Pros and Cons of Bouterse

Heads of State

This document is part of this file: https://surinamepress.com/bb2/talking-points-on-suriname-for-ddci-and-ddi/

Desire Bouterse’s six-year record as Suriname’s leader makes him a known quantity with several positive traits from the standpoint of US interests.

  • Until the insurgency in July, the Surinamese strongman had presided over a relatively stable political situation as he consolidated his power in the past two years.
  • Internationally, the regime maintains a nonaligned foreign policy and favors all “progressive” Third World causes, but Bouterse’s principal foreign objective has been to secure foreign economic and military aid.
  • The steady deterioration in the economy since the Dutch canceled aid in 1982 has prompted him in recent years to try to improve relations with the US, the Netherlands, and several Latin American countries.
  • Meanwhile, relations between Havana and Paramaribo remain cool since Bouterse, fearing a Grenada-type US invasion, in October 1983 ordered that the Cubans reduce their official presence in Suriname; Havana responded by closing its Embassy and probably would want guarantees that Bouterse was becoming more leftist and that it would not be kicked out again before ever considering any warming of relations with the regime.
  • Although the Bouterse government has publicly charged that the French and Dutch governments are lending support to Surinamese rebels and exile leaders, the regime has avoided direct official and media attacks against the United States. [CENSORED]

These tentative pluses are outweighed by the darker side of Bouterse’s erratic personality and brutal leadership, which clearly show his willingness to use any means—including murder—to stay in power.

  • Under stress, Bouterse’s extreme suspiciousness mounts, and he is apt to give vent to brutal violence; this is best illustrated by the events of December 1982, in which he ordered the execution of 15 leading political opponents and—according to newspaper accounts—personally shot his most vocal opponent.
  • At the same time, US officials describe Bouterse as shy, insecure, and very much wanting popular support while being out of touch with the people.

The reaction to the invasion among key Latin American players would unlikely go much beyond verbal support or condemnation.

[CENSORED]

  • Although Havana would express public outrage, Castro—who considers Bouterse a cowardly opportunist—probably would privately not be disappointed over the Surinamese leader’s ouster.
  • The Nicaraguans, perceiving any Dutch invasion as serving US interests, would be quick to condemn the attack regardless of outcome. [CENSORED]

The Dutch probably would install a transitional civilian government and assign it the task of drafting a constitution and preparing for elections. This government would most likely be made up of more moderate current cabinet members or draw upon a broader base that includes members of traditional political parties and such special interest groups as labor, rebel, and exile representatives.

  • Small numbers of leftists, who lack popular support, would not play a significant role under a democratic system.
  • The Bouterse regime lacks legitimacy; its narrow base of support has been limited to the military and a smattering of radical leftists.
  • Although Bouterse is not an ideologue, he has been openly sympathetic to radical leftist regimes; his embryonic radical political party—the 25 February Movement—apparently is based on the Cuban model.
  • Bouterse’s tentative steps toward democratization are tactical, and formidable barriers remain to a return to democracy as long as Bouterse holds power; before relinquishing power, Bouterse reportedly wants assurances that a civilian government would not repeal the amnesty granted to the military for its involvement in the 1982 murders—a guarantee that would be unlikely to be forthcoming.
  • Although Bouterse remains suspicious of Tripoli’s intentions, he has permitted a gradual warming of relations with Libya in order to obtain the economic and military aid needed to bolster his regime.

Credible evidence of high-level official involvement in corruption, including drug trafficking, has further tarnished the regime’s image. The probability that Bouterse is directly involved could weaken his critical support in the military. [CENSORED]

Source:

CIA-RDP91B00874R000200250004-0

Link:

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00874R000200250004-0.pdf

Internal Link:

https://surinamepress.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Talking-Points-on-Suriname-for-DDCI-and-DDI-1986-CIA-RDP91B00874R000200250004-0.pdf

Date:
December 19, 1986
Categories:
Desi Bouterse, Planned Suriname Invasion
Tags:
CIA, DDCI, DDI, Invasion
Boxes:
CIA-RDP91B00874R
Years:
1986
Persons:
Desi Bouterse
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