Reports Bouterse has decided to reestablish democracy; continuing rumors of FonMin’s impending resignation

F-2012-32749

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-32749 Doc No. C05267159 Date: 01/03/2013
Confidential
Page 01 Parama 02030 01 of 02 011525Z
Action ARA-16
Info OCT-00 Copy-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSC-01 NSAE-00 HA-08 L-03 PM-09 PA-01 SAL-01 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /089 W
362016 011527Z /53
P 011245Z Oct 82

FM Amembassy Paramaribo
TO Secstate WashDC Priority 9052

Info Amembassy Brasilia
Amembassy Bridgetown
Amembassy Caracas
Amembassy Georgetown 04
Amembassy Kingston
Amembassy Port of Spain
Amembassy The Hague
USCINCSO Quarry Hgts PN

Released in full

Confidential Section 01 of 02 Paramaribo 2030
E.O. 12356: Decl: 09/30/88
TAGS: PINT US
Subj: Reports Bouterse has decided to reestablish democracy; continuing rumors of FonMin’s impending resignation

  1. (C) – Entire text.
  2. Summary: Embassy has learned from several sources that Commander Bouterse plans to announce, probably by mid-November, series of measures to move country toward democratic framework while retaining military supervision over government. Overtures to Brazil and Western Europe, and downgrading of opening to Cuba, could involve ouster of FonMin Naarendorp as scapegoat in policy shift. End summary.
  3. In conversation September 28 with PolOff and visiting INR analyst Davis, MFA North American and Canada Section Head Kerpens stated that Commander Bouterse plans to make statement October 1 on “new democratic order.” Kerpens proceeded to add his own views as follows: political parties could not be revived because of their divisive tendencies; military tutelage will continue “for several more years” due to people’s lack of experience with “true” democracy as distinct from former bankrupt “Westminster system”; and, new constitution would be tentative since regime has had only little over two years to reeducate people as to their new responsibilities and duties.
  4. In conversation later same day, Dyril Daal (Chairman of Moederbond Labor Confederation) predicted that Bouterse’s statement on reconstituting democracy would not take place until November 15. According to Daal, draft constitution and several other political proposals have been drawn up under direction of Andre Haakmat, adviser to both Moederbond and Roy Horb (Garrison Commander and Policy Center member).
    According to Daal, Bouterse’s statement will include following:
  • New constitution should be submitted to public referendum for approval immediately following Bouterse’s announcement, and then will be implemented by February 1983;
  • Political parties will be prohibited by law for organizing on ethnic or religious basis;
  • Elections will take place immediately following constitutional referendum. Majority party or coalition will select Prime Minister;
  • Popular participation in selecting National Assembly (yet unnamed) will be via semi-corporatist system wherein electorate will vote within three constituencies: (A) geographic/political (e.g. people’s committees, district and regional councils); (B) economic (e.g. agricultural and mining sectors); and (C) functional (e.g. trade unions, business associations, and religious organizations);
  • “Controlling role” for military will be written into constitution and military will withdraw from day-to-day policymaking function.
  1. Daal noted that new anti-trade union legislation is a possibility. He had no further information on this point, but asserted that trade unions would “shut country down” if necessary to protest such action by GOS.
  2. Near end of discussion, Daal closed office door, asked if PolOff had heard radio news; informed not, he said in conspiratorial tone that “news around town” is Policy Center has decided to request Naarendorp’s resignation probably due to his statement in Holland which criticized Dutch government’s concern over continuing lack of movement toward democracy in Suriname. Daal declined to elaborate further. Asserting several times his complete faith in Haakmat’s information, Daal said he believes Haakmat will be offered key post in new government formed after elections.
  1. With respect to Naarendorp’s rumored resignation, some observers and opponents of GOS perceive him as “architect” of GOS’ “Cuba line” and believe he could become scapegoat if Bouterse decides to back away from any earlier plans to develop special relationship with Cuba. These observers point to FonMin’s failure to accompany Bouterse on recent Brazilian visit as evidence that he is falling from grace.
  2. Comments:
    (A) Embassy has heard several essentially similar versions of info in para 4 above to effect that Bouterse is planning comprehensive public proposal on reconstituting democratic institutions, in part due to strong criticism by press and among important groups such as business associations and trade unions. As previously reported, GOS task force has apparently been working on proposals for new electoral mechanisms and political institutions similar to those described para 4. In his Holland press conference, FonMin Naarendorp also said such announcement could be expected in “very short time.” Bouterse may be hoping to have framework for new political order in place by February 25, 1983 third anniversary of military takeover.

(B) Bouterse is clearly in for long haul. While somewhat responsive to public pressure, he is determined to be final arbiter of Suriname’s economic and political development. Hence, military’s authority will certainly be legitimized and confirmed via constitution while people are offered limited democracy.

(C) Rumors of Naarendorp’s resignation have been around for several months. “Evidence” may be more wish than fact, and can be reasonably explained otherwise. For example, Brazilians treated Bouterse’s visit on military not head-of-state level, which would account for FonMin’s absence. Moreover, Naarendorp was engaged in this period on rebuilding GOS’ bridges in Western Europe. Additionally, according to newspaper text, FonMin’s “criticism” of Holland focused on weaknesses in Suriname’s inherited Western political institutions, and did not directly criticize Dutch government’s statements on Suriname’s lack of democracy.

Duemling

META DATA
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