Meeting with Ambassador Hoekman
F-2012-32744
(C) – Entire text.
Charge met with Ambassador Hoekman at Dutch Embassy March 18 shortly after Bouterse briefing (reftel). Hoekman lingered behind at the end of briefing in order to tell Bouterse, on instructions, that his recall had been specifically intended to carry Dutch concern over Hawker execution, which the GON found “unacceptable.” Hoekman said further that the GON hoped it was an isolated incident and “expected” it not to be repeated. Bouterse, according to Hoekman, simply acknowledged Hoekman’s remarks as being “quite clear.”
(Hoekman leaves for Holland on March 19 on consultations; he said he expected to return on March 26.)
In his discussion with Charge, Hoekman gave view that the Hawker execution was a blunder of serious proportions which Bouterse was turning into a more damaging event through his attempt to provide legal justification retroactively. In his opinion, it would have been wiser and more courageous (and more palatable to both domestic and international audiences) for Bouterse to have admitted the killing as a regrettable mistake done in heat of battle.
Hoekman thought that Bouterse’s actions in the next few days were certain to affect future bilateral relations between Holland and Suriname and further imprudence or possible defiance (in light of the unambiguous Dutch warning) could lead to a review of the totality of the relationship. Hoekman was not sure who had Bouterse’s ear just now—he repeated that he was convinced that Bouterse tended to act on the advice of the “last person in the door”—but he acknowledged the possibility that acting on advice from the left and following through on the theme of resisting neo-colonialism, Bouterse might cast off from Holland altogether. Hoekman admitted that Bouterse remained inscrutable to him and he had given up trying to predict the latter’s behavior.
Comment: The meeting with Hoekman took place before the radio announcement by Horb in which he read the March 11 decrees which declare a state of war and describe the workings of the so-called “military court in the field.” End comment.
Hoekman, asked what recommendations he was carrying home, said that he felt that in his view it was time that the GON did a systematic review of all aspects of Dutch aid to Suriname. He said he would first assess the mood of his minister and then probably recommend that substantive Dutch aid be employed as a lever. Hoekman would, on the other hand, intensify Dutch cooperation in the fields of information and culture. As two examples of his thinking, he said in confidence (protect) that he learned that the Suriname News Agency was financially pressed and was in arrears in its payments to the Dutch News Agency ANP. Hoekman was attempting to find a way the GON could cover the debt and beyond that, of establishing an ANP ticker in Paramaribo under embassy auspices. The objective would be to make ANP items available to the newspapers or broadcast media who wanted them.
The ambassador said also that during the recent period as local press came more and more under government control he knew that more Surinamers were turning in to broadcasts by Radio Holland (Wereld Omroep). He would recommend to increase its coverage of events in Suriname.
Hoekman expected the Dutch MOD to resist any proposal to adjust the current flow of military assistance—he pointed out that the National Army was likely to seek replacements soon for equipment damaged and ammunition expended during the coup—and anticipated the argument. They will ask, “If we don’t, then who?” He knew any decisions taken on adjustments in aid flow, economic or military, would be political; he intended, nevertheless, to introduce the human rights arguments which, complicated as they were, he felt had to be taken into account.
Details of the coup: Hoekman revealed (protect) that the single soldier implicated in the coup who Bouterse had said in his morning briefing remained at large was, in fact, Sgt. Mohabir who (#) one of several men who fled the Memre Boekoe Kaserne with Rambocus on March 12, returned to Paramaribo and went straight to the Dutch Embassy to ask assistance. Hoekman saw no need to go into details but said he facilitated Mohabir’s escape by alerting French (through The Hague), who allowed Mohabir to enter French Guiana and let him aboard a flight to France. Hoekman suggested our DATT in The Hague might want to be in touch with Dutch MOD to ask for results of debriefing.
Professor Oemrawsingh: Hoekman said Oemrawsingh had been in contact with him directly twice (he did not give dates). When he first met the professor, Hoekman was struck by his “wild” look. On the second occasion (a phone call), Hoekman cut Oemrawsingh short, saying further contact was inappropriate. Oemrawsingh had told Hoekman he had been to visit the American Embassy “among others.” Hoekman thought that Oemrawsingh might have told others of his co-conspirators, including Rambocus, that the US and Holland were sympathetic to the coup plotters’ cause and may even have implied that in a crisis, aid of one kind or another might be forthcoming from both governments. Hoekman had several reports on Oemrawsingh’s death, but they conflicted and he was not sure of the actual circumstances. Poison had certainly been found during the autopsy; Hoekman had heard that there were also slashes on Oemrawsingh’s wrists and heels and, further, that there were bullet wounds. Hoekman asked us for any corroborating information we could turn up in support of Bouterse’s allegations that plotters had tried several times to stage an assassination of the MA.
Comment: Hoekman has been consistent in his arguments to the GON for more decisive conduct of its relations with Suriname. During this trip home, with heightened attention among the Dutch public and political parties, Hoekman may, depending on his minister’s mood, find greater receptivity for his ideas about how Bouterse should be dealt with. He is, above all, a realist who understands the political context at home and has full knowledge of the risks involved in pushing Bouterse to the “brink.” Apparently firm handling is what he will prescribe. End comment.
Department please repeat as appropriate.
LA ROCHE
NOTE BY OC/T: (#) Omission. Correction to follow.
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META DATA
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2012-32744
Doc No. C06033915
Date: 02/22/2017
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 PARAMA 00529 01 OF 02 182223Z
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
046524 182228Z/60
O 182100Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8544
INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION 1 OF 2 PARAMARIBO 0529
RELEASE IN FULL
EXDIS DECAPTIONED
E.O. 12065: GDS 03/18/88 (La Roche, Richard R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINT, MOPS, NS, NL
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Hoekman
REF: PARAMARIBO 0524