Situation in Suriname: Interview with Moederbond Chairman Cyril Daal

F-2012-32749

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0 121900Z Feb 82 ZFF-4

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Confidential Paramaribo 0275
Corrected Copy (Para 8)
Released in full
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/12/88 (La Roche, Richard R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT PINR NS
Subject: Situation in Suriname: Interview with Moederbond Chairman Cyril Daal

  1. (C) – Entire text.
  2. Summary: In an interview February 12, labor federation leader Cyril Daal (Moederbond) gave his pessimistic assessment of political developments in Suriname. He sees Army Commander Bouterse leading the country sharply left but suspects that Bouterse himself, intellectually dim, is being guided by left advisors who may have ties to Cuba. Daal believes the plan of action set out by the military for transformation of Suriname’s governing structure will be implemented as quickly as Bouterse and his advisors can force the pace. As a counter-strategy, Daal believes non-leftist groups like the two main former parties (NPS and VHP) could combine with labor groups, perhaps under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Haakmat, to block the move left. Another means for exerting moderating influence on army leaders, according to Daal, lies in possible naming of Haakmat as Prime Minister. End summary.
  3. Cyril Daal, chairman of the labor federation De Moederbond, spoke with Emboffs in his office February 12 and gave a deeply pessimistic assessment of current political events in Suriname. He handed over a copy of a paper entitled, “List of Decisions Taken by the Military Leadership February 6, 1982,” which describes goals and methods to be employed in the transformation of the GOS over the next several months (see Septel for text and comment). Daal finds the plan very disturbing and believes it will lead to a Suriname held tightly in the grip of a military with a government comprised of civilian puppets and no means available for free political expression by Suriname’s citizens. “Our freedom is in danger,” said Daal somberly.
  4. Daal, who knows most of the men who have acted at one time or another as advisors to Horb and Bouterse, is unable to pinpoint to his satisfaction the persons who formulated the plan of action described in the paper (which he is satisfied is authentic) but he has vague suspicions that there is some Cuban link. He knew, he said, that among those persons close to Bouterse now was former VHP member Surhindra Mungra, whom Daal felt was Cuban sympathizer and whom he knew spoke Spanish.
  5. Bouterse, according to Daal, simply doesn’t have the intellectual capacity to devise the plan outlined in the paper. He does not think Garrison Commander Roy Horb is entirely sympathetic to the principles described in the plan and writes off both Battalion Commander Henk Fernandes and National Military Council Chairman Graanoogst as lightweights with no political understanding. He concludes that Bouterse may be following advice which he is incapable of critically understanding but which he thinks will advance his own political fortunes. Daal reads Bouterse as ambitious, impulsive, suspicious, and therefore, dangerous.
  6. Adding to Daal’s suspicions about the intelligence behind the plan is the speed with which it seems to have been prepared and set into action. It is dated only two days after the Chin A Sen government “resigned.” The first deadline (when draft reports are to be consolidated) is less than two weeks away.
  7. Daal, while pessimistic about the possibilities for blocking the military’s strategy, already has considered two options: If former Foreign Minister Andre Haakmat were chosen by the military as Prime Minister, depending upon the nature of that office in the new structure, Haakmat himself, Daal felt, was sufficiently skilled politically and committed philosophically to democracy, to serve as a counter to any extreme left moves by the military.
  8. Daal has also thought of ways by which his labor federation might combine with others and with the two former major parties, Nationalist Party of Suriname (NPS) and the United Hindustani Party (VHP), with whom he has already had preliminary contact. In some way, as yet undecided, these groups might form a coalition, perhaps under the leadership of Haakmat whom Daal says is acceptable to both the NPS and VHP to counter the anti-democratic course along which the military is leading the country. Daal said there were also members of the military officer corps who might lend support to his coalition. This was important in his opinion, because he felt the Surinamese military would therefore be reluctant to suppress demonstrations of disapproval of government policies.
  9. Comment: Embassy considers Daal a moderate with sturdy democratic principles. In our experience, he is not given to alarmist statements. Based on the information we have gathered up to now, we find Daal’s assessment of what is happening here not exaggerated. There is no evidence available to use, however, of a direct Cuban influence on Bouterse. What single or collective intelligence is behind the plan described in the paper given us by Daal is also unknown. Embassy analysis of effect of these developments will follow after scheduled talk with Bouterse next week.

LaRoche
Note by OC/T: EUR please take as original

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