Draft Human Rights Report on Suriname for 1983

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2012-32749
Doc No. C05267195
Date: 01/03/2013

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJ: Draft Human Rights Report on Suriname for 1983

1. (CONFIDENTIAL – ENTIRE TEXT).
2. TRANSMITTED FOR DEPARTMENT’S REVIEW IS EMBASSY’S DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON SURINAME FOR 1983. ALL SECTIONS IN TEXT ARE KEYED TO FORMAT IN REFTEL, PER INSTRUCTIONS.

Introduction
Suriname is ruled by a military government whose authority derives from its monopoly of force. At the apex is a four-man National Policy Center, headed by the Commander of the National Armed Forces, LTC. Desire D. Bouterse. A Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, is assigned the task of implementing Policy Center decisions and running day-to-day government operations. The current cabinet is a coalition of ministers from the Progressive Workers and Farmers Union (PALU) and the Revolutionary People’s Party (RVP), plus two politically unaffiliated ministers. (Technically, all political parties are banned; these identifications derive from pre-ban affiliations.)

This situation results from a trend toward military authoritarianism which began with the February 25, 1980 coup by a group of 16 non-commissioned officers. The military government has given the people little reason to hope for restoration of parliamentary democracy, formerly the hallmark of Suriname’s political system after independence (in November 1975) from three centuries of Dutch colonial rule. The government has no electoral mandate, but it is not actively or violently resisted within Suriname. It is tolerated by people lacking the means to emigrate, by those whose economic livelihood the government does not directly threaten, and it is actively supported by those who find no other source of hope for a better life.

There has been a steady expansion of the country’s security apparatus since (1) the military’s December 8-9, 1982 violent preemptive actions against civilian opposition leaders, and (2) the emergence of the anti-regime campaign by the expatriate Council for the Liberation of Suriname based in the Netherlands. The security forces consist of the armed forces (including military police), the people’s militia, and anti-intervention committees. Anti-intervention committees were formed early in 1983 to alert the population to the “mercenary threat” from abroad as well as to perform general political mobilization and security duties. Additionally, “revolutionary mass organizations” (anti-intervention committees, youth militia, people’s committees, youth organizations, and others) all have been assigned a role in mobilizing people to “defend the revolution” against its “imperialist” enemies and to induce citizens to support social and economic goals as defined by Commander Bouterse.

Suriname continues to have a predominantly free-market economy, with state control or influence exerted principally through regulation. There has been a gradual expansion of industrial firms wholly or partly controlled by government—the so-called parastatal sector. There are few restrictions on individual, small-scale enterprises. The current government has encouraged this tradition of free enterprise in part to support its goal of economic self-sufficiency and full employment.

The human rights picture in Suriname is mixed.

On the one hand, freedom of speech and press is curtailed. There are no political mechanisms to allow everyone a voice in how the government is conducted. With no parliament, laws are promulgated by decree, with little if any citizen input. There is periodic invasion of domestic privacy. A midnight-to-four a.m. curfew is imposed from Mondays to Fridays. The government has recently interfered in internal trade union matters.

On the other hand, there is freedom of non-political assembly and association. Workers retain the written right to strike and unions have resumed limited activity in the past six months. There is no attempt by the government to restrict religious practices. Churches, synagogues, mosques, and Hindu temples are open and freely visited. The Baha’i faith is freely practiced as well as imported African and Native Amerindian animistic cults. Racial, sexist, or other major forms of discrimination against individuals are not condoned by the government.

A special court, established to try former government officials accused of corruption, ended its work in June 1983. The court’s legitimacy was criticized by Amnesty International (AI) in its 1982 Human Rights Report, and there is reason to believe that AI’s criticism had some bearing on the government’s decision to disband the court.

Surinamers are free to travel within and outside the country. The government has gradually become more receptive to allowing relatively unimpeded investigations by international and non-governmental human rights organizations. The people’s standard of living is comparatively high, despite current financial difficulties caused by the cutoff of aid from the Netherlands in December 1982. Suriname’s per capita GNP of dollars 3,032 is among the highest in the region. (By way of contrast, per capita GNP for the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole was dollars 1,840, according to 1980 World Bank data.) There is little abject poverty. Adult literacy is 67 percent—high by Caribbean standards.

In summary, the human rights situation in Suriname in 1983 represents a derogation from the admirable conditions existing before the 1980 revolution, and particularly before the killings of December 1982, but it remains far better than is the case in many—perhaps most—countries in the hemisphere. The problem lies not in the magnitude of overt crimes or in government decrees eliminating or compromising human rights, but in the fear generated by limited though dramatic events, and the intimidation arising from government statements and political rallies threatening harm to those who oppose the revolution.

The public mood has changed during the course of 1983. The shock and silent panic that followed the events of December 1982 has given way to resignation and guarded optimism. Surinamers who felt personally threatened by the December 1982 turn of events have either departed the country or decided to remain and somehow exist within the system. For almost four years Surinamers have gone without the prospect of free and secret elections, but that deprivation no longer seriously rankles. It is not possible to criticize the government through public institutions or the media, but Surinamers are quite outspoken within the circle of their friends. They do not live in an atmosphere of fear and trembling. Indeed, the casual visitor to this country finds nothing amiss, and much to admire. Outwardly, the country is calm, peaceful, prosperous. Only behind the scenes is the picture somewhat different.

Respect for Human Rights

Section 1. Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From

A. Unlawful or Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

Surinamers now live under a five-day per week curfew imposed by the military in December 1982. In February 1983, one person who allegedly violated the curfew was shot and killed by police. We received three reports of isolated curfew-related killings by security forces, but they have not been documented.

On February 3, former Deputy Commander Roy Horb, arrested the previous month with several of his bodyguards and two former ministers in connection with an alleged plot to assassinate Commander Bouterse, was found dead in his cell. There were widespread reports that Horb had been tortured, drugged, and hanged or forced to hang himself by authorities.

According to the official version of events, jailers at the military prison where Horb was incarcerated found him dead hanging by a waist-string from his gym shorts. The report released by the coroner, and investigation by police experts, agreed with the government’s statement that there was no evidence of foul play, and that Horb had committed suicide. The local government-controlled newspaper reported later that after examination of tissue and blood samples from Horb’s body, a medical laboratory in Holland found no evidence of drugs. However, objective observers are skeptical. The government’s account of Horb’s death in his cell lacks credibility.

B. Disappearance

There were at least six unconfirmed reports that two of the bodyguards of the late Major Roy Horb, who were arrested January 30 in connection with an alleged assassination plot, were found dead in a river. The authorities have not publicly commented on those reports. To our knowledge, the government has not sponsored non-governmental forces to abduct people, and it has the capability to prevent such action if indeed it were to occur by forces other than its own. There are periodic unconfirmed reports of politically-related disappearances.

C. Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Since December 8, 1982, the military police have arrested and detained for varying lengths of time Surinamese and foreign nationals for alleged anti-government activities. Precise numbers are not available, but we estimate total at fewer than 100 persons. There have been no charges that torture accompanied these detentions.

According to press reports, an investigator from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who visited Suriname in February said that prison conditions for political detainees in the alleged Horb conspiracy were poor. The ICRC conducted a follow-up investigation in early October, but the results have not yet been made public.

Dutch nationals arrested and interrogated by military police received degrading treatment. On February 8, two Dutch sisters (one a Suriname resident) were arrested at the airport by military police and charged with sending seditious information (by telephone) out of the country. They were taken into custody for two days during which time they were apparently subjected to harassment and indignities. They were subsequently obliged to appear on television where they were “interrogated” by an official of the government’s National Information Service, and forced to confess their “crimes.” One sister, who was expelled from the country, later reported that Lt. Col. Bouterse told her if she revealed anything of her treatment, her sister who remained in Suriname would be harmed. She also said she had been threatened and roughed up by military police officers. Suriname authorities maintained that the two sisters were assisting overseas enemies who wanted to “destabilize” the country’s leadership. There was no official response to the allegations of mistreatment and threats.

On August 28, a Dutch journalist and another Dutch citizen resident in French Guiana were arrested in Paramaribo for allegedly “photographing military objects.” The journalist said after his expulsion from Suriname that he had been threatened with physical harm by the military police chief.

D. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

During the year, the embassy received approximately 13 reports of arbitrary arrest or detention since December 8, 1982, but they remain undocumented and the authorities have not admitted to such occurrences. Those arrested (including one government official) have reportedly been questioned for their alleged involvement in plots to invade Suriname by expatriate “mercenaries” of the Netherlands-based Council for the Liberation of Suriname.

As far as we are aware, all detainees were released after one to three days of questioning without significant duress. On July 27, military police rounded up and deported two thousand or more aliens across Suriname in night and early morning raids. Eighty percent of the deportees apparently were undocumented workers from neighboring Guyana, i.e., illegal immigrants.

According to eyewitness reports, the Guyanese were rousted out of their beds without warning and put on buses for the border if they lacked visas or valid work permits. There have been no such massive roundups since. The Guyanese ambassador in Paramaribo expressed the view that the Suriname government was within its rights to deport these illegal immigrants.

E. Denial of Fair Public Trial

In the case of the late Major Horb and those implicated in his alleged assassination conspiracy, arrests were carried out by military police operating without court warrants. The prisoners were held in military prison. Following Horb’s death on February 3, one minister involved was brought to trial in civil court where he was represented by legal counsel. Four of Horb’s bodyguards were court-martialed. Three were acquitted for insufficient evidence and one was convicted for mistreatment of a prisoner.

The civilian magistrate in the cases of both the bodyguards and the minister appeared to exercise control of the judicial process. The judges threw out major charges against the accused, citing insufficient proof by the government of guilt. In the case of the minister who went to trial, the court recommended that eight months of his sentence be remanded due to time spent in pre-trial detention.

The two persons receiving prison terms as the result of these trials are the only persons known to the embassy who could be considered “political prisoners.”

The recently published report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) on the human rights situation in Suriname concluded that “serious violations of important human rights provided in the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man have occurred in Suriname.” In the area of denial of fair public trial, the IAHRC report stated that independent judicial power in Suriname has been abridged since judges now serve at the pleasure of the policy center. This was found to be contrary to the now-abrogated 1975 Constitution’s provision for an independent judiciary.

Additionally, due to “the climate of fear which pervades the legal profession,” according to the report, lawyers are unwilling to defend people accused of political crimes, i.e., crimes against the state. The report also stated that there is a lack of judicial authority over cases involving crimes allegedly threatening state security.

F. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy

There have been about 20 unconfirmed reports in 1983 that the government engages in systematic telephonic surveillance in its attempt to ferret out persons it perceives to be politically dangerous. The two Dutch sisters arrested for sedition may have been apprehended through information which the police gained via taps of telephones. There are also 10–12 uncorroborated reports of mail openings by the post office.

In addition, customs agents at the airport have on at least two occasions seized, opened, and read stamped mail which had been handed over by residents to travelers for posting outside Suriname. During maneuvers, the army has also infringed on individual privacy when vehicles were stopped and searched without advance warning, and homes in the maneuver areas were reportedly entered without notice.

The expansion of “revolutionary mass organizations” which support the revolution has resulted in intimidation of many people. The people’s militia and anti-intervention committees are urged by government to report any “suspicious” persons or actions by individuals in neighborhoods, and some units work closely with military police in the continuing attempt to “defend the revolution” against enemies.

International news magazines such as Time or Newsweek must be submitted to government censorship before newsstand distribution, though the embassy knows of no instance when the magazines failed to appear. The government apparently attempted on one occasion to jam a broadcast by Radio Netherlands, which it accused of spreading anti-government information disseminated by the Council for the Liberation of Suriname.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

A. Freedom of Speech and Press

Since December 8, 1982, Surinamers have become increasingly reluctant publicly to criticize their government. Fear of retribution has increased in proportion to the expansion of security forces and “mass organizations.” The establishment of anti-intervention committees within most public organizations and institutions has caused many citizens to fear that even one inadvertent critical comment about the country or its leaders may result in loss of jobs, or worse.

Suriname is without an independent press. The government stated in May 1983 that once a committee now at work develops a code to ensure “responsible” journalistic behavior, the private media which were closed or destroyed on December 8, 1982, will be permitted to reopen. In conjunction with their drive to mobilize support for the revolution, the authorities have indicated that only the so-called hitherto voiceless and oppressed masses will have the right to express their views in these fora.

The government emphasis on creation of a new single political party which effectively precludes any other indicates that for the average Surinamer, the lack of a vehicle to express personal political views which may differ from the authorities will become the norm rather than the exception. Commander Bouterse is expected to make a major announcement regarding the institutionalization of his new party at a planned November 25th mass meeting.

While there is no official ban on public assembly for the purpose of criticizing the government, a climate of intimidation arises through unrelenting government publicity of activities of anti-intervention committees, people’s committees, people’s militia, and the military police in “defense of the revolution.” LTC Bouterse announced in June 1982 that the people’s militia will be expanding at the rate of 500 persons per month.

Surinamers also remain intimidated by the events of November–December 1982, when those who organized marches, demonstrations, and strikes against the government were beaten, jailed, and killed (the 15 who were executed on December 8–9, 1982). The connection between November 1982 public assembly for redress of grievance and December 1982 response of retaliatory brutality is easily and widely made to this date in Surinamese minds.

The only news sources available to Suriname are government-controlled facilities: one newspaper, one printed news bulletin, one army newspaper, one television service, and one radio station. In order to hear uncensored news about Suriname or the rest of the world, many Surinamers tune in to short-wave broadcasts of Radio Netherlands, the BBC, Voice of America, and even Voice of Israel.

The previously cited Inter-American Human Rights Commission report on Suriname also says that the people’s right to free opinion has been jeopardized by a 1983 government decree which bans the possession, distribution, sale, and importation of any work that might be considered threatening to national security or public morals.

B. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

In mid-1983, the government withdrew the December 1982 decree which restricted public gatherings to no more than three persons. Political parties remain banned. Political organization is limited to supporters of the revolution through officially sanctioned organizations, for example, anti-intervention committees. Most Surinamers have no vehicle to express their personal political views.

Labor organizations have resumed relatively normal activities during the past six months, for example, renegotiating recurring wage agreements. There have been two wildcat strikes. The government has shown readiness to intervene in labor disputes where the opportunity exists to increase its influence in the labor movement. In one case, the government imposed a referendum to resolve an internal union conflict at a lumber company. The moderate incumbent union board lost to a leadership slate backed by activists of the radical Revolutionary People’s Party.

The losing board has, however, initiated a lawsuit which in part alleges that the government supervisors of the referendum allowed non-union employees to vote. In another labor dispute, the National Policy Center appointed a military officer to investigate and report back to it on internal dissidence in one union at the Paramaribo docks.

The AFL-CIO recently issued a statement in October 1983 condemning Commander Bouterse by name for his “continuing repression and abuse of trade union organizations” and in particular “Bouterse’s wanton murder on December 8, 1982 of Cyrill Daal, chairman of the Moederbond Labor Federation.” The AFL-CIO pledged to work together with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to have trade union rights restored in Suriname.

LTC Bouterse’s newest effort to consolidate the revolution includes a proposal to amalgamate Suriname’s four competing labor federations into one. The four independent federations appear to be regarded as conservative obstacles to achievement of revolutionary social and economic goals. There are indications that the nationalistic C-47 Trade Union Federation, apparently supported by Commander Bouterse, has convinced or cowed the other three federations to join it in a national trade union council which C-47 hopes will be the precursor to the complaisant unitary labor organization which the regime hopes to co-opt for its purposes.

C. Freedom of Religion

There is no infringement of freedom of religion. Many religious organizations which chose to adopt a low profile in the aftermath of the December 1982 crackdown on political opposition have resumed normal activities. Articles sponsored by churches and sects appear in the daily newspaper, and in television and radio spots.

D. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Surinamers are not restricted from traveling within or outside the country, from changing jobs, moving residences, from emigrating, or from returning home after long years abroad. Increasingly tight currency restrictions, however, place an indirect restraint on the individual’s freedom to travel outside the country.

Many Surinamers continue to emigrate to Holland, the Netherlands Antilles, and less frequently, to the United States for a combination of personal, economic, and political reasons. The government has instituted no restrictions on this right to emigrate. While there is no restriction on returning to Suriname after long residence abroad, those Surinamers overseas whom the government has characterized as “mercenaries,” “traitors,” and “threats to national security” (these include former President Chin A Sen and others supporting opposition leaders who were executed in December 1982) rightfully fear for their safety if they were to return to Suriname.

Section 3. The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Surinamers do not have the right to change their government. Despite the military government’s statements that it plans to institute “real democracy” in place of the overturned parliamentary system, there have been no elections in the country since the military coup of February 25, 1980, and none are scheduled.

On May 1, 1983, the government said that it plans to establish procedures and structures which will lead to selection by the people of a representative commission to draft a constitution. This pledge was recently renewed in a draft political document which proposes to institutionalize a one-party system, but no date for the constitution was announced. The same document also said that the “Statute of Basic Rights and Duties” (promulgated by government decree in April 1982 and sometimes referred to as a “transitional constitution”) will be “built up and applied.” There was no further explanation of this statement nor date given for application of the statute.

In any case, Commander Bouterse has said several times since December 1982 that parliamentary democracy is dead in Suriname and that movement toward a new form of constitutionalism depends on the growth and vitality of the “revolutionary mass organizations” which support the planned transformation of Suriname. Those institutions such as trade unions and churches which have traditionally participated in the political process are not allowed to do so now, and there is no indication that they will be allowed to participate in the near future.

The most recent development affecting political participation is the February 25th, or Unity Movement, first announced in June 1983. Commander Bouterse in a recent speech invited Surinamers to critique the movement’s stated objectives of bringing about “real” mass democracy to Suriname in order to help defend the country against “imperialism” and consolidate the revolution. Surinamers were also asked voluntarily to contribute money to finance the Unity Movement. It is the commander’s proposed intention to proclaim a new political order on November 25, 1983. In the period between mid-September and mid-November 1983, all elements of the Surinamese population are invited to express orally or in writing any reservations they may have regarding a series of draft political documents which Commander Bouterse has caused to be circulated.

Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and Non-Governmental Organizations Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

There exist no independent domestic organizations broadly concerned with human rights. Local organizations which address individual issues such as press “freedom” and women’s rights are, however, officially sanctioned but their activities are intended to further the government’s political objectives. The Association of Progressive Media Workers, for example, believes that a responsible press has a politically didactic function—the propagation of revolutionary ideas.

Independent media are seen by LTC Bouterse as parasitical and counterproductive to the goal of integrating the Surinamese people into a new social and political entity. Several women’s organizations in Suriname are sponsored by the Ministry of People’s Mobilization and Culture. Women’s organizations work to bring women into the labor force and ensure equal treatment in employment, sponsor establishment of day care centers and so forth, but the organization’s main goals are perceived to be mobilization of women to support the revolution.

The government is less than enthusiastic about international and non-governmental investigations of human rights in Suriname. The Suriname authorities believe that their enemies overseas (such as the Council for the Liberation of Suriname) pressure outside human rights organizations to visit the country. The government attempts to control the activities of visiting investigative teams, to limit public knowledge of critical reports, or distort to its own purposes any investigation or report which contains positive comments.

In February, following a visit by the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to investigate prison conditions, the government issued a statement intended to show itself as sensitive to human rights issues, despite its hesitation in allowing the visit. In a report about the ICRC team visiting Suriname October 1983, the government-controlled newspaper repeated the charges that “destabilizing” elements overseas attempted to use ICRC findings against Suriname.

In March 1983, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) sent a mission to Suriname to investigate the December 8-9, 1982, killings. The government publicly interpreted the visit as supportive of its human rights policies and did not publish any of the ICJ’s critical findings, despite the latter’s wide circulation overseas.

The April 1983 visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) was treated in a manner designed to decrease the mission’s local visibility. It received sparse press coverage. The IAHRC officials were shown in the press and on TV meeting with government officials, but no government statement regarding the visit was issued.

A July visit by a Caribbean Congress of Labor team investigating the status of trade unions received local media coverage highlighting the government’s self-described pro-labor policies. A representative of the United Nations’ International Human Rights Commission plans to visit Suriname in November 1983.

In his October 1983 speech to the UNGA, Commander Bouterse said his government respects the Charter of the UN and intends to adhere to the basic rules and principles that apply to UN members.

Suriname is eager for resumption of Dutch economic assistance. The Dutch government, as recently as an October 16, 1983, statement by Prime Minister Lubbers, said there will be no resumption of aid without a fair, impartial investigation and explanation of the December killings. This Dutch pressure may explain the Surinamese government’s grudging willingness to receive outside human rights investigators.

The Surinamese government is not itself actively involved in international or regional human rights arenas involving violations in other countries. It is passive except when the government itself stands accused, as before the UNHRC in Geneva in February 1983. At that time, in protest against Dutch government criticism of Suriname before the UNHRC, the Suriname government publicly attacked the Netherlands and accused it of political motives.

Social, Economic, and Cultural Situation

In 1983, government leaders several times publicly renewed their commitment to the people to provide full employment, adequate housing, medical care, nutrition, and education. The government has focused its attention on raising the standard of living of the lowest sectors of the population. Despite the government’s tendency to view steadily increasing state control of the economy as the best means to strengthen and protect the public interest, no nationalizations of firms or industries have taken place this year. Instead, the government has contented itself with promoting its social and economic policies by tightening regulatory control over the country’s relatively large and still vigorous private sector.

Compared to most developing countries, Suriname’s estimated population of 363,000 and its population growth rate of 1.80 percent are low (1983 World Bank figures). To some degree, population growth has been held down due to unimpeded emigration to the Netherlands. However, emigration has slowed due to tighter visa restrictions by the Dutch, and re-emigration of Surinamers (about 1,000 per year, according to unofficial sources).

Last year’s report characterized social and economic standards (as reflected in World Bank and government statistics) as high. This remains true, despite the suspension of Dutch economic aid in December 1982. Per capita GNP, according to 1981 World Bank data, is dollars 3,032.40. Most recent (1982) Government of Suriname figures show dollars 2,860. Other figures such as life expectancy at birth (68.28), infant mortality rate (23.70), and adult literacy rate of 65 percent have not significantly changed from last year. Other figures cited in the table below confirm that the average Surinamer is not experiencing abject poverty:

• Percent of population with access to safe water.
• Primary school enrollment ratios: total 1978—103.00; male 1978—107.00; female 1978—100.00.
• Calorie supply as percent of requirements: total 1977—123.35.
• Percent of population below absolute poverty level: urban (FSID); rural (FSID).

The economic stagnation noted last year continues due to a combination of political and economic factors. Government efforts to assure investors (local and foreign) that the climate for economic activity has improved have not been very successful. The economy remains highly dependent on exports of bauxite and aluminum from the two bauxite-producing companies, Suralco (an Alcoa subsidiary) and Billiton (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell). The bauxite levy first introduced in 1974 has provided a significant percentage of Suriname’s budget revenues.

Overall unemployment is estimated at about 20 percent. Youth unemployment is much higher and expected to continue to climb. Nevertheless, in this family-oriented and closely knit society, many unemployed and poor people can and do depend on families and friends for food and shelter.

Despite this decline in economic activity, the government is committed to instituting wide-ranging social services, such as bringing free schooling to more children, including those in remote areas; free medical care; and increased retirement benefits. However, given the lack of success to date in the search for financial aid to replace the former Dutch development funds, the government has shifted partly to emphasizing construction of a self-sustaining economy, and indeed, has said that citizens can expect to see taxes raised in the near future.

DUEMLING