treaster, "G.I.'s Whip Grenada Unit into Shape." *The New York Times*, January 3, 1985.

94 See: D. Sewell, "Grenada Se Une al Pacto de Seguridad," *El Reportero* (Puerto Rico), February 27, 1985.

95 W. Rilong, *op. cit.*, and P. Gailey, "U.S. Says All G.I.'s Will Quit Grenada," *The New York Times*, February 8, 1985, p. 3A.

96 See: "Charles: No Arms Build-Up," *Advocate News*, January 8, 1984, p. 3; *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, January 20, 1984, rc-84-01; "Charles says: It's No Secret Army," *Advocate News*, January 30, 1984; "News Capsule: To Join Forces in Grenada," *Advocate News*, February 4, 1984, p. 1; "News Capsule: Police Complete Training," *Advocate News*, February 10, 1984, p. 1; "News Capsule: 18 Replacements," *Advocate News*, February 11, 1984, p. 1; and B. Diederich, "The End of West Indian Innocence. Arming the Police," *Caribbean Review*, XIII, No. 2 Spring 1984, pp. 11-12.

97 See: A. Brandfor, "Call for U.S. to Help Train Our Forces," *Advocate News*, November 8, 1983, p. 5.

98 "Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries," *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4. An amendment to Section 660 was also suggested by the Kissinger Report for Central America in January of the same year. See: "El Informe Kissinger para Centroamérica y el Caribe," *El Caribe Contemporáneo*, No. 8, June 1984, pp. 125-126; N. Goldberg, "Don't Aid Central American Police," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1984; and H. Borkhalter and A. Paine, "Our Overseas Cops," *The Nation*, September 24, 1985, p. 197.

99 See: "Top U.S. Military Delegation Meets with Local Police and Security Officials," *Lucian Times*, (St. Lucia), 1, No. 7, September, 1983, p. 2. The difficulty of obtaining information from each island does not allow us to corroborate whether these meetings took place on the other islands. The *Lucian Times* reports an "extraordinary increase" in the visits of similar delegations to Dominica.

100 The MAP Program consists mainly of the donation of military equipment and weapons, while IMET provides training for foreign military personnel in the United States or in the U.S. Armed Forces schools abroad.

101 *Latin American Monitor*, 1, No. 1, January 1-31, 1984, p. 4.

102 "Adams Favors Regional Army," *Advocate News*, January 23, 1984, p. 1. (Our emphasis).

103 See: F. Lewis, "To Cool the Caribbean," *The New York Times*, January 27, 1984.

104 See: "Report of the Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries," *op. cit.*, pp. 24-43.

105 "U.S. Studying Security Plan," *Advocate News*, February 9, 1984, p. 1.

106 "Region Seeking Help with Force," *Advocate News*, February 9, 1984, p. 1. Adams used the NATO analogy in his conversations with Shultz.

107 F. Lewis, *op. cit.*

108 W. Rilong, *op. cit.*

109 B. Diederich, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

110 "'Defense Force is a Military Secret'," *Advocate News*, March 21, 1984, p. 1.

111 R. Singh, "Policy Turnabout," *Caribbean Contact*, September, 1985, p. 1.

112 J.B. Treaster, "Caribbean War Games: Not Everyone is Delighted," *The New York Times*, September 16, 1985, p. 2.

113 See: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, *op. cit.*

114 M.E. Gil, "Caribe Oriental: Tregua a las Armas," *Claridad* (Puerto Rico), March 3-9, 1985, p. 41.

115 "Problems Remain for Revised Regional Security Concept," *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 3, March, 1985, p. 5. See also: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, August 24, 1984, rc-84-07.

116 H. Morgenthau, "The Police in Their Political Setting," H. Morgenthau, ed., *Truth and Power. Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970, p. 301. (Our emphasis).

117 See: R. Singh, *op. cit.*

118 *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, August 24, 1984, rc-84-07.

119 Quoted in: B. Diederich, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

120 A. Martin, "The Internal Impact of Militarization in Dominica," Paper presented in the Seminar on Threats to Peace in the Caribbean and Central America, Aguas Buenas, Puerto Rico, October 4, 1984.

121 J.B. Treaster, "G.I.'s Unit Whipped Grenada Unit into Shape," *op. cit.* (Our emphasis).

122 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 4, April 1985, p. 1.

123 The second-in-command of the Dominica Defense Force, Malcolm Reid, was found guilty together with former Prime Minister Patrick John of attempting to overthrow the government in 1981. See: *The San Juan Star*, October 24, 1985, p. 10.

124 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 9, September, 1985, p. 4.

125 E. Bousquet, "Caribbean Security Service under Suspicion," *Caribbean Contact*, November, 1985, p. 7.

126 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 8, August, 1985, p. 1.

127 V. Lewis, "Warning against 'Security' Question in the US-Caribbean Ties," *Caribbean Contact*, April, 1982.

128 R. Singh, "OECS Leaders to Talk," *Advocate News*, February 20, 1984, p. 4. Lewis stated that the interven-

tion in Grenada could be seen, according to each person's own philosophical perception, as "the high point" or the "most disastrous moment of the OECS." He added that "all the prevailing factors of October 1983 and the subsequent discoveries and assessments in Grenada itself, have served to justify the decision taken by the governments of the OECS."

129 For a fuller discussion, see: H.A. Watson, "The Caribbean Basin Initiative and Caribbean Development," *Contemporary Marxism*, No. 10, pp. 1-37, and D. Phillips, "Caribbean Militarization: A Response to the Crisis," *Contemporary Marxism*, No. 10, pp. 92-109.

130 J.B. Treaster, "Caribbean War Games: Not Everyone is Delighted," *op.cit.*

131 See: D. Ronfeldt, "Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin," The Rand Corporation, R-2997-AF/RC, November, 1983, pp. v-vi.

132 "Secretary Shultz: Security and Economic Assistance for FY 1984," *Current Policy* No. 454, February 16, 1983, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., p. 2.

133 *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 5, May, 1985, p. 1.

134 The correspondent for *The New York Times* described them in the following manner: "Trained by the United States Special Forces and equipped with M-16 rifles, they and about 300 others, still at home on their islands, make up one of the most lethal concentrations of firepower in the modern history of the English-speaking Caribbean." Saint Vincent refused to participate in the exercise. Prime Minister Mitchell stated that the regional security system "is not a priority for me." J.B. Treaster, *op. cit.*

135 See: *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 3.

136 See: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, August 24, 1984, rc-84-07, p. 1.

137 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 9, September, 1985, p. 3. For an analysis of the creation and development of the rapid deployment units see: M.T. Klare, *Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome": U.S. Interventionism in the 1980's*, Washington, D.C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1982, Chapter 5.

138 See: "Crearán Escuela Militar Caribeña en Antigua," *Claridad*, November 22-28, 1985, p. 32.

139 *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 12, December, 1985, p. 2.

140 See: Correspondent, "US Military to Train in Antigua," *Caribbean Contact*, December, 1985, p. 9.

141 D. Bohning, "Antigua on Sunday Becomes the 34th Nation on Hemisphere," *Miami Herald*, October 28, 1981. The United States delegation to the independence celebration was made up of 23 people and Under Secretary of State William P. Clark announced at that time that the consulate would become an embassy. See: "New Nation Gets $19 Million Gift," *Miami Herald*, November 2, 1981.

142 See: S. Conn and B. Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1960, Reprint 1978, pp. 51-62.

143 The complete text of the agreement is published in: R.M. Preiswerk, ed., *Documents on International Relations in the Caribbean*, Río Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico; St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1970, pp. 617-637.

144 See: "United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations," Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April, 1979, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 203.

145 *Hearing Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives*, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Sub-Committee of the Department of Defense (Part 3), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 315. (Our emphasis). See also: R. Crasweller, *The Caribbean Community. Changing Societies and U.S. Policy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, pp. 42-43, and T. Mathews, "The Military Prsence in the Caribbean," *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, 7, No. 7, September, 1973, pp. 7-11.

146 See: *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, 11, No. 10, October, 1977, p. 27.

147 Quoted in: "Strange Activities in Antigua: CIA and Military Intelligence on the Move," *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 10, August/September, 1980, p. 32. This article says that the relief station is in truth the center of the CIA communications network in the Eastern Caribbean.

148 Vere Bird is 75 years old and Lester hopes to be his successor, although it is said that the Minister of Finance, John St. Luce, has the support of the party. See: Correspondent, "US Military to Train in Antigua," *op. cit.*

149 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 8, August, 1985, p. 2.

150 See: *Ibid.*, 8, No. 6, June, 1985, p. 2.

151 See: *Ibid.*, 8, No. 9, September, 1985, p. 2.

152 See: *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, October 30, 1981, rc-81-09, p. 8.

153 See: *Caribbean Monthly Bulletin*, 14, Nos. 11-12, November/December, 1980, p. 45.

154 Quoted in: A.P. Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Playing the Cuban Card," *Caribbean Review*, Winter, 1980, p. 45.

155 See: E. Dew, "Did Suriname Switch? Dialectics a la Dante," *Caribbean Review*, Fall, 1983, pp. 29-30. See also: R.S. Gowrichwarn, "El Golpe de Estado de Surinam," *El Caribe Contemporáneo*, No. 6, June, 1982, pp. 51-66, and A. Lampe, "Nuevos Acontecimientos en Surinam," *El Caribe Contemporáneo*, No. 6, June, 1982, pp. 67-69.

156 See: W. Hodge, "Brazil Negotiating Trade Aid Deal with Surinam," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1983.

157 See: "CIA Suriname Plot Reported," *Miami Herald*, June 1, 1983.

158 When Jean Claude Duvalier inherited power in 1971, the United States sent a marine detachment to train the "Leopards." See: "Exporting the American Idea in Haiti," *Caribbean Contact*, September, 1982, p. 3.

159 For a recent analysis, see: L.R. Fernández Tabio, "Prioridades de la 'Asistencia de Seguridad' Norteamericana hacia América Latina en 1984," *Síntesis Informativa CIAC* (Cuba), No. 70, 1984, pp. 14-19.

160 D.C. Jones, General, USAF, *United States Military Posture for FY 1982: An Overview with a Supplement Pre-*

pared by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d., p. 66. (Our emphasis).

161 See: *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 7, July, 1985, p. 7.

162 *Moneda* (Puerto Rico), p. 2.

163 *Ibid.*, p. 19. See: G.D. Martin, "The United States Armed Services and the Puerto Rican Economy: A Quantitative Appraisal," *Puerto Rico Business Review*, 9, No. 8, August, 1984, pp. 3-12.

164 A study by the Rand Corporation suggests that an expansion of a hostile presence in the Basin, in addition to that of Cuba, would require the designing of a new command structure, perhaps called the "North American Security Zone," and which would include the United States and Canada. See: D. Ronfeldt, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

165 For an analysis of Cuban military forces see: The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1983*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d., pp. 115-116.

166 Admiral McDonald stated that "there are times when I have seriously questioned our ability to respond to simultaneous world crises and still have a credible force to deal with a Soviet or Cuban power manoeuvre in the Caribbean." *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean Report*, March 29, 1985, rc-85-03, pp. 4-5.

167 See: M. Goldwert, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of the United States Intervention*, Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962. For more information concerning the Dominican Republic see: S.M. Fuller, Capt., USMCR, and G.A. Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924*, Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1974, pp. 45-52. On Haiti see: J.H. McCrocklin, compiler, *Garde D'Haiti 1915-1934. Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps*, Annapolis, Maryland: The U.S. Naval Institute, 1956.

168 W. LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions. The United States in Central America*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984, p. 169.

169 E.N. Muller, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," *International Studies Quarterly*, 29, No. 4, December, 1985, pp. 465-466.

170 See: C. Stone, "The Jamaican Reaction: Grenada and the Political Stalemate," *Caribbean Review*, XII, No. 4, Fall, 1983, pp. 31-32, 60-63, and *Caribbean Insight*, 8, No. 6, June, 1985, p. 3.

171 "Bish—US Willing to Intervene Again," *Advocate News*, January 30, 1984, p. 4.